--- /dev/null
+Git v2.17.4 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release is to address the security issue: CVE-2020-5260
+
+Fixes since v2.17.3
+-------------------
+
+ * With a crafted URL that contains a newline in it, the credential
+ helper machinery can be fooled to give credential information for
+ a wrong host. The attack has been made impossible by forbidding
+ a newline character in any value passed via the credential
+ protocol.
+
+Credit for finding the vulnerability goes to Felix Wilhelm of Google
+Project Zero.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.18.3 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.17.4; see
+the release notes for that version for details.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.19.4 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.17.4; see
+the release notes for that version for details.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.20.3 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.17.4; see
+the release notes for that version for details.
--- /dev/null
+Git v2.21.2 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.17.4; see
+the release notes for that version for details.
#!/bin/sh
GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE
-DEF_VER=v2.21.1
+DEF_VER=v2.21.2
LF='
'
-Documentation/RelNotes/2.21.1.txt
\ No newline at end of file
+Documentation/RelNotes/2.21.2.txt
\ No newline at end of file
{
if (!value)
return;
+ if (strchr(value, '\n'))
+ die("credential value for %s contains newline", key);
fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value);
}
c->approved = 0;
}
-void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
+static int check_url_component(const char *url, int quiet,
+ const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+ if (!value)
+ return 0;
+ if (!strchr(value, '\n'))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!quiet)
+ warning(_("url contains a newline in its %s component: %s"),
+ name, url);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int credential_from_url_gently(struct credential *c, const char *url,
+ int quiet)
{
const char *at, *colon, *cp, *slash, *host, *proto_end;
*/
proto_end = strstr(url, "://");
if (!proto_end)
- return;
+ return 0;
cp = proto_end + 3;
at = strchr(cp, '@');
colon = strchr(cp, ':');
while (p > c->path && *p == '/')
*p-- = '\0';
}
+
+ if (check_url_component(url, quiet, "username", c->username) < 0 ||
+ check_url_component(url, quiet, "password", c->password) < 0 ||
+ check_url_component(url, quiet, "protocol", c->protocol) < 0 ||
+ check_url_component(url, quiet, "host", c->host) < 0 ||
+ check_url_component(url, quiet, "path", c->path) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
+{
+ if (credential_from_url_gently(c, url, 0) < 0) {
+ warning(_("skipping credential lookup for url: %s"), url);
+ credential_clear(c);
+ }
}
int credential_read(struct credential *, FILE *);
void credential_write(const struct credential *, FILE *);
+
+/*
+ * Parse a url into a credential struct, replacing any existing contents.
+ *
+ * Ifthe url can't be parsed (e.g., a missing "proto://" component), the
+ * resulting credential will be empty but we'll still return success from the
+ * "gently" form.
+ *
+ * If we encounter a component which cannot be represented as a credential
+ * value (e.g., because it contains a newline), the "gently" form will return
+ * an error but leave the broken state in the credential object for further
+ * examination. The non-gentle form will issue a warning to stderr and return
+ * an empty credential.
+ */
void credential_from_url(struct credential *, const char *url);
+int credential_from_url_gently(struct credential *, const char *url, int quiet);
+
int credential_match(const struct credential *have,
const struct credential *want);
#include "packfile.h"
#include "submodule-config.h"
#include "config.h"
+#include "credential.h"
#include "help.h"
static struct oidset gitmodules_found = OIDSET_INIT;
return fsck_tag_buffer(tag, data, size, options);
}
+static int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
+{
+ struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
+ return -1;
+
+ ret = credential_from_url_gently(&c, url, 1);
+ credential_clear(&c);
+ return ret;
+}
+
struct fsck_gitmodules_data {
struct object *obj;
struct fsck_options *options;
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
if (!strcmp(key, "url") && value &&
- looks_like_command_line_option(value))
+ check_submodule_url(value) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_URL,
"disallowed submodule url: %s",
false
fi &&
test_cmp expect-stdout stdout &&
- test_cmp expect-stderr stderr
+ test_i18ncmp expect-stderr stderr
}
read_chunk() {
EOF
'
+test_expect_success 'url parser ignores embedded newlines' '
+ check fill <<-EOF
+ url=https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
+ --
+ username=askpass-username
+ password=askpass-password
+ --
+ warning: url contains a newline in its host component: https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
+ warning: skipping credential lookup for url: https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
+ askpass: Username:
+ askpass: Password:
+ EOF
+'
+
test_done
#!/bin/sh
-test_description='check handling of .gitmodule url with dash'
+test_description='check handling of disallowed .gitmodule urls'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'create submodule with protected dash in url' '
test_i18ngrep ! "unknown option" err
'
+test_expect_success 'fsck rejects embedded newline in url' '
+ # create an orphan branch to avoid existing .gitmodules objects
+ git checkout --orphan newline &&
+ cat >.gitmodules <<-\EOF &&
+ [submodule "foo"]
+ url = "https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/foo.git"
+ EOF
+ git add .gitmodules &&
+ git commit -m "gitmodules with newline" &&
+ test_when_finished "rm -rf dst" &&
+ git init --bare dst &&
+ git -C dst config transfer.fsckObjects true &&
+ test_must_fail git push dst HEAD 2>err &&
+ grep gitmodulesUrl err
+'
+
test_done
projects / platform / upstream / git.git / commitdiff