"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
+ "crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
return errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config")
}
+ c.sendHandshakeSeq = 0
+ c.recvHandshakeSeq = 0
+
+ nextProtosLength := 0
+ for _, proto := range c.config.NextProtos {
+ if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 {
+ return errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value")
+ } else {
+ nextProtosLength += 1 + l
+ }
+ }
+ if nextProtosLength > 0xffff {
+ return errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large")
+ }
+
hello := &clientHelloMsg{
+ isDTLS: c.isDTLS,
vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
random: make([]byte, 32),
supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
secureRenegotiation: true,
+ alpnProtocols: c.config.NextProtos,
duplicateExtension: c.config.Bugs.DuplicateExtension,
+ channelIDSupported: c.config.ChannelID != nil,
+ npnLast: c.config.Bugs.SwapNPNAndALPN,
+ }
+
+ if c.config.Bugs.SendClientVersion != 0 {
+ hello.vers = c.config.Bugs.SendClientVersion
}
possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
continue
}
+ // Don't advertise non-DTLS cipher suites on DTLS.
+ if c.isDTLS && suite.flags&suiteNoDTLS != 0 {
+ continue
+ }
hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
continue NextCipherSuite
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
+
+ if c.isDTLS {
+ helloVerifyRequest, ok := msg.(*helloVerifyRequestMsg)
+ if ok {
+ if helloVerifyRequest.vers != VersionTLS10 {
+ // Per RFC 6347, the version field in
+ // HelloVerifyRequest SHOULD be always DTLS
+ // 1.0. Enforce this for testing purposes.
+ return errors.New("dtls: bad HelloVerifyRequest version")
+ }
+
+ hello.raw = nil
+ hello.cookie = helloVerifyRequest.cookie
+ helloBytes = hello.marshal()
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloBytes)
+
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
}
- vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
- if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 {
- // TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
+ c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
+ if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", serverHello.vers)
}
- c.vers = vers
c.haveVers = true
suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
session: session,
}
- hs.finishedHash.Write(helloBytes)
- hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+ hs.writeHash(helloBytes, hs.c.sendHandshakeSeq-1)
+ hs.writeServerHash(hs.serverHello.marshal())
if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec > 0 {
hs.establishKeys()
if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
return err
}
- if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
+ if err := hs.sendFinished(isResume); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
return err
}
- if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
+ if err := hs.sendFinished(isResume); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
- hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+ hs.writeServerHash(certMsg.marshal())
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(cs, msg)
}
- hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
+ hs.writeServerHash(cs.marshal())
if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
c.ocspResponse = cs.response
skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
if ok {
- hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
+ hs.writeServerHash(skx.marshal())
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, certs[0], skx)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
// arrangement to the contrary.
- hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
+ hs.writeServerHash(certReq.marshal())
var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
}
- hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
+ hs.writeServerHash(shd.marshal())
// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
if chainToSend != nil {
certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
}
- hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+ hs.writeClientHash(certMsg.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
}
}
if ckx != nil {
if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec < 2 {
- hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
+ hs.writeClientHash(ckx.marshal())
}
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
}
+ hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
+
if chainToSend != nil {
var signed []byte
certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
break
}
var digest []byte
- digest, _, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash)
+ digest, _, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
if err != nil {
break
}
}
var digest []byte
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
- digest, hashFunc, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash)
+ digest, hashFunc, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
if err != nil {
break
}
}
certVerify.signature = signed
- hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+ hs.writeClientHash(certVerify.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
}
- hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
+ hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
+
return nil
}
return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
}
- if !hs.hello.nextProtoNeg && hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
+ clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg
+ clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0
+ serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg
+ serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0
+
+ if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN extension")
}
+ if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested ALPN extension")
+ }
+
+ if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return false, errors.New("server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions")
+ }
+
+ if serverHasALPN {
+ c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol
+ c.clientProtocolFallback = false
+ c.usedALPN = true
+ }
+
+ if !hs.hello.channelIDSupported && hs.serverHello.channelIDRequested {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested Channel ID extension")
+ }
+
if hs.serverResumedSession() {
// Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state
hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
+ hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
return true, nil
}
return false, nil
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
}
}
- hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
+ hs.writeServerHash(serverFinished.marshal())
return nil
}
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
}
- hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
hs.session = &ClientSessionState{
sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
vers: c.vers,
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
+ handshakeHash: hs.finishedHash.server.Sum(nil),
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
}
+ hs.writeServerHash(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
+
return nil
}
-func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished() error {
+func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(isResume bool) error {
c := hs.c
var postCCSBytes []byte
+ seqno := hs.c.sendHandshakeSeq
if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos)
c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
nextProtoBytes := nextProto.marshal()
- hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProtoBytes)
+ hs.writeHash(nextProtoBytes, seqno)
+ seqno++
postCCSBytes = append(postCCSBytes, nextProtoBytes...)
}
+ if hs.serverHello.channelIDRequested {
+ encryptedExtensions := new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
+ if c.config.ChannelID.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
+ return fmt.Errorf("tls: Channel ID is not on P-256.")
+ }
+ var resumeHash []byte
+ if isResume {
+ resumeHash = hs.session.handshakeHash
+ }
+ r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), c.config.ChannelID, hs.finishedHash.hashForChannelID(resumeHash))
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ channelID := make([]byte, 128)
+ writeIntPadded(channelID[0:32], c.config.ChannelID.X)
+ writeIntPadded(channelID[32:64], c.config.ChannelID.Y)
+ writeIntPadded(channelID[64:96], r)
+ writeIntPadded(channelID[96:128], s)
+ encryptedExtensions.channelID = channelID
+
+ c.channelID = &c.config.ChannelID.PublicKey
+
+ encryptedExtensionsBytes := encryptedExtensions.marshal()
+ hs.writeHash(encryptedExtensionsBytes, seqno)
+ seqno++
+ postCCSBytes = append(postCCSBytes, encryptedExtensionsBytes...)
+ }
+
finished := new(finishedMsg)
if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec == 2 {
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(nil)
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
}
finishedBytes := finished.marshal()
- hs.finishedHash.Write(finishedBytes)
+ hs.writeHash(finishedBytes, seqno)
postCCSBytes = append(postCCSBytes, finishedBytes...)
if c.config.Bugs.FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec {
return nil
}
+func (hs *clientHandshakeState) writeClientHash(msg []byte) {
+ // writeClientHash is called before writeRecord.
+ hs.writeHash(msg, hs.c.sendHandshakeSeq)
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeState) writeServerHash(msg []byte) {
+ // writeServerHash is called after readHandshake.
+ hs.writeHash(msg, hs.c.recvHandshakeSeq-1)
+}
+
+func (hs *clientHandshakeState) writeHash(msg []byte, seqno uint16) {
+ if hs.c.isDTLS {
+ // This is somewhat hacky. DTLS hashes a slightly different format.
+ // First, the TLS header.
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[:4])
+ // Then the sequence number and reassembled fragment offset (always 0).
+ hs.finishedHash.Write([]byte{byte(seqno >> 8), byte(seqno), 0, 0, 0})
+ // Then the reassembled fragment (always equal to the message length).
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[1:4])
+ // And then the message body.
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[4:])
+ } else {
+ hs.finishedHash.Write(msg)
+ }
+}
+
// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could
// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server.
func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string {
return serverAddr.String()
}
-// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation protocol given the
-// set of client and server supported protocols. The set of client supported
-// protocols must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
+// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation or ALPN protocol
+// given list of possible protocols and a list of the preference order. The
+// first list must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
-func mutualProtocol(clientProtos, serverProtos []string) (string, bool) {
- for _, s := range serverProtos {
- for _, c := range clientProtos {
+func mutualProtocol(protos, preferenceProtos []string) (string, bool) {
+ for _, s := range preferenceProtos {
+ for _, c := range protos {
if s == c {
return s, false
}
}
}
- return clientProtos[0], true
+ return protos[0], true
+}
+
+// writeIntPadded writes x into b, padded up with leading zeros as
+// needed.
+func writeIntPadded(b []byte, x *big.Int) {
+ for i := range b {
+ b[i] = 0
+ }
+ xb := x.Bytes()
+ copy(b[len(b)-len(xb):], xb)
}