1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
113 #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/mem.h>
117 #include <openssl/obj.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #include "ssl_locl.h"
121 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
122 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
123 SSL_SESSION **psess);
124 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
125 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_export_keying_material,
141 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
142 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
146 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
149 tls1_setup_key_block,
150 tls1_generate_master_secret,
151 tls1_change_cipher_state,
152 tls1_final_finish_mac,
153 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
154 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
188 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
194 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
195 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
199 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
201 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 s->version = s->method->version;
214 static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2)
216 uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t*)p1);
217 uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t*)p2);
232 /* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be more
233 * than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. This
234 * function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
236 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs)
238 CBS extensions = *cbs;
239 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
240 uint16_t *extension_types = NULL;
243 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
244 while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0)
249 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
250 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
258 if (num_extensions == 0)
263 extension_types = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
264 if (extension_types == NULL)
266 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
270 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
272 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++)
276 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
277 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
279 /* This should not happen. */
283 assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
285 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
286 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
287 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++)
289 if (extension_types[i-1] == extension_types[i])
298 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
302 char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx)
304 CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions;
306 CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
308 /* Skip client version. */
309 if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2))
312 /* Skip client nonce. */
313 if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32))
316 /* Extract session_id. */
317 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id))
319 ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
320 ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
322 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
323 if (ctx->ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ctx->ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
327 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie))
331 /* Extract cipher_suites. */
332 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
333 CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 ||
334 (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0)
336 ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
337 ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
339 /* Extract compression_methods. */
340 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
341 CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1)
343 ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
344 ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
346 /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
347 * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */
348 if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0)
350 ctx->extensions = NULL;
351 ctx->extensions_len = 0;
355 /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
356 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
357 !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
358 CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0)
360 ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
361 ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
367 SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
368 uint16_t extension_type,
369 const unsigned char **out_data,
374 CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
376 while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
381 /* Decode the next extension. */
382 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
383 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
386 if (type == extension_type)
388 *out_data = CBS_data(&extension);
389 *out_len = CBS_len(&extension);
397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
399 static int nid_list[] =
401 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
402 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
403 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
404 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
405 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
406 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
407 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
408 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
409 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
410 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
411 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
412 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
413 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
414 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
415 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
416 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
417 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
418 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
419 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
420 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
421 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
422 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
423 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
424 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
425 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
426 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
427 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
428 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
431 static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] =
433 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
436 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] =
438 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
439 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
440 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
443 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] =
449 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id)
451 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
452 if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))
454 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
457 uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
460 for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
462 /* nid_list[i] stores the NID corresponding to curve ID i+1. */
463 if (nid == nid_list[i])
466 /* Use 0 for non-existent curve ID. Note: this assumes that curve ID 0
467 * will never be allocated. */
471 /* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the list
472 * of allowed curve IDs. If |get_client_curves| is non-zero, return the client
473 * curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */
474 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_client_curves,
475 const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len)
477 if (get_client_curves)
479 *out_curve_ids = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
480 *out_curve_ids_len = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
483 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
484 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
486 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
487 *out_curve_ids = suiteb_curves;
488 *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(suiteb_curves) / sizeof(suiteb_curves[0]);
491 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
492 *out_curve_ids = suiteb_curves;
493 *out_curve_ids_len = 1;
496 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
497 *out_curve_ids = suiteb_curves + 1;
498 *out_curve_ids_len = 1;
501 *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
502 *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
506 *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default;
507 *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]);
511 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id)
515 const uint16_t *curves;
516 size_t curves_len, i;
518 /* Only support named curves. */
519 if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) ||
520 curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
521 !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id))
524 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
527 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
528 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
530 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
533 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
535 if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
538 else /* Should never happen */
541 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
542 for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
544 if (curve_id == curves[i])
546 *out_curve_id = curve_id;
553 int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s)
555 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
556 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
558 /* Can't do anything on client side */
564 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
565 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
568 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
569 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
570 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
571 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
572 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
573 /* Should never happen */
577 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
578 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
580 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
582 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++)
584 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++)
586 if (pref[i] == supp[j])
587 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]);
593 /* NOTE: tls1_ec_curve_id2nid and tls1_set_curves assume that
595 * (a) 0 is not a valid curve ID.
597 * (b) The largest curve ID is 31.
599 * Those implementations must be revised before adding support for curve IDs
600 * that break these assumptions. */
601 OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
602 (sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) < 32, small_curve_ids);
604 int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len,
605 const int *curves, size_t ncurves)
609 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
610 * while curve ids < 32
612 uint32_t dup_list = 0;
613 curve_ids = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
616 for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
620 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
621 idmask = ((uint32_t)1) << id;
622 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
624 OPENSSL_free(curve_ids);
631 OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids);
632 *out_curve_ids = curve_ids;
633 *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves;
637 /* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
638 * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
639 * success and zero on failure. */
640 static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec)
648 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
652 /* Determine curve ID */
653 nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
654 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
658 /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not
664 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
666 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
667 *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
669 *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
674 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
675 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
676 const uint16_t *curve_id, const uint8_t *comp_id)
678 const uint16_t *curves;
679 size_t curves_len, i;
681 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
682 * is supported (see RFC4492).
684 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
686 uint8_t *p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
687 size_t plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
688 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++)
690 if (*comp_id == p[i])
698 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
699 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
701 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &curves, &curves_len);
702 for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
704 if (curves[i] == *curve_id)
709 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
716 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
719 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
721 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
723 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
724 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
728 *pformats = ecformats_default;
729 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
731 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
733 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
737 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
738 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
740 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
746 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
749 /* If not EC nothing to do */
750 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
755 rv = tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
759 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
760 * supported curves extension.
762 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? &curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
765 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
766 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
768 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
773 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
774 if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
775 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
776 else if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
777 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
779 return 0; /* Should never happen */
780 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
781 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
783 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
787 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
788 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
790 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
795 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
796 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
799 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
800 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
801 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
802 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
805 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
806 * no other curves permitted.
810 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
811 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
812 curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
813 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
814 curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
817 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
818 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, NULL))
820 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
821 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
823 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
829 if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
831 if (curve_tmp == curve_id)
837 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
839 /* Need a shared curve */
840 return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef;
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
869 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
870 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
873 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
875 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
876 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
878 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
881 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
882 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
884 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
887 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
888 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
889 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
890 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
892 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
893 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
894 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
895 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
896 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
898 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
902 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
903 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
907 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
909 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
913 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
915 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
916 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
917 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
919 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
920 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
923 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
924 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
928 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
929 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
931 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
932 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
934 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
936 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
937 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
941 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
942 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
946 /* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of
947 * |cbs|. It checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported
948 * signature algorithms and, if so, writes the relevant digest into
949 * |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0 and writes an alert
952 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert,
953 SSL *s, CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
955 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
956 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
957 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
958 uint8_t hash, signature;
959 /* Should never happen */
962 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
963 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
966 if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) ||
967 !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature))
969 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
970 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
973 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
974 if (sigalg != signature)
976 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
977 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
985 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
986 if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
988 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
991 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, &comp_id))
993 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
994 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
997 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1000 if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1002 if (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1004 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1005 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1009 else if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1011 if (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1013 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1014 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1020 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1025 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1027 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1032 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1033 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1034 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1036 if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1])
1039 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1040 if (i == sent_sigslen && (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1042 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1043 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1046 *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
1047 if (*out_md == NULL)
1049 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1050 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1053 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1056 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1057 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *out_md;
1060 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1061 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1062 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1063 * session and not global settings.
1066 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1069 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1070 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1071 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1074 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1075 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1076 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1079 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1080 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1083 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1084 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1088 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1092 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1097 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1103 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1104 * signature algorithms.
1108 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1109 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1113 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1114 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1118 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1119 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1121 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1122 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1124 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1125 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1130 /* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
1131 * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
1133 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, size_t header_len)
1136 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1137 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1139 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1141 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1144 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1145 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1147 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1149 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1151 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1152 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1153 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1154 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1163 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1164 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1165 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1170 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1172 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1174 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1175 unsigned long size_str;
1178 /* check for enough space.
1179 4 for the servername type and entension length
1180 2 for servernamelist length
1181 1 for the hostname type
1182 2 for hostname length
1186 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1187 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1190 /* extension type and length */
1191 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1192 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1194 /* length of servername list */
1195 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1197 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1198 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1200 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1204 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1209 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1211 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1220 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1222 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1232 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1233 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1234 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1235 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1237 s->session->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(
1238 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1239 s->tlsext_session_ticket->length);
1240 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1242 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1243 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1247 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1248 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1250 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1253 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1254 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1258 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1264 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1267 const unsigned char *salg;
1268 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1269 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1272 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1274 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1278 /* TODO(fork): we probably want OCSP stapling, but it currently pulls in a lot of code. */
1280 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1283 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1287 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1289 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1290 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1296 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1298 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1305 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1307 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1309 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1310 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1312 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1314 /* save position of id len */
1315 unsigned char *q = ret;
1316 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1317 /* skip over id len */
1319 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1325 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1330 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1332 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1333 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1334 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1336 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1341 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1343 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1345 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1346 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1347 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1348 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1349 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1350 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1353 if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
1355 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1356 * support for Channel ID. */
1357 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1359 if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new)
1360 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
1366 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1370 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1372 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1377 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1379 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1388 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1390 const uint8_t *formats;
1391 const uint16_t *curves;
1392 size_t formats_len, curves_len, i;
1394 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len);
1396 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1397 if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1398 if (formats_len > 255)
1400 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1405 s2n(formats_len + 1,ret);
1406 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formats_len;
1407 memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len);
1410 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1411 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
1413 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1414 if ((curves_len * 2) > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1415 if ((curves_len * 2) > 65532)
1417 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1422 s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret);
1424 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1425 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1426 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1427 * resolves this to two bytes.
1429 s2n(curves_len * 2, ret);
1430 for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
1432 s2n(curves[i], ret);
1435 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1437 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1438 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1439 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1441 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1442 * extensions it MUST always appear last. */
1445 header_len += ret - orig;
1446 if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200)
1448 size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
1449 /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always
1450 * include least one byte of data if including the
1451 * extension. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is
1452 * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
1453 if (padding_len >= 4 + 1)
1457 if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0)
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1461 s2n(padding_len, ret);
1462 memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
1468 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1471 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1475 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
1478 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1479 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1481 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1484 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1485 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1486 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1487 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1489 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1490 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1494 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1496 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1498 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1504 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1508 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1510 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1514 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1516 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1519 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1521 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1531 const unsigned char *plist;
1533 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1536 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1538 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1539 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1542 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1547 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1548 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1549 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1553 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1554 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1556 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1557 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1559 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1564 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1566 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1575 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1577 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1582 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1584 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1591 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1592 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1593 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1595 const unsigned char *npa;
1596 unsigned int npalen;
1599 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1600 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1602 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1605 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1607 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1612 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1614 const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1615 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1617 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1623 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1627 /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
1628 * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
1629 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
1631 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1633 if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
1636 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
1640 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2) == 0)
1643 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1647 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1649 * cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1650 * out_alert: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a zero
1653 * returns: 1 on success. */
1654 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
1656 CBS protocol_name_list;
1657 const unsigned char *selected;
1658 unsigned char selected_len;
1661 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1664 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) ||
1665 CBS_len(cbs) != 0 ||
1666 CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2)
1669 /* Validate the protocol list. */
1670 CBS protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
1671 while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0)
1675 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name))
1679 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1680 CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
1681 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1682 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1683 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1684 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1685 s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1686 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1688 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1691 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1696 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1700 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
1702 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1706 s->servername_done = 0;
1707 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1709 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1712 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1714 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1715 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1718 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1719 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1721 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1722 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1724 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1725 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1727 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1728 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1730 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1731 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1733 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1734 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1737 /* TODO(fork): we probably want OCSP stapling support, but this pulls in
1740 /* Clear OCSP state. */
1741 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1742 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
1744 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
1745 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
1747 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1749 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
1750 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
1754 /* There may be no extensions. */
1755 if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
1760 /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
1761 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
1762 !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1764 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1768 while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
1773 /* Decode the next extension. */
1774 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
1775 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
1777 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1781 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1783 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
1784 CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1787 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1789 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1790 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1791 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1792 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1793 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1794 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1795 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1796 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1797 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1798 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1799 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1800 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1801 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1802 the value of the Host: field.
1803 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1804 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1805 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1806 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1810 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1812 CBS server_name_list;
1814 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) ||
1815 CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 ||
1816 CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
1818 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1822 /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
1823 while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0)
1828 /* Decode the NameType. */
1829 if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type))
1831 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1835 /* Only host_name is supported. */
1836 if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1841 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1843 /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT
1844 contain more than one name of
1845 the same name_type. */
1846 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1850 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
1851 CBS_len(&host_name) < 1)
1853 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1857 if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
1858 CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name))
1860 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1864 /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
1865 if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname))
1867 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1870 s->servername_done = 1;
1874 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1875 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == CBS_len(&host_name)
1876 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1877 (char *)CBS_data(&host_name), CBS_len(&host_name)) == 0;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1883 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1885 CBS ec_point_format_list;
1887 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
1888 CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
1890 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1896 if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
1897 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1898 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length))
1900 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1905 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1907 CBS elliptic_curve_list;
1908 size_t i, num_curves;
1910 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
1911 CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
1912 (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
1913 CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
1915 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1921 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1923 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1924 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1926 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
1927 (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
1928 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
1930 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1933 num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
1934 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++)
1936 if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
1937 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist[i]))
1939 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1943 if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0)
1945 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
1951 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1952 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1954 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1955 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension), s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1957 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1961 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1963 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
1965 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1967 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1969 CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
1971 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
1972 CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
1974 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1978 /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It
1979 * contains a list of SignatureAndHashAlgorithms
1980 * which are two bytes each. */
1981 if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
1982 (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0)
1984 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms))
1990 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1993 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1996 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1998 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1999 *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2004 /* TODO(fork): we probably want OCSP stapling support, but this pulls in a lot of code. */
2006 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2008 uint8_t status_type;
2009 CBS responder_id_list;
2010 CBS request_extensions;
2012 if (!CBS_get_u8(&extension, &status_type))
2014 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2018 /* Only OCSP is supported. */
2019 if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2022 s->tlsext_status_type = status_type;
2024 /* Extension consists of a responder_id_list and
2025 * request_extensions. */
2026 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &responder_id_list) ||
2027 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &request_extensions) ||
2028 CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2030 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 if (CBS_len(&responder_id_list) > 0)
2036 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2037 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL)
2039 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 /* Parse out the responder IDs. */
2045 while (CBS_len(&responder_id_list) > 0)
2049 const uint8_t *data;
2051 /* Each ResponderID must have size at least 1. */
2052 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) ||
2053 CBS_len(&responder_id) < 1)
2055 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2059 /* TODO(fork): Add CBS versions of d2i_FOO_BAR. */
2060 data = CBS_data(&responder_id);
2061 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&responder_id));
2064 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 if (!CBS_skip(&responder_id, data - CBS_data(&responder_id)))
2069 /* This should never happen. */
2070 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2074 if (CBS_len(&responder_id) != 0)
2076 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2081 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2083 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2084 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2089 /* Parse out request_extensions. */
2090 if (CBS_len(&request_extensions) > 0)
2092 const uint8_t *data;
2094 data = CBS_data(&request_extensions);
2095 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2096 &data, CBS_len(&request_extensions));
2097 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL)
2099 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 if (!CBS_skip(&request_extensions, data - CBS_data(&request_extensions)))
2104 /* This should never happen. */
2105 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 if (CBS_len(&request_extensions) != 0)
2110 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2118 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2119 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2120 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2122 /* The extension must be empty. */
2123 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2125 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2129 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2132 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2133 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2134 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2135 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2136 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2137 * anything like that, but this might change).
2139 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2140 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2141 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2142 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2143 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2144 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2149 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2150 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2152 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert))
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2155 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2156 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2160 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id &&
2161 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
2163 /* The extension must be empty. */
2164 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2166 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
2173 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
2174 s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
2176 /* The extension must be empty. */
2177 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2179 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
2184 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
2188 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2189 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2191 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
2198 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2200 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2201 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2203 *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2204 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2207 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2208 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2209 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2214 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
2217 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
2219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
2223 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2225 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2232 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2233 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2234 * the length of the block. */
2235 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs)
2239 while (CBS_len(©) != 0)
2242 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) ||
2243 CBS_len(&proto) == 0)
2252 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
2254 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2255 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2259 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2262 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2264 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2266 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2267 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2270 /* There may be no extensions. */
2271 if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
2276 /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
2277 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
2278 !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
2280 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
2289 /* Decode the next extension. */
2290 if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
2291 !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
2293 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2299 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
2300 CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2303 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2305 /* The extension must be empty. */
2306 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2308 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */
2312 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2314 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2317 tlsext_servername = 1;
2319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2320 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2322 CBS ec_point_format_list;
2324 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
2325 CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2327 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2333 if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
2334 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2335 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length))
2337 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2343 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2345 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2346 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension),
2347 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2349 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2353 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0)
2355 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2361 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2363 /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if
2364 * we've requested a status request message. */
2365 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2367 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 if (s->tlsext_status_type == -1)
2372 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2375 /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */
2376 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2379 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2380 unsigned char *selected;
2381 unsigned char selected_len;
2383 /* We must have requested it. */
2384 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2386 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2390 /* The data must be valid. */
2391 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension))
2393 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2398 CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension),
2399 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2401 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2405 s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2406 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL)
2408 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2411 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2412 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2417 CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
2419 /* We must have requested it. */
2420 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2422 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2426 /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList
2427 * which must have exactly one ProtocolName. Each of
2428 * these is length-prefixed. */
2429 if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) ||
2430 CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||
2431 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
2432 CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0)
2434 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2438 if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name,
2439 &s->s3->alpn_selected,
2440 &s->s3->alpn_selected_len))
2442 *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2447 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
2449 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2451 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
2456 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new)
2458 if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
2460 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2463 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
2464 s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
2467 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2469 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
2471 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2475 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
2480 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2482 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2484 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2486 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2487 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2489 *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2495 *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2503 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2504 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2505 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2506 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2507 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2508 * absence on initial connect only.
2510 if (!renegotiate_seen
2511 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2512 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2514 *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2515 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2523 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2528 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2533 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2535 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2536 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2539 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2540 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2542 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2543 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2547 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2548 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2549 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2550 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2554 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2555 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2558 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2559 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2562 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2563 s->servername_done=0;
2569 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2571 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2574 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2575 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2576 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2577 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2579 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2582 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2583 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2584 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2585 if (certpkey == NULL)
2587 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2590 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2591 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2593 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2594 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2597 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2598 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2599 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2601 /* status request response should be sent */
2602 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2603 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2604 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2606 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2608 /* something bad happened */
2609 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2610 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2611 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2616 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2621 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2622 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2625 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2626 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2634 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2636 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2637 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2640 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2641 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2642 * it must contain uncompressed.
2644 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2645 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2646 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2647 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2648 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2650 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2652 unsigned char *list;
2653 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2654 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2655 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2657 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2659 found_uncompressed = 1;
2663 if (!found_uncompressed)
2665 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2669 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2672 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2673 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2674 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2675 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2677 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2680 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2681 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2684 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2685 * there is no response.
2687 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2689 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2690 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2692 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2693 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2696 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2697 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2701 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2702 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2708 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2709 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2712 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2713 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2716 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2717 s->servername_done=0;
2723 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
2726 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2729 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
2731 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
2735 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2737 OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2744 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2745 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2746 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2748 * ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
2749 * shallow parse of the ClientHello.
2750 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2751 * point to the resulting session.
2753 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2754 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2755 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2758 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2759 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2760 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2761 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2762 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2763 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2764 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2767 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2768 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2769 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2770 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2771 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2772 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2774 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
2778 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2779 const unsigned char *data;
2783 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2784 * to permit stateful resumption.
2786 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2788 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) && !ctx->extensions)
2790 if (!SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
2791 ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, &data, &len))
2797 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2798 * currently have one. */
2799 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2802 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2804 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2805 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2806 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2807 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2808 * calculate the master secret later. */
2811 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id,
2812 ctx->session_id_len, ret);
2815 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2816 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2818 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2820 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2821 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2823 default: /* fatal error */
2828 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2830 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2831 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2832 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2833 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2834 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2835 * point to the resulting session.
2838 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2839 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2840 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2841 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2843 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2844 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2845 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2848 unsigned char *sdec;
2849 const unsigned char *p;
2850 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2851 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2854 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2855 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2858 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2859 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2860 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2861 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2863 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2864 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2875 /* Check key name matches */
2876 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2878 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2879 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2880 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2881 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2883 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2884 * integrity checks on ticket.
2886 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2889 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2893 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2894 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2895 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2896 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2897 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2899 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2900 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2901 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2902 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2903 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2906 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2909 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2910 if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2912 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2917 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2920 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2924 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2925 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2926 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2927 * as required by standard.
2930 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2931 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2939 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2944 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2952 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2953 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2954 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2955 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2956 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2957 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2958 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2961 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2962 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2963 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2964 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2967 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2970 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2972 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2978 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2981 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2983 if ((table[i].id) == id)
2984 return table[i].nid;
2989 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2994 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2995 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2998 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3001 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3002 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3006 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3008 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3009 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3012 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3017 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3021 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3024 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3025 return EVP_sha224();
3027 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3028 return EVP_sha256();
3029 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3030 return EVP_sha384();
3032 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3033 return EVP_sha512();
3040 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3044 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3045 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3047 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3048 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3051 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3052 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3058 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3059 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3060 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3062 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3063 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3065 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3067 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3068 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3070 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3072 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3074 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3075 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3077 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3081 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3082 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3083 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3085 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3088 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3089 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3090 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3091 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3093 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3094 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3095 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3097 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3098 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3100 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3102 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3104 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3109 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3110 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3111 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3113 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3124 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3125 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3127 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3128 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3130 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3132 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3133 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3135 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3136 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3138 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3139 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3141 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3142 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3144 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3146 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3147 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3150 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3151 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3155 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3156 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3162 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3163 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3165 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3168 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3171 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3172 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3173 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3178 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3180 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs)
3186 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3188 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3189 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3191 /* Length must be even */
3192 if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0)
3194 /* Should never happen */
3198 if (!CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen))
3201 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3203 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3204 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3206 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3207 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3209 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3211 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3213 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3216 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3217 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3218 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3219 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3220 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3222 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3223 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3229 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3230 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3232 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3233 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3235 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3236 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3237 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3238 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3240 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3241 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3246 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3247 * use the certificate for signing.
3249 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3251 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3252 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3255 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3256 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3258 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3260 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3261 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3264 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3265 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3272 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3273 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3274 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3276 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3282 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3289 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3291 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3294 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3295 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3296 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3298 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3299 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3303 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3305 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3307 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3309 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3311 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3312 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3315 /* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
3316 * SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
3318 tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
3321 unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3322 unsigned temp_digest_len;
3324 static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
3326 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3327 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3330 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
3332 if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
3334 static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
3335 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
3336 sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
3337 if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
3339 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
3340 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
3343 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
3344 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
3346 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
3348 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
3349 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
3350 EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
3352 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3357 /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
3358 * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
3359 int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
3362 /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
3363 * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
3364 * full handshake. */
3367 /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
3369 if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
3372 digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
3373 s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
3374 sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
3378 s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
3383 /* TODO(fork): remove */
3385 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3390 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3393 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3395 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3398 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3399 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3401 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3403 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3405 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3413 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3414 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3415 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3416 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3417 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3418 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3421 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3422 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3423 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3424 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3427 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3429 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3430 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3433 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3434 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3438 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3439 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3440 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3444 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3448 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3452 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3454 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3459 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3460 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3462 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3464 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3465 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3466 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3467 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3469 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3477 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3478 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3479 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3480 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3484 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3485 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3486 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3487 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3493 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3497 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3501 if (default_nid == -1)
3503 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3505 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3506 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3507 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3511 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3512 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3516 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3517 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3519 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3525 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3526 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3527 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3528 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3531 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3533 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3534 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3535 /* Strict mode flags */
3536 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3537 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3538 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3540 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3545 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3546 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3548 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3549 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3552 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3556 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3559 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3561 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3563 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3564 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3567 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3568 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3569 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3571 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3572 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3581 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3584 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3585 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3586 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3588 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3596 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3597 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3598 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3601 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3607 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3608 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3611 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3614 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3615 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3617 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3622 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3623 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3624 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3625 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3626 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3629 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3630 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3631 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3632 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3636 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3637 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3645 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3646 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3649 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3652 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3653 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3655 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3658 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3666 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3667 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3669 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3672 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3673 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3674 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3676 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3681 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3689 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3690 else if(check_flags)
3691 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3693 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3694 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3695 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3696 else if (!check_flags)
3699 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3700 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3701 else if (strict_mode)
3703 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3704 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3706 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3707 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
3711 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3719 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
3721 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3722 uint8_t check_type = 0;
3726 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3729 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3732 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3737 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
3738 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
3739 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
3740 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
3741 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
3746 if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_types &&
3747 memchr(s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, check_type, s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types))
3749 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3751 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3755 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3758 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3760 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3761 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3763 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3765 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3766 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3768 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3770 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3772 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3773 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
3775 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3780 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3784 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3786 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3787 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3791 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3793 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3794 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3795 else if (cpk->digest)
3796 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3799 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3801 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
3802 * if the chain is invalid.
3806 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3807 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3810 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3811 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3818 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3819 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3821 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3822 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3823 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3824 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
3825 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
3826 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3828 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3829 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3831 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);