openconnect_LDADD = libopenconnect.la $(SSL_LIBS) $(DTLS_SSL_LIBS) $(LIBXML2_LIBS) $(LIBPROXY_LIBS) $(ZLIB_LIBS) $(LIBINTL)
library_srcs = ssl.c http.c auth.c library.c compat.c
-lib_srcs_gnutls = gnutls.c gnutls_pkcs12.c
+lib_srcs_gnutls = gnutls.c gnutls_pkcs12.c gnutls_tpm.c
lib_srcs_openssl = openssl.c
if OPENCONNECT_GNUTLS
library_srcs += $(lib_srcs_gnutls)
return 0;
}
-/* In GnuTLS 2.12 this can't be a real private key; we have to use the sign_callback
- instead. But we want to set the 'pkey' variable to *something* non-NULL in order
- to indicate that we aren't just using an x509 key. */
-#define OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY ((void *)1UL)
-
-#ifdef HAVE_TROUSERS
-/* TPM code based on client-tpm.c from Carolin Latze <latze@angry-red-pla.net>
- and Tobias Soder */
-static int tpm_sign_fn(gnutls_privkey_t key, void *_vpninfo,
- const gnutls_datum_t *data, gnutls_datum_t *sig)
-{
- struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = _vpninfo;
- TSS_HHASH hash;
- int err;
-
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
- _("TPM sign function called for %d bytes.\n"),
- data->size);
-
- err = Tspi_Context_CreateObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, TSS_OBJECT_TYPE_HASH,
- TSS_HASH_OTHER, &hash);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to create TPM hash object: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- return GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
- }
- err = Tspi_Hash_SetHashValue(hash, data->size, data->data);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to set value in TPM hash object: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, hash);
- return GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
- }
- err = Tspi_Hash_Sign(hash, vpninfo->tpm_key, &sig->size, &sig->data);
- Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, hash);
- if (err) {
- if (vpninfo->tpm_key_policy || err != TPM_E_AUTHFAIL)
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("TPM hash signature failed: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- if (err == TPM_E_AUTHFAIL)
- return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
- else
- return GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-static int sign_dummy_data(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_privkey_t pkey,
- const gnutls_datum_t *data, gnutls_datum_t *sig);
-
-static int load_tpm_key(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_datum_t *fdata, gnutls_privkey_t *pkey,
- gnutls_datum_t *pkey_sig)
-{
- static const TSS_UUID SRK_UUID = TSS_UUID_SRK;
- gnutls_datum_t asn1;
- unsigned int tss_len;
- char *pass;
- int ofs, err;
-
- err = gnutls_pem_base64_decode_alloc("TSS KEY BLOB", fdata, &asn1);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Error decoding TSS key blob: %s\n"),
- gnutls_strerror(err));
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- /* Ick. We have to parse the ASN1 OCTET_STRING for ourselves. */
- if (asn1.size < 2 || asn1.data[0] != 0x04 /* OCTET_STRING */) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Error in TSS key blob\n"));
- goto out_blob;
- }
-
- tss_len = asn1.data[1];
- ofs = 2;
- if (tss_len & 0x80) {
- int lenlen = tss_len & 0x7f;
-
- if (asn1.size < 2 + lenlen || lenlen > 3) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Error in TSS key blob\n"));
- goto out_blob;
- }
-
- tss_len = 0;
- while (lenlen) {
- tss_len <<= 8;
- tss_len |= asn1.data[ofs++];
- lenlen--;
- }
- }
- if (tss_len + ofs != asn1.size) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Error in TSS key blob\n"));
- goto out_blob;
- }
-
- err = Tspi_Context_Create(&vpninfo->tpm_context);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to create TPM context: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_blob;
- }
- err = Tspi_Context_Connect(vpninfo->tpm_context, NULL);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to connect TPM context: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_context;
- }
- err = Tspi_Context_LoadKeyByUUID(vpninfo->tpm_context, TSS_PS_TYPE_SYSTEM,
- SRK_UUID, &vpninfo->srk);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to load TPM SRK key: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_context;
- }
- err = Tspi_GetPolicyObject(vpninfo->srk, TSS_POLICY_USAGE, &vpninfo->srk_policy);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to load TPM SRK policy object: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_srk;
- }
-
- pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
- vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
- while (1) {
- static const char nullpass[20];
-
- /* We don't seem to get the error here... */
- if (pass)
- err = Tspi_Policy_SetSecret(vpninfo->srk_policy, TSS_SECRET_MODE_PLAIN,
- strlen(pass), (BYTE *)pass);
- else /* Well-known NULL key */
- err = Tspi_Policy_SetSecret(vpninfo->srk_policy, TSS_SECRET_MODE_SHA1,
- sizeof(nullpass), (BYTE *)nullpass);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to set TPM PIN: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_srkpol;
- }
-
- free(pass);
-
- /* ... we get it here instead. */
- err = Tspi_Context_LoadKeyByBlob(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->srk,
- tss_len, asn1.data + ofs, &vpninfo->tpm_key);
- if (!err)
- break;
-
- if (pass)
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to load TPM key blob: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
-
- if (err != TPM_E_AUTHFAIL)
- goto out_srkpol;
-
- err = request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_tpm_srk",
- &pass, _("Enter TPM SRK PIN:"));
- if (err)
- goto out_srkpol;
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
- gnutls_privkey_init(pkey);
- /* This would be nicer if there was a destructor callback. I could
- allocate a data structure with the TPM handles and the vpninfo
- pointer, and destroy that properly when the key is destroyed. */
- gnutls_privkey_import_ext(*pkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, vpninfo, tpm_sign_fn, NULL, 0);
-#else
- *pkey = OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY;
-#endif
-
- retry_sign:
- err = sign_dummy_data(vpninfo, *pkey, fdata, pkey_sig);
- if (err == GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS) {
- if (!vpninfo->tpm_key_policy) {
- err = Tspi_Context_CreateObject(vpninfo->tpm_context,
- TSS_OBJECT_TYPE_POLICY,
- TSS_POLICY_USAGE,
- &vpninfo->tpm_key_policy);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to create key policy object: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_key;
- }
- err = Tspi_Policy_AssignToObject(vpninfo->tpm_key_policy,
- vpninfo->tpm_key);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to assign policy to key: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_key_policy;
- }
- }
- err = request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_tpm_key",
- &pass, _("Enter TPM key PIN:"));
- if (err)
- goto out_key_policy;
-
- err = Tspi_Policy_SetSecret(vpninfo->tpm_key_policy,
- TSS_SECRET_MODE_PLAIN,
- strlen(pass), (void *)pass);
- free (pass);
-
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to set key PIN: %s\n"),
- Trspi_Error_String(err));
- goto out_key_policy;
- }
- goto retry_sign;
- }
-
- free (asn1.data);
- return 0;
- out_key_policy:
- Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->tpm_key_policy);
- vpninfo->tpm_key_policy = 0;
- out_key:
- Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->tpm_key);
- vpninfo->tpm_key = 0;
- out_srkpol:
- Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->srk_policy);
- vpninfo->srk_policy = 0;
- out_srk:
- Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->srk);
- vpninfo->srk = 0;
- out_context:
- Tspi_Context_Close(vpninfo->tpm_context);
- vpninfo->tpm_context = 0;
- out_blob:
- free (asn1.data);
- return -EIO;
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
-/* We *want* to use gnutls_privkey_import_ext() to create a privkey with our
- own signing function tpm_sign_fn(). But GnuTLS 2.12 doesn't support that,
- so instead we have to register this sign_callback function with the
- *session* */
-static int gtls_tpm_sign_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, void *_vpninfo,
- gnutls_certificate_type_t cert_type,
- const gnutls_datum_t *cert, const gnutls_datum_t *data,
- gnutls_datum_t *sig)
-{
- struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = _vpninfo;
-
- if (cert_type != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
- return GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
-
- return tpm_sign_fn(NULL, vpninfo, data, sig);
-}
-#endif /* !SET_KEY */
-#endif /* HAVE_TROUSERS */
-
-#if defined (HAVE_P11KIT) || defined (HAVE_TROUSERS)
-/* We do a test signing of data, to check which certificate matches our key.
- This helper does that with with gnutls_privkey_sign_data() in the sane
- cases, or in the case of GnuTLS 2.12 with TPM it will generate the
- appropriate BER-encoded hash and call our special TPM-signing function. */
-static int sign_dummy_data(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_privkey_t pkey,
- const gnutls_datum_t *data, gnutls_datum_t *sig)
-{
-#if defined (HAVE_TROUSERS) && !defined (GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
- /* Actually the thing we care about is gnutls_privkey_import_ext()
- not gnutls_certificate_set_key() — if we could create a privkey
- to represent the TPM key, we wouldn't have to jump through these
- hoops to reproduce what gnutls_privkey_sign_data() would have
- done for us. But there's no point in a separate check for the
- import_ext() function; it arrived with set_key() in GnuTLS 3.0 */
-
- if (pkey == OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY) {
- static const unsigned char ber_encode[15] = {
- 0x30, 0x21, /* SEQUENCE, length 31 */
- 0x30, 0x09, /* SEQUENCE, length 9 */
- 0x06, 0x05, /* OBJECT_ID, length 5 */
- 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* SHA1: 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL (parameters) */
- 0x04, 0x14, /* OCTET_STRING, length 20 */
- /* followed by the 20-byte sha1 */
- };
- gnutls_datum_t hash;
- unsigned char digest[sizeof(ber_encode) + SHA1_SIZE];
- size_t shalen = SHA1_SIZE;
- int err;
-
- err = gnutls_fingerprint(GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, data,
- &digest[sizeof(ber_encode)], &shalen);
- if (err) {
- vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
- _("Failed to SHA1 input data for signing: %s\n"),
- gnutls_strerror(err));
- return err;
- }
-
- memcpy(digest, ber_encode, sizeof(ber_encode));
-
- hash.data = digest;
- hash.size = sizeof(digest);
-
- return tpm_sign_fn(NULL, vpninfo, &hash, sig);
- }
-#endif
- return gnutls_privkey_sign_data(pkey, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, 0, data, sig);
-}
-
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+#if !defined (HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY) && \
+ (defined (HAVE_P11KIT) || defined (HAVE_TROUSERS))
/* For GnuTLS 2.12 even if we *have* a privkey (as we do for PKCS#11), we
can't register it. So we have to use the cert_callback function. This
just hands out the certificate chain we prepared in load_certificate().
handle that. */
static int gtls_cert_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, const gnutls_datum_t *req_ca_dn,
int nreqs, const gnutls_pk_algorithm_t *pk_algos,
- int pk_algos_length, gnutls_retr2_st* st) {
+ int pk_algos_length, gnutls_retr2_st *st) {
struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = gnutls_session_get_ptr(sess);
int algo = GNUTLS_PK_RSA; /* TPM */
return 0;
}
-#endif /* !SET_KEY */
-#endif /* P11KIT || TROUSERS */
+#endif /* !SET_KEY && (P11KIT || TROUSERS) */
static int load_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
{
gnutls_session_set_ptr (vpninfo->https_sess, (void *) vpninfo);
#if defined(HAVE_TROUSERS) && !defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
if (vpninfo->my_pkey == OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY)
- gnutls_sign_callback_set(vpninfo->https_sess, gtls_tpm_sign_cb, vpninfo);
+ gnutls_sign_callback_set(vpninfo->https_sess, gtls2_tpm_sign_cb, vpninfo);
#endif
err = gnutls_priority_set_direct (vpninfo->https_sess, "NONE:+VERS-TLS1.0:+SHA1:+AES-128-CBC:+RSA:+COMP-NULL:%COMPAT:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION", NULL);
if (err) {
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <gnutls/pkcs12.h>
+#include <gnutls/abstract.h>
+
+#include "openconnect-internal.h"
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS12_SIMPLE_PARSE
/* If we're using a version of GnuTLS from before this was
#endif /* !HAVE_GNUTLS_PKCS12_SIMPLE_PARSE */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+int gtls2_tpm_sign_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, void *_vpninfo,
+ gnutls_certificate_type_t cert_type,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *cert, const gnutls_datum_t *data,
+ gnutls_datum_t *sig);
+int gtls2_tpm_sign_dummy_data(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *data,
+ gnutls_datum_t *sig);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY */
+
+/* In GnuTLS 2.12 this can't be a real private key; we have to use the sign_callback
+ instead. But we want to set the 'pkey' variable to *something* non-NULL in order
+ to indicate that we aren't just using an x509 key. */
+#define OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY ((void *)1UL)
+
+static inline int sign_dummy_data(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
+ gnutls_privkey_t pkey,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *data,
+ gnutls_datum_t *sig)
+{
+#if defined (HAVE_TROUSERS) && !defined(HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY)
+ if (pkey == OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY)
+ return gtls2_tpm_sign_dummy_data(vpninfo, data, sig);
+#endif
+ return gnutls_privkey_sign_data(pkey, GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, 0, data, sig);
+}
+
+int load_tpm_key(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_datum_t *fdata,
+ gnutls_privkey_t *pkey, gnutls_datum_t *pkey_sig);
+
#endif /* __OPENCONNECT_GNUTLS_H__ */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * OpenConnect (SSL + DTLS) VPN client
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2008-2012 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Author: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * version 2.1, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, write to:
+ *
+ * Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
+ * Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
+ */
+
+/*
+ * TPM code based on client-tpm.c from
+ * Carolin Latze <latze@angry-red-pla.net> and Tobias Soder
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
+#include "openconnect-internal.h"
+
+#include "gnutls.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TROUSERS
+
+/* Signing function for TPM privkeys, set with gnutls_privkey_import_ext() */
+static int tpm_sign_fn(gnutls_privkey_t key, void *_vpninfo,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *data, gnutls_datum_t *sig);
+
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+/* We *want* to use gnutls_privkey_import_ext() to create a privkey with our
+ own signing function tpm_sign_fn(). But GnuTLS 2.12 doesn't support that,
+ so instead we have to register this sign_callback function with the
+ *session* */
+int gtls2_tpm_sign_cb(gnutls_session_t sess, void *_vpninfo,
+ gnutls_certificate_type_t cert_type,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *cert, const gnutls_datum_t *data,
+ gnutls_datum_t *sig)
+{
+ struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = _vpninfo;
+
+ if (cert_type != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
+ return GNUTLS_E_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+
+ return tpm_sign_fn(NULL, vpninfo, data, sig);
+}
+
+/* In GnuTLS 2.12 since we don't have a normal privkey and hence can't just
+ use gnutls_privkey_sign_data() with it, we have to jump through hoops to
+ prepare the hash in exactly the right way and call our internal TPM
+ signing function. */
+int gtls2_tpm_sign_dummy_data(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *data,
+ gnutls_datum_t *sig)
+{
+ static const unsigned char ber_encode[15] = {
+ 0x30, 0x21, /* SEQUENCE, length 31 */
+ 0x30, 0x09, /* SEQUENCE, length 9 */
+ 0x06, 0x05, /* OBJECT_ID, length 5 */
+ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* SHA1 OID: 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
+ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL (parameters) */
+ 0x04, 0x14, /* OCTET_STRING, length 20 */
+ /* followed by the 20-byte sha1 */
+ };
+ gnutls_datum_t hash;
+ unsigned char digest[sizeof(ber_encode) + SHA1_SIZE];
+ size_t shalen = SHA1_SIZE;
+ int err;
+
+ err = gnutls_fingerprint(GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1, data,
+ &digest[sizeof(ber_encode)], &shalen);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to SHA1 input data for signing: %s\n"),
+ gnutls_strerror(err));
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(digest, ber_encode, sizeof(ber_encode));
+
+ hash.data = digest;
+ hash.size = sizeof(digest);
+
+ return tpm_sign_fn(NULL, vpninfo, &hash, sig);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY */
+
+static int tpm_sign_fn(gnutls_privkey_t key, void *_vpninfo,
+ const gnutls_datum_t *data, gnutls_datum_t *sig)
+{
+ struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = _vpninfo;
+ TSS_HHASH hash;
+ int err;
+
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
+ _("TPM sign function called for %d bytes.\n"),
+ data->size);
+
+ err = Tspi_Context_CreateObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, TSS_OBJECT_TYPE_HASH,
+ TSS_HASH_OTHER, &hash);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to create TPM hash object: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ return GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
+ }
+ err = Tspi_Hash_SetHashValue(hash, data->size, data->data);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to set value in TPM hash object: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, hash);
+ return GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
+ }
+ err = Tspi_Hash_Sign(hash, vpninfo->tpm_key, &sig->size, &sig->data);
+ Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, hash);
+ if (err) {
+ if (vpninfo->tpm_key_policy || err != TPM_E_AUTHFAIL)
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("TPM hash signature failed: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ if (err == TPM_E_AUTHFAIL)
+ return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
+ else
+ return GNUTLS_E_PK_SIGN_FAILED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int load_tpm_key(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, gnutls_datum_t *fdata,
+ gnutls_privkey_t *pkey, gnutls_datum_t *pkey_sig)
+{
+ static const TSS_UUID SRK_UUID = TSS_UUID_SRK;
+ gnutls_datum_t asn1;
+ unsigned int tss_len;
+ char *pass;
+ int ofs, err;
+
+ err = gnutls_pem_base64_decode_alloc("TSS KEY BLOB", fdata, &asn1);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Error decoding TSS key blob: %s\n"),
+ gnutls_strerror(err));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ /* Ick. We have to parse the ASN1 OCTET_STRING for ourselves. */
+ if (asn1.size < 2 || asn1.data[0] != 0x04 /* OCTET_STRING */) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Error in TSS key blob\n"));
+ goto out_blob;
+ }
+
+ tss_len = asn1.data[1];
+ ofs = 2;
+ if (tss_len & 0x80) {
+ int lenlen = tss_len & 0x7f;
+
+ if (asn1.size < 2 + lenlen || lenlen > 3) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Error in TSS key blob\n"));
+ goto out_blob;
+ }
+
+ tss_len = 0;
+ while (lenlen) {
+ tss_len <<= 8;
+ tss_len |= asn1.data[ofs++];
+ lenlen--;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tss_len + ofs != asn1.size) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Error in TSS key blob\n"));
+ goto out_blob;
+ }
+
+ err = Tspi_Context_Create(&vpninfo->tpm_context);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to create TPM context: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_blob;
+ }
+ err = Tspi_Context_Connect(vpninfo->tpm_context, NULL);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to connect TPM context: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_context;
+ }
+ err = Tspi_Context_LoadKeyByUUID(vpninfo->tpm_context, TSS_PS_TYPE_SYSTEM,
+ SRK_UUID, &vpninfo->srk);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to load TPM SRK key: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_context;
+ }
+ err = Tspi_GetPolicyObject(vpninfo->srk, TSS_POLICY_USAGE, &vpninfo->srk_policy);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to load TPM SRK policy object: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_srk;
+ }
+
+ pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
+ vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
+ while (1) {
+ static const char nullpass[20];
+
+ /* We don't seem to get the error here... */
+ if (pass)
+ err = Tspi_Policy_SetSecret(vpninfo->srk_policy,
+ TSS_SECRET_MODE_PLAIN,
+ strlen(pass), (BYTE *)pass);
+ else /* Well-known NULL key */
+ err = Tspi_Policy_SetSecret(vpninfo->srk_policy,
+ TSS_SECRET_MODE_SHA1,
+ sizeof(nullpass), (BYTE *)nullpass);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to set TPM PIN: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_srkpol;
+ }
+
+ free(pass);
+
+ /* ... we get it here instead. */
+ err = Tspi_Context_LoadKeyByBlob(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->srk,
+ tss_len, asn1.data + ofs,
+ &vpninfo->tpm_key);
+ if (!err)
+ break;
+
+ if (pass)
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to load TPM key blob: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+
+ if (err != TPM_E_AUTHFAIL)
+ goto out_srkpol;
+
+ err = request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_tpm_srk",
+ &pass, _("Enter TPM SRK PIN:"));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_srkpol;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERTIFICATE_SET_KEY
+ gnutls_privkey_init(pkey);
+ /* This would be nicer if there was a destructor callback. I could
+ allocate a data structure with the TPM handles and the vpninfo
+ pointer, and destroy that properly when the key is destroyed. */
+ gnutls_privkey_import_ext(*pkey, GNUTLS_PK_RSA, vpninfo, tpm_sign_fn, NULL, 0);
+#else
+ *pkey = OPENCONNECT_TPM_PKEY;
+#endif
+
+ retry_sign:
+ err = sign_dummy_data(vpninfo, *pkey, fdata, pkey_sig);
+ if (err == GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS) {
+ if (!vpninfo->tpm_key_policy) {
+ err = Tspi_Context_CreateObject(vpninfo->tpm_context,
+ TSS_OBJECT_TYPE_POLICY,
+ TSS_POLICY_USAGE,
+ &vpninfo->tpm_key_policy);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to create key policy object: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_key;
+ }
+ err = Tspi_Policy_AssignToObject(vpninfo->tpm_key_policy,
+ vpninfo->tpm_key);
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to assign policy to key: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_key_policy;
+ }
+ }
+ err = request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_tpm_key",
+ &pass, _("Enter TPM key PIN:"));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_key_policy;
+
+ err = Tspi_Policy_SetSecret(vpninfo->tpm_key_policy,
+ TSS_SECRET_MODE_PLAIN,
+ strlen(pass), (void *)pass);
+ free (pass);
+
+ if (err) {
+ vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
+ _("Failed to set key PIN: %s\n"),
+ Trspi_Error_String(err));
+ goto out_key_policy;
+ }
+ goto retry_sign;
+ }
+
+ free (asn1.data);
+ return 0;
+ out_key_policy:
+ Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->tpm_key_policy);
+ vpninfo->tpm_key_policy = 0;
+ out_key:
+ Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->tpm_key);
+ vpninfo->tpm_key = 0;
+ out_srkpol:
+ Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->srk_policy);
+ vpninfo->srk_policy = 0;
+ out_srk:
+ Tspi_Context_CloseObject(vpninfo->tpm_context, vpninfo->srk);
+ vpninfo->srk = 0;
+ out_context:
+ Tspi_Context_Close(vpninfo->tpm_context);
+ vpninfo->tpm_context = 0;
+ out_blob:
+ free (asn1.data);
+ return -EIO;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_TROUSERS */
projects / platform / upstream / openconnect.git / commitdiff