src/content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/debugger.h"
  12 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  13 #include "base/debug/trace_event.h"
  14 #include "base/file_util.h"
  15 #include "base/hash.h"
  16 #include "base/path_service.h"
  17 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  18 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  19 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  20 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  21 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  22 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  23 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  24 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  25 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  26 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  27 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  28 #include "ipc/ipc_switches.h"
  29 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  30 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  31 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  32 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  33
  34 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  35 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  36
  37 namespace content {
  38 namespace {
  39
  40 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  41 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  42 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  43 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  44   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  45   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  46   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  47   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  48   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  49   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  50   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  51   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  52   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  53   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  54   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  55   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  56   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  57   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  58   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  59   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  60   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  61   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  62   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  63   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  64   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  65   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  66   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  67   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  68   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  69   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  70   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  71   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  72   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  73   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  74   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  75   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  76   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  77   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  78   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  79   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
  80   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  81   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  82   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
  83   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
  84   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
  85   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
  86   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
  87   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
  88   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  89   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
  90   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
  91   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
  92   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
  93   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
  94   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
  95   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
  96   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  97   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
  98   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  99   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 100   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 101   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 102   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 103 };
 104
 105 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 106 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 107 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 108 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 109                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 110                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 111   base::FilePath directory;
 112   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 113     return false;
 114
 115   if (sub_dir)
 116     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 117
 118   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 119   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 120                            directory.value().c_str());
 121   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 122     return false;
 123
 124   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 125   if (children)
 126     directory_str += L"*";
 127   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 128
 129   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 130                            directory_str.c_str());
 131   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 132     return false;
 133
 134   return true;
 135 }
 136
 137 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|.
 138 // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys.
 139 bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key,
 140                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 141                       sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 142   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 143   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 144                            key.c_str());
 145   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 146     return false;
 147
 148   key += L"\\*";
 149   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access,
 150                            key.c_str());
 151   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 152     return false;
 153
 154   return true;
 155 }
 156
 157 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 158 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 159   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 160   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 161   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 162     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 163     return false;
 164   }
 165   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 166     return false;
 167   base::FilePath fname(path);
 168   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 169 }
 170
 171 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 172 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 173 // is also loaded in this process.
 174 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 175                         bool check_in_browser,
 176                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 177   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 178   if (!module) {
 179     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 180     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 181     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 182     std::wstring name(module_name);
 183     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 184     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 185     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 186     if (period <= 8)
 187       return;
 188     for (int ix = 0; ix < 3; ++ix) {
 189       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ('1' + ix), 0};
 190       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 191       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 192       if (check_in_browser) {
 193         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 194         if (!module)
 195           return;
 196         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 197         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 198         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 199           return;
 200       }
 201       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 202       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 203     }
 204   }
 205   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 206   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 207   return;
 208 }
 209
 210 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 211 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 212 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 213 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 214   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 215     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 216 }
 217
 218 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 219 string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const char16* object) {
 220   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 221   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 222   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 223     HANDLE token;
 224     DWORD session_id_length;
 225     DWORD session_id = 0;
 226
 227     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 228     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 229         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 230     CloseHandle(token);
 231     if (session_id)
 232       s_session_id = session_id;
 233   }
 234
 235   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 236 }
 237
 238 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 239 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 240   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 241     return true;
 242
 243   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 244   // job.
 245   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 246     return true;
 247
 248   BOOL in_job = true;
 249   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 250   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 251     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 252   if (!in_job)
 253     return true;
 254
 255   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 256   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {0};
 257   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 258                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 259                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 260     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 261     return true;
 262   }
 263   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 264     return true;
 265
 266   return false;
 267 }
 268
 269 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 270 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 271   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 272
 273   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 274   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 275   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 276                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 277                            L"Section");
 278   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 279     return false;
 280
 281   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 282   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 283   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 284   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 285                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 286                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 287   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 288     return false;
 289
 290   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 291   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 292   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 293   // system services.
 294   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 295                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 296                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 297   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 298     return false;
 299
 300   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 301   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 302   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 303                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 304                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 305   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 306     return false;
 307
 308   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 309 #ifndef NDEBUG
 310   base::FilePath app_dir;
 311   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 312     return false;
 313
 314   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 315   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 316                                                  long_path_buf,
 317                                                  MAX_PATH);
 318   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 319     return false;
 320
 321   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 322   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 323   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 324                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 325                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 326   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 327     return false;
 328 #endif  // NDEBUG
 329
 330   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 331
 332   return true;
 333 }
 334
 335 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 336   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 337   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 338   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 339                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 340                            L"Event");
 341   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 342     return false;
 343
 344   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 345   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 346     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 347     // token is restricted.
 348     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 349   }
 350
 351   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 352   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 353   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 354
 355   bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
 356                         switches::kDisableAltWinstation);
 357
 358   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) {
 359     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 360   }
 361
 362   return true;
 363 }
 364
 365 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 366 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 367 // command_line as needed. is_in_sandbox must be true if the child process will
 368 // be in a sandbox.
 369 //
 370 // Returns true if the caller should "help" the child process by calling the JIT
 371 // debugger on it. It may only happen if is_in_sandbox is true.
 372 bool ProcessDebugFlags(CommandLine* command_line, bool is_in_sandbox) {
 373   bool should_help_child = false;
 374   const CommandLine& current_cmd_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 375   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 376   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDebugChildren)) {
 377     // Look to pass-on the kDebugOnStart flag.
 378     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 379         switches::kDebugChildren);
 380     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 381       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDebugOnStart);
 382       should_help_child = true;
 383     }
 384     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kDebugChildren, value);
 385   } else if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 386     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 387     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 388         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 389     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 390       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 391     }
 392     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 393   }
 394   return should_help_child;
 395 }
 396
 397 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 398 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 399 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 400 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 401
 402 BOOL (WINAPI *g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 403                                            HANDLE source_handle,
 404                                            HANDLE target_process_handle,
 405                                            LPHANDLE target_handle,
 406                                            DWORD desired_access,
 407                                            BOOL inherit_handle,
 408                                            DWORD options);
 409
 410 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 411
 412 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 413     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 414     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 415     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 416
 417 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 418   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 419   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 420   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 421       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 422   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 423   NTSTATUS error;
 424   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 425   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 426   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 427
 428   // Get the object basic information.
 429   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 430   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 431   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 432                         &size);
 433   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 434
 435   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 436       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 437
 438   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 439     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask = ~(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION |
 440                                          SYNCHRONIZE);
 441     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 442         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 443   }
 444 }
 445
 446 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 447                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 448                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 449                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 450                                  DWORD desired_access,
 451                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 452                                  DWORD options) {
 453   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 454   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 455                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 456                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 457     return FALSE;
 458
 459   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 460   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 461       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 462     return TRUE;
 463
 464   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 465   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 466   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 467     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 468     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 469       base::win::ScopedHandle process;
 470       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 471                                         target_process_handle,
 472                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 473                                         process.Receive(),
 474                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 475                                         FALSE, 0));
 476       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process, NULL, &is_in_job));
 477     }
 478   }
 479
 480   if (is_in_job) {
 481     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 482     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 483
 484     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 485     base::win::ScopedHandle handle;
 486     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 487                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), handle.Receive(),
 488                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 489
 490     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 491     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle);
 492   }
 493
 494   return TRUE;
 495 }
 496 #endif
 497
 498 }  // namespace
 499
 500 void SetJobLevel(const CommandLine& cmd_line,
 501                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 502                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 503                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 504   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line))
 505     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 506   else
 507     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 508 }
 509
 510 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 511 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 512 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 513   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 514   string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 515       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 516   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 517 }
 518
 519 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 520   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 521   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 522   DCHECK(broker_services);
 523   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 524   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 525   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 526
 527   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 528 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 529   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 530   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 531   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 532   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 533   // original function.
 534   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 535       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 536     HMODULE module = NULL;
 537     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 538     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 539                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 540                               &module));
 541     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 542     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 543       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 544       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle = ::DuplicateHandle;
 545       g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 546           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 547           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 548     }
 549   }
 550 #endif
 551
 552   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 553 }
 554
 555 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 556   DCHECK(target_services);
 557   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 558   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 559   g_target_services = target_services;
 560   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 561 }
 562
 563 base::ProcessHandle StartSandboxedProcess(
 564     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 565     CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 566   const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 567   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 568
 569   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 570
 571   bool in_sandbox = true;
 572   if (delegate)
 573     delegate->ShouldSandbox(&in_sandbox);
 574
 575   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 576       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 577     // The user or the caller has explicity opted-out from all sandboxing.
 578     in_sandbox = false;
 579   }
 580
 581
 582   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 583   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 584       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 585     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 586   }
 587
 588   bool child_needs_help = ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, in_sandbox);
 589
 590   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 591   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 592   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 593   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 594
 595   if (!in_sandbox) {
 596     base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
 597     base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
 598     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process);
 599     return process;
 600   }
 601
 602   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target;
 603   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 604
 605   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 606                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 607                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 608                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 609                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 610
 611   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 612     return 0;
 613
 614   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 615                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 616
 617   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 618     return 0;
 619
 620   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 621
 622   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 623   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 624   if (delegate)
 625     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 626
 627   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 628     return 0;
 629
 630   if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
 631     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 632     // this subprocess. See
 633     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 634     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 635   }
 636
 637   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 638   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 639     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 640                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 641                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 642     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 643       return 0;
 644
 645     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 646     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 647                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 648                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 649     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 650       return 0;
 651   }
 652
 653   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 654     NOTREACHED();
 655     return 0;
 656   }
 657
 658   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging)) {
 659     // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 660     // have no effect.
 661     policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 662     policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 663   }
 664
 665   if (delegate) {
 666     bool success = true;
 667     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 668     if (!success)
 669       return 0;
 670   }
 671
 672   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 673
 674   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 675       cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 676       cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 677       policy, target.Receive());
 678   policy->Release();
 679
 680   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 681
 682   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 683     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 684       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 685     else
 686       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 687     return 0;
 688   }
 689
 690   if (delegate)
 691     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 692
 693   ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
 694
 695   // Help the process a little. It can't start the debugger by itself if
 696   // the process is in a sandbox.
 697   if (child_needs_help)
 698     base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.process_id());
 699
 700   return target.TakeProcessHandle();
 701 }
 702
 703 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 704                            DWORD target_process_id,
 705                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 706                            DWORD desired_access,
 707                            DWORD options) {
 708   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 709   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 710     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 711                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 712                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 713
 714   }
 715
 716   // Try the broker next
 717   if (g_target_services &&
 718       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 719                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 720                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 721     return true;
 722   }
 723
 724   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 725   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 726   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 727                                     target_process_id));
 728   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 729     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 730                                 target_process, target_handle,
 731                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 732   }
 733
 734   return false;
 735 }
 736
 737 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 738   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 739 }
 740
 741 }  // namespace content