iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C
authorNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Fri, 6 Jun 2014 01:08:57 +0000 (18:08 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 26 Jun 2014 19:15:37 +0000 (15:15 -0400)
commit124067ae6606c2e9433a912b3c57fcc78b484362
tree754796e3fe75227605161a19a6edcf9d61a96dc5
parent4b71e348b5e49ab1f43319b390c64bd97bfb958b
iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C

commit 1d2b60a5545942b1376cb48c1d55843d71e3a08f upstream.

This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure
the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication
does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target.

This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1:

   Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder
   for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication.
   Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP
   connection if it occurs.

Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c