4 * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
5 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
6 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
8 /* TLS extension code moved here from ssl3ecc.c */
16 #ifdef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
23 static unsigned char key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN];
24 static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL;
25 static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL;
27 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
28 static unsigned char session_ticket_enc_key[AES_256_KEY_LENGTH];
29 static unsigned char session_ticket_mac_key[SHA256_LENGTH];
31 static PRBool session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_FALSE;
33 static PRCallOnceType generate_session_keys_once;
35 /* forward static function declarations */
36 static SECStatus ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss,
37 SECItem *data, EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket);
38 static SECStatus ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf,
40 static SECStatus ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num,
42 static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss,
43 PK11SymKey **aes_key, PK11SymKey **mac_key);
44 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
45 static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key,
46 PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key,
47 PRUint32 *mac_key_length);
49 static PRInt32 ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket * ss,
50 PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes);
51 static SECStatus ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
52 PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
53 static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
54 PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
55 static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
56 PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
57 static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
58 PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
59 static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
61 static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
63 static PRInt32 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
65 static SECStatus ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
67 static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleChannelIDXtn(sslSocket *ss,
68 PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
69 static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendChannelIDXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
71 static SECStatus ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss,
72 PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes);
73 static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss,
74 PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
75 static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss,
78 static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
80 static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
82 static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
84 static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(sslSocket *ss,
87 static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(sslSocket *ss,
92 * Write bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure
93 * cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function
94 * on a shallow copy of the structure.
97 ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf, PRUint32 bytes)
99 if (bytes > item->len)
102 PORT_Memcpy(item->data, buf, bytes);
109 * Write a number in network byte order. Using this function means the
110 * SECItem structure cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call
111 * this function on a shallow copy of the structure.
114 ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num, PRInt32 lenSize)
122 *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 24);
124 *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 16);
126 *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 8);
130 rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(item, &b[0], lenSize);
134 static SECStatus ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(void* appData, void* nssData)
136 if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11) {
137 PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11);
138 session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL;
140 if (session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11) {
141 PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11);
142 session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL;
144 PORT_Memset(&generate_session_keys_once, 0,
145 sizeof(generate_session_keys_once));
151 ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(void *data)
154 sslSocket *ss = (sslSocket *)data;
155 SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY;
156 SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverKeyPair->pubKey;
158 if (svrPrivKey == NULL || svrPubKey == NULL) {
159 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Pub or priv key(s) is NULL.",
160 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
164 /* Get a copy of the session keys from shared memory. */
165 PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX,
166 sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX));
167 if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(svrPrivKey, svrPubKey,
168 ss->pkcs11PinArg, &key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN],
169 &session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11, &session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11))
172 rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown, NULL);
173 if (rv != SECSuccess)
179 ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(NULL, NULL);
184 ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **aes_key,
185 PK11SymKey **mac_key)
187 if (PR_CallOnceWithArg(&generate_session_keys_once,
188 ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11, ss) != PR_SUCCESS)
191 if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 == NULL ||
192 session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 == NULL)
195 *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11;
196 *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11;
200 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
202 ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys(void)
204 PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX,
205 sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX));
207 if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeys(&key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN],
208 session_ticket_enc_key, session_ticket_mac_key))
211 session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_TRUE;
216 ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key,
217 PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key,
218 PRUint32 *mac_key_length)
220 if (PR_CallOnce(&generate_session_keys_once,
221 ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys) != PR_SUCCESS)
224 if (!session_ticket_keys_initialized)
227 *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key;
228 *aes_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key);
229 *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key;
230 *mac_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key);
236 /* Table of handlers for received TLS hello extensions, one per extension.
237 * In the second generation, this table will be dynamic, and functions
238 * will be registered here.
240 /* This table is used by the server, to handle client hello extensions. */
241 static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = {
242 { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn },
243 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
244 { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedCurvesXtn },
245 { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn },
247 { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn },
248 { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
249 { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn },
250 { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn },
251 { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn },
252 { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn },
256 /* These two tables are used by the client, to handle server hello
258 static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersTLS[] = {
259 { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn },
260 /* TODO: add a handler for ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn */
261 { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn },
262 { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
263 { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn },
264 { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn },
265 { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn },
266 { ssl_channel_id_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleChannelIDXtn },
267 { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn },
268 { ssl_signed_certificate_timestamp_xtn,
269 &ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn },
273 static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersSSL3[] = {
274 { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
278 /* Tables of functions to format TLS hello extensions, one function per
280 * These static tables are for the formatting of client hello extensions.
281 * The server's table of hello senders is dynamic, in the socket struct,
282 * and sender functions are registered there.
285 ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersTLS[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = {
286 { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_SendServerNameXtn },
287 { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn },
288 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
289 { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedCurvesXtn },
290 { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn },
292 { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn },
293 { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn },
294 { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn },
295 { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn },
296 { ssl_channel_id_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendChannelIDXtn },
297 { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn },
298 { ssl_signed_certificate_timestamp_xtn,
299 &ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn },
300 /* WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension
301 * being zero-length. It is not intolerant of TLS 1.2, so move
302 * signature_algorithms to the end. */
303 { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn }
304 /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL } */
308 ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersSSL3[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = {
309 { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn }
310 /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL } */
314 arrayContainsExtension(const PRUint16 *array, PRUint32 len, PRUint16 ex_type)
317 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
318 if (ex_type == array[i])
325 ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) {
326 TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
327 return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->negotiated,
328 xtnData->numNegotiated, ex_type);
332 ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) {
333 TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
334 return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->advertised,
335 xtnData->numAdvertised, ex_type);
338 /* Format an SNI extension, using the name from the socket's URL,
339 * unless that name is a dotted decimal string.
340 * Used by client and server.
343 ssl3_SendServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
349 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
353 /* must have a hostname */
354 if (!ss->url || !ss->url[0])
356 /* must not be an IPv4 or IPv6 address */
357 if (PR_SUCCESS == PR_StringToNetAddr(ss->url, &netAddr)) {
358 /* is an IP address (v4 or v6) */
361 len = PORT_Strlen(ss->url);
362 if (append && maxBytes >= len + 9) {
364 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2);
365 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
366 /* length of extension_data */
367 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 5, 2);
368 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
369 /* length of server_name_list */
370 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 3, 2);
371 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
372 /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
373 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, "\0", 1);
374 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
375 /* HostName (length and value) */
376 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, (PRUint8 *)ss->url, len, 2);
377 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
378 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
379 TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
380 xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
387 if (append && maxBytes >= 4) {
388 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2);
389 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
390 /* length of extension_data */
391 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
392 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
397 /* handle an incoming SNI extension, by ignoring it. */
399 ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
401 SECItem *names = NULL;
402 PRUint32 listCount = 0, namesPos = 0, i;
403 TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
405 PRInt32 listLenBytes = 0;
407 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
408 /* Verify extension_data is empty. */
409 if (data->data || data->len ||
410 !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) {
411 /* malformed or was not initiated by the client.*/
417 /* Server side - consume client data and register server sender. */
418 /* do not parse the data if don't have user extension handling function. */
419 if (!ss->sniSocketConfig) {
422 /* length of server_name_list */
423 listLenBytes = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
424 if (listLenBytes == 0 || listLenBytes != data->len) {
428 /* Calculate the size of the array.*/
429 while (listLenBytes > 0) {
433 /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
434 type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &ldata.data, &ldata.len);
438 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 2, &ldata.data, &ldata.len);
439 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
442 /* Adjust total length for cunsumed item, item len and type.*/
443 listLenBytes -= litem.len + 3;
444 if (listLenBytes > 0 && !ldata.len) {
452 names = PORT_ZNewArray(SECItem, listCount);
456 for (i = 0;i < listCount;i++) {
460 PRBool nametypePresent = PR_FALSE;
461 /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
462 type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
463 /* Check if we have such type in the list */
464 for (j = 0;j < listCount && names[j].data;j++) {
465 if (names[j].type == type) {
466 nametypePresent = PR_TRUE;
470 /* HostName (length and value) */
471 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &names[namesPos], 2,
472 &data->data, &data->len);
473 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
476 if (nametypePresent == PR_FALSE) {
480 /* Free old and set the new data. */
481 if (xtnData->sniNameArr) {
482 PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr);
484 xtnData->sniNameArr = names;
485 xtnData->sniNameArrSize = namesPos;
486 xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_server_name_xtn;
495 /* Called by both clients and servers.
496 * Clients sends a filled in session ticket if one is available, and otherwise
497 * sends an empty ticket. Servers always send empty tickets.
500 ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn(
505 PRInt32 extension_length;
506 NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL;
507 sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
509 /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */
510 if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets)
513 /* Empty extension length = extension_type (2-bytes) +
514 * length(extension_data) (2-bytes)
516 extension_length = 4;
518 /* If we are a client then send a session ticket if one is availble.
519 * Servers that support the extension and are willing to negotiate the
520 * the extension always respond with an empty extension.
522 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
523 /* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. We cannot
524 * just acquire and release the lock within this function because the
525 * caller will call this function twice, and we need the inputs to be
526 * consistent between the two calls. Note that currently the caller
527 * will only be holding the lock when we are the client and when we're
528 * attempting to resume an existing session.
531 session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
532 if (session_ticket->ticket.data) {
533 if (ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) {
534 extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len;
535 } else if (!append &&
536 (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0 ||
537 (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint +
538 session_ticket->received_timestamp > ssl_Time()))) {
539 extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len;
540 ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_TRUE;
545 if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
548 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, 2);
549 if (rv != SECSuccess)
551 if (session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data &&
552 ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) {
553 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, session_ticket->ticket.data,
554 session_ticket->ticket.len, 2);
555 ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
556 ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE;
558 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
560 if (rv != SECSuccess)
563 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
564 TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
565 xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
566 ssl_session_ticket_xtn;
568 } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
572 return extension_length;
575 ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
579 /* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */
581 ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
583 if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) {
584 /* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */
585 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
589 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
591 /* TODO: server side NPN support would require calling
592 * ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender here in order to echo the
593 * extension back to the client. */
598 /* ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego checks that the given block of data is valid: none
599 * of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of
602 ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char* data, unsigned int length)
604 unsigned int offset = 0;
606 while (offset < length) {
607 unsigned int newOffset = offset + 1 + (unsigned int) data[offset];
608 /* Reject embedded nulls to protect against buggy applications that
609 * store protocol identifiers in null-terminated strings.
611 if (newOffset > length || data[offset] == 0) {
612 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
618 if (offset > length) {
619 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
627 ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
631 unsigned char resultBuffer[255];
632 SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 };
634 PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
636 if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) {
637 /* If the server negotiated ALPN then it has already told us what protocol
638 * to use, so it doesn't make sense for us to try to negotiate a different
639 * one by sending the NPN handshake message. However, if we've negotiated
640 * NPN then we're required to send the NPN handshake message. Thus, these
641 * two extensions cannot both be negotiated on the same connection. */
642 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
646 rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len);
647 if (rv != SECSuccess)
650 /* ss->nextProtoCallback cannot normally be NULL if we negotiated the
651 * extension. However, It is possible that an application erroneously
652 * cleared the callback between the time we sent the ClientHello and now.
654 PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback != NULL);
655 if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
656 /* XXX Use a better error code. This is an application error, not an
658 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
662 rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len,
663 result.data, &result.len, sizeof resultBuffer);
664 if (rv != SECSuccess)
666 /* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our
668 if (result.len > sizeof resultBuffer) {
669 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
673 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
675 SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE);
676 return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &result);
680 ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
682 const unsigned char* d = data->data;
683 PRUint16 name_list_len;
684 SECItem protocol_name;
686 if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn)) {
687 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
691 /* The extension data from the server has the following format:
692 * uint16 name_list_len;
694 * uint8 protocol_name[len]; */
695 if (data->len < 4 || data->len > 2 + 1 + 255) {
696 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
700 name_list_len = ((PRUint16) d[0]) << 8 |
702 if (name_list_len != data->len - 2 || d[2] != data->len - 3) {
703 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
707 protocol_name.data = data->data + 3;
708 protocol_name.len = data->len - 3;
710 SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE);
711 ss->ssl3.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED;
712 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
713 return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &protocol_name);
717 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
720 PRInt32 extension_length;
722 /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
723 if (!ss->opt.enableNPN || !ss->nextProtoCallback || ss->firstHsDone) {
727 extension_length = 4;
729 if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
731 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, 2);
732 if (rv != SECSuccess)
734 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
735 if (rv != SECSuccess)
737 ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
738 ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn;
739 } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
743 return extension_length;
750 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
752 PRInt32 extension_length;
753 unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
755 /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
756 if (!ss->opt.enableALPN || !ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data || ss->firstHsDone) {
760 extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ +
761 2 /* protocol name list length */ +
762 ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;
764 if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
765 /* NPN requires that the client's fallback protocol is first in the
766 * list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So we
767 * allocate a buffer and move the first protocol to the end of the
770 const unsigned int len = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;
772 alpn_protos = PORT_Alloc(len);
773 if (alpn_protos == NULL) {
777 /* Each protocol string is prefixed with a single byte length. */
778 unsigned int i = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[0] + 1;
780 memcpy(alpn_protos, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[i], len - i);
781 memcpy(alpn_protos + len - i, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, i);
783 /* This seems to be invalid data so we'll send as-is. */
784 memcpy(alpn_protos, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len);
788 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2);
789 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
792 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
793 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
796 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, alpn_protos, len, 2);
797 PORT_Free(alpn_protos);
799 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
802 ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
803 ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn;
804 } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
808 return extension_length;
812 PORT_Free(alpn_protos);
818 ssl3_ClientHandleChannelIDXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
821 PORT_Assert(ss->getChannelID != NULL);
824 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CHANNEL_ID_DATA);
827 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
832 ssl3_ClientSendChannelIDXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
835 PRInt32 extension_length = 4;
837 if (!ss->getChannelID)
840 if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
845 if (ss->sec.ci.sid->cached != never_cached &&
846 ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.originalHandshakeHash.len == 0) {
847 /* We can't do ChannelID on a connection if we're resuming and didn't
848 * do ChannelID on the original connection: without ChannelID on the
849 * original connection we didn't record the handshake hashes needed for
856 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_channel_id_xtn, 2);
857 if (rv != SECSuccess)
859 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
860 if (rv != SECSuccess)
862 ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
866 return extension_length;
873 ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
876 /* The echoed extension must be empty. */
880 /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
881 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
887 ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(
892 PRInt32 extension_length;
895 PRBool haveStatus = PR_FALSE;
897 for (i = kt_null; i < kt_kea_size; i++) {
898 /* TODO: This is a temporary workaround.
899 * The correct code needs to see if we have an OCSP response for
900 * the server certificate being used, rather than if we have any
901 * OCSP response. See also ssl3_SendCertificateStatus.
903 if (ss->certStatusArray[i] && ss->certStatusArray[i]->len) {
904 haveStatus = PR_TRUE;
911 extension_length = 2 + 2;
912 if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
914 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2);
915 if (rv != SECSuccess)
917 /* length of extension_data */
918 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
919 if (rv != SECSuccess)
923 return extension_length;
926 /* ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn builds the status_request extension on the
927 * client side. See RFC 4366 section 3.6. */
929 ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
932 PRInt32 extension_length;
934 if (!ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling)
937 /* extension_type (2-bytes) +
938 * length(extension_data) (2-bytes) +
940 * responder_id_list length (2) +
941 * request_extensions length (2)
943 extension_length = 9;
945 if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
947 TLSExtensionData *xtnData;
950 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2);
951 if (rv != SECSuccess)
953 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
954 if (rv != SECSuccess)
956 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /* status_type ocsp */, 1);
957 if (rv != SECSuccess)
959 /* A zero length responder_id_list means that the responders are
960 * implicitly known to the server. */
961 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
962 if (rv != SECSuccess)
964 /* A zero length request_extensions means that there are no extensions.
965 * Specifically, we don't set the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension. This
966 * means that the server can replay a cached OCSP response to us. */
967 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
968 if (rv != SECSuccess)
971 xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
972 xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn;
973 } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
977 return extension_length;
982 * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished
985 ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss)
989 NewSessionTicket ticket;
991 SECItem plaintext_item = {0, NULL, 0};
992 SECItem ciphertext = {0, NULL, 0};
993 PRUint32 ciphertext_length;
994 PRBool ms_is_wrapped;
995 unsigned char wrapped_ms[SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH];
996 SECItem ms_item = {0, NULL, 0};
997 SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType = ssl_kea_null;
998 PRUint32 padding_length;
999 PRUint32 message_length;
1000 PRUint32 cert_length;
1001 PRUint8 length_buf[4];
1003 PK11SymKey *aes_key_pkcs11;
1004 PK11SymKey *mac_key_pkcs11;
1005 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1006 const unsigned char *aes_key;
1007 const unsigned char *mac_key;
1008 PRUint32 aes_key_length;
1009 PRUint32 mac_key_length;
1010 PRUint64 aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
1011 AESContext *aes_ctx;
1012 const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
1013 PRUint64 hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
1014 HMACContext *hmac_ctx;
1016 CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC;
1017 PK11Context *aes_ctx_pkcs11;
1018 CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
1019 PK11Context *hmac_ctx_pkcs11;
1020 unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH];
1021 unsigned int computed_mac_length;
1022 unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
1024 SECItem *srvName = NULL;
1025 PRUint32 srvNameLen = 0;
1026 CK_MECHANISM_TYPE msWrapMech = 0; /* dummy default value,
1029 SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send session_ticket handshake",
1030 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1032 PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
1033 PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
1035 ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT;
1036 cert_length = (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) ?
1037 3 + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len : 0;
1039 /* Get IV and encryption keys */
1041 ivItem.len = sizeof(iv);
1042 rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv, sizeof(iv));
1043 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1045 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1046 if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
1047 rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length,
1048 &mac_key, &mac_key_length);
1052 rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11,
1055 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1057 if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data) {
1058 /* The master secret is available unwrapped. */
1059 ms_item.data = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data;
1060 ms_item.len = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len;
1061 ms_is_wrapped = PR_FALSE;
1063 /* Extract the master secret wrapped. */
1065 PORT_Memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sslSessionID));
1067 if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) {
1068 effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa;
1070 effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
1073 rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, &sid, ss->ssl3.pwSpec,
1074 effectiveExchKeyType);
1075 if (rv == SECSuccess) {
1076 if (sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len > sizeof(wrapped_ms))
1078 memcpy(wrapped_ms, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
1079 sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len);
1080 ms_item.data = wrapped_ms;
1081 ms_item.len = sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
1082 msWrapMech = sid.u.ssl3.masterWrapMech;
1084 /* TODO: else send an empty ticket. */
1087 ms_is_wrapped = PR_TRUE;
1089 /* Prep to send negotiated name */
1090 srvName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
1091 if (srvName->data && srvName->len) {
1092 srvNameLen = 2 + srvName->len; /* len bytes + name len */
1096 sizeof(PRUint16) /* ticket_version */
1097 + sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) /* ssl_version */
1098 + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) /* ciphersuite */
1099 + 1 /* compression */
1100 + 10 /* cipher spec parameters */
1101 + 1 /* SessionTicket.ms_is_wrapped */
1102 + 1 /* effectiveExchKeyType */
1103 + 4 /* msWrapMech */
1104 + 2 /* master_secret.length */
1105 + ms_item.len /* master_secret */
1106 + 1 /* client_auth_type */
1107 + cert_length /* cert */
1108 + 1 /* server name type */
1109 + srvNameLen /* name len + length field */
1110 + sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint);
1111 padding_length = AES_BLOCK_SIZE -
1112 (ciphertext_length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1113 ciphertext_length += padding_length;
1116 sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint) /* ticket_lifetime_hint */
1117 + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket */
1118 + SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN /* key_name */
1119 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE /* iv */
1120 + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket.encrypted_state */
1121 + ciphertext_length /* encrypted_state */
1122 + TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH; /* mac */
1124 if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &plaintext_item, ciphertext_length) == NULL)
1127 plaintext = plaintext_item;
1129 /* ticket_version */
1130 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION,
1132 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1135 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->version,
1136 sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion));
1137 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1140 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite,
1141 sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
1142 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1145 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1);
1146 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1148 /* cipher spec parameters */
1149 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authAlgorithm, 1);
1150 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1151 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authKeyBits, 4);
1152 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1153 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaType, 1);
1154 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1155 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaKeyBits, 4);
1156 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1159 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_is_wrapped, 1);
1160 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1161 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, effectiveExchKeyType, 1);
1162 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1163 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, msWrapMech, 4);
1164 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1165 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.len, 2);
1166 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1167 rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.data, ms_item.len);
1168 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1170 /* client_identity */
1171 if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) {
1172 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE, 1);
1173 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1174 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext,
1175 ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3);
1176 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1177 rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext,
1178 ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.data,
1179 ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len);
1180 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1182 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1);
1183 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1188 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, now,
1189 sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint));
1190 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1193 /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
1194 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->type, 1);
1195 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1196 /* HostName (length and value) */
1197 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->len, 2);
1198 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1199 rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, srvName->data, srvName->len);
1200 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1203 rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, (char)TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME,
1205 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1208 PORT_Assert(plaintext.len == padding_length);
1209 for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++)
1210 plaintext.data[i] = (unsigned char)padding_length;
1212 if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ciphertext, ciphertext_length) == NULL) {
1217 /* Generate encrypted portion of ticket. */
1218 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1219 if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
1220 aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf;
1221 rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key, aes_key_length, iv,
1222 NSS_AES_CBC, 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1223 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1225 rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_ctx, ciphertext.data, &ciphertext.len,
1226 ciphertext.len, plaintext_item.data,
1227 plaintext_item.len);
1228 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1232 aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech,
1233 CKA_ENCRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem);
1234 if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11)
1237 rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data,
1238 (int *)&ciphertext.len, ciphertext.len,
1239 plaintext_item.data, plaintext_item.len);
1240 PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11);
1241 PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
1242 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1245 /* Convert ciphertext length to network order. */
1246 length_buf[0] = (ciphertext.len >> 8) & 0xff;
1247 length_buf[1] = (ciphertext.len ) & 0xff;
1250 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1251 if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
1252 hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf;
1253 hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
1254 if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key,
1255 mac_key_length, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
1258 HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx);
1259 HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
1260 HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));
1261 HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2);
1262 HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len);
1263 HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length,
1264 sizeof(computed_mac));
1269 macParam.data = NULL;
1271 hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech,
1272 CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam);
1273 if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11)
1276 rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11);
1277 rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, key_name,
1278 SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
1279 rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, iv, sizeof(iv));
1280 rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2);
1281 rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len);
1282 rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac,
1283 &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac));
1284 PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
1285 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1288 /* Serialize the handshake message. */
1289 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, message_length);
1290 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1292 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint,
1293 sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint));
1294 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1296 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
1297 message_length - sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint) - 2, 2);
1298 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1300 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
1301 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1303 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, iv, sizeof(iv));
1304 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1306 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len, 2);
1307 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1309 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, computed_mac, computed_mac_length);
1310 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
1313 if (plaintext_item.data)
1314 SECITEM_FreeItem(&plaintext_item, PR_FALSE);
1315 if (ciphertext.data)
1316 SECITEM_FreeItem(&ciphertext, PR_FALSE);
1321 /* When a client receives a SessionTicket extension a NewSessionTicket
1322 * message is expected during the handshake.
1325 ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
1331 /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
1332 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
1337 ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
1341 SECItem *decrypted_state = NULL;
1342 SessionTicket *parsed_session_ticket = NULL;
1343 sslSessionID *sid = NULL;
1344 SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats;
1346 /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */
1347 if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets)
1350 /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
1351 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
1353 /* Parse the received ticket sent in by the client. We are
1354 * lenient about some parse errors, falling back to a fullshake
1355 * instead of terminating the current connection.
1357 if (data->len == 0) {
1358 ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket = PR_TRUE;
1361 SECItem extension_data;
1362 EncryptedSessionTicket enc_session_ticket;
1363 unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH];
1364 unsigned int computed_mac_length;
1365 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1366 const SECHashObject *hashObj;
1367 const unsigned char *aes_key;
1368 const unsigned char *mac_key;
1369 PRUint32 aes_key_length;
1370 PRUint32 mac_key_length;
1371 PRUint64 hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
1372 HMACContext *hmac_ctx;
1373 PRUint64 aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
1374 AESContext *aes_ctx;
1376 PK11SymKey *aes_key_pkcs11;
1377 PK11SymKey *mac_key_pkcs11;
1378 PK11Context *hmac_ctx_pkcs11;
1379 CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
1380 PK11Context *aes_ctx_pkcs11;
1381 CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC;
1382 unsigned char * padding;
1383 PRUint32 padding_length;
1384 unsigned char *buffer;
1385 unsigned int buffer_len;
1388 PRInt8 nameType = TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME;
1390 /* Turn off stateless session resumption if the client sends a
1391 * SessionTicket extension, even if the extension turns out to be
1392 * malformed (ss->sec.ci.sid is non-NULL when doing session
1395 if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) {
1396 if (ss->sec.uncache)
1397 ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
1398 ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
1399 ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
1402 extension_data.data = data->data; /* Keep a copy for future use. */
1403 extension_data.len = data->len;
1405 if (ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(ss, data, &enc_session_ticket)
1409 /* Get session ticket keys. */
1410 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1411 if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
1412 rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length,
1413 &mac_key, &mac_key_length);
1417 rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11,
1420 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
1421 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to get/generate session ticket keys.",
1422 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1426 /* If the ticket sent by the client was generated under a key different
1427 * from the one we have, bypass ticket processing.
1429 if (PORT_Memcmp(enc_session_ticket.key_name, key_name,
1430 SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
1431 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket key_name sent mismatch.",
1432 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1436 /* Verify the MAC on the ticket. MAC verification may also
1437 * fail if the MAC key has been recently refreshed.
1439 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1440 if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
1441 hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf;
1442 hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
1443 if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key,
1444 sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key), PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
1446 HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx);
1447 HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, extension_data.data,
1448 extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH);
1449 if (HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length,
1450 sizeof(computed_mac)) != SECSuccess)
1456 macParam.data = NULL;
1458 hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech,
1459 CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam);
1460 if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11) {
1461 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create HMAC context: %d.",
1462 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
1465 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Successfully created HMAC context.",
1466 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1468 rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11);
1469 rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, extension_data.data,
1470 extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH);
1471 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
1472 PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
1475 rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac,
1476 &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac));
1477 PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
1478 if (rv != SECSuccess)
1481 if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(computed_mac, enc_session_ticket.mac,
1482 computed_mac_length) != 0) {
1483 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket MAC mismatch.",
1484 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1488 /* We ignore key_name for now.
1489 * This is ok as MAC verification succeeded.
1492 /* Decrypt the ticket. */
1494 /* Plaintext is shorter than the ciphertext due to padding. */
1495 decrypted_state = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL,
1496 enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);
1498 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1499 if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
1500 aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf;
1501 rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key,
1502 sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key), enc_session_ticket.iv,
1503 NSS_AES_CBC, 0,AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
1504 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
1505 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.",
1506 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1510 rv = AES_Decrypt(aes_ctx, decrypted_state->data,
1511 &decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len,
1512 enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data,
1513 enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);
1514 if (rv != SECSuccess)
1520 ivItem.data = enc_session_ticket.iv;
1521 ivItem.len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
1522 aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech,
1523 CKA_DECRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem);
1524 if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11) {
1525 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.",
1526 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1530 rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, decrypted_state->data,
1531 (int *)&decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len,
1532 enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data,
1533 enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);
1534 PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11);
1535 PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
1536 if (rv != SECSuccess)
1540 /* Check padding. */
1542 (PRUint32)decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - 1];
1543 if (padding_length == 0 || padding_length > AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
1546 padding = &decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - padding_length];
1547 for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++, padding++) {
1548 if (padding_length != (PRUint32)*padding)
1552 /* Deserialize session state. */
1553 buffer = decrypted_state->data;
1554 buffer_len = decrypted_state->len;
1556 parsed_session_ticket = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SessionTicket));
1557 if (parsed_session_ticket == NULL) {
1562 /* Read ticket_version (which is ignored for now.) */
1563 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1564 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1565 parsed_session_ticket->ticket_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
1567 /* Read SSLVersion. */
1568 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1569 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1570 parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;
1572 /* Read cipher_suite. */
1573 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1574 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1575 parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp;
1577 /* Read compression_method. */
1578 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1579 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1580 parsed_session_ticket->compression_method = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp;
1582 /* Read cipher spec parameters. */
1583 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1584 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1585 parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm = (SSLSignType)temp;
1586 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1587 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1588 parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp;
1589 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1590 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1591 parsed_session_ticket->keaType = (SSLKEAType)temp;
1592 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1593 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1594 parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp;
1596 /* Read wrapped master_secret. */
1597 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1598 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1599 parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped = (PRBool)temp;
1601 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1602 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1603 parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType = (SSL3KEAType)temp;
1605 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1606 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1607 parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)temp;
1609 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1610 if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
1611 parsed_session_ticket->ms_length = (PRUint16)temp;
1612 if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length == 0 || /* sanity check MS. */
1613 parsed_session_ticket->ms_length >
1614 sizeof(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret))
1617 /* Allow for the wrapped master secret to be longer. */
1618 if (buffer_len < parsed_session_ticket->ms_length)
1620 PORT_Memcpy(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret, buffer,
1621 parsed_session_ticket->ms_length);
1622 buffer += parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
1623 buffer_len -= parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
1625 /* Read client_identity */
1626 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1629 parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type =
1630 (ClientAuthenticationType)temp;
1631 switch(parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type) {
1632 case CLIENT_AUTH_ANONYMOUS:
1634 case CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE:
1635 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_item, 3,
1636 &buffer, &buffer_len);
1637 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
1638 rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert,
1640 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
1645 /* Read timestamp. */
1646 temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1649 parsed_session_ticket->timestamp = (PRUint32)temp;
1651 /* Read server name */
1653 ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
1654 if (nameType != TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME) {
1656 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &name_item, 2, &buffer,
1658 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
1659 rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->srvName,
1661 if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
1662 parsed_session_ticket->srvName.type = nameType;
1665 /* Done parsing. Check that all bytes have been consumed. */
1666 if (buffer_len != padding_length)
1669 /* Use the ticket if it has not expired, otherwise free the allocated
1670 * memory since the ticket is of no use.
1672 if (parsed_session_ticket->timestamp != 0 &&
1673 parsed_session_ticket->timestamp +
1674 TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT > ssl_Time()) {
1676 sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
1682 /* Copy over parameters. */
1683 sid->version = parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version;
1684 sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite;
1685 sid->u.ssl3.compression = parsed_session_ticket->compression_method;
1686 sid->authAlgorithm = parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm;
1687 sid->authKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits;
1688 sid->keaType = parsed_session_ticket->keaType;
1689 sid->keaKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits;
1691 /* Copy master secret. */
1692 #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
1693 if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 &&
1694 parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped)
1697 if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length >
1698 sizeof(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret))
1700 PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
1701 parsed_session_ticket->master_secret,
1702 parsed_session_ticket->ms_length);
1703 sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len =
1704 parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
1705 sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType;
1706 sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech;
1707 sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped =
1708 parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped;
1709 sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE;
1710 sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE;
1712 /* Copy over client cert from session ticket if there is one. */
1713 if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data != NULL) {
1714 if (sid->peerCert != NULL)
1715 CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert);
1716 sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle,
1717 &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
1718 if (sid->peerCert == NULL) {
1723 if (parsed_session_ticket->srvName.data != NULL) {
1724 sid->u.ssl3.srvName = parsed_session_ticket->srvName;
1726 ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE;
1727 ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
1733 SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket parsing failed.",
1734 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
1735 ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics();
1736 SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats->hch_sid_ticket_parse_failures );
1741 /* ss->sec.ci.sid == sid if it did NOT come here via goto statement
1742 * in that case do not free sid
1744 if (sid && (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid)) {
1748 if (decrypted_state != NULL) {
1749 SECITEM_FreeItem(decrypted_state, PR_TRUE);
1750 decrypted_state = NULL;
1753 if (parsed_session_ticket != NULL) {
1754 if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data) {
1755 SECITEM_FreeItem(&parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, PR_FALSE);
1757 PORT_ZFree(parsed_session_ticket, sizeof(SessionTicket));
1764 * Read bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure
1765 * cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function
1766 * on a shallow copy of the structure.
1769 ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(SECItem *item, unsigned char **buf, PRUint32 bytes)
1771 if (bytes > item->len)
1775 item->data += bytes;
1781 ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data,
1782 EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket)
1784 if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->key_name,
1785 SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != SECSuccess)
1787 if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->iv,
1788 AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != SECSuccess)
1790 if (ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &enc_session_ticket->encrypted_state,
1791 2, &data->data, &data->len) != SECSuccess)
1793 if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->mac,
1794 TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH) != SECSuccess)
1796 if (data->len != 0) /* Make sure that we have consumed all bytes. */
1802 /* go through hello extensions in buffer "b".
1803 * For each one, find the extension handler in the table, and
1804 * if present, invoke that handler.
1805 * Servers ignore any extensions with unknown extension types.
1806 * Clients reject any extensions with unadvertised extension types.
1809 ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length)
1811 const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handlers;
1813 if (ss->sec.isServer) {
1814 handlers = clientHelloHandlers;
1815 } else if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
1816 handlers = serverHelloHandlersTLS;
1818 handlers = serverHelloHandlersSSL3;
1822 const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handler;
1824 PRInt32 extension_type;
1825 SECItem extension_data;
1827 /* Get the extension's type field */
1828 extension_type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length);
1829 if (extension_type < 0) /* failure to decode extension_type */
1830 return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */
1832 /* get the data for this extension, so we can pass it or skip it. */
1833 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extension_data, 2, b, length);
1834 if (rv != SECSuccess)
1837 /* Check whether the server sent an extension which was not advertised
1838 * in the ClientHello.
1840 if (!ss->sec.isServer &&
1841 !ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(ss, extension_type))
1842 return SECFailure; /* TODO: send unsupported_extension alert */
1844 /* Check whether an extension has been sent multiple times. */
1845 if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, extension_type))
1848 /* find extension_type in table of Hello Extension Handlers */
1849 for (handler = handlers; handler->ex_type >= 0; handler++) {
1850 /* if found, call this handler */
1851 if (handler->ex_type == extension_type) {
1852 rv = (*handler->ex_handler)(ss, (PRUint16)extension_type,
1854 /* Ignore this result */
1855 /* Treat all bad extensions as unrecognized types. */
1863 /* Add a callback function to the table of senders of server hello extensions.
1866 ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
1867 ssl3HelloExtensionSenderFunc cb)
1870 ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender = &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0];
1872 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) {
1873 if (!sender->ex_sender) {
1874 sender->ex_type = ex_type;
1875 sender->ex_sender = cb;
1878 /* detect duplicate senders */
1879 PORT_Assert(sender->ex_type != ex_type);
1880 if (sender->ex_type == ex_type) {
1885 PORT_Assert(i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS); /* table needs to grow */
1886 PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
1890 /* call each of the extension senders and return the accumulated length */
1892 ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes,
1893 const ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender)
1895 PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0;
1899 sender = ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ?
1900 &clientHelloSendersTLS[0] : &clientHelloSendersSSL3[0];
1903 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) {
1904 if (sender->ex_sender) {
1905 PRInt32 extLen = (*sender->ex_sender)(ss, append, maxBytes);
1909 total_exten_len += extLen;
1912 return total_exten_len;
1916 /* Extension format:
1917 * Extension number: 2 bytes
1918 * Extension length: 2 bytes
1919 * Verify Data Length: 1 byte
1920 * Verify Data (TLS): 12 bytes (client) or 24 bytes (server)
1921 * Verify Data (SSL): 36 bytes (client) or 72 bytes (server)
1924 ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(
1929 PRInt32 len, needed;
1931 /* In draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to send
1932 * both the SCSV and the empty RI, so when we send SCSV in
1933 * the initial handshake, we don't also send RI.
1935 if (!ss || ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV)
1937 len = !ss->firstHsDone ? 0 :
1938 (ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2
1939 : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes);
1941 if (append && maxBytes >= needed) {
1943 /* extension_type */
1944 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, 2);
1945 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
1946 /* length of extension_data */
1947 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 1, 2);
1948 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
1949 /* verify_Data from previous Finished message(s) */
1950 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
1951 ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, len, 1);
1952 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
1953 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
1954 TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
1955 xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
1956 ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn;
1963 ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
1966 SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
1968 /* remember that we got this extension. */
1969 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
1970 PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
1971 /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */
1972 rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type,
1973 ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn);
1977 /* This function runs in both the client and server. */
1979 ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
1981 SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
1984 if (ss->firstHsDone) {
1985 len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes
1986 : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2;
1988 if (data->len != 1 + len ||
1989 data->data[0] != len || (len &&
1990 NSS_SecureMemcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data,
1991 data->data + 1, len))) {
1992 /* Can we do this here? Or, must we arrange for the caller to do it? */
1993 (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
1994 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
1997 /* remember that we got this extension and it was correct. */
1998 ss->peerRequestedProtection = 1;
1999 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
2000 if (ss->sec.isServer) {
2001 /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */
2002 rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type,
2003 ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn);
2009 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
2011 PRUint32 ext_data_len;
2018 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
2021 if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount)
2022 return 0; /* Not relevant */
2024 ext_data_len = 2 + 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount + 1;
2026 if (append && maxBytes >= 4 + ext_data_len) {
2027 /* Extension type */
2028 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2);
2029 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
2030 /* Length of extension data */
2031 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ext_data_len, 2);
2032 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
2033 /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */
2034 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
2035 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount,
2037 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
2038 /* The SRTP ciphers */
2039 for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
2040 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
2041 ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i],
2044 /* Empty MKI value */
2045 ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);
2047 ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
2051 return 4 + ext_data_len;
2055 if (append && maxBytes >= 9) {
2056 /* Extension type */
2057 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2);
2058 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
2059 /* Length of extension data */
2060 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 5, 2);
2061 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
2062 /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */
2063 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, 2);
2064 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
2065 /* The selected cipher */
2066 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite, 2);
2067 if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
2068 /* Empty MKI value */
2069 ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);
2076 ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
2079 SECItem ciphers = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
2082 PRUint16 cipher = 0;
2083 PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
2086 if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
2088 if (!data->data || !data->len) {
2093 /* Get the cipher list */
2094 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2,
2095 &data->data, &data->len);
2096 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
2099 /* Now check that the number of ciphers listed is 1 (len = 2) */
2100 if (ciphers.len != 2) {
2104 /* Get the selected cipher */
2105 cipher = (ciphers.data[0] << 8) | ciphers.data[1];
2107 /* Now check that this is one of the ciphers we offered */
2108 for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
2109 if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) {
2119 /* Get the srtp_mki value */
2120 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1,
2121 &data->data, &data->len);
2122 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
2126 /* We didn't offer an MKI, so this must be 0 length */
2127 /* XXX RFC 5764 Section 4.1.3 says:
2128 * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's
2129 * response that is different than the one the client offered,
2130 * then the client MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an
2131 * invalid_parameter alert.
2133 * Due to a limitation of the ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions function,
2134 * returning SECFailure here won't abort the handshake. It will
2135 * merely cause the use_srtp extension to be not negotiated. We
2136 * should fix this. See NSS bug 753136.
2138 if (litem.len != 0) {
2142 if (data->len != 0) {
2147 /* OK, this looks fine. */
2148 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn;
2149 ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher;
2154 if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) {
2155 /* Ignore the extension if we aren't doing DTLS or no DTLS-SRTP
2156 * preferences have been set. */
2160 if (!data->data || data->len < 5) {
2165 /* Get the cipher list */
2166 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2,
2167 &data->data, &data->len);
2168 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
2171 /* Check that the list is even length */
2172 if (ciphers.len % 2) {
2176 /* Walk through the offered list and pick the most preferred of our
2177 * ciphers, if any */
2178 for (i = 0; !found && i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
2179 for (j = 0; j + 1 < ciphers.len; j += 2) {
2180 cipher = (ciphers.data[j] << 8) | ciphers.data[j + 1];
2181 if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) {
2188 /* Get the srtp_mki value */
2189 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
2190 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
2194 if (data->len != 0) {
2195 return SECFailure; /* Malformed */
2198 /* Now figure out what to do */
2200 /* No matching ciphers */
2204 /* OK, we have a valid cipher and we've selected it */
2205 ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher;
2206 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn;
2208 return ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn,
2209 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn);
2212 /* ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn handles the signature_algorithms extension
2214 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
2216 ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
2220 const unsigned char *b;
2221 unsigned int numAlgorithms, i;
2223 /* Ignore this extension if we aren't doing TLS 1.2 or greater. */
2224 if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
2228 /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
2229 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
2231 rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &data->data,
2233 if (rv != SECSuccess) {
2236 /* Trailing data, empty value, or odd-length value is invalid. */
2237 if (data->len != 0 || algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0) {
2238 PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
2242 numAlgorithms = algorithms.len/2;
2244 /* We don't care to process excessive numbers of algorithms. */
2245 if (numAlgorithms > 512) {
2246 numAlgorithms = 512;
2249 ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash =
2250 PORT_NewArray(SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm, numAlgorithms);
2251 if (!ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash) {
2254 ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash = 0;
2256 b = algorithms.data;
2257 for (i = 0; i < numAlgorithms; i++) {
2258 unsigned char tls_hash = *(b++);
2259 unsigned char tls_sig = *(b++);
2260 SECOidTag hash = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(tls_hash);
2262 if (hash == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
2263 /* We ignore formats that we don't understand. */
2266 /* tls_sig support will be checked later in
2267 * ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm. */
2268 ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].hashAlg = hash;
2269 ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].sigAlg = tls_sig;
2270 ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash++;
2273 if (!ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash) {
2274 /* We didn't understand any of the client's requested signature
2275 * formats. We'll use the defaults. */
2276 PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash);
2277 ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash = NULL;
2283 /* ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn sends the signature_algorithm extension for TLS
2284 * 1.2 ClientHellos. */
2286 ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
2288 static const unsigned char signatureAlgorithms[] = {
2289 /* This block is the contents of our signature_algorithms extension, in
2291 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
2292 tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_rsa,
2293 tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_rsa,
2294 tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_rsa,
2295 #ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
2296 tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_ecdsa,
2297 tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_ecdsa,
2298 tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_ecdsa,
2300 tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_dsa,
2301 tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_dsa,
2303 PRInt32 extension_length;
2305 if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
2310 2 /* extension type */ +
2311 2 /* extension length */ +
2312 2 /* supported_signature_algorithms length */ +
2313 sizeof(signatureAlgorithms);
2315 if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
2317 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, 2);
2318 if (rv != SECSuccess)
2320 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
2321 if (rv != SECSuccess)
2323 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signatureAlgorithms,
2324 sizeof(signatureAlgorithms), 2);
2325 if (rv != SECSuccess)
2327 ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
2328 ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn;
2329 } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
2334 return extension_length;
2341 ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(unsigned int clientHelloLength)
2343 unsigned int recordLength = 1 /* handshake message type */ +
2344 3 /* handshake message length */ +
2346 unsigned int extensionLength;
2348 if (recordLength < 256 || recordLength >= 512) {
2352 extensionLength = 512 - recordLength;
2353 /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least
2354 * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application Server
2355 * 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
2356 if (extensionLength < 4 + 1) {
2357 extensionLength = 4 + 1;
2360 return extensionLength;
2363 /* ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension possibly adds an extension which ensures that a
2364 * ClientHello record is either < 256 bytes or is >= 512 bytes. This ensures
2365 * that we don't trigger bugs in F5 products. */
2367 ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int extensionLen,
2370 unsigned int paddingLen = extensionLen - 4;
2371 static unsigned char padding[256];
2373 if (extensionLen == 0) {
2377 if (extensionLen < 4 ||
2378 extensionLen > maxBytes ||
2379 paddingLen > sizeof(padding)) {
2384 if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_padding_xtn, 2))
2386 if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, paddingLen, 2))
2388 if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, padding, paddingLen))
2391 return extensionLen;
2394 /* ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn sends the signed_certificate_timestamp
2395 * extension for TLS ClientHellos. */
2397 ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
2400 PRInt32 extension_length = 2 /* extension_type */ +
2401 2 /* length(extension_data) */;
2403 /* Only send the extension if processing is enabled. */
2404 if (!ss->opt.enableSignedCertTimestamps)
2407 if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
2409 /* extension_type */
2410 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
2411 ssl_signed_certificate_timestamp_xtn,
2413 if (rv != SECSuccess)
2416 rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
2417 if (rv != SECSuccess)
2419 ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
2420 ssl_signed_certificate_timestamp_xtn;
2421 } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
2426 return extension_length;
2432 ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
2435 /* We do not yet know whether we'll be resuming a session or creating
2436 * a new one, so we keep a pointer to the data in the TLSExtensionData
2437 * structure. This pointer is only valid in the scope of
2438 * ssl3_HandleServerHello, and, if not resuming a session, the data is
2439 * copied once a new session structure has been set up.
2440 * All parsing is currently left to the application and we accept
2441 * everything, including empty data.
2443 SECItem *scts = &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps;
2444 PORT_Assert(!scts->data && !scts->len);
2447 /* Empty extension data: RFC 6962 mandates non-empty contents. */
2451 /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
2452 ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;