From 4e2b7f7351d43b34078d6b213f0bdd1bb2d0efa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Stenberg Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 12:24:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc ... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500 Reported-by: Peter Wu Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html Backported patch details:- Link: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ba1dbd78e5f1e.patch Change-Id: I5e6572de38862229fa319ce10c0d571e9e5a3543 Signed-off-by: Nishant Chaprana --- lib/smtp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/smtp.c b/lib/smtp.c index 3f3b45a..400ad54 100644 --- a/lib/smtp.c +++ b/lib/smtp.c @@ -1563,13 +1563,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct connectdata *conn, const ssize_t nread) if(!scratch || data->set.crlf) { oldscratch = scratch; - scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * data->set.buffer_size); + scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * UPLOAD_BUFSIZE); if(!newscratch) { failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer!"); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } } + DEBUGASSERT(UPLOAD_BUFSIZE >= nread); /* Have we already sent part of the EOB? */ eob_sent = smtp->eob; -- 2.7.4