From b9d84cf85bd2fec5d1d5b3345f13dd261fe7e2ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anas Nashif Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2012 09:56:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Rebase for util-linux 2.28 Change-Id: I61e0efe71ecc161a75b425174457c291dd374dd9 Signed-off-by: DongHun Kwak --- include/Makemodule.am | 10 +- lib/xgetpass.c | 65 ++ libmount/src/Makemodule.am | 5 +- libmount/src/aes.c | 299 ++++++++ libmount/src/aes.h | 97 +++ libmount/src/context.c | 3 +- libmount/src/context_loopdev1.c | 1525 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ libmount/src/context_umount.c | 27 +- libmount/src/optmap.c | 13 +- libmount/src/rmd160.c | 532 ++++++++++++++ libmount/src/rmd160.h | 9 + libmount/src/sha512.c | 432 +++++++++++ libmount/src/sha512.h | 45 ++ login-utils/Makemodule.am | 2 + login-utils/su-common.c | 4 +- packaging/baselibs.conf | 9 + packaging/blkid.conf | 5 + packaging/etc_filesystems | 1 + packaging/login.pamd | 14 + packaging/nologin.8 | 63 ++ packaging/nologin.c | 58 ++ packaging/remote.pamd | 12 + packaging/su.default | 11 + packaging/su.pamd | 8 + packaging/util-linux-rpmlintrc | 7 + packaging/util-linux.changes | 37 + packaging/util-linux.manifest | 5 + packaging/util-linux.spec | 406 +++++++++++ sys-utils/Makemodule.am | 43 +- sys-utils/loop.c | 221 ++++++ sys-utils/loop.h | 87 +++ sys-utils/losetup.8 | 340 ++++----- sys-utils/losetup1.c | 1281 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ sys-utils/mount.8 | 15 +- sys-utils/mount.c | 63 +- sys-utils/swapoff.c | 71 +- sys-utils/swapon.8 | 16 + sys-utils/swapon.c | 498 ++++++++++++- term-utils/Makemodule.am | 2 + 39 files changed, 6108 insertions(+), 233 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/xgetpass.c create mode 100644 libmount/src/aes.c create mode 100644 libmount/src/aes.h create mode 100644 libmount/src/context_loopdev1.c create mode 100644 libmount/src/rmd160.c create mode 100644 libmount/src/rmd160.h create mode 100644 libmount/src/sha512.c create mode 100644 libmount/src/sha512.h create mode 100644 packaging/baselibs.conf create mode 100644 packaging/blkid.conf create mode 100644 packaging/etc_filesystems create mode 100644 packaging/login.pamd create mode 100644 packaging/nologin.8 create mode 100644 packaging/nologin.c create mode 100644 packaging/remote.pamd create mode 100644 packaging/su.default create mode 100644 packaging/su.pamd create mode 100644 packaging/util-linux-rpmlintrc create mode 100644 packaging/util-linux.changes create mode 100644 packaging/util-linux.manifest create mode 100644 packaging/util-linux.spec create mode 100644 sys-utils/loop.c create mode 100644 sys-utils/loop.h create mode 100644 sys-utils/losetup1.c diff --git a/include/Makemodule.am b/include/Makemodule.am index d4ae10c..9a6cec6 100644 --- a/include/Makemodule.am +++ b/include/Makemodule.am @@ -53,4 +53,12 @@ dist_noinst_HEADERS += \ include/timeutils.h \ include/ttyutils.h \ include/widechar.h \ - include/xalloc.h + include/xalloc.h \ + include/xgetpass.h \ + include/pt-sgi.h \ + include/pt-bsd.h \ + include/pt-mbr.h \ + include/xgetpass.h \ + include/pt-mbr-partnames.h \ + include/pt-sun.h \ + include/statfs_magic.h diff --git a/lib/xgetpass.c b/lib/xgetpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0875e46 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/xgetpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * A function to read the passphrase either from the terminal or from + * an open file descriptor. + * + * Public domain. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "c.h" +#include "xgetpass.h" + +char *xgetpass(int pfd, const char *prompt) +{ + char *p = NULL, *n; + int x = 0, y = 0; + + if (pfd < 0) { + /* read from terminal */ + p = getpass(prompt); + if(!p) return NULL; + /* caller insists on free()ing this pointer, so make sure it is such */ + n = strdup(p); + y = strlen(p); + if(y) memset(p, 0, y); /* erase original */ + /* return a free()able copy, or 0 if strdup() failed */ + return n; + } + + do { + if(y >= (x - 1)) { + x += 128; + /* Must enforce some max limit here -- this code */ + /* runs as part of mount, and mount is setuid root */ + /* and has used mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE) */ + if(x > (4*1024)) { + error_out: + if(p) { + memset(p, 0, y); + free(p); + } + return NULL; + } + n = malloc(x); + if(!n) goto error_out; + if(p) { + memcpy(n, p, y); + memset(p, 0, y); + free(p); + } + p = n; + } + if(read(pfd, p + y, 1) != 1) break; + if((p[y] == '\n') || !p[y]) break; + y++; + } while(1); + if(p) p[y] = 0; + return p; +} + diff --git a/libmount/src/Makemodule.am b/libmount/src/Makemodule.am index 8c5ef08..b3b7f6f 100644 --- a/libmount/src/Makemodule.am +++ b/libmount/src/Makemodule.am @@ -28,7 +28,10 @@ libmount_la_SOURCES = \ if LINUX libmount_la_SOURCES += \ libmount/src/context.c \ - libmount/src/context_loopdev.c \ + libmount/src/context_loopdev1.c \ + libmount/src/sha512.c \ + libmount/src/rmd160.c \ + libmount/src/aes.c \ libmount/src/context_mount.c \ libmount/src/context_umount.c \ libmount/src/monitor.c diff --git a/libmount/src/aes.c b/libmount/src/aes.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6983576 --- /dev/null +++ b/libmount/src/aes.c @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +// I retain copyright in this code but I encourage its free use provided +// that I don't carry any responsibility for the results. I am especially +// happy to see it used in free and open source software. If you do use +// it I would appreciate an acknowledgement of its origin in the code or +// the product that results and I would also appreciate knowing a little +// about the use to which it is being put. I am grateful to Frank Yellin +// for some ideas that are used in this implementation. +// +// Dr B. R. Gladman 6th April 2001. +// +// This is an implementation of the AES encryption algorithm (Rijndael) +// designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. This version is designed +// to provide both fixed and dynamic block and key lengths and can also +// run with either big or little endian internal byte order (see aes.h). +// It inputs block and key lengths in bytes with the legal values being +// 16, 24 and 32. + +/* + * Modified by Jari Ruusu, May 1 2001 + * - Fixed some compile warnings, code was ok but gcc warned anyway. + * - Changed basic types: byte -> unsigned char, word -> u_int32_t + * - Major name space cleanup: Names visible to outside now begin + * with "aes_" or "AES_". A lot of stuff moved from aes.h to aes.c + * - Removed C++ and DLL support as part of name space cleanup. + * - Eliminated unnecessary recomputation of tables. (actual bug fix) + * - Merged precomputed constant tables to aes.c file. + * - Removed data alignment restrictions for portability reasons. + * - Made block and key lengths accept bit count (128/192/256) + * as well byte count (16/24/32). + * - Removed all error checks. This change also eliminated the need + * to preinitialize the context struct to zero. + * - Removed some totally unused constants. + */ + +/* + * Modified by Jari Ruusu, June 9 2003 + * - Removed all code not necessary for small size + * optimized encryption using 256 bit keys. + */ + +#include "aes.h" + +#if AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 16 +#error an illegal block size has been specified +#endif + +// upr(x,n): rotates bytes within words by n positions, moving bytes +// to higher index positions with wrap around into low positions +// bval(x,n): extracts a byte from a word + +#define upr(x,n) (((x) << 8 * (n)) | ((x) >> (32 - 8 * (n)))) +#define bval(x,n) ((unsigned char)((x) >> 8 * (n))) +#define bytes2word(b0, b1, b2, b3) \ + ((u_int32_t)(b3) << 24 | (u_int32_t)(b2) << 16 | (u_int32_t)(b1) << 8 | (b0)) + +#if defined(i386) || defined(_I386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__i386) +/* little endian processor without data alignment restrictions */ +#define word_in(x) *(u_int32_t*)(x) +#define word_out(x,v) *(u_int32_t*)(x) = (v) +#else +/* slower but generic big endian or with data alignment restrictions */ +#define word_in(x) ((u_int32_t)(((unsigned char *)(x))[0])|((u_int32_t)(((unsigned char *)(x))[1])<<8)|((u_int32_t)(((unsigned char *)(x))[2])<<16)|((u_int32_t)(((unsigned char *)(x))[3])<<24)) +#define word_out(x,v) ((unsigned char *)(x))[0]=(v),((unsigned char *)(x))[1]=((v)>>8),((unsigned char *)(x))[2]=((v)>>16),((unsigned char *)(x))[3]=((v)>>24) +#endif + +// the finite field modular polynomial and elements + +#define ff_poly 0x011b +#define ff_hi 0x80 + +static int tab_gen = 0; +static unsigned char s_box[256]; // the S box +static u_int32_t rcon_tab[AES_RC_LENGTH]; // table of round constants +static u_int32_t ft_tab[4][256]; +static u_int32_t fl_tab[4][256]; + +// Generate the tables for the dynamic table option + +// It will generally be sensible to use tables to compute finite +// field multiplies and inverses but where memory is scarse this +// code might sometimes be better. + +// return 2 ^ (n - 1) where n is the bit number of the highest bit +// set in x with x in the range 1 < x < 0x00000200. This form is +// used so that locals within FFinv can be bytes rather than words + +static unsigned char hibit(const u_int32_t x) +{ unsigned char r = (unsigned char)((x >> 1) | (x >> 2)); + + r |= (r >> 2); + r |= (r >> 4); + return (r + 1) >> 1; +} + +// return the inverse of the finite field element x + +static unsigned char FFinv(const unsigned char x) +{ unsigned char p1 = x, p2 = 0x1b, n1 = hibit(x), n2 = 0x80, v1 = 1, v2 = 0; + + if(x < 2) return x; + + for(;;) + { + if(!n1) return v1; + + while(n2 >= n1) + { + n2 /= n1; p2 ^= p1 * n2; v2 ^= v1 * n2; n2 = hibit(p2); + } + + if(!n2) return v2; + + while(n1 >= n2) + { + n1 /= n2; p1 ^= p2 * n1; v1 ^= v2 * n1; n1 = hibit(p1); + } + } +} + +// define the finite field multiplies required for Rijndael + +#define FFmul02(x) ((((x) & 0x7f) << 1) ^ ((x) & 0x80 ? 0x1b : 0)) +#define FFmul03(x) ((x) ^ FFmul02(x)) + +// The forward and inverse affine transformations used in the S-box + +#define fwd_affine(x) \ + (w = (u_int32_t)x, w ^= (w<<1)^(w<<2)^(w<<3)^(w<<4), 0x63^(unsigned char)(w^(w>>8))) + +static void gen_tabs(void) +{ u_int32_t i, w; + + for(i = 0, w = 1; i < AES_RC_LENGTH; ++i) + { + rcon_tab[i] = bytes2word(w, 0, 0, 0); + w = (w << 1) ^ (w & ff_hi ? ff_poly : 0); + } + + for(i = 0; i < 256; ++i) + { unsigned char b; + + s_box[i] = b = fwd_affine(FFinv((unsigned char)i)); + + w = bytes2word(b, 0, 0, 0); + fl_tab[0][i] = w; + fl_tab[1][i] = upr(w,1); + fl_tab[2][i] = upr(w,2); + fl_tab[3][i] = upr(w,3); + w = bytes2word(FFmul02(b), b, b, FFmul03(b)); + ft_tab[0][i] = w; + ft_tab[1][i] = upr(w,1); + ft_tab[2][i] = upr(w,2); + ft_tab[3][i] = upr(w,3); + } +} + +#define four_tables(x,tab,vf,rf,c) \ + ( tab[0][bval(vf(x,0,c),rf(0,c))] \ + ^ tab[1][bval(vf(x,1,c),rf(1,c))] \ + ^ tab[2][bval(vf(x,2,c),rf(2,c))] \ + ^ tab[3][bval(vf(x,3,c),rf(3,c))]) + +#define vf1(x,r,c) (x) +#define rf1(r,c) (r) +#define rf2(r,c) ((r-c)&3) + +#define ls_box(x,c) four_tables(x,fl_tab,vf1,rf2,c) + +#define nc (AES_BLOCK_SIZE / 4) + +// Initialise the key schedule from the user supplied key. +// The key length is now specified in bytes, 32. +// This corresponds to bit length of 256 bits, and +// to Nk value of 8 respectively. + +void __loDev_aes_set_key(aes_context *cx, const unsigned char in_key[], int n_bytes, const int f) +{ u_int32_t *kf, *kt, rci; + + if(!tab_gen) { gen_tabs(); tab_gen = 1; } + + cx->aes_Nkey = 8; + cx->aes_Nrnd = (cx->aes_Nkey > nc ? cx->aes_Nkey : nc) + 6; + + cx->aes_e_key[0] = word_in(in_key ); + cx->aes_e_key[1] = word_in(in_key + 4); + cx->aes_e_key[2] = word_in(in_key + 8); + cx->aes_e_key[3] = word_in(in_key + 12); + + kf = cx->aes_e_key; + kt = kf + nc * (cx->aes_Nrnd + 1) - cx->aes_Nkey; + rci = 0; + + switch(cx->aes_Nkey) + { + case 8: cx->aes_e_key[4] = word_in(in_key + 16); + cx->aes_e_key[5] = word_in(in_key + 20); + cx->aes_e_key[6] = word_in(in_key + 24); + cx->aes_e_key[7] = word_in(in_key + 28); + do + { kf[ 8] = kf[0] ^ ls_box(kf[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[rci++]; + kf[ 9] = kf[1] ^ kf[ 8]; + kf[10] = kf[2] ^ kf[ 9]; + kf[11] = kf[3] ^ kf[10]; + kf[12] = kf[4] ^ ls_box(kf[11],0); + kf[13] = kf[5] ^ kf[12]; + kf[14] = kf[6] ^ kf[13]; + kf[15] = kf[7] ^ kf[14]; + kf += 8; + } + while (kf < kt); + break; + } +} + +// y = output word, x = input word, r = row, c = column +// for r = 0, 1, 2 and 3 = column accessed for row r + +#define s(x,c) x[c] + +// I am grateful to Frank Yellin for the following constructions +// which, given the column (c) of the output state variable that +// is being computed, return the input state variables which are +// needed for each row (r) of the state + +// For the fixed block size options, compilers reduce these two +// expressions to fixed variable references. For variable block +// size code conditional clauses will sometimes be returned + +#define fwd_var(x,r,c) \ + ( r==0 ? \ + ( c==0 ? s(x,0) \ + : c==1 ? s(x,1) \ + : c==2 ? s(x,2) \ + : c==3 ? s(x,3) \ + : c==4 ? s(x,4) \ + : c==5 ? s(x,5) \ + : c==6 ? s(x,6) \ + : s(x,7)) \ + : r==1 ? \ + ( c==0 ? s(x,1) \ + : c==1 ? s(x,2) \ + : c==2 ? s(x,3) \ + : c==3 ? nc==4 ? s(x,0) : s(x,4) \ + : c==4 ? s(x,5) \ + : c==5 ? nc==8 ? s(x,6) : s(x,0) \ + : c==6 ? s(x,7) \ + : s(x,0)) \ + : r==2 ? \ + ( c==0 ? nc==8 ? s(x,3) : s(x,2) \ + : c==1 ? nc==8 ? s(x,4) : s(x,3) \ + : c==2 ? nc==4 ? s(x,0) : nc==8 ? s(x,5) : s(x,4) \ + : c==3 ? nc==4 ? s(x,1) : nc==8 ? s(x,6) : s(x,5) \ + : c==4 ? nc==8 ? s(x,7) : s(x,0) \ + : c==5 ? nc==8 ? s(x,0) : s(x,1) \ + : c==6 ? s(x,1) \ + : s(x,2)) \ + : \ + ( c==0 ? nc==8 ? s(x,4) : s(x,3) \ + : c==1 ? nc==4 ? s(x,0) : nc==8 ? s(x,5) : s(x,4) \ + : c==2 ? nc==4 ? s(x,1) : nc==8 ? s(x,6) : s(x,5) \ + : c==3 ? nc==4 ? s(x,2) : nc==8 ? s(x,7) : s(x,0) \ + : c==4 ? nc==8 ? s(x,0) : s(x,1) \ + : c==5 ? nc==8 ? s(x,1) : s(x,2) \ + : c==6 ? s(x,2) \ + : s(x,3))) + +#define si(y,x,k,c) s(y,c) = word_in(x + 4 * c) ^ k[c] +#define so(y,x,c) word_out(y + 4 * c, s(x,c)) + +#define fwd_rnd(y,x,k,c) s(y,c)= (k)[c] ^ four_tables(x,ft_tab,fwd_var,rf1,c) +#define fwd_lrnd(y,x,k,c) s(y,c)= (k)[c] ^ four_tables(x,fl_tab,fwd_var,rf1,c) + +#define locals(y,x) x[4],y[4] + +#define l_copy(y, x) s(y,0) = s(x,0); s(y,1) = s(x,1); \ + s(y,2) = s(x,2); s(y,3) = s(x,3); +#define state_in(y,x,k) si(y,x,k,0); si(y,x,k,1); si(y,x,k,2); si(y,x,k,3) +#define state_out(y,x) so(y,x,0); so(y,x,1); so(y,x,2); so(y,x,3) +#define round(rm,y,x,k) rm(y,x,k,0); rm(y,x,k,1); rm(y,x,k,2); rm(y,x,k,3) + +void __loDev_aes_encrypt(const aes_context *cx, const unsigned char in_blk[], unsigned char out_blk[]) +{ u_int32_t locals(b0, b1); + const u_int32_t *kp = cx->aes_e_key; + + state_in(b0, in_blk, kp); kp += nc; + + { u_int32_t rnd; + + for(rnd = 0; rnd < cx->aes_Nrnd - 1; ++rnd) + { + round(fwd_rnd, b1, b0, kp); + l_copy(b0, b1); kp += nc; + } + + round(fwd_lrnd, b0, b1, kp); + } + + state_out(out_blk, b0); +} diff --git a/libmount/src/aes.h b/libmount/src/aes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..660e8ce --- /dev/null +++ b/libmount/src/aes.h @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// I retain copyright in this code but I encourage its free use provided +// that I don't carry any responsibility for the results. I am especially +// happy to see it used in free and open source software. If you do use +// it I would appreciate an acknowledgement of its origin in the code or +// the product that results and I would also appreciate knowing a little +// about the use to which it is being put. I am grateful to Frank Yellin +// for some ideas that are used in this implementation. +// +// Dr B. R. Gladman 6th April 2001. +// +// This is an implementation of the AES encryption algorithm (Rijndael) +// designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. This version is designed +// to provide both fixed and dynamic block and key lengths and can also +// run with either big or little endian internal byte order (see aes.h). +// It inputs block and key lengths in bytes with the legal values being +// 16, 24 and 32. + +/* + * Modified by Jari Ruusu, May 1 2001 + * - Fixed some compile warnings, code was ok but gcc warned anyway. + * - Changed basic types: byte -> unsigned char, word -> u_int32_t + * - Major name space cleanup: Names visible to outside now begin + * with "aes_" or "AES_". A lot of stuff moved from aes.h to aes.c + * - Removed C++ and DLL support as part of name space cleanup. + * - Eliminated unnecessary recomputation of tables. (actual bug fix) + * - Merged precomputed constant tables to aes.c file. + * - Removed data alignment restrictions for portability reasons. + * - Made block and key lengths accept bit count (128/192/256) + * as well byte count (16/24/32). + * - Removed all error checks. This change also eliminated the need + * to preinitialize the context struct to zero. + * - Removed some totally unused constants. + */ + +#ifndef _AES_H +#define _AES_H + +#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__KERNEL__) +# include +#else +# include +#endif + +// CONFIGURATION OPTIONS (see also aes.c) +// +// Define AES_BLOCK_SIZE to set the cipher block size (16, 24 or 32) or +// leave this undefined for dynamically variable block size (this will +// result in much slower code). +// IMPORTANT NOTE: AES_BLOCK_SIZE is in BYTES (16, 24, 32 or undefined). If +// left undefined a slower version providing variable block length is compiled + +#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 + +// The number of key schedule words for different block and key lengths +// allowing for method of computation which requires the length to be a +// multiple of the key length +// +// Nk = 4 6 8 +// ------------- +// Nb = 4 | 60 60 64 +// 6 | 96 90 96 +// 8 | 120 120 120 + +#if !defined(AES_BLOCK_SIZE) || (AES_BLOCK_SIZE == 32) +#define AES_KS_LENGTH 120 +#define AES_RC_LENGTH 29 +#else +#define AES_KS_LENGTH 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE +#define AES_RC_LENGTH (9 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) / 8 - 8 +#endif + +typedef struct +{ + u_int32_t aes_Nkey; // the number of words in the key input block + u_int32_t aes_Nrnd; // the number of cipher rounds + u_int32_t aes_e_key[AES_KS_LENGTH]; // the encryption key schedule + u_int32_t aes_d_key[AES_KS_LENGTH]; // the decryption key schedule +#if !defined(AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + u_int32_t aes_Ncol; // the number of columns in the cipher state +#endif +} aes_context; + +// THE CIPHER INTERFACE + +#if !defined(AES_BLOCK_SIZE) +extern void aes_set_blk(aes_context *, const int); +#endif +extern void __loDev_aes_set_key(aes_context *, const unsigned char [], const int, const int); +extern void __loDev_aes_encrypt(const aes_context *, const unsigned char [], unsigned char []); +extern void __loDev_aes_decrypt(const aes_context *, const unsigned char [], unsigned char []); + +// The block length inputs to aes_set_block and aes_set_key are in numbers +// of bytes or bits. The calls to subroutines must be made in the above +// order but multiple calls can be made without repeating earlier calls +// if their parameters have not changed. + +#endif // _AES_H diff --git a/libmount/src/context.c b/libmount/src/context.c index e26135f..ebcfc3e 100644 --- a/libmount/src/context.c +++ b/libmount/src/context.c @@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ void mnt_free_context(struct libmnt_context *cxt) mnt_unref_table(cxt->fstab); mnt_unref_cache(cxt->cache); - mnt_context_clear_loopdev(cxt); mnt_free_lock(cxt->lock); mnt_free_update(cxt->update); @@ -128,6 +127,8 @@ int mnt_reset_context(struct libmnt_context *cxt) DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "<---- reset [status=%d] ---->", mnt_context_get_status(cxt))); + mnt_context_clear_loopdev(cxt); /* this _has_ to be called before cxt->fs gets freed */ + fl = cxt->flags; mnt_unref_fs(cxt->fs); diff --git a/libmount/src/context_loopdev1.c b/libmount/src/context_loopdev1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21cc53f --- /dev/null +++ b/libmount/src/context_loopdev1.c @@ -0,0 +1,1525 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2011 Karel Zak + * + * This file may be redistributed under the terms of the + * GNU Lesser General Public License. + */ + +/* (c) 2001-2012 Jari Ruusu */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "mountP.h" +#include "linux_version.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "sha512.h" +#include "rmd160.h" +#include "aes.h" + + +#define LO_CRYPT_NONE 0 +#define LO_CRYPT_XOR 1 +#define LO_CRYPT_DES 2 +#define LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI 18 + +#define LOOP_SET_FD 0x4C00 +#define LOOP_CLR_FD 0x4C01 +#define LOOP_SET_STATUS 0x4C02 +#define LOOP_GET_STATUS 0x4C03 +#define LOOP_SET_STATUS64 0x4C04 +#define LOOP_GET_STATUS64 0x4C05 +#define LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP 0x4C4D +#define LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP_V3 0x4C4E +#define LOOP_RECOMPUTE_DEV_SIZE 0x4C52 + +#define LO_NAME_SIZE 64 +#define LO_KEY_SIZE 32 + +struct loop_info { + int lo_number; +#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= 0x20600 + __kernel_old_dev_t lo_device; +#else + __kernel_dev_t lo_device; +#endif + unsigned long lo_inode; +#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= 0x20600 + __kernel_old_dev_t lo_rdevice; +#else + __kernel_dev_t lo_rdevice; +#endif + int lo_offset; + int lo_encrypt_type; + int lo_encrypt_key_size; + int lo_flags; + char lo_name[LO_NAME_SIZE]; + unsigned char lo_encrypt_key[LO_KEY_SIZE]; + unsigned long lo_init[2]; + char reserved[4]; +}; + +struct loop_info64 { + u_int64_t lo_device; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int64_t lo_inode; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int64_t lo_rdevice; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int64_t lo_offset; /* bytes */ + u_int64_t lo_sizelimit; /* bytes, 0 == max available */ + u_int32_t lo_number; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int32_t lo_encrypt_type; + u_int32_t lo_encrypt_key_size; /* ioctl w/o */ + u_int32_t lo_flags; /* ioctl r/o */ + unsigned char lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE]; + unsigned char lo_crypt_name[LO_NAME_SIZE]; + unsigned char lo_encrypt_key[LO_KEY_SIZE]; /* ioctl w/o */ + u_int64_t lo_init[2]; +}; + +#if !defined(LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) +# define LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH 20 +#endif + +typedef struct { + char *multiKeyPass[66]; + int multiKeyMode; + char *loopFileName; + char *pass_cb_string; + char *extraPtrToFree; + + char *loopDevName; + char *loopOffsetBytes; + char *loopSizeBytes; + char *loopEncryptionType; + char *passSeedString; + char *passHashFuncName; + char *passIterThousands; + char *loInitValue; + char *gpgKeyFile; + char *gpgHomeDir; + char *clearTextKeyFile; +} loDev_passInfo; + + + +static int loDev_rd_wr_retry(int fd, char *buf, int cnt, int w) +{ + int x, y, z; + + x = 0; + while(x < cnt) { + y = cnt - x; + if(w) { + z = write(fd, buf + x, y); + } else { + z = read(fd, buf + x, y); + if (!z) return x; + } + if(z < 0) { + if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == ENOMEM) || (errno == ERESTART) || (errno == EINTR)) { + continue; + } + return x; + } + x += z; + } + return x; +} + +static char *loDev_get_FD_pass(int fd) +{ + char *p = NULL, *n; + int x = 0, y = 0; + + do { + if(y >= (x - 1)) { + x += 128; + /* Must enforce some max limit here -- this code */ + /* runs as part of mount, and mount is setuid root */ + /* and has used mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE) */ + if(x > (4*1024)) { + error_out: + if(p) { + memset(p, 0, y); + free(p); + } + return NULL; + } + n = malloc(x); + if(!n) goto error_out; + if(p) { + memcpy(n, p, y); + memset(p, 0, y); + free(p); + } + p = n; + } + if(loDev_rd_wr_retry(fd, p + y, 1, 0) != 1) break; + if((p[y] == '\n') || !p[y]) break; + y++; + } while(1); + if(p) p[y] = 0; + return p; +} + +static unsigned long long loDev_mystrtoull(char *s, int acceptAT) +{ + unsigned long long v = 0; + int negative = 0; + + while ((*s == ' ') || (*s == '\t')) + s++; + if (acceptAT && (*s == '@')) { + s++; + negative = 1; + } + if (*s == '0') { + s++; + if ((*s == 'x') || (*s == 'X')) { + s++; + sscanf(s, "%llx", &v); + } else { + sscanf(s, "%llo", &v); + } + } else { + sscanf(s, "%llu", &v); + } + return negative ? -v : v; +} + +static void loDev_warnAboutBadKeyData(struct libmnt_context *cxt, int x) +{ + if((x > 1) && (x != 64) && (x != 65)) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Warning: Unknown key data format - using it anyway")); + } +} + + +static int loDev_are_these_files_same(const char *name1, const char *name2) +{ + struct stat statbuf1; + struct stat statbuf2; + + if(!name1 || !*name1 || !name2 || !*name2) return 0; + if(stat(name1, &statbuf1)) return 0; + if(stat(name2, &statbuf2)) return 0; + if(statbuf1.st_dev != statbuf2.st_dev) return 0; + if(statbuf1.st_ino != statbuf2.st_ino) return 0; + return 1; /* are same */ +} + +static char *loDev_do_GPG_pipe(struct libmnt_context *cxt, loDev_passInfo *pi, char *pass) +{ + int x, pfdi[2], pfdo[2], failed = 0; + char str[10], *a[16], *e[2], *h; + pid_t gpid; + struct passwd *p; + void *oldSigPipeHandler; + + if((getuid() == 0) && pi->gpgHomeDir && pi->gpgHomeDir[0]) { + h = pi->gpgHomeDir; + } else { + if(!(p = getpwuid(getuid()))) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: Unable to detect home directory")); + return NULL; + } + h = p->pw_dir; + } + if(!(e[0] = malloc(strlen(h) + 6))) { + nomem1: + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: Unable to allocate memory")); + return NULL; + } + sprintf(e[0], "HOME=%s", h); + e[1] = 0; + + if(pipe(&pfdi[0])) { + nomem2: + free(e[0]); + goto nomem1; + } + if(pipe(&pfdo[0])) { + close(pfdi[0]); + close(pfdi[1]); + goto nomem2; + } + + /* + * When this code is run as part of mount, only root can set + * 'gpgKeyFile' and as such, only root can decide what file is opened + * below. However, since mount is usually setuid-root all non-root + * users can also open() the file too, but that file's contents are + * only piped to gpg. This readable-for-all is intended behaviour, + * and is very useful in situations where non-root users mount loop + * devices with their own gpg private key, and yet don't have access + * to the actual key used to encrypt loop device. + */ + if((x = open(pi->gpgKeyFile, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: unable to open gpg key file for reading")); + nomem3: + free(e[0]); + close(pfdo[0]); + close(pfdo[1]); + close(pfdi[0]); + close(pfdi[1]); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * If someone puts a gpg key file at beginning of device and + * puts the real file system at some offset into the device, + * this code extracts that gpg key file into a temp file so gpg + * won't end up reading whole device when decrypting the key file. + * + * Example of encrypted cdrom mount with 8192 bytes reserved for gpg key file: + * mount -t iso9660 /dev/cdrom /cdrom -o loop=/dev/loop0,encryption=AES128,gpgkey=/dev/cdrom,offset=8192 + * ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ + */ + if(pi->loopOffsetBytes && loDev_are_these_files_same(pi->loopFileName, pi->gpgKeyFile)) { + FILE *f; + char b[1024]; + long long cnt; + int cnt2, cnt3; + + cnt = loDev_mystrtoull(pi->loopOffsetBytes, 1); + if(cnt < 0) cnt = -cnt; + if(cnt > (1024 * 1024)) cnt = 1024 * 1024; /* sanity check */ + f = tmpfile(); + if(!f) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: unable to create temp file")); + close(x); + goto nomem3; + } + while(cnt > 0) { + cnt2 = sizeof(b); + if(cnt < cnt2) cnt2 = cnt; + cnt3 = loDev_rd_wr_retry(x, b, cnt2, 0); + if(cnt3 && (fwrite(b, cnt3, 1, f) != 1)) { + tmpWrErr: + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: unable to write to temp file")); + fclose(f); + close(x); + goto nomem3; + } + if(cnt2 != cnt3) break; + cnt -= cnt3; + } + if(fflush(f)) goto tmpWrErr; + close(x); + x = dup(fileno(f)); + fclose(f); + lseek(x, 0L, SEEK_SET); + } + + sprintf(str, "%d", pfdi[0]); + if(!(gpid = fork())) { + dup2(x, 0); + dup2(pfdo[1], 1); + close(x); + close(pfdi[1]); + close(pfdo[0]); + close(pfdo[1]); + if((x = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) >= 0) { + dup2(x, 2); + close(x); + } + x = 0; + a[x++] = "gpg"; + if(pi->gpgHomeDir && pi->gpgHomeDir[0]) { + a[x++] = "--homedir"; + a[x++] = pi->gpgHomeDir; + } + a[x++] = "--no-options"; + a[x++] = "--quiet"; + a[x++] = "--batch"; + a[x++] = "--no-tty"; + a[x++] = "--passphrase-fd"; + a[x++] = str; + a[x++] = "--decrypt"; + a[x] = 0; + if(setgid(getgid())) exit(1); + if(setuid(getuid())) exit(1); + for(x = 3; x < 1024; x++) { + if(x == pfdi[0]) continue; + close(x); + } + execve("/bin/gpg", &a[0], &e[0]); + execve("/usr/bin/gpg", &a[0], &e[0]); + execve("/usr/local/bin/gpg", &a[0], &e[0]); + exit(1); + } + free(e[0]); + close(x); + close(pfdi[0]); + close(pfdo[1]); + if(gpid == -1) { + close(pfdi[1]); + close(pfdo[0]); + goto nomem1; + } + + x = strlen(pass); + + /* ignore possible SIGPIPE signal while writing to gpg */ + oldSigPipeHandler = signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + loDev_rd_wr_retry(pfdi[1], pass, x, 1); + loDev_rd_wr_retry(pfdi[1], "\n", 1, 1); + if(oldSigPipeHandler != SIG_ERR) signal(SIGPIPE, oldSigPipeHandler); + + close(pfdi[1]); + memset(pass, 0, x); + x = 0; + while(x < 66) { + if(pi->multiKeyPass[x]) { + free(pi->multiKeyPass[x]); + pi->multiKeyPass[x] = NULL; + } + x++; + } + x = 0; + while(x < 66) { + pi->multiKeyPass[x] = loDev_get_FD_pass(pfdo[0]); + if(!pi->multiKeyPass[x]) { + /* mem alloc failed - abort */ + failed = 1; + break; + } + if(strlen(pi->multiKeyPass[x]) < LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) break; + x++; + } + loDev_warnAboutBadKeyData(cxt, x); + if(x >= 65) + pi->multiKeyMode = 65; + if(x == 64) + pi->multiKeyMode = 64; + close(pfdo[0]); + waitpid(gpid, &x, 0); + if(failed || !pi->multiKeyPass[0]) goto nomem1; + return pi->multiKeyPass[0]; +} + +/* password returned by this function must not be free()ed directly, because it + came from either cxt->pwd_get_cb() or is a duplicate of pi->multiKeyPass[0]. + cxt->pwd_release_cb() free()s the one that came from cxt->pwd_get_cb() and + pi->multiKeyPass[0] gets free()d with rest of pi->multiKeyPass[] pointers. + If this function actually malloc()s a pointer, a copy is at pi->extraPtrToFree */ +static char *loDev_sGetPass(struct libmnt_context *cxt, loDev_passInfo *pi, int minLen, int warnLen) +{ + char *p, *s, *seed; + int i, x; + + if(pi->clearTextKeyFile) { + if((i = open(pi->clearTextKeyFile, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: unable to open cleartext key file for reading")); + return NULL; + } + x = 0; + while(x < 66) { + pi->multiKeyPass[x] = loDev_get_FD_pass(i); + if(!pi->multiKeyPass[x]) { + close(i); + goto nomem; + } + if(strlen(pi->multiKeyPass[x]) < LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) break; + x++; + } + close(i); + loDev_warnAboutBadKeyData(cxt, x); + if(x >= 65) { + pi->multiKeyMode = 65; + return pi->multiKeyPass[0]; + } + if(x == 64) { + pi->multiKeyMode = 64; + return pi->multiKeyPass[0]; + } + p = pi->multiKeyPass[0]; + } else { + if(!cxt->pwd_get_cb) + return NULL; + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "asking for pass")); + p = pi->pass_cb_string = cxt->pwd_get_cb(cxt); + } + + if(!p) goto nomem; + if(pi->gpgKeyFile && pi->gpgKeyFile[0]) { + p = loDev_do_GPG_pipe(cxt, pi, p); + if(!p) return NULL; + if(!p[0]) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: gpg key file decryption failed")); + return NULL; + } + if(pi->multiKeyMode) return p; + } + i = strlen(p); + if(i < minLen) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: Password is too short")); + return NULL; + } + seed = pi->passSeedString; + if(!seed) seed = ""; + s = pi->extraPtrToFree = malloc(i + strlen(seed) + 1); + if(!s) { + memset(p, 0, i); + nomem: + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: Unable to allocate memory")); + return NULL; + } + strcpy(s, p); + memset(p, 0, i); + if(i < warnLen) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "WARNING - Please use longer password")); + } + strcat(s, seed); + return(s); +} + +/* this is for compatibility with historic loop-AES version */ +static void loDev_unhashed1_key_setup(unsigned char *keyStr, int ile, unsigned char *keyBuf, int bufSize) +{ + register int x, y, z, cnt = ile; + unsigned char *kp; + + memset(keyBuf, 0, bufSize); + kp = keyStr; + for(x = 0; x < (bufSize * 8); x += 6) { + y = *kp++; + if(--cnt <= 0) { + kp = keyStr; + cnt = ile; + } + if((y >= '0') && (y <= '9')) y -= '0'; + else if((y >= 'A') && (y <= 'Z')) y -= ('A' - 10); + else if((y >= 'a') && (y <= 'z')) y -= ('a' - 36); + else if((y == '.') || (y == '/')) y += (62 - '.'); + else y &= 63; + z = x >> 3; + if(z < bufSize) { + keyBuf[z] |= y << (x & 7); + } + z++; + if(z < bufSize) { + keyBuf[z] |= y >> (8 - (x & 7)); + } + } +} + +/* this is for compatibility with mainline mount */ +static void loDev_unhashed2_key_setup(unsigned char *keyStr, int ile, unsigned char *keyBuf, int bufSize) +{ + memset(keyBuf, 0, bufSize); + strncpy((char *)keyBuf, (char *)keyStr, bufSize - 1); + keyBuf[bufSize - 1] = 0; +} + +static void loDev_rmd160HashTwiceWithA(unsigned char *ib, int ile, unsigned char *ob, int ole) +{ + char tmpBuf[20 + 20]; + char pwdCopy[130]; + + if(ole < 1) return; + memset(ob, 0, ole); + if(ole > 40) ole = 40; + __loDev_rmd160_hash_buffer(&tmpBuf[0], (char *)ib, ile); + pwdCopy[0] = 'A'; + if(ile > sizeof(pwdCopy) - 1) ile = sizeof(pwdCopy) - 1; + memcpy(pwdCopy + 1, ib, ile); + __loDev_rmd160_hash_buffer(&tmpBuf[20], pwdCopy, ile + 1); + memcpy(ob, tmpBuf, ole); + memset(tmpBuf, 0, sizeof(tmpBuf)); + memset(pwdCopy, 0, sizeof(pwdCopy)); +} + +extern long long llseek(int, long long, int); + +static long long loDev_xx_lseek(int fd, long long offset, int whence) +{ + if(sizeof(off_t) >= 8) { + return lseek(fd, offset, whence); + } else { + return llseek(fd, offset, whence); + } +} + +static int loDev_create_random_keys(struct libmnt_context *cxt, char *partition, long long offset, long long sizelimit, int loopro, unsigned char *k) +{ + int x, y, fd; + sha512_context s; + unsigned char b[4096]; + + if(loopro) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: read-only device")); + return 1; + } + + /* + * Compute SHA-512 over first 40 KB of old fs data. SHA-512 hash + * output is then used as entropy for new fs encryption key. + */ + if((fd = open(partition, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + seekFailed: + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: unable to open/seek device")); + return 1; + } + if(offset < 0) offset = -offset; + if(loDev_xx_lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) { + close(fd); + goto seekFailed; + } + __loDev_sha512_init(&s); + for(x = 1; x <= 10; x++) { + if((sizelimit > 0) && ((sizeof(b) * x) > sizelimit)) break; + if(loDev_rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[0], sizeof(b), 0) != sizeof(b)) break; + __loDev_sha512_write(&s, &b[0], sizeof(b)); + } + __loDev_sha512_final(&s); + + /* + * Overwrite 40 KB of old fs data 20 times so that recovering + * SHA-512 output beyond this point is difficult and expensive. + */ + for(y = 0; y < 20; y++) { + int z; + struct { + struct timeval tv; + unsigned char h[64]; + int x,y,z; + } j; + if(loDev_xx_lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) break; + memcpy(&j.h[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + gettimeofday(&j.tv, NULL); + j.y = y; + for(x = 1; x <= 10; x++) { + j.x = x; + for(z = 0; z < sizeof(b); z += 64) { + j.z = z; + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer((unsigned char *)&j, sizeof(j), &b[z], 64); + } + if((sizelimit > 0) && ((sizeof(b) * x) > sizelimit)) break; + if(loDev_rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[0], sizeof(b), 1) != sizeof(b)) break; + } + memset(&j, 0, sizeof(j)); + if(fsync(fd)) break; + } + close(fd); + + /* + * Use all 512 bits of hash output + */ + memcpy(&b[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); + + /* + * Read 32 bytes of random entropy from kernel's random + * number generator. This code may be executed early on startup + * scripts and amount of random entropy may be non-existent. + * SHA-512 of old fs data is used as workaround for missing + * entropy in kernel's random number generator. + */ + if((fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: unable to open /dev/urandom")); + return 1; + } + loDev_rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[64], 32, 0); + + /* generate multi-key hashes */ + x = 0; + while(x < 65) { + loDev_rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[64+32], 16, 0); + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(&b[0], 64+32+16, k, 32); + k += 32; + x++; + } + + close(fd); + memset(&b[0], 0, sizeof(b)); + return 0; +} + +static int loDev_fork_mkfs_command(struct libmnt_context *cxt, char *device, char *fstype) +{ + int x, y = 0; + char *a[10], *e[2]; + + sync(); + if(!(x = fork())) { + if((x = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) >= 0) { + dup2(x, 0); + dup2(x, 1); + dup2(x, 2); + close(x); + } + x = 0; + a[x++] = "mkfs"; + a[x++] = "-t"; + a[x++] = fstype; + /* mkfs.reiserfs and mkfs.xfs need -f option */ + if(!strcmp(fstype, "reiserfs") || !strcmp(fstype, "xfs")) { + a[x++] = "-f"; + } + a[x++] = device; + a[x] = 0; + e[0] = "PATH=/sbin:/usr/sbin"; + e[1] = 0; + if(setgid(getgid())) exit(1); + if(setuid(getuid())) exit(1); + for(x = 3; x < 1024; x++) { + close(x); + } + execve("/sbin/mkfs", &a[0], &e[0]); + exit(1); + } + if(x == -1) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: fork failed")); + return 1; + } + waitpid(x, &y, 0); + sync(); + if(!WIFEXITED(y) || (WEXITSTATUS(y) != 0)) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "Error: encrypted file system mkfs failed")); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void loDev_convert_info_to_info64(struct loop_info *info, struct loop_info64 *info64) +{ + memset(info64, 0, sizeof(*info64)); + info64->lo_number = info->lo_number; + info64->lo_device = info->lo_device; + info64->lo_inode = info->lo_inode; + info64->lo_rdevice = info->lo_rdevice; + info64->lo_offset = info->lo_offset; + info64->lo_encrypt_type = info->lo_encrypt_type; + info64->lo_encrypt_key_size = info->lo_encrypt_key_size; + info64->lo_flags = info->lo_flags; + info64->lo_init[0] = info->lo_init[0]; + info64->lo_init[1] = info->lo_init[1]; + info64->lo_sizelimit = 0; + if (info->lo_encrypt_type == 18) /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + memcpy(info64->lo_crypt_name, info->lo_name, sizeof(info64->lo_crypt_name)); + else + memcpy(info64->lo_file_name, info->lo_name, sizeof(info64->lo_file_name)); + memcpy(info64->lo_encrypt_key, info->lo_encrypt_key, sizeof(info64->lo_encrypt_key)); +} + +static int loDev_convert_info64_to_info(struct loop_info64 *info64, struct loop_info *info) +{ + memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); + info->lo_number = info64->lo_number; + info->lo_device = info64->lo_device; + info->lo_inode = info64->lo_inode; + info->lo_rdevice = info64->lo_rdevice; + info->lo_offset = info64->lo_offset; + info->lo_encrypt_type = info64->lo_encrypt_type; + info->lo_encrypt_key_size = info64->lo_encrypt_key_size; + info->lo_flags = info64->lo_flags; + info->lo_init[0] = info64->lo_init[0]; + info->lo_init[1] = info64->lo_init[1]; + if (info->lo_encrypt_type == 18) /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + memcpy(info->lo_name, info64->lo_crypt_name, sizeof(info->lo_name)); + else + memcpy(info->lo_name, info64->lo_file_name, sizeof(info->lo_name)); + memcpy(info->lo_encrypt_key, info64->lo_encrypt_key, sizeof(info->lo_encrypt_key)); + + /* error in case values were truncated */ + if (info->lo_device != info64->lo_device || + info->lo_rdevice != info64->lo_rdevice || + info->lo_inode != info64->lo_inode || + info->lo_offset != info64->lo_offset || + info64->lo_sizelimit) { + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int loDev_set_status64_ioctl(int fd, struct loop_info64 *info64) +{ + struct loop_info info; + struct loop_info64 tmp; + int r; + + /* + * This ugly work around is needed because some + * Red Hat kernels are using same ioctl code: + * #define LOOP_CHANGE_FD 0x4C04 + * vs. + * #define LOOP_SET_STATUS64 0x4C04 + * that is used by modern loop driver. + * + * Attempt to detect presense of LOOP_GET_STATUS64 + * ioctl before issuing LOOP_SET_STATUS64 ioctl. + * Red Hat kernels with above LOOP_CHANGE_FD damage + * should return -1 and set errno to EINVAL. + */ + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &tmp); + memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + if ((r == 0) || (errno != EINVAL)) { + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_SET_STATUS64, info64); + if (!r) + return 0; + } + r = loDev_convert_info64_to_info(info64, &info); + if (!r) + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_SET_STATUS, &info); + + /* don't leave copies of encryption key on stack */ + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + return r; +} + +static int loDev_get_status64_ioctl(int fd, struct loop_info64 *info64) +{ + struct loop_info info; + int r; + + memset(info64, 0, sizeof(*info64)); + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, info64); + if (!r) + return 0; + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS, &info); + if (!r) + loDev_convert_info_to_info64(&info, info64); + + /* don't leave copies of encryption key on stack */ + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + return r; +} + +/* returns: 1=unused 0=busy */ +static int loDev_is_unused_loop_device(int fd) +{ + struct loop_info64 info64; + struct loop_info info; + int r; + + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &info64); + memset(&info64, 0, sizeof(info64)); + if (!r) + return 0; + if (errno == ENXIO) + return 1; + + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS, &info); + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + if (!r) + return 0; + if (errno == ENXIO) + return 1; + if (errno == EOVERFLOW) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +struct loDev_crypt_type_struct { + short int id; + unsigned char flags; /* bit0 = show keybits, bit1 = add '-' before keybits */ + unsigned char keyBytes; + char *name; +}; + +static struct loDev_crypt_type_struct loDev_crypt_type_tbl[] = { + { 0, 0, 0, "no" }, + { 0, 0, 0, "none" }, + { 1, 0, 0, "xor" }, + { 3, 1, 16, "twofish" }, + { 4, 1, 16, "blowfish" }, + { 7, 1, 16, "serpent" }, + { 8, 1, 16, "mars" }, + { 11, 3, 16, "rc6" }, + { 12, 0, 21, "tripleDES" }, + { 12, 0, 24, "3des" }, + { 12, 0, 24, "des3_ede" }, + { 16, 1, 16, "AES" }, + { -1, 0, 0, NULL } +}; + +static char *loDev_getApiName(char *e, int *len) +{ + int x, y, z = 1, q = -1; + unsigned char *s; + + *len = y = 0; + s = (unsigned char *)strdup(e); + if(!s) + return NULL; + x = strlen((char *)s); + while(x > 0) { + x--; + if(!isdigit(s[x])) + break; + y += (s[x] - '0') * z; + z *= 10; + q = x; + } + while(x >= 0) { + s[x] = tolower(s[x]); + if(s[x] == '-') + s[x] = 0; + x--; + } + if(y >= 40) { + if(q >= 0) + s[q] = 0; + *len = y; + } + return((char *)s); +} + +static int loDev_crypt_type_fn(const char *name, u_int32_t *kbyp, char **apiName) +{ + int i, k; + char *s; + + *apiName = s = loDev_getApiName((char *)name, &k); + if(!s) s = ""; + if(k < 0) + k = 0; + if(k > 256) + k = 256; + for (i = 0; loDev_crypt_type_tbl[i].id != -1; i++) { + if (!strcasecmp (s , loDev_crypt_type_tbl[i].name)) { + *kbyp = k ? k >> 3 : loDev_crypt_type_tbl[i].keyBytes; + return loDev_crypt_type_tbl[i].id; + } + } + *kbyp = 16; /* 128 bits */ + return 18; /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ +} + +static int loDev_try_cryptoapi_interface(int fd, struct loop_info64 *loopinfo, char *apiName) +{ + if(!apiName) apiName = ""; + snprintf((char *)loopinfo->lo_crypt_name, sizeof(loopinfo->lo_crypt_name), "%s-cbc", apiName); + loopinfo->lo_crypt_name[LO_NAME_SIZE - 1] = 0; + loopinfo->lo_encrypt_type = 18; /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + return(loDev_set_status64_ioctl(fd, loopinfo)); +} + +static int loDev_is_loop_device(const char *device) +{ + struct stat statbuf; + + return (stat(device, &statbuf) == 0 && + S_ISBLK(statbuf.st_mode) && + major(statbuf.st_rdev) == 7); +} + +int __loDev_is_loop_active_same_back(char *dev, char *backdev, char *offsetStr, char *sizelimitStr) +{ + int fd; + int ret = 0; + struct stat statbuf; + struct loop_info64 loopinfo; + uint64_t offset = 0, sizelimit = 0; + + if(offsetStr) + offset = loDev_mystrtoull(offsetStr, 1); + if(sizelimitStr) + sizelimit = loDev_mystrtoull(sizelimitStr, 0); + + if (stat (dev, &statbuf) == 0 && S_ISBLK(statbuf.st_mode) && major(statbuf.st_rdev) == 7) { + if(stat (backdev, &statbuf) != 0) + return 0; + fd = open (dev, O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return 0; + if ((loDev_get_status64_ioctl(fd, &loopinfo) == 0) + && (loopinfo.lo_offset == offset) + && (loopinfo.lo_sizelimit == sizelimit) + && (statbuf.st_dev == loopinfo.lo_device) + && (statbuf.st_ino == loopinfo.lo_inode)) + ret = 1; /* backing device matches */ + memset(&loopinfo, 0, sizeof(loopinfo)); + close(fd); + } + return ret; +} + +#define SIZE(a) (sizeof(a)/sizeof(a[0])) + +static char * loDev_find_unused_loop_device(void) +{ + /* Just creating a device, say in /tmp, is probably a bad idea - + people might have problems with backup or so. + So, we just try /dev/loop[0-7]. */ + char dev[20]; + char *loop_formats[] = { "/dev/loop%d", "/dev/loop/%d" }; + int i, j, fd, somedev = 0, someloop = 0; + struct stat statbuf; + + for (j = 0; j < SIZE(loop_formats); j++) { + for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + sprintf(dev, loop_formats[j], i); + if (stat (dev, &statbuf) == 0 && S_ISBLK(statbuf.st_mode)) { + somedev++; + fd = open (dev, O_RDONLY); + if (fd >= 0) { + if (loDev_is_unused_loop_device(fd) == 0) + someloop++; /* in use */ + else if (errno == ENXIO) { + close (fd); + return strdup(dev);/* probably free */ + } + close (fd); + } + continue;/* continue trying as long as devices exist */ + } + break; + } + } + return 0; +} + +int mnt_context_is_loopdev(struct libmnt_context *cxt) +{ + const char *type, *src; + + assert(cxt); + + /* The mount flags have to be merged, otherwise we have to use + * expensive mnt_context_get_user_mflags() instead of cxt->user_mountflags. */ + assert((cxt->flags & MNT_FL_MOUNTFLAGS_MERGED)); + + if (!cxt->fs) + return 0; + src = mnt_fs_get_srcpath(cxt->fs); + if (!src) + return 0; /* backing file not set */ + + if (cxt->user_mountflags & (MNT_MS_LOOP | + MNT_MS_OFFSET | + MNT_MS_SIZELIMIT)) { + + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loopdev specific options detected")); + return 1; + } + + if (cxt->mountflags & (MS_BIND | MS_MOVE | MS_PROPAGATION)) + return 0; + + /* Automatically create a loop device from a regular file if a + * filesystem is not specified or the filesystem is known for libblkid + * (these filesystems work with block devices only). The file size + * should be at least 1KiB otherwise we will create empty loopdev where + * is no mountable filesystem... + * + * Note that there is not a restriction (on kernel side) that prevents regular + * file as a mount(2) source argument. A filesystem that is able to mount + * regular files could be implemented. + */ + type = mnt_fs_get_fstype(cxt->fs); + + if (mnt_fs_is_regular(cxt->fs) && + (!type || strcmp(type, "auto") == 0 || blkid_known_fstype(type))) { + struct stat st; + + if (stat(src, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && + st.st_size > 1024) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* Check, if there already exists a mounted loop device on the mountpoint node + * with the same parameters. + */ +static int is_mounted_same_loopfile(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + const char *target, + char *backing_file, + char *offsetStr, char *sizelimitStr) +{ + struct libmnt_table *tb; + struct libmnt_iter itr; + struct libmnt_fs *fs; + struct libmnt_cache *cache; + + assert(cxt); + assert(cxt->fs); + assert((cxt->flags & MNT_FL_MOUNTFLAGS_MERGED)); + + if (!target || !backing_file || mnt_context_get_mtab(cxt, &tb)) + return 0; + + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "checking if %s mounted on %s", + backing_file, target)); + + cache = mnt_context_get_cache(cxt); + mnt_reset_iter(&itr, MNT_ITER_BACKWARD); + + /* Search for mountpoint node in mtab, procceed if any of these has the + * loop option set or the device is a loop device + */ + while (mnt_table_next_fs(tb, &itr, &fs) == 0) { + const char *src = mnt_fs_get_source(fs); + const char *opts = mnt_fs_get_user_options(fs); + char *val; + size_t len; + int res = 0; + + if (!src || !mnt_fs_match_target(fs, target, cache)) + continue; + + if (strncmp(src, "/dev/loop", 9) == 0) { + res = __loDev_is_loop_active_same_back((char *) src, backing_file, offsetStr, sizelimitStr); + + } else if (opts && (cxt->user_mountflags & MNT_MS_LOOP) && + mnt_optstr_get_option(opts, "loop", &val, &len) == 0 && val) { + + val = strndup(val, len); + res = __loDev_is_loop_active_same_back((char *) val, backing_file, offsetStr, sizelimitStr); + free(val); + } + + if (res) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "%s already mounted", backing_file)); + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mnt_context_setup_loopdev(struct libmnt_context *cxt) +{ + int loop_dev_fd = -1, backing_fi_fd = -1; + loDev_passInfo pi; + struct loop_info64 loopinfo; + int i; + char *pass = NULL, *apiName = NULL; + void (*hashFunc)(unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); + unsigned char multiKeyBits[65][32]; + int minPassLen = LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH; + int run_mkfs_command = 0; + int mode = O_RDWR; + int fixedLoopName = 0; + unsigned int chmodVal = 0; + const char *optstr; + char *val = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + int rc = 0, myErrno = 0; + uint64_t offset = 0, sizelimit = 0; + + + memset(&pi, 0, sizeof(pi)); + assert(cxt); + assert(cxt->fs); + assert((cxt->flags & MNT_FL_MOUNTFLAGS_MERGED)); + cxt->loopdev_fd = -1; + + pi.loopFileName = (char *) mnt_fs_get_srcpath(cxt->fs); + if (!pi.loopFileName) + return -EINVAL; + + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "trying to setup loopdev for %s", pi.loopFileName)); + + if (cxt->mountflags & MS_RDONLY) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "enabling READ-ONLY flag")); + mode = O_RDONLY; + } + + optstr = mnt_fs_get_user_options(cxt->fs); + +#define MM(a,b) if(mnt_optstr_get_option(optstr, a, &val, &len) == 0 && val && len) { \ + if(!(b = strndup(val, len))) rc = -ENOMEM; \ + } + + MM("loop", pi.loopDevName); + MM("offset", pi.loopOffsetBytes); + MM("sizelimit", pi.loopSizeBytes); + MM("encryption", pi.loopEncryptionType); + MM("pseed", pi.passSeedString); + MM("phash", pi.passHashFuncName); + MM("itercountk", pi.passIterThousands); + MM("loinit", pi.loInitValue); + MM("gpgkey", pi.gpgKeyFile); + MM("gpghome", pi.gpgHomeDir); + MM("cleartextkey", pi.clearTextKeyFile); + +#undef MM + + if(pi.loopOffsetBytes) + offset = loDev_mystrtoull(pi.loopOffsetBytes, 1); + if(pi.loopSizeBytes) + sizelimit = loDev_mystrtoull(pi.loopSizeBytes, 0); + + if (rc == 0 && is_mounted_same_loopfile(cxt, mnt_context_get_target(cxt), pi.loopFileName, pi.loopOffsetBytes, pi.loopSizeBytes)) + rc = -EBUSY; + if (rc) + goto clean_up_out; + if(pi.loopDevName) { + fixedLoopName = 1; + if(__loDev_is_loop_active_same_back(pi.loopDevName, pi.loopFileName, pi.loopOffsetBytes, pi.loopSizeBytes)) { + /* loop device appears to be already set up to same backing file, so skip most of loop setup */ + /* this is useful for encrypted losetup -> fsck -> mount, where passphrase needs to be typed only once */ + rc = mnt_fs_set_source(cxt->fs, pi.loopDevName); + if(rc) goto clean_up_out; + goto skip_setup_ok_out; + } + } else if(cxt->fs && mnt_optstr_get_option(optstr, "loop", &val, &len) != 0) { + /* Looks like no "loop" option at all. Add one so it gets cleaned up by umount */ + mnt_optstr_append_option(&cxt->fs->user_optstr, "loop", NULL); + } + if((backing_fi_fd = open(pi.loopFileName, mode)) < 0) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "can't open backing device/file")); + myErrno = ENODEV; + rc = -MNT_ERR_LOOPDEV; + goto clean_up_out; + } + +try_again_another_loopdev: + sync(); + if(!pi.loopDevName) { + pi.loopDevName = loDev_find_unused_loop_device(); + if(!pi.loopDevName) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "can't find free loop device")); + myErrno = ENODEV; + rc = -MNT_ERR_LOOPDEV; + goto clean_up_out; + } + } + if((loop_dev_fd = open(pi.loopDevName, mode)) < 0) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "can't open loop device")); + myErrno = ENODEV; + rc = -MNT_ERR_LOOPDEV; + goto clean_up_out; + } + if(ioctl(loop_dev_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, backing_fi_fd) < 0) { + if(errno == EBUSY && !fixedLoopName) { + close(loop_dev_fd); + loop_dev_fd = -1; + free(pi.loopDevName); + pi.loopDevName = NULL; + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loopdev stolen...trying again")); + goto try_again_another_loopdev; + } + close(loop_dev_fd); + loop_dev_fd = -1; + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loop set-fd ioctl failed")); + myErrno = EBUSY; + rc = -MNT_ERR_LOOPDEV; + goto clean_up_out; + } + + memset(&loopinfo, 0, sizeof (loopinfo)); + strncpy((char *)loopinfo.lo_file_name, pi.loopFileName, LO_NAME_SIZE - 1); + loopinfo.lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE - 1] = 0; + if(pi.loopEncryptionType) + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type = loDev_crypt_type_fn(pi.loopEncryptionType, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size, &apiName); + loopinfo.lo_offset = offset; + loopinfo.lo_sizelimit = sizelimit; + + switch(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type) { + case 0: /* LO_CRYPT_NONE */ + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 0; + break; + case 1: /* LO_CRYPT_XOR */ + pass = loDev_sGetPass(cxt, &pi, 1, 0); + if(!pass) { + myErrno = ENOKEY; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + strncpy((char *)loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key, pass, LO_KEY_SIZE - 1); + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[LO_KEY_SIZE - 1] = 0; + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = strlen((char*)loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key); + break; + case 3: /* LO_CRYPT_FISH2 */ + case 4: /* LO_CRYPT_BLOW */ + case 7: /* LO_CRYPT_SERPENT */ + case 8: /* LO_CRYPT_MARS */ + case 11: /* LO_CRYPT_RC6 */ + case 12: /* LO_CRYPT_DES_EDE3 */ + case 16: /* LO_CRYPT_AES */ + case 18: /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + /* set default hash function */ + hashFunc = __loDev_sha256_hash_buffer; + if(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size == 24) hashFunc = __loDev_sha384_hash_buffer; + if(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size == 32) hashFunc = __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer; + /* possibly override default hash function */ + if(pi.passHashFuncName) { + if(!strcasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "sha256")) { + hashFunc = __loDev_sha256_hash_buffer; + } else if(!strcasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "sha384")) { + hashFunc = __loDev_sha384_hash_buffer; + } else if(!strcasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "sha512")) { + hashFunc = __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer; + } else if(!strcasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "rmd160")) { + hashFunc = loDev_rmd160HashTwiceWithA; + minPassLen = 1; + } else if(!strcasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "unhashed1")) { + hashFunc = loDev_unhashed1_key_setup; + } else if(!strcasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "unhashed2")) { + hashFunc = loDev_unhashed2_key_setup; + minPassLen = 1; + } else if(!strncasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "random", 6) && ((pi.passHashFuncName[6] == 0) || (pi.passHashFuncName[6] == '/'))) { + /* random hash type sets up 65 random keys */ + /* WARNING! DO NOT USE RANDOM HASH TYPE ON PARTITION WITH EXISTING */ + /* IMPORTANT DATA ON IT. RANDOM HASH TYPE WILL DESTROY YOUR DATA. */ + if(loDev_create_random_keys(cxt, pi.loopFileName, loopinfo.lo_offset, loopinfo.lo_sizelimit, cxt->mountflags & MS_RDONLY, &multiKeyBits[0][0])) { + myErrno = ENOKEY; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + memcpy(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], &multiKeyBits[0][0], sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + run_mkfs_command = pi.multiKeyMode = 1000; + break; /* out of switch(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type) */ + } + } + pass = loDev_sGetPass(cxt, &pi, minPassLen, LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH); + if(!pass) { + myErrno = ENOKEY; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + i = strlen(pass); + if(hashFunc == loDev_unhashed1_key_setup) { + /* this is for compatibility with historic loop-AES version */ + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 16; /* 128 bits */ + if(i >= 32) loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 24; /* 192 bits */ + if(i >= 43) loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 32; /* 256 bits */ + } + (*hashFunc)((unsigned char *)pass, i, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + if(pi.multiKeyMode) { + int r = 0, t; + while(r < pi.multiKeyMode) { + t = strlen(pi.multiKeyPass[r]); + (*hashFunc)((unsigned char *)pi.multiKeyPass[r], t, &multiKeyBits[r][0], 32); + memset(pi.multiKeyPass[r], 0, t); + /* + * MultiKeyMode uses md5 IV. One key mode uses sector IV. Sector IV + * and md5 IV v2 and v3 are all computed differently. This first key + * byte XOR with 0x55/0xF4 is needed to cause complete decrypt failure + * in cases where data is encrypted with one type of IV and decrypted + * with another type IV. If identical key was used but only IV was + * computed differently, only first plaintext block of 512 byte CBC + * chain would decrypt incorrectly and rest would decrypt correctly. + * Partially correct decryption is dangerous. Decrypting all blocks + * incorrectly is safer because file system mount will simply fail. + */ + if(pi.multiKeyMode == 65) { + multiKeyBits[r][0] ^= 0xF4; /* version 3 */ + } else { + multiKeyBits[r][0] ^= 0x55; /* version 2 */ + } + r++; + } + } else if(pi.passIterThousands) { + aes_context ctx; + unsigned long iter = 0; + unsigned char tempkey[32]; + /* + * Set up AES-256 encryption key using same password and hash function + * as before but with password bit 0 flipped before hashing. That key + * is then used to encrypt actual loop key 'itercountk' thousand times. + */ + pass[0] ^= 1; + (*hashFunc)((unsigned char *)pass, i, &tempkey[0], 32); + __loDev_aes_set_key(&ctx, &tempkey[0], 32, 0); + sscanf(pi.passIterThousands, "%lu", &iter); + iter *= 1000; + while(iter > 0) { + /* encrypt both 128bit blocks with AES-256 */ + __loDev_aes_encrypt(&ctx, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[ 0], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[ 0]); + __loDev_aes_encrypt(&ctx, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16]); + /* exchange upper half of first block with lower half of second block */ + memcpy(&tempkey[0], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[8], 8); + memcpy(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[8], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16], 8); + memcpy(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16], &tempkey[0], 8); + iter--; + } + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + memset(&tempkey[0], 0, sizeof(tempkey)); + } + memset(pass, 0, i); /* erase original password */ + break; + default: + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "don't know how to set up this type encryption")); + myErrno = ENOKEY; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + + if(pi.loInitValue) { + /* cipher modules are free to do whatever they want with this value */ + i = 0; + sscanf(pi.loInitValue, "%d", &i); + loopinfo.lo_init[0] = i; + } + + /* type 18 == LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + if ((loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type == 18) || (loDev_set_status64_ioctl(loop_dev_fd, &loopinfo) < 0)) { + /* direct cipher interface failed - try CryptoAPI interface now */ + if(!apiName || (loDev_try_cryptoapi_interface(loop_dev_fd, &loopinfo, apiName) < 0)) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loop set-status ioctl failed")); + myErrno = ENOTSUP; + loop_clr_fd_out: + (void) ioctl(loop_dev_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0); + rc = -MNT_ERR_LOOPDEV; + goto clean_up_out; + } + } + if(pi.multiKeyMode >= 65) { + if(ioctl(loop_dev_fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP_V3, &multiKeyBits[0][0]) < 0) { + if(pi.multiKeyMode == 1000) goto try_v2_setup; + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loop multi-key-v3 ioctl failed")); + myErrno = ENOTSUP; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + } else if(pi.multiKeyMode == 64) { + try_v2_setup: + if((ioctl(loop_dev_fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP, &multiKeyBits[0][0]) < 0) && (pi.multiKeyMode != 1000)) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loop multi-key-v2 ioctl failed")); + myErrno = ENOTSUP; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + } + + if(run_mkfs_command && cxt->fs && cxt->fs->fstype && cxt->fs->fstype[0] && (getuid() == 0)) { + if(!loDev_fork_mkfs_command(cxt, pi.loopDevName, cxt->fs->fstype)) { + /* !strncasecmp(pi.passHashFuncName, "random", 6) test matched */ + /* This reads octal mode for newly created file system root */ + /* directory node from '-o phash=random/1777' mount option. */ + /* octal mode--^^^^ */ + if(sscanf(pi.passHashFuncName + 6, "/%o", &chmodVal) == 1) { + /* bits 31...24 set to magic value, so that if something */ + /* interprets cxt->loopdev_fd as a file descriptor, it will fail */ + chmodVal &= 0x00FFFFFF; + chmodVal |= 0x77000000; + } + + } else { + myErrno = ENOMEM; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + } + + rc = mnt_fs_set_source(cxt->fs, pi.loopDevName); + if(rc) { + myErrno = ENOMEM; + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + +skip_setup_ok_out: + /* success */ + cxt->flags |= MNT_FL_LOOPDEV_READY; + if(chmodVal) { + cxt->loopdev_fd = (int)chmodVal; + } + +clean_up_out: + if(loop_dev_fd != -1) close(loop_dev_fd); + if(backing_fi_fd != -1) close(backing_fi_fd); + + memset(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key, 0, sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + memset(&multiKeyBits[0][0], 0, sizeof(multiKeyBits)); + + for(i = 0; i < 66; i++) { + if(pi.multiKeyPass[i]) free(pi.multiKeyPass[i]); + } + if(pi.loopDevName) free(pi.loopDevName); + if(pi.loopOffsetBytes) free(pi.loopOffsetBytes); + if(pi.loopSizeBytes) free(pi.loopSizeBytes); + if(pi.loopEncryptionType) free(pi.loopEncryptionType); + if(pi.passSeedString) free(pi.passSeedString); + if(pi.passHashFuncName) free(pi.passHashFuncName); + if(pi.passIterThousands) free(pi.passIterThousands); + if(pi.loInitValue) free(pi.loInitValue); + if(pi.gpgKeyFile) free(pi.gpgKeyFile); + if(pi.gpgHomeDir) free(pi.gpgHomeDir); + if(pi.clearTextKeyFile) free(pi.clearTextKeyFile); + + if(apiName) free(apiName); + if(pi.extraPtrToFree) free(pi.extraPtrToFree); + + if(pi.pass_cb_string && cxt->pwd_release_cb) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "release pass")); + cxt->pwd_release_cb(cxt, pi.pass_cb_string); + } + if(myErrno) errno = myErrno; + return rc; +} + +/* + * Deletes loop device + */ +int mnt_context_delete_loopdev(struct libmnt_context *cxt) +{ + const char *src; + int rc = 0, fd; + + assert(cxt); + assert(cxt->fs); + + src = mnt_fs_get_srcpath(cxt->fs); + if (!src) + return -EINVAL; + + if(!loDev_is_loop_device(src)) + return -EINVAL; + + sync(); + if((fd = open(src, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "can't open loop device")); + rc = -ENODEV; + } else { + if(ioctl(fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0) < 0) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loop crl-fd ioctl failed")); + rc = -EINVAL; + } + close(fd); + } + cxt->flags &= ~MNT_FL_LOOPDEV_READY; + cxt->loopdev_fd = -1; + + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "loopdev deleted [rc=%d]", rc)); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Clears loopdev stuff in context, should be called after + * failed or successful mount(2). + */ +int mnt_context_clear_loopdev(struct libmnt_context *cxt) +{ + unsigned int chmodVal; + + assert(cxt); + + if(mnt_context_get_status(cxt) == 0 && (cxt->flags & MNT_FL_LOOPDEV_READY)) { + /* mount(2) failed, delete loopdev */ + mnt_context_delete_loopdev(cxt); + } else if(cxt->loopdev_fd != -1) { + chmodVal = (unsigned int) cxt->loopdev_fd; + if((chmodVal & 0xFF000000) == 0x77000000) { /* check magic value */ + chmodVal &= 0x00FFFFFF; + if(cxt->fs && cxt->fs->target && cxt->fs->target[0]) { + /* + * If loop was set up using random keys and new file system + * was created on the loop device, initial permissions for + * file system root directory need to be set here. + */ + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "doing chmod() on mountpoint")); + if(chmod(cxt->fs->target, chmodVal)) { + DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, "chmod() on mountpoint failed")); + } + } + } + } + cxt->loopdev_fd = -1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/libmount/src/context_umount.c b/libmount/src/context_umount.c index f3d473f..9c71e65 100644 --- a/libmount/src/context_umount.c +++ b/libmount/src/context_umount.c @@ -303,11 +303,12 @@ static int lookup_umount_fs(struct libmnt_context *cxt) */ static int is_associated_fs(const char *devname, struct libmnt_fs *fs) { - uintmax_t offset = 0; + int r; const char *src; char *val, *optstr; size_t valsz; - int flags = 0; + char *offsetStr = NULL, *sizelimitStr = NULL; + extern int __loDev_is_loop_active_same_back(char *, char *, char *, char *); /* check if it begins with /dev/loop */ if (strncmp(devname, _PATH_DEV_LOOP, sizeof(_PATH_DEV_LOOP) - 1)) @@ -319,16 +320,16 @@ static int is_associated_fs(const char *devname, struct libmnt_fs *fs) /* check for the offset option in @fs */ optstr = (char *) mnt_fs_get_user_options(fs); - - if (optstr && - mnt_optstr_get_option(optstr, "offset", &val, &valsz) == 0) { - flags |= LOOPDEV_FL_OFFSET; - - if (mnt_parse_offset(val, valsz, &offset) != 0) - return 0; - } - - return loopdev_is_used(devname, src, offset, flags); + if (optstr) { + if(mnt_optstr_get_option(optstr, "offset", &val, &valsz) == 0 && val && valsz) + offsetStr = strndup(val, valsz); + if(mnt_optstr_get_option(optstr, "sizelimit", &val, &valsz) == 0 && val && valsz) + sizelimitStr = strndup(val, valsz); + } + r = __loDev_is_loop_active_same_back((char *) devname, (char *) src, offsetStr, sizelimitStr); + if(offsetStr) free(offsetStr); + if(sizelimitStr) free(sizelimitStr); + return r; } static int prepare_helper_from_options(struct libmnt_context *cxt, @@ -788,7 +789,7 @@ int mnt_context_prepare_umount(struct libmnt_context *cxt) if (!rc && mnt_context_is_loopdel(cxt) && cxt->fs) { const char *src = mnt_fs_get_srcpath(cxt->fs); - if (src && (!is_loopdev(src) || loopdev_is_autoclear(src))) + if (src && !is_loopdev(src)) mnt_context_enable_loopdel(cxt, FALSE); } diff --git a/libmount/src/optmap.c b/libmount/src/optmap.c index 3ad7727..834b7a0 100644 --- a/libmount/src/optmap.c +++ b/libmount/src/optmap.c @@ -161,10 +161,19 @@ static const struct libmnt_optmap userspace_opts_map[] = { "comment=", MNT_MS_COMMENT, MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB },/* fstab comment only */ { "x-", MNT_MS_XCOMMENT, MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB | MNT_PREFIX }, /* x- options */ - { "loop[=]", MNT_MS_LOOP, MNT_NOHLPS }, /* use the loop device */ + { "loop[=]", MNT_MS_LOOP, MNT_NOHLPS }, /* use the loop device (no MNT_NOMTAB flag) */ { "offset=", MNT_MS_OFFSET, MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device offset */ { "sizelimit=", MNT_MS_SIZELIMIT, MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device size limit */ - { "encryption=", MNT_MS_ENCRYPTION, MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device encryption */ +/* IMPORTANT - make sure that bit numbers below do not conflict with other MNT_MS_* bit numbers in libmount.h.in */ + { "encryption=", (1 << 23), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device encryption */ + { "pseed=", (1 << 24), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device passphrase seed */ + { "phash=", (1 << 25), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device passphrase hash function */ + { "itercountk=", (1 << 26), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device passphrase iteration count */ + { "loinit=", (1 << 27), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device initialization code */ + { "gpgkey=", (1 << 28), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device GnuPG key file */ + { "gpghome=", (1 << 29), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device GnuPG home directory */ + { "cleartextkey=", (1 << 30), MNT_NOHLPS | MNT_NOMTAB }, /* loop device clear text key file */ +/* end IMPORTANT */ { "nofail", MNT_MS_NOFAIL, MNT_NOMTAB }, /* Do not fail if ENOENT on dev */ diff --git a/libmount/src/rmd160.c b/libmount/src/rmd160.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db2b6c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/libmount/src/rmd160.c @@ -0,0 +1,532 @@ +/* rmd160.c - RIPE-MD160 + * Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + */ + +/* This file was part of GnuPG. Modified for use within the Linux + * mount utility by Marc Mutz . None of this code is + * by myself. I just removed everything that you don't need when all + * you want to do is to use rmd160_hash_buffer(). + * My comments are marked with (mm). */ + +/* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA */ + +#include /* (mm) for memcpy */ +#include /* (mm) for BIG_ENDIAN and BYTE_ORDER */ +#include "rmd160.h" + +/* (mm) these are used by the original GnuPG file. In order to modify + * that file not too much, we keep the notations. maybe it would be + * better to include linux/types.h and typedef __u32 to u32 and __u8 + * to byte? */ +typedef unsigned int u32; /* taken from e.g. util-linux's minix.h */ +typedef unsigned char byte; + +typedef struct { + u32 h0,h1,h2,h3,h4; + u32 nblocks; + byte buf[64]; + int count; +} RMD160_CONTEXT; + +/**************** + * Rotate a 32 bit integer by n bytes + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__) +static inline u32 +rol( u32 x, int n) +{ + __asm__("roll %%cl,%0" + :"=r" (x) + :"0" (x),"c" (n)); + return x; +} +#else + #define rol(x,n) ( ((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))) ) +#endif + +/********************************* + * RIPEMD-160 is not patented, see (as of 25.10.97) + * http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html + * Note that the code uses Little Endian byteorder, which is good for + * 386 etc, but we must add some conversion when used on a big endian box. + * + * + * Pseudo-code for RIPEMD-160 + * + * RIPEMD-160 is an iterative hash function that operates on 32-bit words. + * The round function takes as input a 5-word chaining variable and a 16-word + * message block and maps this to a new chaining variable. All operations are + * defined on 32-bit words. Padding is identical to that of MD4. + * + * + * RIPEMD-160: definitions + * + * + * nonlinear functions at bit level: exor, mux, -, mux, - + * + * f(j, x, y, z) = x XOR y XOR z (0 <= j <= 15) + * f(j, x, y, z) = (x AND y) OR (NOT(x) AND z) (16 <= j <= 31) + * f(j, x, y, z) = (x OR NOT(y)) XOR z (32 <= j <= 47) + * f(j, x, y, z) = (x AND z) OR (y AND NOT(z)) (48 <= j <= 63) + * f(j, x, y, z) = x XOR (y OR NOT(z)) (64 <= j <= 79) + * + * + * added constants (hexadecimal) + * + * K(j) = 0x00000000 (0 <= j <= 15) + * K(j) = 0x5A827999 (16 <= j <= 31) int(2**30 x sqrt(2)) + * K(j) = 0x6ED9EBA1 (32 <= j <= 47) int(2**30 x sqrt(3)) + * K(j) = 0x8F1BBCDC (48 <= j <= 63) int(2**30 x sqrt(5)) + * K(j) = 0xA953FD4E (64 <= j <= 79) int(2**30 x sqrt(7)) + * K'(j) = 0x50A28BE6 (0 <= j <= 15) int(2**30 x cbrt(2)) + * K'(j) = 0x5C4DD124 (16 <= j <= 31) int(2**30 x cbrt(3)) + * K'(j) = 0x6D703EF3 (32 <= j <= 47) int(2**30 x cbrt(5)) + * K'(j) = 0x7A6D76E9 (48 <= j <= 63) int(2**30 x cbrt(7)) + * K'(j) = 0x00000000 (64 <= j <= 79) + * + * + * selection of message word + * + * r(j) = j (0 <= j <= 15) + * r(16..31) = 7, 4, 13, 1, 10, 6, 15, 3, 12, 0, 9, 5, 2, 14, 11, 8 + * r(32..47) = 3, 10, 14, 4, 9, 15, 8, 1, 2, 7, 0, 6, 13, 11, 5, 12 + * r(48..63) = 1, 9, 11, 10, 0, 8, 12, 4, 13, 3, 7, 15, 14, 5, 6, 2 + * r(64..79) = 4, 0, 5, 9, 7, 12, 2, 10, 14, 1, 3, 8, 11, 6, 15, 13 + * r0(0..15) = 5, 14, 7, 0, 9, 2, 11, 4, 13, 6, 15, 8, 1, 10, 3, 12 + * r0(16..31)= 6, 11, 3, 7, 0, 13, 5, 10, 14, 15, 8, 12, 4, 9, 1, 2 + * r0(32..47)= 15, 5, 1, 3, 7, 14, 6, 9, 11, 8, 12, 2, 10, 0, 4, 13 + * r0(48..63)= 8, 6, 4, 1, 3, 11, 15, 0, 5, 12, 2, 13, 9, 7, 10, 14 + * r0(64..79)= 12, 15, 10, 4, 1, 5, 8, 7, 6, 2, 13, 14, 0, 3, 9, 11 + * + * + * amount for rotate left (rol) + * + * s(0..15) = 11, 14, 15, 12, 5, 8, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 6, 7, 9, 8 + * s(16..31) = 7, 6, 8, 13, 11, 9, 7, 15, 7, 12, 15, 9, 11, 7, 13, 12 + * s(32..47) = 11, 13, 6, 7, 14, 9, 13, 15, 14, 8, 13, 6, 5, 12, 7, 5 + * s(48..63) = 11, 12, 14, 15, 14, 15, 9, 8, 9, 14, 5, 6, 8, 6, 5, 12 + * s(64..79) = 9, 15, 5, 11, 6, 8, 13, 12, 5, 12, 13, 14, 11, 8, 5, 6 + * s'(0..15) = 8, 9, 9, 11, 13, 15, 15, 5, 7, 7, 8, 11, 14, 14, 12, 6 + * s'(16..31)= 9, 13, 15, 7, 12, 8, 9, 11, 7, 7, 12, 7, 6, 15, 13, 11 + * s'(32..47)= 9, 7, 15, 11, 8, 6, 6, 14, 12, 13, 5, 14, 13, 13, 7, 5 + * s'(48..63)= 15, 5, 8, 11, 14, 14, 6, 14, 6, 9, 12, 9, 12, 5, 15, 8 + * s'(64..79)= 8, 5, 12, 9, 12, 5, 14, 6, 8, 13, 6, 5, 15, 13, 11, 11 + * + * + * initial value (hexadecimal) + * + * h0 = 0x67452301; h1 = 0xEFCDAB89; h2 = 0x98BADCFE; h3 = 0x10325476; + * h4 = 0xC3D2E1F0; + * + * + * RIPEMD-160: pseudo-code + * + * It is assumed that the message after padding consists of t 16-word blocks + * that will be denoted with X[i][j], with 0 <= i <= t-1 and 0 <= j <= 15. + * The symbol [+] denotes addition modulo 2**32 and rol_s denotes cyclic left + * shift (rotate) over s positions. + * + * + * for i := 0 to t-1 { + * A := h0; B := h1; C := h2; D = h3; E = h4; + * A' := h0; B' := h1; C' := h2; D' = h3; E' = h4; + * for j := 0 to 79 { + * T := rol_s(j)(A [+] f(j, B, C, D) [+] X[i][r(j)] [+] K(j)) [+] E; + * A := E; E := D; D := rol_10(C); C := B; B := T; + * T := rol_s'(j)(A' [+] f(79-j, B', C', D') [+] X[i][r'(j)] + [+] K'(j)) [+] E'; + * A' := E'; E' := D'; D' := rol_10(C'); C' := B'; B' := T; + * } + * T := h1 [+] C [+] D'; h1 := h2 [+] D [+] E'; h2 := h3 [+] E [+] A'; + * h3 := h4 [+] A [+] B'; h4 := h0 [+] B [+] C'; h0 := T; + * } + */ + +/* Some examples: + * "" 9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31 + * "a" 0bdc9d2d256b3ee9daae347be6f4dc835a467ffe + * "abc" 8eb208f7e05d987a9b044a8e98c6b087f15a0bfc + * "message digest" 5d0689ef49d2fae572b881b123a85ffa21595f36 + * "a...z" f71c27109c692c1b56bbdceb5b9d2865b3708dbc + * "abcdbcde...nopq" 12a053384a9c0c88e405a06c27dcf49ada62eb2b + * "A...Za...z0...9" b0e20b6e3116640286ed3a87a5713079b21f5189 + * 8 times "1234567890" 9b752e45573d4b39f4dbd3323cab82bf63326bfb + * 1 million times "a" 52783243c1697bdbe16d37f97f68f08325dc1528 + */ + + +static void +rmd160_init( RMD160_CONTEXT *hd ) +{ + hd->h0 = 0x67452301; + hd->h1 = 0xEFCDAB89; + hd->h2 = 0x98BADCFE; + hd->h3 = 0x10325476; + hd->h4 = 0xC3D2E1F0; + hd->nblocks = 0; + hd->count = 0; +} + + + +/**************** + * Transform the message X which consists of 16 32-bit-words + */ +static void +transform( RMD160_CONTEXT *hd, byte *data ) +{ + u32 a,b,c,d,e,aa,bb,cc,dd,ee,t; + #if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN + u32 x[16]; + { int i; + byte *p2, *p1; + for(i=0, p1=data, p2=(byte*)x; i < 16; i++, p2 += 4 ) { + p2[3] = *p1++; + p2[2] = *p1++; + p2[1] = *p1++; + p2[0] = *p1++; + } + } + #else + #if 0 + u32 *x =(u32*)data; + #else + /* this version is better because it is always aligned; + * The performance penalty on a 586-100 is about 6% which + * is acceptable - because the data is more local it might + * also be possible that this is faster on some machines. + * This function (when compiled with -02 on gcc 2.7.2) + * executes on a 586-100 (39.73 bogomips) at about 1900kb/sec; + * [measured with a 4MB data and "gpgm --print-md rmd160"] */ + u32 x[16]; + memcpy( x, data, 64 ); + #endif + #endif + + +#define K0 0x00000000 +#define K1 0x5A827999 +#define K2 0x6ED9EBA1 +#define K3 0x8F1BBCDC +#define K4 0xA953FD4E +#define KK0 0x50A28BE6 +#define KK1 0x5C4DD124 +#define KK2 0x6D703EF3 +#define KK3 0x7A6D76E9 +#define KK4 0x00000000 +#define F0(x,y,z) ( (x) ^ (y) ^ (z) ) +#define F1(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (y)) | (~(x) & (z)) ) +#define F2(x,y,z) ( ((x) | ~(y)) ^ (z) ) +#define F3(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (z)) | ((y) & ~(z)) ) +#define F4(x,y,z) ( (x) ^ ((y) | ~(z)) ) +#define R(a,b,c,d,e,f,k,r,s) do { t = a + f(b,c,d) + k + x[r]; \ + a = rol(t,s) + e; \ + c = rol(c,10); \ + } while(0) + + /* left lane */ + a = hd->h0; + b = hd->h1; + c = hd->h2; + d = hd->h3; + e = hd->h4; + R( a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 0, 11 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 1, 14 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 2, 15 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 3, 12 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 4, 5 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 5, 8 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 6, 7 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 7, 9 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 8, 11 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 9, 13 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 10, 14 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 11, 15 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 12, 6 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 13, 7 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 14, 9 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 15, 8 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 7, 7 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 4, 6 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 13, 8 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 1, 13 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 10, 11 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 6, 9 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 15, 7 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 3, 15 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 12, 7 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 0, 12 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 9, 15 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 5, 9 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 2, 11 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 14, 7 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 11, 13 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 8, 12 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 3, 11 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 10, 13 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 14, 6 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 4, 7 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 9, 14 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 15, 9 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 8, 13 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 1, 15 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 2, 14 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 7, 8 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 0, 13 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 6, 6 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 13, 5 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 11, 12 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 5, 7 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 12, 5 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 1, 11 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 9, 12 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 11, 14 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 10, 15 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 0, 14 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 8, 15 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 12, 9 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 4, 8 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 13, 9 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 3, 14 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 7, 5 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 15, 6 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 14, 8 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 5, 6 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 6, 5 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 2, 12 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 4, 9 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 0, 15 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 5, 5 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 9, 11 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 7, 6 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 12, 8 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 2, 13 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 10, 12 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 14, 5 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 1, 12 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 3, 13 ); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 8, 14 ); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 11, 11 ); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 6, 8 ); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 15, 5 ); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 13, 6 ); + + aa = a; bb = b; cc = c; dd = d; ee = e; + + /* right lane */ + a = hd->h0; + b = hd->h1; + c = hd->h2; + d = hd->h3; + e = hd->h4; + R( a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 5, 8); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 14, 9); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 7, 9); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 0, 11); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 9, 13); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 2, 15); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 11, 15); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 4, 5); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 13, 7); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 6, 7); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 15, 8); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 8, 11); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 1, 14); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 10, 14); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 3, 12); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 12, 6); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 6, 9); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 11, 13); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 3, 15); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 7); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 0, 12); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 13, 8); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 5, 9); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 10, 11); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 14, 7); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 15, 7); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 8, 12); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 12, 7); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 4, 6); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 9, 15); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 1, 13); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 2, 11); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 15, 9); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 5, 7); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 1, 15); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 3, 11); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 7, 8); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 14, 6); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 6, 6); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 9, 14); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 11, 12); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 8, 13); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 12, 5); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 2, 14); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 10, 13); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 0, 13); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 4, 7); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 13, 5); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 8, 15); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 6, 5); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 4, 8); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 1, 11); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 3, 14); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 11, 14); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 15, 6); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 0, 14); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 5, 6); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 12, 9); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 2, 12); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 13, 9); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 9, 12); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 7, 5); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 10, 15); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 14, 8); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 12, 8); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 15, 5); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 10, 12); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 4, 9); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 1, 12); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 5, 5); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 8, 14); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 7, 6); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 6, 8); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 2, 13); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 13, 6); + R( a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 14, 5); + R( e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 0, 15); + R( d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 3, 13); + R( c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 9, 11); + R( b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 11, 11); + + + t = hd->h1 + d + cc; + hd->h1 = hd->h2 + e + dd; + hd->h2 = hd->h3 + a + ee; + hd->h3 = hd->h4 + b + aa; + hd->h4 = hd->h0 + c + bb; + hd->h0 = t; +} + + +/* Update the message digest with the contents + * of INBUF with length INLEN. + */ +static void +rmd160_write( RMD160_CONTEXT *hd, byte *inbuf, size_t inlen) +{ + if( hd->count == 64 ) { /* flush the buffer */ + transform( hd, hd->buf ); + hd->count = 0; + hd->nblocks++; + } + if( !inbuf ) + return; + if( hd->count ) { + for( ; inlen && hd->count < 64; inlen-- ) + hd->buf[hd->count++] = *inbuf++; + rmd160_write( hd, NULL, 0 ); + if( !inlen ) + return; + } + + while( inlen >= 64 ) { + transform( hd, inbuf ); + hd->count = 0; + hd->nblocks++; + inlen -= 64; + inbuf += 64; + } + for( ; inlen && hd->count < 64; inlen-- ) + hd->buf[hd->count++] = *inbuf++; +} + +/* The routine terminates the computation + */ + +static void +rmd160_final( RMD160_CONTEXT *hd ) +{ + u32 t, msb, lsb; + byte *p; + + rmd160_write(hd, NULL, 0); /* flush */; + + msb = 0; + t = hd->nblocks; + if( (lsb = t << 6) < t ) /* multiply by 64 to make a byte count */ + msb++; + msb += t >> 26; + t = lsb; + if( (lsb = t + hd->count) < t ) /* add the count */ + msb++; + t = lsb; + if( (lsb = t << 3) < t ) /* multiply by 8 to make a bit count */ + msb++; + msb += t >> 29; + + if( hd->count < 56 ) { /* enough room */ + hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0x80; /* pad */ + while( hd->count < 56 ) + hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0; /* pad */ + } + else { /* need one extra block */ + hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0x80; /* pad character */ + while( hd->count < 64 ) + hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0; + rmd160_write(hd, NULL, 0); /* flush */; + memset(hd->buf, 0, 56 ); /* fill next block with zeroes */ + } + /* append the 64 bit count */ + hd->buf[56] = lsb ; + hd->buf[57] = lsb >> 8; + hd->buf[58] = lsb >> 16; + hd->buf[59] = lsb >> 24; + hd->buf[60] = msb ; + hd->buf[61] = msb >> 8; + hd->buf[62] = msb >> 16; + hd->buf[63] = msb >> 24; + transform( hd, hd->buf ); + + p = hd->buf; + #if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN + #define X(a) do { *p++ = hd->h##a ; *p++ = hd->h##a >> 8; \ + *p++ = hd->h##a >> 16; *p++ = hd->h##a >> 24; } while(0) + #else /* little endian */ + #define X(a) do { *(u32*)p = hd->h##a ; p += 4; } while(0) + #endif + X(0); + X(1); + X(2); + X(3); + X(4); + #undef X +} + +/**************** + * Shortcut functions which puts the hash value of the supplied buffer + * into outbuf which must have a size of 20 bytes. + */ +void +__loDev_rmd160_hash_buffer( char *outbuf, const char *buffer, size_t length ) +{ + RMD160_CONTEXT hd; + + rmd160_init( &hd ); + rmd160_write( &hd, (byte*)buffer, length ); + rmd160_final( &hd ); + memcpy( outbuf, hd.buf, 20 ); +} diff --git a/libmount/src/rmd160.h b/libmount/src/rmd160.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d83444f --- /dev/null +++ b/libmount/src/rmd160.h @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +#ifndef RMD160_H +#define RMD160_H + +void +__loDev_rmd160_hash_buffer( char *outbuf, const char *buffer, size_t length ); + +#endif /*RMD160_H*/ + + diff --git a/libmount/src/sha512.c b/libmount/src/sha512.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25a03ba --- /dev/null +++ b/libmount/src/sha512.c @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ +/* + * sha512.c + * + * Written by Jari Ruusu, April 16 2001 + * + * Copyright 2001 by Jari Ruusu. + * Redistribution of this file is permitted under the GNU Public License. + */ + +#include +#include +#include "sha512.h" + +/* Define one or more of these. If none is defined, you get all of them */ +#if !defined(SHA256_NEEDED)&&!defined(SHA512_NEEDED)&&!defined(SHA384_NEEDED) +# define SHA256_NEEDED 1 +# define SHA512_NEEDED 1 +# define SHA384_NEEDED 1 +#endif + +#if defined(SHA256_NEEDED) +static const u_int32_t sha256_hashInit[8] = { + 0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, + 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19 +}; +static const u_int32_t sha256_K[64] = { + 0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, + 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5, 0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, + 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174, 0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, + 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da, + 0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, + 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967, 0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, + 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85, 0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, + 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070, + 0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, + 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3, 0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, + 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2 +}; +#endif + +#if defined(SHA512_NEEDED) +static const u_int64_t sha512_hashInit[8] = { + 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL, 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL, 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL, + 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL, 0x510e527fade682d1ULL, 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL, + 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL, 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL +}; +#endif + +#if defined(SHA384_NEEDED) +static const u_int64_t sha384_hashInit[8] = { + 0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL, 0x629a292a367cd507ULL, 0x9159015a3070dd17ULL, + 0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL, 0x67332667ffc00b31ULL, 0x8eb44a8768581511ULL, + 0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL, 0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL +}; +#endif + +#if defined(SHA512_NEEDED) || defined(SHA384_NEEDED) +static const u_int64_t sha512_K[80] = { + 0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL, 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, + 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL, 0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL, + 0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL, 0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, + 0x12835b0145706fbeULL, 0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL, + 0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL, 0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, + 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL, 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL, + 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL, 0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, + 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL, 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL, + 0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL, 0xb00327c898fb213fULL, + 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL, 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL, + 0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL, 0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, + 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL, 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL, + 0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL, 0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, + 0x92722c851482353bULL, 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL, + 0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL, 0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, + 0xd69906245565a910ULL, 0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL, + 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL, 0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, + 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL, 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL, + 0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL, 0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, + 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL, 0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL, + 0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL, 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, + 0xc67178f2e372532bULL, 0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL, + 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL, 0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, + 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL, 0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL, + 0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL, 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, + 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL, 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL, + 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL +}; +#endif + +#define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z))) +#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z))) +#define R(x,y) ((y) >> (x)) + +#if defined(SHA256_NEEDED) +void __loDev_sha256_init(sha256_context *ctx) +{ + memcpy(&ctx->sha_H[0], &sha256_hashInit[0], sizeof(ctx->sha_H)); + ctx->sha_blocks = 0; + ctx->sha_bufCnt = 0; +} + +#define S(x,y) (((y) >> (x)) | ((y) << (32 - (x)))) +#define uSig0(x) ((S(2,(x))) ^ (S(13,(x))) ^ (S(22,(x)))) +#define uSig1(x) ((S(6,(x))) ^ (S(11,(x))) ^ (S(25,(x)))) +#define lSig0(x) ((S(7,(x))) ^ (S(18,(x))) ^ (R(3,(x)))) +#define lSig1(x) ((S(17,(x))) ^ (S(19,(x))) ^ (R(10,(x)))) + +static void sha256_transform(sha256_context *ctx, unsigned char *datap) +{ + register int j; + u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h; + u_int32_t T1, T2, W[64], Wm2, Wm15; + + /* read the data, big endian byte order */ + j = 0; + do { + W[j] = (((u_int32_t)(datap[0]))<<24) | (((u_int32_t)(datap[1]))<<16) | + (((u_int32_t)(datap[2]))<<8 ) | ((u_int32_t)(datap[3])); + datap += 4; + } while(++j < 16); + + /* initialize variables a...h */ + a = ctx->sha_H[0]; + b = ctx->sha_H[1]; + c = ctx->sha_H[2]; + d = ctx->sha_H[3]; + e = ctx->sha_H[4]; + f = ctx->sha_H[5]; + g = ctx->sha_H[6]; + h = ctx->sha_H[7]; + + /* apply compression function */ + j = 0; + do { + if(j >= 16) { + Wm2 = W[j - 2]; + Wm15 = W[j - 15]; + W[j] = lSig1(Wm2) + W[j - 7] + lSig0(Wm15) + W[j - 16]; + } + T1 = h + uSig1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + sha256_K[j] + W[j]; + T2 = uSig0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); + h = g; g = f; f = e; + e = d + T1; + d = c; c = b; b = a; + a = T1 + T2; + } while(++j < 64); + + /* compute intermediate hash value */ + ctx->sha_H[0] += a; + ctx->sha_H[1] += b; + ctx->sha_H[2] += c; + ctx->sha_H[3] += d; + ctx->sha_H[4] += e; + ctx->sha_H[5] += f; + ctx->sha_H[6] += g; + ctx->sha_H[7] += h; + + ctx->sha_blocks++; +} + +void __loDev_sha256_write(sha256_context *ctx, unsigned char *datap, int length) +{ + while(length > 0) { + if(!ctx->sha_bufCnt) { + while(length >= (int) sizeof(ctx->sha_out)) { + sha256_transform(ctx, datap); + datap += sizeof(ctx->sha_out); + length -= sizeof(ctx->sha_out); + } + if(!length) return; + } + ctx->sha_out[ctx->sha_bufCnt] = *datap++; + length--; + if(++ctx->sha_bufCnt == sizeof(ctx->sha_out)) { + sha256_transform(ctx, &ctx->sha_out[0]); + ctx->sha_bufCnt = 0; + } + } +} + +void __loDev_sha256_final(sha256_context *ctx) +{ + register int j; + u_int64_t bitLength; + u_int32_t i; + unsigned char padByte, *datap; + + bitLength = (ctx->sha_blocks << 9) | (ctx->sha_bufCnt << 3); + padByte = 0x80; + __loDev_sha256_write(ctx, &padByte, 1); + + /* pad extra space with zeroes */ + padByte = 0; + while(ctx->sha_bufCnt != 56) { + __loDev_sha256_write(ctx, &padByte, 1); + } + + /* write bit length, big endian byte order */ + ctx->sha_out[56] = bitLength >> 56; + ctx->sha_out[57] = bitLength >> 48; + ctx->sha_out[58] = bitLength >> 40; + ctx->sha_out[59] = bitLength >> 32; + ctx->sha_out[60] = bitLength >> 24; + ctx->sha_out[61] = bitLength >> 16; + ctx->sha_out[62] = bitLength >> 8; + ctx->sha_out[63] = bitLength; + sha256_transform(ctx, &ctx->sha_out[0]); + + /* return results in ctx->sha_out[0...31] */ + datap = &ctx->sha_out[0]; + j = 0; + do { + i = ctx->sha_H[j]; + datap[0] = i >> 24; + datap[1] = i >> 16; + datap[2] = i >> 8; + datap[3] = i; + datap += 4; + } while(++j < 8); + + /* clear sensitive information */ + memset(&ctx->sha_out[32], 0, sizeof(sha256_context) - 32); +} + +void __loDev_sha256_hash_buffer(unsigned char *ib, int ile, unsigned char *ob, int ole) +{ + sha256_context ctx; + + if(ole < 1) return; + memset(ob, 0, ole); + if(ole > 32) ole = 32; + __loDev_sha256_init(&ctx); + __loDev_sha256_write(&ctx, ib, ile); + __loDev_sha256_final(&ctx); + memcpy(ob, &ctx.sha_out[0], ole); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); +} + +#endif + +#if defined(SHA512_NEEDED) +void __loDev_sha512_init(sha512_context *ctx) +{ + memcpy(&ctx->sha_H[0], &sha512_hashInit[0], sizeof(ctx->sha_H)); + ctx->sha_blocks = 0; + ctx->sha_blocksMSB = 0; + ctx->sha_bufCnt = 0; +} +#endif + +#if defined(SHA512_NEEDED) || defined(SHA384_NEEDED) +#undef S +#undef uSig0 +#undef uSig1 +#undef lSig0 +#undef lSig1 +#define S(x,y) (((y) >> (x)) | ((y) << (64 - (x)))) +#define uSig0(x) ((S(28,(x))) ^ (S(34,(x))) ^ (S(39,(x)))) +#define uSig1(x) ((S(14,(x))) ^ (S(18,(x))) ^ (S(41,(x)))) +#define lSig0(x) ((S(1,(x))) ^ (S(8,(x))) ^ (R(7,(x)))) +#define lSig1(x) ((S(19,(x))) ^ (S(61,(x))) ^ (R(6,(x)))) + +static void sha512_transform(sha512_context *ctx, unsigned char *datap) +{ + register int j; + u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h; + u_int64_t T1, T2, W[80], Wm2, Wm15; + + /* read the data, big endian byte order */ + j = 0; + do { + W[j] = (((u_int64_t)(datap[0]))<<56) | (((u_int64_t)(datap[1]))<<48) | + (((u_int64_t)(datap[2]))<<40) | (((u_int64_t)(datap[3]))<<32) | + (((u_int64_t)(datap[4]))<<24) | (((u_int64_t)(datap[5]))<<16) | + (((u_int64_t)(datap[6]))<<8 ) | ((u_int64_t)(datap[7])); + datap += 8; + } while(++j < 16); + + /* initialize variables a...h */ + a = ctx->sha_H[0]; + b = ctx->sha_H[1]; + c = ctx->sha_H[2]; + d = ctx->sha_H[3]; + e = ctx->sha_H[4]; + f = ctx->sha_H[5]; + g = ctx->sha_H[6]; + h = ctx->sha_H[7]; + + /* apply compression function */ + j = 0; + do { + if(j >= 16) { + Wm2 = W[j - 2]; + Wm15 = W[j - 15]; + W[j] = lSig1(Wm2) + W[j - 7] + lSig0(Wm15) + W[j - 16]; + } + T1 = h + uSig1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + sha512_K[j] + W[j]; + T2 = uSig0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); + h = g; g = f; f = e; + e = d + T1; + d = c; c = b; b = a; + a = T1 + T2; + } while(++j < 80); + + /* compute intermediate hash value */ + ctx->sha_H[0] += a; + ctx->sha_H[1] += b; + ctx->sha_H[2] += c; + ctx->sha_H[3] += d; + ctx->sha_H[4] += e; + ctx->sha_H[5] += f; + ctx->sha_H[6] += g; + ctx->sha_H[7] += h; + + ctx->sha_blocks++; + if(!ctx->sha_blocks) ctx->sha_blocksMSB++; +} + +void __loDev_sha512_write(sha512_context *ctx, unsigned char *datap, int length) +{ + while(length > 0) { + if(!ctx->sha_bufCnt) { + while(length >= (int) sizeof(ctx->sha_out)) { + sha512_transform(ctx, datap); + datap += sizeof(ctx->sha_out); + length -= sizeof(ctx->sha_out); + } + if(!length) return; + } + ctx->sha_out[ctx->sha_bufCnt] = *datap++; + length--; + if(++ctx->sha_bufCnt == sizeof(ctx->sha_out)) { + sha512_transform(ctx, &ctx->sha_out[0]); + ctx->sha_bufCnt = 0; + } + } +} + +void __loDev_sha512_final(sha512_context *ctx) +{ + register int j; + u_int64_t bitLength, bitLengthMSB; + u_int64_t i; + unsigned char padByte, *datap; + + bitLength = (ctx->sha_blocks << 10) | (ctx->sha_bufCnt << 3); + bitLengthMSB = (ctx->sha_blocksMSB << 10) | (ctx->sha_blocks >> 54); + padByte = 0x80; + __loDev_sha512_write(ctx, &padByte, 1); + + /* pad extra space with zeroes */ + padByte = 0; + while(ctx->sha_bufCnt != 112) { + __loDev_sha512_write(ctx, &padByte, 1); + } + + /* write bit length, big endian byte order */ + ctx->sha_out[112] = bitLengthMSB >> 56; + ctx->sha_out[113] = bitLengthMSB >> 48; + ctx->sha_out[114] = bitLengthMSB >> 40; + ctx->sha_out[115] = bitLengthMSB >> 32; + ctx->sha_out[116] = bitLengthMSB >> 24; + ctx->sha_out[117] = bitLengthMSB >> 16; + ctx->sha_out[118] = bitLengthMSB >> 8; + ctx->sha_out[119] = bitLengthMSB; + ctx->sha_out[120] = bitLength >> 56; + ctx->sha_out[121] = bitLength >> 48; + ctx->sha_out[122] = bitLength >> 40; + ctx->sha_out[123] = bitLength >> 32; + ctx->sha_out[124] = bitLength >> 24; + ctx->sha_out[125] = bitLength >> 16; + ctx->sha_out[126] = bitLength >> 8; + ctx->sha_out[127] = bitLength; + sha512_transform(ctx, &ctx->sha_out[0]); + + /* return results in ctx->sha_out[0...63] */ + datap = &ctx->sha_out[0]; + j = 0; + do { + i = ctx->sha_H[j]; + datap[0] = i >> 56; + datap[1] = i >> 48; + datap[2] = i >> 40; + datap[3] = i >> 32; + datap[4] = i >> 24; + datap[5] = i >> 16; + datap[6] = i >> 8; + datap[7] = i; + datap += 8; + } while(++j < 8); + + /* clear sensitive information */ + memset(&ctx->sha_out[64], 0, sizeof(sha512_context) - 64); +} + +void __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(unsigned char *ib, int ile, unsigned char *ob, int ole) +{ + sha512_context ctx; + + if(ole < 1) return; + memset(ob, 0, ole); + if(ole > 64) ole = 64; + __loDev_sha512_init(&ctx); + __loDev_sha512_write(&ctx, ib, ile); + __loDev_sha512_final(&ctx); + memcpy(ob, &ctx.sha_out[0], ole); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); +} +#endif + +#if defined(SHA384_NEEDED) +void __loDev_sha384_init(sha512_context *ctx) +{ + memcpy(&ctx->sha_H[0], &sha384_hashInit[0], sizeof(ctx->sha_H)); + ctx->sha_blocks = 0; + ctx->sha_blocksMSB = 0; + ctx->sha_bufCnt = 0; +} + +void __loDev_sha384_hash_buffer(unsigned char *ib, int ile, unsigned char *ob, int ole) +{ + sha512_context ctx; + + if(ole < 1) return; + memset(ob, 0, ole); + if(ole > 48) ole = 48; + __loDev_sha384_init(&ctx); + __loDev_sha512_write(&ctx, ib, ile); + __loDev_sha512_final(&ctx); + memcpy(ob, &ctx.sha_out[0], ole); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); +} +#endif diff --git a/libmount/src/sha512.h b/libmount/src/sha512.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bbd2b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/libmount/src/sha512.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * sha512.h + * + * Written by Jari Ruusu, April 16 2001 + * + * Copyright 2001 by Jari Ruusu. + * Redistribution of this file is permitted under the GNU Public License. + */ + +#include + +typedef struct { + unsigned char sha_out[64]; /* results are here, bytes 0...31 */ + u_int32_t sha_H[8]; + u_int64_t sha_blocks; + int sha_bufCnt; +} sha256_context; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char sha_out[128]; /* results are here, bytes 0...63 */ + u_int64_t sha_H[8]; + u_int64_t sha_blocks; + u_int64_t sha_blocksMSB; + int sha_bufCnt; +} sha512_context; + +/* no sha384_context, use sha512_context */ + +/* 256 bit hash, provides 128 bits of security against collision attacks */ +extern void __loDev_sha256_init(sha256_context *); +extern void __loDev_sha256_write(sha256_context *, unsigned char *, int); +extern void __loDev_sha256_final(sha256_context *); +extern void __loDev_sha256_hash_buffer(unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); + +/* 512 bit hash, provides 256 bits of security against collision attacks */ +extern void __loDev_sha512_init(sha512_context *); +extern void __loDev_sha512_write(sha512_context *, unsigned char *, int); +extern void __loDev_sha512_final(sha512_context *); +extern void __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); + +/* 384 bit hash, provides 192 bits of security against collision attacks */ +extern void __loDev_sha384_init(sha512_context *); +/* no sha384_write(), use sha512_write() */ +/* no sha384_final(), use sha512_final(), result in ctx->sha_out[0...47] */ +extern void __loDev_sha384_hash_buffer(unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); diff --git a/login-utils/Makemodule.am b/login-utils/Makemodule.am index 502ecd5..a19798c 100644 --- a/login-utils/Makemodule.am +++ b/login-utils/Makemodule.am @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ sulogin_SOURCES = \ login-utils/sulogin.c \ login-utils/sulogin-consoles.c \ login-utils/sulogin-consoles.h +sulogin_CFLAGS = $(SUID_CFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) +sulogin_LDFLAGS = $(SUID_LDFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) sulogin_LDADD = $(LDADD) libcommon.la if HAVE_LIBCRYPT diff --git a/login-utils/su-common.c b/login-utils/su-common.c index fe6d0c8..bde21c1 100644 --- a/login-utils/su-common.c +++ b/login-utils/su-common.c @@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ enum #define PAM_SRVNAME_RUNUSER "runuser" #define PAM_SRVNAME_RUNUSER_L "runuser-l" -#define _PATH_LOGINDEFS_SU "/etc/defaults/su" -#define _PATH_LOGINDEFS_RUNUSER "/etc/defaults/runuser" +#define _PATH_LOGINDEFS_SU "/etc/default/su" +#define _PATH_LOGINDEFS_RUNUSER "/etc/default/runuser" #define is_pam_failure(_rc) ((_rc) != PAM_SUCCESS) diff --git a/packaging/baselibs.conf b/packaging/baselibs.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a340d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/baselibs.conf @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +libuuid +libuuid-devel + requires "libuuid- = " +libblkid +libblkid-devel + requires "libblkid- = " +libmount +libmount-devel + requires "libmount- = " diff --git a/packaging/blkid.conf b/packaging/blkid.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf51ff4 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/blkid.conf @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# do not keep cache file across reboots +CACHE_FILE=/dev/.blkid.tab + +# never try to sequentially scan all devices in /dev +EVALUATE=udev,scan diff --git a/packaging/etc_filesystems b/packaging/etc_filesystems new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1506af7 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/etc_filesystems @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +vfat diff --git a/packaging/login.pamd b/packaging/login.pamd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..500dd2a --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/login.pamd @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth requisite pam_nologin.so +auth [user_unknown=ignore success=ok ignore=ignore default=bad] pam_securetty.so +auth include system-auth +account required pam_nologin.so +account include system-auth +password include system-auth + +session include system-auth +session required pam_loginuid.so +session required pam_namespace.so +session optional pam_keyinit.so force revoke +session required pam_smack.so + diff --git a/packaging/nologin.8 b/packaging/nologin.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cb1601 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/nologin.8 @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: nologin.8,v 1.8 1999/06/04 02:45:19 aaron Exp $ +.\" $NetBSD: nologin.8,v 1.3 1995/03/18 14:59:09 cgd Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1993 +.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +.\" must display the following acknowledgement: +.\" This product includes software developed by the University of +.\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. +.\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" @(#)nologin.8 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/19/93 +.\" +.Dd February 15, 1997 +.Dt NOLOGIN 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm nologin +.Nd politely refuse a login +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm nologin +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +displays a message that an account is not available and +exits non-zero. +It is intended as a replacement shell field for accounts that +have been disabled. +.Pp +If the file +.Pa /etc/nologin.txt +exists, +.Nm +displays its contents to the user instead of the default message. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr login 1 +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +command appeared in +.Bx 4.4 . diff --git a/packaging/nologin.c b/packaging/nologin.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a51ba9 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/nologin.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: nologin.c,v 1.2 1997/04/04 16:51:37 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, Jason Downs. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER + * CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* Distinctly different from _PATH_NOLOGIN. */ +#define _PATH_NOLOGIN_TXT "/etc/nologin.txt" + +#define DEFAULT_MESG "This account is currently not available.\n" + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +int main(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ + int nfd, nrd; + char nbuf[128]; + + nfd = open(_PATH_NOLOGIN_TXT, O_RDONLY); + if (nfd < 0) { + write(STDOUT_FILENO, DEFAULT_MESG, strlen(DEFAULT_MESG)); + exit (1); + } + + while ((nrd = read(nfd, nbuf, sizeof(nbuf))) > 0) + write(STDOUT_FILENO, nbuf, nrd); + close (nfd); + + exit (1); +} diff --git a/packaging/remote.pamd b/packaging/remote.pamd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4786d56 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/remote.pamd @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +# This file is used by /bin/login in case of remote logins (means where +# the -h option is used +auth requisite pam_nologin.so +auth [user_unknown=ignore success=ok ignore=ignore auth_err=die default=bad] pam_securetty.so +auth include system-auth +account include system-auth +password include system-auth +session required pam_loginuid.so +session include system-auth +session optional pam_lastlog.so nowtmp showfailed +session optional pam_mail.so standard diff --git a/packaging/su.default b/packaging/su.default new file mode 100644 index 0000000..148087f --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/su.default @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Per default, only "su -" will set a new PATH. +# If this variable is changed to "yes" (default is "no"), +# every su call will overwrite the PATH variable. +ALWAYS_SET_PATH=no + +# Default path. +ENV_PATH=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin + +# Default path for a user invoking su to root. +ENV_SUPATH=/usr/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin + diff --git a/packaging/su.pamd b/packaging/su.pamd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..475f0a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/su.pamd @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth sufficient pam_rootok.so +auth include system-auth +account sufficient pam_rootok.so +account include system-auth +password include system-auth +session include system-auth +session optional pam_xauth.so diff --git a/packaging/util-linux-rpmlintrc b/packaging/util-linux-rpmlintrc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..226c79f --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/util-linux-rpmlintrc @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +addFilter("init-script-without-%stop_on_removal-preun /etc/init.d/raw") +addFilter("init-script-without-%restart_on_update-postun /etc/init.d/raw") +addFilter("incoherent-init-script-name raw") +addFilter("no-reload-entry /etc/init.d/raw") +# There is no egrep(1) used -> False positive +addFilter("deprecated-grep") + diff --git a/packaging/util-linux.changes b/packaging/util-linux.changes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb1cd71 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/util-linux.changes @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +* Mon Oct 27 2014 Maciej Wereski upstream/2.25.2 +- Update to 2.25.2 + +* Tue Jun 17 2014 John L. Whiteman accepted/tizen/ivi/panda/20140312.123353-1-g390b4ea +- Bug-Tizen: TC-294 Bug: https://bugs.tizen.org/jira/browse/TC-294?filter=-1 Setting default user to 'User' for tty sessions. This change provides default user consistency for tty, ssh and wayland console sessions. + +* Wed Jan 15 2014 Maciej Wereski upstream/2.24@2e42ced +- Update to 2.24 + +* Mon Oct 28 2013 Aleksander Zdyb accepted/tizen/20130913.063250@801f6bc +- Fixed group and upstream URL + +* Mon Sep 30 2013 Aleksander Zdyb accepted/tizen/20130913.063250@c0e303b +- Removed unnecessary dependency on bash +- Moved examples to docs package + +* Fri Aug 16 2013 Mikko Ylinen 1a08de4 +- blkid: enable evaluate by scan (TIVI-1121) + +* Wed Aug 07 2013 Maciej Wereski a801ef2 +- Enable mountpoint utility + +* Thu Jul 18 2013 Shane Bryan e8cbe9e +- Fix man8 file conflicts with -docs subpackage + +* Sat Jun 29 2013 Alexandru Cornea 14b3f6f +- resetting manifest requested domain to floor + +* Sat May 11 2013 Anas Nashif submit/tizen/20130509.184703@07a1e5d +- Set license using %license + +* Fri Mar 22 2013 Anas Nashif submit/trunk/20130116.154548@34e7e97 +- Fixed package groups + +* Wed Jan 16 2013 Anas Nashif upstream/2.22.2@bb588e5 +- Update to 2.22.2 + diff --git a/packaging/util-linux.manifest b/packaging/util-linux.manifest new file mode 100644 index 0000000..017d22d --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/util-linux.manifest @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + + + + + diff --git a/packaging/util-linux.spec b/packaging/util-linux.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba60457 --- /dev/null +++ b/packaging/util-linux.spec @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +Name: util-linux +Version: 2.25.2 +BuildRequires: binutils-devel +BuildRequires: fdupes +BuildRequires: gettext-devel +BuildRequires: libtool +BuildRequires: ncurses-devel +BuildRequires: pam-devel +BuildRequires: pkg-config +BuildRequires: readline-devel +BuildRequires: zlib-devel +Release: 1 +# util-linux is a base package and uuidd pre-requiring pwdutils pulls +# that into the core build cycle. pwdutils also pulls in the whole +# ldap stack into it. Avoid this whole mess which is done only to +# make the rpm install check of uuidd happy which has support to work without +# these tools as well +#!BuildIgnore: pwdutils +Url: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux +Summary: A collection of basic system utilities +License: GPL-2.0 +Group: Base/Utilities +Source: ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.25/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz +Source1: util-linux-rpmlintrc +# XXX: make nologin part of util-linux upstream +Source2: nologin.c +Source3: nologin.8 +Source6: etc_filesystems +Source7: baselibs.conf +Source8: login.pamd +Source9: remote.pamd +Source14: su.pamd +Source15: su.default +Source51: blkid.conf +Source1001: util-linux.manifest + +Requires(pre): /usr/bin/sed +Provides: eject +Provides: base = %{version}-%{release} +Provides: login = 4.0-33.7 +Provides: util = %{version}-%{release} +Provides: uuid-runtime = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: base < %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: login < 4.0-33.7 +Obsoletes: util < %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: uuid-runtime < %{version}-%{release} + +%description +This package contains a large variety of low-level system utilities +that are necessary for a Linux system to function. It contains the +mount program, the fdisk configuration tool, and more. + +%package -n libblkid +Summary: Filesystem detection library +Group: Base/File Systems + +%description -n libblkid +Library for filesystem detection. + +%package -n libblkid-devel +Summary: Development files for the filesystem detection library +Group: Development/Libraries +Requires: libblkid = %{version} + +%description -n libblkid-devel +Files needed to develop applications using the library for filesystem +detection. + +%package -n uuidd +Summary: Helper daemon to guarantee uniqueness of time-based UUIDs +Group: Base/File Systems + +%description -n uuidd +The uuidd package contains a userspace daemon (uuidd) which guarantees +uniqueness of time-based UUID generation even at very high rates on +SMP systems. + +%package -n libuuid +Summary: Library to generate UUIDs +Group: Base/File Systems + +%description -n libuuid +A library to generate universally unique IDs (UUIDs). + +%package -n libuuid-devel +Summary: Development files for libuuid1 +Group: Development/Libraries +Requires: libuuid = %{version} + +%description -n libuuid-devel +Files to develop applications using the library to generate universally +unique IDs (UUIDs). + +%package -n libmount +Summary: Device mount library +Group: Base/File Systems + +%description -n libmount +Library designed to be used in low-level utils like +mount(8) and /usr/sbin/mount. helpers. + +%package -n libmount-devel +Summary: Development files for libmount +Group: Development/Libraries +Requires: libmount = %{version} + +%description -n libmount-devel +Files to develop applications using the libmount library. + +%package -n libsmartcols +Summary: Library for printing data in various formats +Group: Base/File Systems + +%description -n libsmartcols +This library allows to print data in tables, trees or +parsable formats, support colors, sorting etc. + +%package -n libsmartcols-devel +Summary: Development files for libsmartcols +Group: Development/Libraries +Requires: libsmartcols = %{version} + +%description -n libsmartcols-devel +Files to develop applications using the libsmartcols library. + +%prep +%setup -q -n %{name}-%{version} +cp %{SOURCE1001} . +# +# nologin +cp %{S:2} %{S:3} . + +%build +autoreconf -fi +export SUID_CFLAGS="-fpie" +export SUID_LDFLAGS="-pie" +%configure \ + --enable-mesg \ + --enable-partx \ + --disable-kill \ + --enable-write \ + --enable-line \ + --enable-new-mount \ + --enable-login-utils \ + --enable-mountpoint \ + --disable-use-tty-group \ + --disable-static \ + --disable-silent-rules \ + --disable-rpath +# +make %{?_smp_mflags} +# +%{__cc} -fwhole-program %{optflags} -o nologin nologin.c + +%install +mkdir -p %{buildroot}{/etc/pam.d,%{_mandir}/man{1,8},/usr/bin,/usr/sbin,%{_infodir}} +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_localstatedir}/lib/libuuid/ +mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_localstatedir}/run/uuidd/ +install -m 644 %{SOURCE51} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/blkid.conf +install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/login +install -m 644 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/remote +install -m 644 %{SOURCE14} %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/su +install -m 644 %{SOURCE14} %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/su-l +install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/etc/default +install -m 644 %{S:15} %{buildroot}/etc/default/su +%make_install +install -m 644 %{SOURCE6} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/filesystems +install -m 755 nologin %{buildroot}/%{_sbindir} +rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/libblkid.la +rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/libuuid.la +rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/libmount.la +install -m 644 nologin.8 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man8 +echo -e "#! /bin/sh\n/sbin/blockdev --flushbufs \$1" > %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/flushb +chmod 755 %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/flushb +# Stupid hack so we don't have a tcsh dependency +chmod 644 %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/doc/%{name}/getopt/getopt*.tcsh +# Following files we don't want to package, so remove them +rm -f %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/pg +rm -f %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/pg.1* +rm -rf %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/bash-completion +# Do not package these files to get rid of the perl dependency +rm -f %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/chkdupexe +rm -f %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/chkdupexe.1 +# we use this tools from pwdutils +rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/{chfn,chsh,newgrp} +rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_sbindir}/{vigr,vipw} +rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/man1/{chfn.1*,chsh.1*,newgrp.1*} +rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/man8/{vigr.8*,vipw.8*} + + + +%find_lang %{name} %{name}.lang +# create list of setarch(8) symlinks +find %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/ -regextype posix-egrep -type l \ + -regex ".*(linux32|linux64|s390|s390x|i386|ppc|ppc64|ppc32|sparc|sparc64|sparc32|sparc32bash|mips|mips64|mips32|ia64|x86_64|parisc|parisc32|parisc64)$" \ + -printf "%{_bindir}/%f\n" >> %{name}.files +# clock.txt from uuidd is a ghost file +touch %{buildroot}%{_localstatedir}/lib/libuuid/clock.txt +# rcuuidd helper + +rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_mandir}/ru + +# remove duplicate manpages +%fdupes -s %{buildroot}/%{_mandir} + + +%post -n libblkid -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%postun -n libblkid -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%post -n libmount -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%postun -n libmount -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%post -n libuuid -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%postun -n libuuid -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%post -n libsmartcols -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%postun -n libsmartcols -p /sbin/ldconfig + +%lang_package + +%docs_package +%dir %{_datadir}/doc/%{name}/getopt +%attr (755,root,root) %{_datadir}/doc/%{name}/getopt/getopt-parse.bash +%attr (755,root,root) %{_datadir}/doc/%{name}/getopt/getopt-parse.tcsh + + +%files -f %{name}.files +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%license COPYING +# Common files for all archs +%defattr(-,root,root) +%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/filesystems +%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/blkid.conf +%config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/login +%config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/remote +%config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/su +%config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/su-l +%config(noreplace) /etc/default/su +%{_bindir}/su +%{_bindir}/cal +%{_bindir}/eject +%{_bindir}/lslocks +%{_bindir}/utmpdump +%{_bindir}/wdctl +%{_sbindir}/resizepart +%{_sbindir}/sulogin +%{_bindir}/login +%{_bindir}/lslogins +%{_bindir}/chrt +%{_bindir}/col +%{_bindir}/colcrt +%{_bindir}/colrm +%{_bindir}/column +%{_bindir}/dmesg +%{_bindir}/fallocate +%{_bindir}/findmnt +%{_bindir}/flock +%{_bindir}/getopt +%{_bindir}/hexdump +%{_bindir}/ionice +%{_bindir}/ipcmk +%{_bindir}/ipcrm +%{_bindir}/ipcs +%{_bindir}/isosize +%{_bindir}/line +%{_bindir}/logger +%{_bindir}/look +%{_bindir}/lsblk +%{_bindir}/lscpu +%{_bindir}/mcookie +%{_bindir}/mesg +%{_bindir}/more +%{_bindir}/mount +%{_bindir}/mountpoint +%{_bindir}/namei +%{_bindir}/prlimit +%{_bindir}/rename +%{_bindir}/renice +%{_bindir}/rev +%{_bindir}/script +%{_bindir}/scriptreplay +%{_bindir}/setarch +%{_bindir}/uname26 +%{_bindir}/setsid +%{_bindir}/tailf +%{_bindir}/taskset +%{_bindir}/ul +%{_bindir}/umount +%{_bindir}/unshare +%{_bindir}/uuidgen +%{_sbindir}/addpart +%{_sbindir}/agetty +%{_sbindir}/blkid +%{_sbindir}/blockdev +%{_sbindir}/chcpu +%{_sbindir}/ctrlaltdel +%{_sbindir}/delpart +%{_sbindir}/findfs +%{_sbindir}/fsck +%{_sbindir}/fsck.minix +%{_sbindir}/fsck.cramfs +%{_sbindir}/fsfreeze +%{_sbindir}/fstrim +%{_sbindir}/ldattach +%{_sbindir}/losetup +%{_sbindir}/mkfs +%{_sbindir}/mkfs.bfs +%{_sbindir}/mkfs.minix +%{_sbindir}/mkfs.cramfs +%{_sbindir}/mkswap +%{_sbindir}/nologin +%{_sbindir}/raw +%{_sbindir}/partx +%{_sbindir}/pivot_root +%{_sbindir}/rtcwake +%{_sbindir}/swaplabel +%{_sbindir}/swapoff +%{_sbindir}/swapon +%{_sbindir}/switch_root +%{_sbindir}/wipefs +%verify(not mode) %attr(0755,root,tty) %{_bindir}/wall +%{_bindir}/whereis +%verify(not mode) %attr(0755,root,tty) %{_bindir}/write +%{_sbindir}/flushb +%{_sbindir}/readprofile +#XXX: post our patches upstream +#XXX: call fdupes on /usr/share/man +%{_sbindir}/fdisk +%{_sbindir}/cfdisk +%{_sbindir}/sfdisk +%{_sbindir}/fdformat +%{_sbindir}/hwclock +%{_bindir}/setterm +%{_sbindir}/blkdiscard +%{_sbindir}/runuser +%{_bindir}/last +%{_bindir}/lastb +%{_bindir}/nsenter + +%files -n libblkid +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +/%{_libdir}/libblkid.so.1 +/%{_libdir}/libblkid.so.1.* + +%files -n libblkid-devel +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +%{_libdir}/libblkid.so +%dir %{_includedir}/blkid +%{_includedir}/blkid/blkid.h +%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/blkid.pc + +%files -n libmount +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +/%{_libdir}/libmount.so.1 +/%{_libdir}/libmount.so.1.* + +%files -n libmount-devel +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +%{_libdir}/libmount.so +%dir %{_includedir}/libmount +%{_includedir}/libmount/libmount.h +%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/mount.pc + +%files -n uuidd +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +%verify(not mode) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/uuidd +%attr(-,uuidd,uuidd) %dir %{_localstatedir}/lib/libuuid +%ghost %{_localstatedir}/lib/libuuid/clock.txt +%attr(-,uuidd,uuidd) %ghost %dir %{_localstatedir}/run/uuidd + +%files -n libuuid +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +/%{_libdir}/libuuid.so.1 +/%{_libdir}/libuuid.so.1.* + +%files -n libuuid-devel +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +%{_libdir}/libuuid.so +%dir %{_includedir}/uuid +%{_includedir}/uuid/uuid.h +%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/uuid.pc + +%files -n libsmartcols +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +%{_libdir}/libsmartcols.so.1 +%{_libdir}/libsmartcols.so.1.* + +%files -n libsmartcols-devel +%manifest %{name}.manifest +%defattr(-, root, root) +%{_libdir}/libsmartcols.so +%dir %{_includedir}/libsmartcols +%{_includedir}/libsmartcols/libsmartcols.h +%{_libdir}/pkgconfig/smartcols.pc diff --git a/sys-utils/Makemodule.am b/sys-utils/Makemodule.am index ad60360..c6f966d 100644 --- a/sys-utils/Makemodule.am +++ b/sys-utils/Makemodule.am @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ endif if BUILD_LOSETUP sbin_PROGRAMS += losetup dist_man_MANS += sys-utils/losetup.8 -losetup_SOURCES = sys-utils/losetup.c +losetup_SOURCES = sys-utils/losetup1.c sys-utils/loop.c libmount/src/sha512.c libmount/src/rmd160.c libmount/src/aes.c losetup_LDADD = $(LDADD) libcommon.la libsmartcols.la losetup_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -I$(ul_libsmartcols_incdir) @@ -273,8 +273,9 @@ endif if MAKEINSTALL_DO_SETUID install-exec-hook-mount: - chmod 4755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mount - chmod 4755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/umount + chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mount + chmod 755 $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/umount + INSTALL_EXEC_HOOKS += install-exec-hook-mount endif @@ -289,33 +290,21 @@ dist_man_MANS += \ swapon_SOURCES = \ sys-utils/swapon.c \ + sys-utils/loop.c \ + libmount/src/sha512.c \ sys-utils/swapon-common.c \ - sys-utils/swapon-common.h \ - lib/swapprober.c \ - include/swapprober.h -swapon_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) \ - -I$(ul_libblkid_incdir) \ - -I$(ul_libmount_incdir) \ - -I$(ul_libsmartcols_incdir) -swapon_LDADD = $(LDADD) \ - libblkid.la \ - libcommon.la \ - libmount.la \ - libsmartcols.la + sys-utils/swapon-common.h + +swapon_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -I$(ul_libmount_incdir) -I$(ul_libsmartcols_incdir) +swapon_LDADD = $(LDADD) libcommon.la libmount.la libsmartcols.la swapoff_SOURCES = \ - sys-utils/swapoff.c \ - sys-utils/swapon-common.c \ - sys-utils/swapon-common.h \ - lib/swapprober.c \ - include/swapprober.h -swapoff_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) \ - -I$(ul_libblkid_incdir) \ - -I$(ul_libmount_incdir) -swapoff_LDADD = $(LDADD) \ - libmount.la \ - libblkid.la \ - libcommon.la + sys-utils/swapoff.c \ + sys-utils/loop.c \ + sys-utils/swapon-common.c + +swapoff_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) -I$(ul_libmount_incdir) +swapoff_LDADD = $(LDADD) libmount.la endif if BUILD_LSCPU diff --git a/sys-utils/loop.c b/sys-utils/loop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fef0916 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys-utils/loop.c @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +/* + * loop.c + * + * Copyright 2003 by Jari Ruusu. + * Redistribution of this file is permitted under the GNU GPL + */ + +/* collection of loop helper functions used by losetup, mount and swapon */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "loop.h" + +static void convert_info_to_info64(struct loop_info *info, struct loop_info64 *info64) +{ + memset(info64, 0, sizeof(*info64)); + info64->lo_number = info->lo_number; + info64->lo_device = info->lo_device; + info64->lo_inode = info->lo_inode; + info64->lo_rdevice = info->lo_rdevice; + info64->lo_offset = info->lo_offset; + info64->lo_encrypt_type = info->lo_encrypt_type; + info64->lo_encrypt_key_size = info->lo_encrypt_key_size; + info64->lo_flags = info->lo_flags; + info64->lo_init[0] = info->lo_init[0]; + info64->lo_init[1] = info->lo_init[1]; + info64->lo_sizelimit = 0; + if (info->lo_encrypt_type == 18) /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + memcpy(info64->lo_crypt_name, info->lo_name, sizeof(info64->lo_crypt_name)); + else + memcpy(info64->lo_file_name, info->lo_name, sizeof(info64->lo_file_name)); + memcpy(info64->lo_encrypt_key, info->lo_encrypt_key, sizeof(info64->lo_encrypt_key)); +} + +static int convert_info64_to_info(struct loop_info64 *info64, struct loop_info *info) +{ + memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info)); + info->lo_number = info64->lo_number; + info->lo_device = info64->lo_device; + info->lo_inode = info64->lo_inode; + info->lo_rdevice = info64->lo_rdevice; + info->lo_offset = info64->lo_offset; + info->lo_encrypt_type = info64->lo_encrypt_type; + info->lo_encrypt_key_size = info64->lo_encrypt_key_size; + info->lo_flags = info64->lo_flags; + info->lo_init[0] = info64->lo_init[0]; + info->lo_init[1] = info64->lo_init[1]; + if (info->lo_encrypt_type == 18) /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + memcpy(info->lo_name, info64->lo_crypt_name, sizeof(info->lo_name)); + else + memcpy(info->lo_name, info64->lo_file_name, sizeof(info->lo_name)); + memcpy(info->lo_encrypt_key, info64->lo_encrypt_key, sizeof(info->lo_encrypt_key)); + + /* error in case values were truncated */ + if (info->lo_device != info64->lo_device || + info->lo_rdevice != info64->lo_rdevice || + info->lo_inode != info64->lo_inode || + (u_int64_t) info->lo_offset != info64->lo_offset || + info64->lo_sizelimit) { + errno = EOVERFLOW; + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +int loop_set_status64_ioctl(int fd, struct loop_info64 *info64) +{ + struct loop_info info; + struct loop_info64 tmp; + int r; + + /* + * This ugly work around is needed because some + * Red Hat kernels are using same ioctl code: + * #define LOOP_CHANGE_FD 0x4C04 + * vs. + * #define LOOP_SET_STATUS64 0x4C04 + * that is used by modern loop driver. + * + * Attempt to detect presense of LOOP_GET_STATUS64 + * ioctl before issuing LOOP_SET_STATUS64 ioctl. + * Red Hat kernels with above LOOP_CHANGE_FD damage + * should return -1 and set errno to EINVAL. + */ + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &tmp); + memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + if ((r == 0) || (errno != EINVAL)) { + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_SET_STATUS64, info64); + if (!r) + return 0; + } + r = convert_info64_to_info(info64, &info); + if (!r) + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_SET_STATUS, &info); + + /* don't leave copies of encryption key on stack */ + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + return r; +} + +int loop_get_status64_ioctl(int fd, struct loop_info64 *info64) +{ + struct loop_info info; + int r; + + memset(info64, 0, sizeof(*info64)); + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, info64); + if (!r) + return 0; + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS, &info); + if (!r) + convert_info_to_info64(&info, info64); + + /* don't leave copies of encryption key on stack */ + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + return r; +} + +/* returns: 1=unused 0=busy */ +int is_unused_loop_device(int fd) +{ + struct loop_info64 info64; + struct loop_info info; + int r; + + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS64, &info64); + memset(&info64, 0, sizeof(info64)); + if (!r) + return 0; + if (errno == ENXIO) + return 1; + + r = ioctl(fd, LOOP_GET_STATUS, &info); + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + if (!r) + return 0; + if (errno == ENXIO) + return 1; + if (errno == EOVERFLOW) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +struct loop_crypt_type_struct loop_crypt_type_tbl[] = { + { 0, 0, 0, "no" }, + { 0, 0, 0, "none" }, + { 1, 0, 0, "xor" }, + { 3, 1, 16, "twofish" }, + { 4, 1, 16, "blowfish" }, + { 7, 1, 16, "serpent" }, + { 8, 1, 16, "mars" }, + { 11, 3, 16, "rc6" }, + { 12, 0, 21, "tripleDES" }, + { 12, 0, 24, "3des" }, + { 12, 0, 24, "des3_ede" }, + { 16, 1, 16, "AES" }, + { -1, 0, 0, NULL } +}; + +static char *getApiName(char *e, int *len) +{ + int x, y, z = 1, q = -1; + unsigned char *s; + + *len = y = 0; + s = (unsigned char *)strdup(e); + if(!s) + return ""; + x = strlen((char *)s); + while(x > 0) { + x--; + if(!isdigit(s[x])) + break; + y += (s[x] - '0') * z; + z *= 10; + q = x; + } + while(x >= 0) { + s[x] = tolower(s[x]); + if(s[x] == '-') + s[x] = 0; + x--; + } + if(y >= 40) { + if(q >= 0) + s[q] = 0; + *len = y; + } + return((char *)s); +} + +int loop_crypt_type(const char *name, u_int32_t *kbyp, char **apiName) +{ + int i, k; + + *apiName = getApiName((char *)name, &k); + if(k < 0) + k = 0; + if(k > 256) + k = 256; + for (i = 0; loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].id != -1; i++) { + if (!strcasecmp (*apiName , loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].name)) { + *kbyp = k ? k >> 3 : loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].keyBytes; + return loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].id; + } + } + *kbyp = 16; /* 128 bits */ + return 18; /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ +} + +int try_cryptoapi_loop_interface(int fd, struct loop_info64 *loopinfo, char *apiName) +{ + snprintf((char *)loopinfo->lo_crypt_name, sizeof(loopinfo->lo_crypt_name), "%s-cbc", apiName); + loopinfo->lo_crypt_name[LO_NAME_SIZE - 1] = 0; + loopinfo->lo_encrypt_type = 18; /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + return(loop_set_status64_ioctl(fd, loopinfo)); +} diff --git a/sys-utils/loop.h b/sys-utils/loop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc9097b --- /dev/null +++ b/sys-utils/loop.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * loop.h + * + * Copyright 2003 by Jari Ruusu. + * Redistribution of this file is permitted under the GNU GPL + */ + +#ifndef _LOOP_H +#define _LOOP_H 1 + +#include +#include +#include + +#define LO_CRYPT_NONE 0 +#define LO_CRYPT_XOR 1 +#define LO_CRYPT_DES 2 +#define LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI 18 + +#define LOOP_SET_FD 0x4C00 +#define LOOP_CLR_FD 0x4C01 +#define LOOP_SET_STATUS 0x4C02 +#define LOOP_GET_STATUS 0x4C03 +#define LOOP_SET_STATUS64 0x4C04 +#define LOOP_GET_STATUS64 0x4C05 +#define LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP 0x4C4D +#define LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP_V3 0x4C4E +#define LOOP_RECOMPUTE_DEV_SIZE 0x4C52 + +#define LO_NAME_SIZE 64 +#define LO_KEY_SIZE 32 + +struct loop_info { + int lo_number; +#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= 0x20600 + __kernel_old_dev_t lo_device; +#else + __kernel_dev_t lo_device; +#endif + unsigned long lo_inode; +#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE >= 0x20600 + __kernel_old_dev_t lo_rdevice; +#else + __kernel_dev_t lo_rdevice; +#endif + int lo_offset; + int lo_encrypt_type; + int lo_encrypt_key_size; + int lo_flags; + char lo_name[LO_NAME_SIZE]; + unsigned char lo_encrypt_key[LO_KEY_SIZE]; + unsigned long lo_init[2]; + char reserved[4]; +}; + +struct loop_info64 { + u_int64_t lo_device; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int64_t lo_inode; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int64_t lo_rdevice; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int64_t lo_offset; /* bytes */ + u_int64_t lo_sizelimit; /* bytes, 0 == max available */ + u_int32_t lo_number; /* ioctl r/o */ + u_int32_t lo_encrypt_type; + u_int32_t lo_encrypt_key_size; /* ioctl w/o */ + u_int32_t lo_flags; /* ioctl r/o */ + unsigned char lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE]; + unsigned char lo_crypt_name[LO_NAME_SIZE]; + unsigned char lo_encrypt_key[LO_KEY_SIZE]; /* ioctl w/o */ + u_int64_t lo_init[2]; +}; + +extern int loop_set_status64_ioctl(int, struct loop_info64 *); +extern int loop_get_status64_ioctl(int, struct loop_info64 *); +extern int is_unused_loop_device(int); + +struct loop_crypt_type_struct { + short int id; + unsigned char flags; /* bit0 = show keybits, bit1 = add '-' before keybits */ + unsigned char keyBytes; + char *name; +}; + +extern struct loop_crypt_type_struct loop_crypt_type_tbl[]; +extern int loop_crypt_type(const char *, u_int32_t *, char **); +extern int try_cryptoapi_loop_interface(int, struct loop_info64 *, char *); + +#endif diff --git a/sys-utils/losetup.8 b/sys-utils/losetup.8 index dbc9095..07c375d 100644 --- a/sys-utils/losetup.8 +++ b/sys-utils/losetup.8 @@ -1,193 +1,201 @@ -.TH LOSETUP 8 "November 2015" "util-linux" "System Administration" +.TH LOSETUP 8 "2012-09-24" "Linux" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS" .SH NAME losetup \- set up and control loop devices .SH SYNOPSIS .ad l -Get info: -.sp -.in +5 .B losetup -.I loopdev -.sp -.B losetup -l -.RB [ \-a ] -.sp -.B losetup -j -.I file -.RB [ \-o -.IR offset ] -.sp -.in -5 -Detach a loop device: -.sp -.in +5 -.B "losetup \-d" -.IR loopdev ... -.sp -.in -5 -Detach all associated loop devices: -.sp -.in +5 -.B "losetup \-D" -.sp -.in -5 -Print the name of the first unused loop device: -.sp -.in +5 -.B "losetup \-f" -.sp -.in -5 -Set up a loop device: -.sp -.in +5 +[options] +.I loop_device +file +.br +.B losetup -F +[options] +.I loop_device +[file] +.br .B losetup -.RB [ \-o -.IR offset ] -.RB [ \-\-sizelimit -.IR size ] -.in +8 -.RB [ \-Pr ] -.RB [ \-\-show ] " \-f" | \fIloopdev\fP -.I file -.sp -.in -13 -Resize a loop device: -.sp -.in +5 -.B "losetup \-c" -.I loopdev -.in -5 +[ +.B \-d +] +.I loop_device +.br +.B losetup -a +.br +.B losetup -f +.br +.B losetup +.B \-R +.I loop_device .ad b .SH DESCRIPTION .B losetup is used to associate loop devices with regular files or block devices, -to detach loop devices, and to query the status of a loop device. If only the -\fIloopdev\fP argument is given, the status of the corresponding loop -device is shown. If no option is given, all loop devices are shown. -.sp -Note that the old output format (i.e. \fBlosetup -a\fR) with comma-delimited -strings is deprecated in favour of the \fB--list\fR output format. - +to detach loop devices and to query the status of a loop device. If only the +\fIloop_device\fP argument is given, the status of the corresponding loop +device is shown. .SH OPTIONS -The \fIsize\fR and \fIoffset\fR -arguments may be followed by the multiplicative suffixes KiB (=1024), -MiB (=1024*1024), and so on for GiB, TiB, PiB, EiB, ZiB and YiB (the "iB" is -optional, e.g., "K" has the same meaning as "KiB") or the suffixes -KB (=1000), MB (=1000*1000), and so on for GB, TB, PB, EB, ZB and YB. +.IP \fB\-a\fP +Show status of all loop devices. +.IP "\fB\-C \fIitercountk\fP" +Runs hashed passphrase through \fIitercountk\fP thousand iterations of AES-256 +before using it for loop encryption. This consumes lots of CPU cycles at +loop setup/mount time but not thereafter. In combination with passphrase seed +this slows down dictionary attacks. Iteration is not done in multi-key mode. +.IP "\fB\-d\fP" +Detach the file or device associated with the specified loop device. +.IP "\fB\-e \fIencryption\fP" +.RS +Enable data encryption. Following encryption types are recognized: +.IP \fBNONE\fP +Use no encryption (default). +.PD 0 +.IP \fBXOR\fP +Use a simple XOR encryption. +.IP "\fBAES128 AES\fP" +Use 128 bit AES encryption. Passphrase is hashed with SHA-256 by default. +.IP \fBAES192\fP +Use 192 bit AES encryption. Passphrase is hashed with SHA-384 by default. +.IP \fBAES256\fP +Use 256 bit AES encryption. Passphrase is hashed with SHA-512 by default. -.TP -.BR \-a , " \-\-all" -Show the status of all loop devices. Note that not all information is accessible -for non-root users. See also \fB\-\-list\fR. The old output format (as printed -without \fB--list)\fR is deprecated. -.TP -.BR \-c , " \-\-set\-capacity " \fIloopdev -Force the loop driver to reread the size of the file associated with the -specified loop device. -.TP -.BR \-d , " \-\-detach " \fIloopdev\fR... -Detach the file or device associated with the specified loop device(s). -.TP -.BR \-D , " \-\-detach\-all" -Detach all associated loop devices. -.TP -.BR \-\-direct\-io [ =on | off ] -Enable or disable direct I/O for the backing file. The optional argument -can be either \fBon\fR or \fBoff\fR. If the argument is omitted, it defaults -to \fBon\fR. -.TP -.BR \-f , " \-\-find" -Find the first unused loop device. If a -.I file -argument is present, use the found device as loop device. -Otherwise, just print its name. -.TP -.BR \-j , " \-\-associated " \fIfile -Show the status of all loop devices associated with the given -.IR file . -.TP -.BR \-J , " \-\-json" -Use JSON format for \fB\-\-list\fP output. -.TP -.BR \-l , " \-\-list" -If a loop device or the \fB-a\fR option is specified, print the default columns -for either the specified loop device or all loop devices; the default is to -print info about all devices. See also \fB\-\-output\fP, \fB\-\-noheadings\fP -\fB\-\-json\fP and \fB\-\-raw\fP. -.TP -.BR \-n , " \-\-noheadings" -Don't print headings for \fB\-\-list\fP output format. -.TP -.BR \-o , " \-\-offset " \fIoffset -The data start is moved \fIoffset\fP bytes into the specified file or device. -.TP -.BR \-O , " \-\-output " \fIcolumns -Specify the columns that are to be printed for the \fB\-\-list\fP output. -.TP -.BR \-P , " \-\-partscan" -Force the kernel to scan the partition table on a newly created loop device. -.IP "\fB\-\-raw\fP" -Use the raw \fB\-\-list\fP output format. -.TP -.BR \-r , " \-\-read\-only" -Set up a read-only loop device. -.IP "\fB\-\-sizelimit \fIsize\fP" -The data end is set to no more than \fIsize\fP bytes after the data start. -.IP "\fB\-\-show\fP" -Display the name of the assigned loop device if the -.B \-f -option and a -.I file -argument are present. -.TP -.BR \-v , " \-\-verbose" -Verbose mode. -.TP -.BR \-V , " \-\-version" -Display version information and exit. -.TP -.BR \-h , " \-\-help" -Display help text and exit. +.IP "\fBtwofish128 twofish160 twofish192 twofish256\fP" +.IP "\fBblowfish128 blowfish160 blowfish192 blowfish256\fP" +.IP "\fBserpent128 serpent192 serpent256 mars128 mars192\fP" +.IP "\fBmars256 rc6-128 rc6-192 rc6-256 tripleDES\fP" +These encryption types are available if they are enabled in kernel +configuration or corresponding modules have been loaded to kernel. +.PD +.RE +.IP "\fB\-f\fP" +Find and show next unused loop device. +.IP "\fB\-F\fP" +Reads and uses mount options from /etc/fstab that match specified loop +device, including offset= sizelimit= encryption= pseed= phash= loinit= +gpgkey= gpghome= cleartextkey= itercountk= and looped to device/file name. +loop= option in /etc/fstab must match specified loop device name. Command +line options take precedence in case of conflict. +.IP "\fB\-G \fIgpghome\fP" +Set gpg home directory to \fIgpghome\fP, so that gpg uses public/private +keys on \fIgpghome\fP directory. This is only used when gpgkey file needs to +be decrypted using public/private keys. If gpgkey file is encrypted with +symmetric cipher only, public/private keys are not required and this option +has no effect. +.IP "\fB\-H \fIphash\fP" +Uses \fIphash\fP function to hash passphrase. Available hash functions are +sha256, sha384, sha512 and rmd160. unhashed1 and unhashed2 +functions also exist for compatibility with some obsolete implementations. + +Hash function random does not ask for passphrase but sets up random keys and +attempts to put loop to multi-key mode. When random/1777 hash type is used +as mount option for mount program, mount program will create new file system +on the loop device and construct initial permissions of file system root +directory from octal digits that follow the slash character. + +WARNING! DO NOT USE RANDOM HASH TYPE ON PARTITION WITH EXISTING IMPORTANT +DATA ON IT. RANDOM HASH TYPE WILL DESTROY YOUR DATA. +.IP "\fB\-I \fIloinit\fP" +Passes a numeric value of \fIloinit\fP as a parameter to cipher transfer +function. Cipher transfer functions are free to interpret value as they +want. +.IP "\fB\-K \fIgpgkey\fP" +Passphrase is piped to gpg so that gpg can decrypt file \fIgpgkey\fP which +contains the real keys that are used to encrypt loop device. If decryption +requires public/private keys and gpghome is not specified, all users use +their own gpg public/private keys to decrypt \fIgpgkey\fP. Decrypted +\fIgpgkey\fP should contain 1 or 64 or 65 keys, each key at least 20 +characters and separated by newline. If decrypted \fIgpgkey\fP contains 64 +or 65 keys, then loop device is put to multi-key mode. In multi-key mode +first key is used for first sector, second key for second sector, and so on. +65th key, if present, is used as additional input to MD5 IV computation. +.IP "\fB\-o \fIoffset\fP" +The data start is moved \fIoffset\fP bytes into the specified file or +device. Normally offset is included in IV (initialization vector) +computations. If offset is prefixed with @ character, then offset is not +included in IV computations. @ prefix functionality may not be supported on +some older kernels and/or loop drivers. +.IP "\fB\-p \fIpasswdfd\fP" +Read the passphrase from file descriptor \fIpasswdfd\fP instead of the +terminal. If -K option is not being used (no gpg key file), then losetup +attempts to read 65 keys from \fIpasswdfd\fP, each key at least 20 +characters and separated by newline. If losetup successfully reads 64 or 65 +keys, then loop device is put to multi-key mode. If losetup encounters +end-of-file before 64 keys are read, then only first key is used in +single-key mode. -.SH ENCRYPTION -.B Cryptoloop is no longer supported in favor of dm-crypt. -.B For more details see cryptsetup (8). +echo SecretPassphraseHere | losetup -p0 -K foo.gpg -e AES128 ... +In above example, losetup reads passphrase from file descriptor 0 (stdin). +.IP "\fB\-P \fIcleartextkey\fP" +Read the passphrase from file \fIcleartextkey\fP instead of the +terminal. If -K option is not being used (no gpg key file), then losetup +attempts to read 65 keys from \fIcleartextkey\fP, each key at least 20 +characters and separated by newline. If losetup successfully reads 64 or 65 +keys, then loop device is put to multi-key mode. If losetup encounters +end-of-file before 64 keys are read, then only first key is used in +single-key mode. If both -p and -P options are used, then -p option takes +precedence. These are equivalent: + +losetup -p3 -K foo.gpg -e AES128 ... 3/etc/fskey9.gpg +losetup -e AES128 -K /etc/fskey9.gpg /dev/loop0 /file +mkfs -t ext2 /dev/loop0 +mount -t ext2 /dev/loop0 /mnt ... -# umount /dev/loop0 -# losetup --detach /dev/loop0 +umount /dev/loop0 +losetup -d /dev/loop0 .fi -.SH ENVIRONMENT -.IP LOOPDEV_DEBUG=all -enables debug output. +.SH RESTRICTION +XOR encryption is terribly weak. .SH AUTHORS -Karel Zak , based on the original version from -Theodore Ts'o -.SH AVAILABILITY -The losetup command is part of the util-linux package and is available from -ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/. +.nf +Original version: Theodore Ts'o +AES support: Jari Ruusu +.fi + diff --git a/sys-utils/losetup1.c b/sys-utils/losetup1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..059832d --- /dev/null +++ b/sys-utils/losetup1.c @@ -0,0 +1,1281 @@ +/* Taken from Ted's losetup.c - Mitch */ +/* Added vfs mount options - aeb - 960223 */ +/* Removed lomount - aeb - 960224 */ + +/* + * 1999-02-22 Arkadiusz Mi¶kiewicz + * - added Native Language Support + * 1999-03-21 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo + * - fixed strerr(errno) in gettext calls + * 2001-04-11 Jari Ruusu + * - added AES support + */ + +#define LOOPMAJOR 7 + +/* + * losetup.c - setup and control loop devices + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "loop.h" +#include "nls.h" +#include "../libmount/src/sha512.h" +#include "../libmount/src/rmd160.h" +#include "../libmount/src/aes.h" + +#if !defined(BLKGETSIZE64) +# define BLKGETSIZE64 _IOR(0x12,114,size_t) +#endif + +int verbose = 0; + +#if !defined(LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) +# define LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH 20 +#endif + +char *passFDnumber = (char *)0; +char *passAskTwice = (char *)0; +char *passSeedString = (char *)0; +char *passHashFuncName = (char *)0; +char *passIterThousands = (char *)0; +char *loInitValue = (char *)0; +char *gpgKeyFile = (char *)0; +char *gpgHomeDir = (char *)0; +char *clearTextKeyFile = (char *)0; +char *loopOffsetBytes = (char *)0; +char *loopSizeBytes = (char *)0; +char *loopEncryptionType = (char *)0; + +static int multiKeyMode = 0; /* 0=single-key 64=multi-key-v2 65=multi-key-v3 1000=any */ +static char *multiKeyPass[66]; +static char *loopFileName; + +static char *xstrdup(const char *s) +{ + char *t; + if(!s) return NULL; + t = strdup(s); + if(!t) { + fprintf(stderr, "not enough memory\n"); + exit(2); /* EX_SYSERR */ + } + return t; +} + +static char * +crypt_name (int id, int *flags) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].id != -1; i++) + if(id == loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].id) { + *flags = loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].flags; + return loop_crypt_type_tbl[i].name; + } + *flags = 0; + if(id == 18) + return "CryptoAPI"; + return "undefined"; +} + +static int +show_loop(char *device) { + struct loop_info64 loopinfo; + int fd; + + if ((fd = open(device, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + int errsv = errno; + fprintf(stderr, _("loop: can't open device %s: %s\n"), + device, strerror (errsv)); + return 2; + } + if (loop_get_status64_ioctl(fd, &loopinfo) < 0) { + int errsv = errno; + close (fd); + fprintf(stderr, _("loop: can't get info on device %s: %s\n"), + device, strerror (errsv)); + return 1; + } + close (fd); + loopinfo.lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE-1] = 0; + loopinfo.lo_crypt_name[LO_NAME_SIZE-1] = 0; + printf("%s: [%04llx]:%llu (%s)", device, (unsigned long long)loopinfo.lo_device, + (unsigned long long)loopinfo.lo_inode, loopinfo.lo_file_name); + if (loopinfo.lo_offset) { + if ((long long)loopinfo.lo_offset < 0) { + printf(_(" offset=@%llu"), -((unsigned long long)loopinfo.lo_offset)); + } else { + printf(_(" offset=%llu"), (unsigned long long)loopinfo.lo_offset); + } + } + if (loopinfo.lo_sizelimit) + printf(_(" sizelimit=%llu"), (unsigned long long)loopinfo.lo_sizelimit); + if (loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type) { + int flags; + char *s = crypt_name (loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type, &flags); + + printf(_(" encryption=%s"), s); + /* type 18 == LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + if (loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type == 18) { + printf("/%s", loopinfo.lo_crypt_name); + } else { + if(flags & 2) + printf("-"); + if(flags & 1) + printf("%u", (unsigned int)loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size << 3); + } + } + switch(loopinfo.lo_flags & 0x180000) { + case 0x180000: + printf(_(" multi-key-v3")); + break; + case 0x100000: + printf(_(" multi-key-v2")); + break; + } + /* type 2 == LO_CRYPT_DES */ + if (loopinfo.lo_init[0] && (loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type != 2)) + printf(_(" loinit=%llu"), (unsigned long long)loopinfo.lo_init[0]); + if (loopinfo.lo_flags & 0x200000) + printf(_(" read-only")); + printf("\n"); + + return 0; +} + +#define SIZE(a) (sizeof(a)/sizeof(a[0])) + +static char * +find_unused_loop_device (void) { + /* Just creating a device, say in /tmp, is probably a bad idea - + people might have problems with backup or so. + So, we just try /dev/loop[0-7]. */ + char dev[20]; + char *loop_formats[] = { "/dev/loop%d", "/dev/loop/%d" }; + int i, j, fd, somedev = 0, someloop = 0; + struct stat statbuf; + + for (j = 0; j < (int)SIZE(loop_formats); j++) { + for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + sprintf(dev, loop_formats[j], i); + if (stat (dev, &statbuf) == 0 && S_ISBLK(statbuf.st_mode)) { + somedev++; + fd = open (dev, O_RDONLY); + if (fd >= 0) { + if (is_unused_loop_device(fd) == 0) + someloop++; /* in use */ + else if (errno == ENXIO) { + close (fd); + return xstrdup(dev);/* probably free */ + } + close (fd); + } + continue;/* continue trying as long as devices exist */ + } + break; + } + } + + if (!somedev) + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: could not find any loop device\n")); + else if (!someloop) + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: could not open any loop device\n")); + else + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: could not find any free loop device\n")); + return 0; +} + +static int rd_wr_retry(int fd, char *buf, int cnt, int w) +{ + int x, y, z; + + x = 0; + while(x < cnt) { + y = cnt - x; + if(w) { + z = write(fd, buf + x, y); + } else { + z = read(fd, buf + x, y); + if (!z) return x; + } + if(z < 0) { + if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == ENOMEM) || (errno == ERESTART) || (errno == EINTR)) { + continue; + } + return x; + } + x += z; + } + return x; +} + +static char *get_FD_pass(int fd) +{ + char *p = NULL, *n; + int x = 0, y = 0; + + do { + if(y >= (x - 1)) { + x += 128; + /* Must enforce some max limit here -- this code */ + /* runs as part of mount, and mount is setuid root */ + /* and has used mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE) */ + if(x > (4*1024)) return(NULL); + n = malloc(x); + if(!n) return(NULL); + if(p) { + memcpy(n, p, y); + memset(p, 0, y); + free(p); + } + p = n; + } + if(rd_wr_retry(fd, p + y, 1, 0) != 1) break; + if((p[y] == '\n') || !p[y]) break; + y++; + } while(1); + if(p) p[y] = 0; + return p; +} + +static unsigned long long mystrtoull(char *s, int acceptAT) +{ + unsigned long long v = 0; + int negative = 0; + + while ((*s == ' ') || (*s == '\t')) + s++; + if (acceptAT && (*s == '@')) { + s++; + negative = 1; + } + if (*s == '0') { + s++; + if ((*s == 'x') || (*s == 'X')) { + s++; + sscanf(s, "%llx", &v); + } else { + sscanf(s, "%llo", &v); + } + } else { + sscanf(s, "%llu", &v); + } + return negative ? -v : v; +} + +static void warnAboutBadKeyData(int x) +{ + if((x > 1) && (x != 64) && (x != 65)) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Warning: Unknown key data format - using it anyway\n")); + } +} + +static int are_these_files_same(const char *name1, const char *name2) +{ + struct stat statbuf1; + struct stat statbuf2; + + if(!name1 || !*name1 || !name2 || !*name2) return 0; + if(stat(name1, &statbuf1)) return 0; + if(stat(name2, &statbuf2)) return 0; + if(statbuf1.st_dev != statbuf2.st_dev) return 0; + if(statbuf1.st_ino != statbuf2.st_ino) return 0; + return 1; /* are same */ +} + +static char *do_GPG_pipe(char *pass) +{ + int x, pfdi[2], pfdo[2]; + char str[10], *a[16], *e[2], *h; + pid_t gpid; + struct passwd *p; + void *oldSigPipeHandler; + + if((getuid() == 0) && gpgHomeDir && gpgHomeDir[0]) { + h = gpgHomeDir; + } else { + if(!(p = getpwuid(getuid()))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: Unable to detect home directory for uid %d\n"), (int)getuid()); + return NULL; + } + h = p->pw_dir; + } + if(!(e[0] = malloc(strlen(h) + 6))) { + nomem1: + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: Unable to allocate memory\n")); + return NULL; + } + sprintf(e[0], "HOME=%s", h); + e[1] = 0; + + if(pipe(&pfdi[0])) { + nomem2: + free(e[0]); + goto nomem1; + } + if(pipe(&pfdo[0])) { + close(pfdi[0]); + close(pfdi[1]); + goto nomem2; + } + + /* + * When this code is run as part of losetup, normal read permissions + * affect the open() below because losetup is not setuid-root. + * + * When this code is run as part of mount, only root can set + * 'gpgKeyFile' and as such, only root can decide what file is opened + * below. However, since mount is usually setuid-root all non-root + * users can also open() the file too, but that file's contents are + * only piped to gpg. This readable-for-all is intended behaviour, + * and is very useful in situations where non-root users mount loop + * devices with their own gpg private key, and yet don't have access + * to the actual key used to encrypt loop device. + */ + if((x = open(gpgKeyFile, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open %s for reading\n"), gpgKeyFile); + nomem3: + free(e[0]); + close(pfdo[0]); + close(pfdo[1]); + close(pfdi[0]); + close(pfdi[1]); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * If someone puts a gpg key file at beginning of device and + * puts the real file system at some offset into the device, + * this code extracts that gpg key file into a temp file so gpg + * won't end up reading whole device when decrypting the key file. + * + * Example of encrypted cdrom mount with 8192 bytes reserved for gpg key file: + * mount -t iso9660 /dev/cdrom /cdrom -o loop=/dev/loop0,encryption=AES128,gpgkey=/dev/cdrom,offset=8192 + * ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ + */ + if(loopOffsetBytes && are_these_files_same(loopFileName, gpgKeyFile)) { + FILE *f; + char b[1024]; + long long cnt; + int cnt2, cnt3; + + cnt = mystrtoull(loopOffsetBytes, 1); + if(cnt < 0) cnt = -cnt; + if(cnt > (1024 * 1024)) cnt = 1024 * 1024; /* sanity check */ + f = tmpfile(); + if(!f) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to create temp file\n")); + close(x); + goto nomem3; + } + while(cnt > 0) { + cnt2 = sizeof(b); + if(cnt < cnt2) cnt2 = cnt; + cnt3 = rd_wr_retry(x, b, cnt2, 0); + if(cnt3 && (fwrite(b, cnt3, 1, f) != 1)) { + tmpWrErr: + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to write to temp file\n")); + fclose(f); + close(x); + goto nomem3; + } + if(cnt2 != cnt3) break; + cnt -= cnt3; + } + if(fflush(f)) goto tmpWrErr; + close(x); + x = dup(fileno(f)); + fclose(f); + lseek(x, 0L, SEEK_SET); + } + + sprintf(str, "%d", pfdi[0]); + if(!(gpid = fork())) { + dup2(x, 0); + dup2(pfdo[1], 1); + close(x); + close(pfdi[1]); + close(pfdo[0]); + close(pfdo[1]); + if((x = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) >= 0) { + dup2(x, 2); + close(x); + } + x = 0; + a[x++] = "gpg"; + if(gpgHomeDir && gpgHomeDir[0]) { + a[x++] = "--homedir"; + a[x++] = gpgHomeDir; + } + a[x++] = "--no-options"; + a[x++] = "--quiet"; + a[x++] = "--batch"; + a[x++] = "--no-tty"; + a[x++] = "--passphrase-fd"; + a[x++] = str; + a[x++] = "--decrypt"; + a[x] = 0; + if(setgid(getgid())) exit(1); + if(setuid(getuid())) exit(1); + for(x = 3; x < 1024; x++) { + if(x == pfdi[0]) continue; + close(x); + } + execve("/bin/gpg", &a[0], &e[0]); + execve("/usr/bin/gpg", &a[0], &e[0]); + execve("/usr/local/bin/gpg", &a[0], &e[0]); + exit(1); + } + free(e[0]); + close(x); + close(pfdi[0]); + close(pfdo[1]); + if(gpid == -1) { + close(pfdi[1]); + close(pfdo[0]); + goto nomem1; + } + + x = strlen(pass); + + /* ignore possible SIGPIPE signal while writing to gpg */ + oldSigPipeHandler = signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + rd_wr_retry(pfdi[1], pass, x, 1); + rd_wr_retry(pfdi[1], "\n", 1, 1); + if(oldSigPipeHandler != SIG_ERR) signal(SIGPIPE, oldSigPipeHandler); + + close(pfdi[1]); + memset(pass, 0, x); + x = 0; + while(x < 66) { + multiKeyPass[x] = get_FD_pass(pfdo[0]); + if(!multiKeyPass[x]) { + /* mem alloc failed - abort */ + multiKeyPass[0] = 0; + break; + } + if(strlen(multiKeyPass[x]) < LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) break; + x++; + } + warnAboutBadKeyData(x); + if(x >= 65) + multiKeyMode = 65; + if(x == 64) + multiKeyMode = 64; + close(pfdo[0]); + waitpid(gpid, &x, 0); + if(!multiKeyPass[0]) goto nomem1; + return multiKeyPass[0]; +} + +static char *sGetPass(int minLen, int warnLen) +{ + char *p, *s, *seed; + int i, ask2, close_i_fd = 0; + + if(!passFDnumber) { + if(clearTextKeyFile) { + if((i = open(clearTextKeyFile, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open %s for reading\n"), clearTextKeyFile); + return NULL; + } + close_i_fd = 1; + goto contReadFrom_i; + } + p = getpass(_("Password: ")); + ask2 = passAskTwice ? 1 : 0; + } else { + i = atoi(passFDnumber); + contReadFrom_i: + if(gpgKeyFile && gpgKeyFile[0]) { + p = get_FD_pass(i); + if(close_i_fd) close(i); + } else { + int x = 0; + while(x < 66) { + multiKeyPass[x] = get_FD_pass(i); + if(!multiKeyPass[x]) goto nomem; + if(strlen(multiKeyPass[x]) < LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH) break; + x++; + } + if(close_i_fd) close(i); + warnAboutBadKeyData(x); + if(x >= 65) { + multiKeyMode = 65; + return multiKeyPass[0]; + } + if(x == 64) { + multiKeyMode = 64; + return multiKeyPass[0]; + } + p = multiKeyPass[0]; + } + ask2 = 0; + } + if(!p) goto nomem; + if(gpgKeyFile && gpgKeyFile[0]) { + if(ask2) { + i = strlen(p); + s = malloc(i + 1); + if(!s) goto nomem; + strcpy(s, p); + p = getpass(_("Retype password: ")); + if(!p) goto nomem; + if(strcmp(s, p)) goto compareErr; + memset(s, 0, i); + free(s); + ask2 = 0; + } + p = do_GPG_pipe(p); + if(!p) return(NULL); + if(!p[0]) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: gpg key file decryption failed\n")); + return(NULL); + } + if(multiKeyMode) return(p); + } + i = strlen(p); + if(i < minLen) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: Password must be at least %d characters.\n"), minLen); + return(NULL); + } + seed = passSeedString; + if(!seed) seed = ""; + s = malloc(i + strlen(seed) + 1); + if(!s) { + nomem: + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: Unable to allocate memory\n")); + return(NULL); + } + strcpy(s, p); + memset(p, 0, i); + if(ask2) { + p = getpass(_("Retype password: ")); + if(!p) goto nomem; + if(strcmp(s, p)) { + compareErr: + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: Passwords are not identical\n")); + return(NULL); + } + memset(p, 0, i); + } + if(i < warnLen) { + fprintf(stderr, _("WARNING - Please use longer password (%d or more characters)\n"), LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH); + } + strcat(s, seed); + return(s); +} + +/* this is for compatibility with historic loop-AES version */ +static void unhashed1_key_setup(unsigned char *keyStr, int ile, unsigned char *keyBuf, int bufSize) +{ + register int x, y, z, cnt = ile; + unsigned char *kp; + + memset(keyBuf, 0, bufSize); + kp = keyStr; + for(x = 0; x < (bufSize * 8); x += 6) { + y = *kp++; + if(--cnt <= 0) { + kp = keyStr; + cnt = ile; + } + if((y >= '0') && (y <= '9')) y -= '0'; + else if((y >= 'A') && (y <= 'Z')) y -= ('A' - 10); + else if((y >= 'a') && (y <= 'z')) y -= ('a' - 36); + else if((y == '.') || (y == '/')) y += (62 - '.'); + else y &= 63; + z = x >> 3; + if(z < bufSize) { + keyBuf[z] |= y << (x & 7); + } + z++; + if(z < bufSize) { + keyBuf[z] |= y >> (8 - (x & 7)); + } + } +} + +/* this is for compatibility with mainline mount */ +static void unhashed2_key_setup(unsigned char *keyStr, int ile, unsigned char *keyBuf, int bufSize) +{ + memset(keyBuf, 0, bufSize); + strncpy((char *)keyBuf, (char *)keyStr, bufSize - 1); + keyBuf[bufSize - 1] = 0; +} + +static void rmd160HashTwiceWithA(unsigned char *ib, int ile, unsigned char *ob, int ole) +{ + char tmpBuf[20 + 20]; + char pwdCopy[130]; + + if(ole < 1) return; + memset(ob, 0, ole); + if(ole > 40) ole = 40; + __loDev_rmd160_hash_buffer(&tmpBuf[0], (char *)ib, ile); + pwdCopy[0] = 'A'; + if(ile > (int)sizeof(pwdCopy) - 1) ile = sizeof(pwdCopy) - 1; + memcpy(pwdCopy + 1, ib, ile); + __loDev_rmd160_hash_buffer(&tmpBuf[20], pwdCopy, ile + 1); + memcpy(ob, tmpBuf, ole); + memset(tmpBuf, 0, sizeof(tmpBuf)); + memset(pwdCopy, 0, sizeof(pwdCopy)); +} + +extern long long llseek(int, long long, int); + +static long long xx_lseek(int fd, long long offset, int whence) +{ + if(sizeof(off_t) >= 8) { + return lseek(fd, offset, whence); + } else { + return llseek(fd, offset, whence); + } +} + +static int loop_create_random_keys(char *partition, long long offset, long long sizelimit, int loopro, unsigned char *k) +{ + int x, y, fd; + sha512_context s; + unsigned char b[4096]; + + if(loopro) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: read-only device %s\n"), partition); + return 1; + } + + /* + * Compute SHA-512 over first 40 KB of old fs data. SHA-512 hash + * output is then used as entropy for new fs encryption key. + */ + if((fd = open(partition, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + seekFailed: + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open/seek device %s\n"), partition); + return 1; + } + if(offset < 0) offset = -offset; + if(xx_lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) { + close(fd); + goto seekFailed; + } + __loDev_sha512_init(&s); + for(x = 1; x <= 10; x++) { + if((sizelimit > 0) && ((long long)(sizeof(b) * x) > sizelimit)) break; + if(rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[0], sizeof(b), 0) != sizeof(b)) break; + __loDev_sha512_write(&s, &b[0], sizeof(b)); + } + __loDev_sha512_final(&s); + + /* + * Overwrite 40 KB of old fs data 20 times so that recovering + * SHA-512 output beyond this point is difficult and expensive. + */ + for(y = 0; y < 20; y++) { + int z; + struct { + struct timeval tv; + unsigned char h[64]; + int x,y,z; + } j; + if(xx_lseek(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) break; + memcpy(&j.h[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + gettimeofday(&j.tv, NULL); + j.y = y; + for(x = 1; x <= 10; x++) { + j.x = x; + for(z = 0; z < (int)sizeof(b); z += 64) { + j.z = z; + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer((unsigned char *)&j, sizeof(j), &b[z], 64); + } + if((sizelimit > 0) && ((long long)(sizeof(b) * x) > sizelimit)) break; + if(rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[0], sizeof(b), 1) != sizeof(b)) break; + } + memset(&j, 0, sizeof(j)); + if(fsync(fd)) break; + } + close(fd); + + /* + * Use all 512 bits of hash output + */ + memcpy(&b[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); + + /* + * Read 32 bytes of random entropy from kernel's random + * number generator. This code may be executed early on startup + * scripts and amount of random entropy may be non-existent. + * SHA-512 of old fs data is used as workaround for missing + * entropy in kernel's random number generator. + */ + if((fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open /dev/urandom\n")); + return 1; + } + rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[64], 32, 0); + + /* generate multi-key hashes */ + x = 0; + while(x < 65) { + rd_wr_retry(fd, (char *) &b[64+32], 16, 0); + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(&b[0], 64+32+16, k, 32); + k += 32; + x++; + } + + close(fd); + memset(&b[0], 0, sizeof(b)); + return 0; +} + +static int +set_loop(const char *device, const char *file, int *loopro, int busyRetVal) { + struct loop_info64 loopinfo; + int fd, ffd, mode, i, errRetVal = 1; + char *pass, *apiName = NULL; + void (*hashFunc)(unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *, int); + unsigned char multiKeyBits[65][32]; + int minPassLen = LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH; + + sync(); + loopFileName = (char *)file; + multiKeyMode = 0; + mode = (*loopro ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR); + if ((ffd = open(file, mode)) < 0) { + if (!*loopro && errno == EROFS) + ffd = open(file, mode = O_RDONLY); + if (ffd < 0) { + perror(file); + return 1; + } + } + if ((fd = open(device, mode)) < 0) { + perror (device); + goto close_ffd_return1; + } + *loopro = (mode == O_RDONLY); + + if (ioctl(fd, LOOP_SET_FD, ffd) < 0) { + if(errno == EBUSY) + errRetVal = busyRetVal; + if((errRetVal != 2) || verbose) + perror("ioctl: LOOP_SET_FD"); +keyclean_close_fd_ffd_return1: + memset(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key, 0, sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + memset(&multiKeyBits[0][0], 0, sizeof(multiKeyBits)); + close (fd); +close_ffd_return1: + close (ffd); + return errRetVal; + } + + memset (&loopinfo, 0, sizeof (loopinfo)); + strncpy ((char *)loopinfo.lo_file_name, file, LO_NAME_SIZE - 1); + loopinfo.lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE - 1] = 0; + if (loopEncryptionType) + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type = loop_crypt_type (loopEncryptionType, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size, &apiName); + if (loopOffsetBytes) + loopinfo.lo_offset = mystrtoull(loopOffsetBytes, 1); + if (loopSizeBytes) + loopinfo.lo_sizelimit = mystrtoull(loopSizeBytes, 0); + +#ifdef MCL_FUTURE + /* + * Oh-oh, sensitive data coming up. Better lock into memory to prevent + * passwd etc being swapped out and left somewhere on disk. + */ + + if(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type && mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE)) { + perror("memlock"); + ioctl (fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0); + fprintf(stderr, _("Couldn't lock into memory, exiting.\n")); + exit(1); + } +#endif + + switch (loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type) { + case LO_CRYPT_NONE: + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 0; + break; + case LO_CRYPT_XOR: + pass = sGetPass (1, 0); + if(!pass) goto loop_clr_fd_out; + strncpy ((char *)loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key, pass, LO_KEY_SIZE - 1); + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[LO_KEY_SIZE - 1] = 0; + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = strlen((char*)loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key); + break; + case 3: /* LO_CRYPT_FISH2 */ + case 4: /* LO_CRYPT_BLOW */ + case 7: /* LO_CRYPT_SERPENT */ + case 8: /* LO_CRYPT_MARS */ + case 11: /* LO_CRYPT_RC6 */ + case 12: /* LO_CRYPT_DES_EDE3 */ + case 16: /* LO_CRYPT_AES */ + case 18: /* LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + /* set default hash function */ + hashFunc = __loDev_sha256_hash_buffer; + if(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size == 24) hashFunc = __loDev_sha384_hash_buffer; + if(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size == 32) hashFunc = __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer; + /* possibly override default hash function */ + if(passHashFuncName) { + if(!strcasecmp(passHashFuncName, "sha256")) { + hashFunc = __loDev_sha256_hash_buffer; + } else if(!strcasecmp(passHashFuncName, "sha384")) { + hashFunc = __loDev_sha384_hash_buffer; + } else if(!strcasecmp(passHashFuncName, "sha512")) { + hashFunc = __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer; + } else if(!strcasecmp(passHashFuncName, "rmd160")) { + hashFunc = rmd160HashTwiceWithA; + minPassLen = 1; + } else if(!strcasecmp(passHashFuncName, "unhashed1")) { + hashFunc = unhashed1_key_setup; + } else if(!strcasecmp(passHashFuncName, "unhashed2")) { + hashFunc = unhashed2_key_setup; + minPassLen = 1; + } else if(!strncasecmp(passHashFuncName, "random", 6) && ((passHashFuncName[6] == 0) || (passHashFuncName[6] == '/'))) { + /* random hash type sets up 65 random keys */ + /* WARNING! DO NOT USE RANDOM HASH TYPE ON PARTITION WITH EXISTING */ + /* IMPORTANT DATA ON IT. RANDOM HASH TYPE WILL DESTROY YOUR DATA. */ + if(loop_create_random_keys((char*)file, loopinfo.lo_offset, loopinfo.lo_sizelimit, *loopro, &multiKeyBits[0][0])) { + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + memcpy(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], &multiKeyBits[0][0], sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + multiKeyMode = 1000; + break; /* out of switch(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type) */ + } + } + pass = sGetPass (minPassLen, LOOP_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH); + if(!pass) goto loop_clr_fd_out; + i = strlen(pass); + if(hashFunc == unhashed1_key_setup) { + /* this is for compatibility with historic loop-AES version */ + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 16; /* 128 bits */ + if(i >= 32) loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 24; /* 192 bits */ + if(i >= 43) loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size = 32; /* 256 bits */ + } + (*hashFunc)((unsigned char *)pass, i, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + if(multiKeyMode) { + int r = 0, t; + while(r < multiKeyMode) { + t = strlen(multiKeyPass[r]); + (*hashFunc)((unsigned char *)multiKeyPass[r], t, &multiKeyBits[r][0], 32); + memset(multiKeyPass[r], 0, t); + /* + * MultiKeyMode uses md5 IV. One key mode uses sector IV. Sector IV + * and md5 IV v2 and v3 are all computed differently. This first key + * byte XOR with 0x55/0xF4 is needed to cause complete decrypt failure + * in cases where data is encrypted with one type of IV and decrypted + * with another type IV. If identical key was used but only IV was + * computed differently, only first plaintext block of 512 byte CBC + * chain would decrypt incorrectly and rest would decrypt correctly. + * Partially correct decryption is dangerous. Decrypting all blocks + * incorrectly is safer because file system mount will simply fail. + */ + if(multiKeyMode == 65) { + multiKeyBits[r][0] ^= 0xF4; /* version 3 */ + } else { + multiKeyBits[r][0] ^= 0x55; /* version 2 */ + } + r++; + } + } else if(passIterThousands) { + aes_context ctx; + unsigned long iter = 0; + unsigned char tempkey[32]; + /* + * Set up AES-256 encryption key using same password and hash function + * as before but with password bit 0 flipped before hashing. That key + * is then used to encrypt actual loop key 'itercountk' thousand times. + */ + pass[0] ^= 1; + (*hashFunc)((unsigned char *)pass, i, &tempkey[0], 32); + __loDev_aes_set_key(&ctx, &tempkey[0], 32, 0); + sscanf(passIterThousands, "%lu", &iter); + iter *= 1000; + while(iter > 0) { + /* encrypt both 128bit blocks with AES-256 */ + __loDev_aes_encrypt(&ctx, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[ 0], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[ 0]); + __loDev_aes_encrypt(&ctx, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16]); + /* exchange upper half of first block with lower half of second block */ + memcpy(&tempkey[0], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[8], 8); + memcpy(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[8], &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16], 8); + memcpy(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[16], &tempkey[0], 8); + iter--; + } + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + memset(&tempkey[0], 0, sizeof(tempkey)); + } + memset(pass, 0, i); /* erase original password */ + break; + default: + fprintf (stderr, _("Error: don't know how to get key for encryption system %d\n"), loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type); + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + + if(loInitValue) { + /* cipher modules are free to do whatever they want with this value */ + i = 0; + sscanf(loInitValue, "%d", &i); + loopinfo.lo_init[0] = i; + } + + /* type 18 == LO_CRYPT_CRYPTOAPI */ + if ((loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type == 18) || (loop_set_status64_ioctl(fd, &loopinfo) < 0)) { + /* direct cipher interface failed - try CryptoAPI interface now */ + if(!apiName || (try_cryptoapi_loop_interface(fd, &loopinfo, apiName) < 0)) { + fprintf(stderr, _("ioctl: LOOP_SET_STATUS: %s, requested cipher or key length (%d bits) not supported by kernel\n"), strerror(errno), loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size << 3); + loop_clr_fd_out: + (void) ioctl (fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0); + goto keyclean_close_fd_ffd_return1; + } + } + if(multiKeyMode >= 65) { + if(ioctl(fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP_V3, &multiKeyBits[0][0]) < 0) { + if(multiKeyMode == 1000) goto try_v2_setup; + perror("ioctl: LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP_V3"); + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + } else if(multiKeyMode == 64) { + try_v2_setup: + if((ioctl(fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP, &multiKeyBits[0][0]) < 0) && (multiKeyMode != 1000)) { + perror("ioctl: LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP"); + goto loop_clr_fd_out; + } + } + + memset(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key, 0, sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + memset(&multiKeyBits[0][0], 0, sizeof(multiKeyBits)); + close (fd); + close (ffd); + + if (verbose > 1) + printf(_("set_loop(%s,%s): success\n"), device, file); + return 0; +} + +#include +#include + +static char *progname; + +static void +usage(void) { + fprintf(stderr, _("usage:\n\ + %s [options] loop_device file # setup\n\ + %s -F [options] loop_device [file] # setup, read /etc/fstab\n\ + %s loop_device # give info\n\ + %s -a # give info of all loops\n\ + %s -f # show next free loop device\n\ + %s -d loop_device # delete\n\ + %s -R loop_device # resize\n\ +options: -e encryption -o offset -s sizelimit -p passwdfd -T -S pseed\n\ + -H phash -I loinit -K gpgkey -G gpghome -C itercountk -v -r\n\ + -P cleartextkey\n"), + progname, progname, progname, progname, progname, progname, progname); + exit(1); +} + +static void +show_all_loops(void) +{ + char dev[20]; + char *lfmt[] = { "/dev/loop%d", "/dev/loop/%d" }; + int i, j, fd, x; + struct stat statbuf; + + for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + for(j = (sizeof(lfmt) / sizeof(lfmt[0])) - 1; j >= 0; j--) { + sprintf(dev, lfmt[j], i); + if(stat(dev, &statbuf) == 0 && S_ISBLK(statbuf.st_mode)) { + fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY); + if(fd >= 0) { + x = is_unused_loop_device(fd); + close(fd); + if(x == 0) { + show_loop(dev); + j = 0; + } + } + } + } + } +} + +static int +read_options_from_fstab(char *loopToFind, char **partitionPtr) +{ + FILE *f; + struct mntent *m; + int y, foundMatch = 0; + char *opt, *fr1, *fr2; + struct options { + char *name; /* name of /etc/fstab option */ + char **dest; /* destination where it is written to */ + char *line; /* temp */ + }; + struct options tbl[] = { + { "device/file name ", partitionPtr }, /* must be index 0 */ + { "loop=", &loopToFind }, /* must be index 1 */ + { "offset=", &loopOffsetBytes }, + { "sizelimit=", &loopSizeBytes }, + { "encryption=", &loopEncryptionType }, + { "pseed=", &passSeedString }, + { "phash=", &passHashFuncName }, + { "loinit=", &loInitValue }, + { "gpgkey=", &gpgKeyFile }, + { "gpghome=", &gpgHomeDir }, + { "cleartextkey=", &clearTextKeyFile }, + { "itercountk=", &passIterThousands }, + }; + struct options *p; + + if (!(f = setmntent("/etc/fstab", "r"))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: unable to open /etc/fstab for reading\n")); + return 0; + } + while ((m = getmntent(f)) != NULL) { + tbl[0].line = fr1 = xstrdup(m->mnt_fsname); + p = &tbl[1]; + do { + p->line = NULL; + } while (++p < &tbl[sizeof(tbl) / sizeof(struct options)]); + opt = fr2 = xstrdup(m->mnt_opts); + for (opt = strtok(opt, ","); opt != NULL; opt = strtok(NULL, ",")) { + p = &tbl[1]; + do { + y = strlen(p->name); + if (!strncmp(opt, p->name, y)) + p->line = opt + y; + } while (++p < &tbl[sizeof(tbl) / sizeof(struct options)]); + } + if (tbl[1].line && !strcmp(loopToFind, tbl[1].line)) { + if (++foundMatch > 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: multiple loop=%s options found in /etc/fstab\n"), loopToFind); + endmntent(f); + return 0; + } + p = &tbl[0]; + do { + if (!*p->dest && p->line) { + *p->dest = p->line; + if (verbose) + printf(_("using %s%s from /etc/fstab\n"), p->name, p->line); + } + } while (++p < &tbl[sizeof(tbl) / sizeof(struct options)]); + fr1 = fr2 = NULL; + } + if(fr1) free(fr1); + if(fr2) free(fr2); + } + endmntent(f); + if (foundMatch == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error: loop=%s option not found in /etc/fstab\n"), loopToFind); + } + return foundMatch; +} + +static int +recompute_loop_dev_size(char *device) +{ + int fd, err1 = 0, err2, err3; + long long oldBytes = -1, newBytes = -1; + + fd = open(device, O_RDONLY); + if(fd < 0) { + perror(device); + return 1; + } + if(verbose) { + err1 = ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE64, &oldBytes); + } + err2 = ioctl(fd, LOOP_RECOMPUTE_DEV_SIZE, 0); + if(err2) { + perror(device); + goto done1; + } + if(verbose) { + err3 = ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE64, &newBytes); + if(!err1 && (oldBytes >= 0)) { + printf("%s: old size %lld bytes\n", device, oldBytes); + } + if(!err3 && (newBytes >= 0)) { + printf("%s: new size %lld bytes\n", device, newBytes); + } + } +done1: + close(fd); + return err2; +} + +static int +del_loop (const char *device) { + int fd; + + sync(); + if ((fd = open (device, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + int errsv = errno; + fprintf(stderr, _("loop: can't delete device %s: %s\n"), + device, strerror (errsv)); + return 1; + } + if (ioctl (fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0) < 0) { + perror ("ioctl: LOOP_CLR_FD"); + return 1; + } + close (fd); + if (verbose > 1) + printf(_("del_loop(%s): success\n"), device); + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) { + char *partitionName = NULL; + char *device = NULL; + int delete,find,c,option_a=0,option_F=0,option_R=0,setup_o=0; + int res = 0; + int ro = 0; + + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); + bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR); + textdomain(PACKAGE); + + delete = find = 0; + progname = argv[0]; + while ((c = getopt(argc,argv,"aC:de:fFG:H:I:K:o:p:P:rRs:S:Tv")) != -1) { + switch (c) { + case 'a': /* show status of all loops */ + option_a = 1; + break; + case 'C': + passIterThousands = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'd': + delete = 1; + break; + case 'e': + loopEncryptionType = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'f': /* find free loop */ + find = 1; + break; + case 'F': /* read loop related options from /etc/fstab */ + option_F = 1; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'G': /* GnuPG home dir */ + gpgHomeDir = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'H': /* passphrase hash function name */ + passHashFuncName = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'I': /* lo_init[0] value (in string form) */ + loInitValue = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'K': /* GnuPG key file name */ + gpgKeyFile = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'o': + loopOffsetBytes = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'p': /* read passphrase from given fd */ + passFDnumber = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'P': /* read passphrase from given file */ + clearTextKeyFile = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'r': /* read-only */ + ro = 1; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'R': /* recompute loop dev size */ + option_R = 1; + break; + case 's': + loopSizeBytes = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'S': /* optional seed for passphrase */ + passSeedString = optarg; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'T': /* ask passphrase _twice_ */ + passAskTwice = "T"; + setup_o = 1; + break; + case 'v': + verbose++; + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + if (option_a + delete + option_R + setup_o + find > 1) usage(); + if (option_a) { + /* show all loops */ + if (argc != optind) usage(); + show_all_loops(); + res = 0; + } else if (find) { + if (argc != optind) + usage(); + device = find_unused_loop_device(); + if (device == NULL) + return -1; + if (verbose) + printf("Loop device is %s\n", device); + printf("%s\n", device); + res = 0; + } else if (delete) { + /* delete loop */ + if (argc != optind+1) usage(); + res = del_loop(argv[optind]); + } else if (option_R) { + /* resize existing loop */ + if (argc != optind+1) usage(); + res = recompute_loop_dev_size(argv[optind]); + } else if ((argc == optind+1) && !setup_o) { + /* show one loop */ + res = show_loop(argv[optind]); + } else { + /* set up new loop */ + if ((argc < optind+1) || ((argc == optind+1) && !option_F) || (argc > optind+2)) + usage(); + if (argc > optind+1) + partitionName = argv[optind+1]; + if (option_F && (read_options_from_fstab(argv[optind], &partitionName) != 1)) + exit(1); + res = set_loop(argv[optind],partitionName,&ro, 1); + } + return res; +} diff --git a/sys-utils/mount.8 b/sys-utils/mount.8 index 3197c8e..b67b108 100644 --- a/sys-utils/mount.8 +++ b/sys-utils/mount.8 @@ -823,6 +823,11 @@ mounted (but not every filesystem actually honors them \(en e.g.\&, the .B sync option today has an effect only for ext2, ext3, fat, vfat and ufs): +.IP "\fB\-p, \-\-pass\-fd \fInum\fP" +In case of a loop mount with encryption, read the passphrase from +file descriptor +.I num +instead of from the terminal. .TP .B async All I/O to the filesystem should be done asynchronously. (See also the @@ -2913,13 +2918,19 @@ not specified or the filesystem is known for libblkid, for example: .B "mount \-t ext3 /tmp/disk.img /mnt" .sp .RE -This type of mount knows about three options, namely -.BR loop ", " offset " and " sizelimit , +This type of mount knows about 11 options, namely +.BR loop ", " offset ", " sizelimit ", " encryption ", " pseed ", " phash ", " loinit ", " gpgkey ", " gpghome ", " cleartextkey " and " itercountk that are really options to .BR \%losetup (8). (These options can be used in addition to those specific to the filesystem type.) +If the mount requires a passphrase, you will be prompted for one unless you +specify a file descriptor to read from instead with the +.BR \-p +command line option, or specify a file name with +.BR cleartextkey +mount option. Since Linux 2.6.25 auto-destruction of loop devices is supported, meaning that any loop device allocated by .B mount diff --git a/sys-utils/mount.c b/sys-utils/mount.c index 9c4729e..faf3c20 100644 --- a/sys-utils/mount.c +++ b/sys-utils/mount.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include "c.h" #include "env.h" #include "strutils.h" +#include "xgetpass.h" #include "exitcodes.h" #include "xalloc.h" #include "closestream.h" @@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ * --options-source-force MNT_OMODE_FORCE */ +static int passfd = -1; static int readwrite; static int mk_exit_code(struct libmnt_context *cxt, int rc); @@ -103,6 +105,58 @@ static int table_parser_errcb(struct libmnt_table *tb __attribute__((__unused__) return 1; } +static char *encrypt_pass_get(struct libmnt_context *cxt) +{ + if (!cxt) + return 0; + +#ifdef MCL_FUTURE + if (mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE)) { + warn(_("couldn't lock into memory")); + return NULL; + } +#endif + return xgetpass(passfd, _("Password: ")); +} + +static void encrypt_pass_release(struct libmnt_context *cxt + __attribute__((__unused__)), char *pwd) +{ + char *p = pwd; + + while (p && *p) + *p++ = '\0'; + + free(pwd); + munlockall(); +} + +static char *encrypt_pass_get(struct libmnt_context *cxt) +{ + if (!cxt) + return 0; + +#ifdef MCL_FUTURE + if (mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE)) { + warn(_("couldn't lock into memory")); + return NULL; + } +#endif + return xgetpass(passfd, _("Password: ")); +} + +static void encrypt_pass_release(struct libmnt_context *cxt + __attribute__((__unused__)), char *pwd) +{ + char *p = pwd; + + while (p && *p) + *p++ = '\0'; + + free(pwd); + munlockall(); +} + /* * Replace control chars with '?' to be compatible with coreutils. For more * robust solution use findmnt(1) where we use \x?? hex encoding. @@ -742,6 +796,7 @@ static void __attribute__((__noreturn__)) usage(FILE *out) fprintf(out, _( " -o, --options comma-separated list of mount options\n" " -O, --test-opts limit the set of filesystems (use with -a)\n" + " -p, --pass-fd read the passphrase from file descriptor\n" " -r, --read-only mount the filesystem read-only (same as -o ro)\n" " -t, --types limit the set of filesystem types\n")); fprintf(out, _( @@ -871,7 +926,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) mnt_context_set_tables_errcb(cxt, table_parser_errcb); - while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "aBcfFhilL:Mno:O:rRsU:vVwt:T:", + while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "aBcfFhilL:Mno:O:p:rRsU:vVwt:T:", longopts, NULL)) != -1) { /* only few options are allowed for non-root users */ @@ -926,6 +981,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) if (mnt_context_set_options_pattern(cxt, optarg)) err(MOUNT_EX_SYSERR, _("failed to set options pattern")); break; + case 'p': + passfd = strtou32_or_err(optarg, + _("invalid passphrase file descriptor")); + break; case 'L': xasprintf(&srcbuf, "LABEL=\"%s\"", optarg); mnt_context_disable_swapmatch(cxt, 1); @@ -1041,6 +1100,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) else if (types) mnt_context_set_fstype(cxt, types); + mnt_context_set_passwd_cb(cxt, encrypt_pass_get, encrypt_pass_release); + if (all) { /* * A) Mount all diff --git a/sys-utils/swapoff.c b/sys-utils/swapoff.c index 168d10f..c781c9e 100644 --- a/sys-utils/swapoff.c +++ b/sys-utils/swapoff.c @@ -1,4 +1,9 @@ #include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -7,6 +12,7 @@ #endif #include "nls.h" +#include "loop.h" #include "c.h" #include "xalloc.h" #include "closestream.h" @@ -141,6 +147,45 @@ static void __attribute__ ((__noreturn__)) usage(FILE * out) exit(out == stderr ? EXIT_FAILURE : EXIT_SUCCESS); } +static void +shutdown_encrypted_swap(char *loop) +{ + int fd; + struct stat statbuf; + struct loop_info64 loopinfo; + unsigned char b[32]; + FILE *f; + size_t ignoreThis = 0; + + if(stat(loop, &statbuf) == 0 && S_ISBLK(statbuf.st_mode)) { + if((fd = open(loop, O_RDWR)) >= 0) { + if(!loop_get_status64_ioctl(fd, &loopinfo)) { + /* + * Read 32 bytes of random data from kernel's random + * number generator and write that to loop device. + * This preserves some of kernel's random entropy + * to next activation of encrypted swap on this + * partition. + */ + if((f = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r")) != NULL) { + ignoreThis += fread(&b[0], 32, 1, f); + fclose(f); + ignoreThis += write(fd, &b[0], 32); + fsync(fd); + } + } + close(fd); + } + sync(); + if((fd = open(loop, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) { + if(!loop_get_status64_ioctl(fd, &loopinfo)) { + ioctl(fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0); + } + close(fd); + } + } +} + static int swapoff_all(void) { int status = 0; @@ -171,8 +216,30 @@ static int swapoff_all(void) mnt_reset_iter(itr, MNT_ITER_FORWARD); while (tb && mnt_table_find_next_fs(tb, itr, match_swap, NULL, &fs) == 0) { - if (!is_active_swap(mnt_fs_get_source(fs))) - do_swapoff(mnt_fs_get_source(fs), QUIET, !CANONIC); + char *special; + char *loop = NULL, *encryption = NULL; + char *val = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + + special = (char *) mnt_fs_get_source(fs); + if(!special) continue; + if(mnt_fs_get_option(fs, "loop", &val, &len) == 0 && val && len) + loop = strndup(val, len); + if(mnt_fs_get_option(fs, "encryption", &val, &len) == 0 && val && len) + encryption = strndup(val, len); + if (loop && encryption) { + if (!is_active_swap(loop)) { /* do this only if it was not in /proc/swaps */ + do_swapoff(loop, QUIET, !CANONIC); + } + shutdown_encrypted_swap(loop); + goto do_free; + } + if (!is_active_swap(special)) { /* do this only if it was not in /proc/swaps */ + do_swapoff(special, QUIET, !CANONIC); + } + do_free: + if(loop) free(loop); + if(encryption) free(encryption); } mnt_free_iter(itr); diff --git a/sys-utils/swapon.8 b/sys-utils/swapon.8 index f64be77..e1821e0 100644 --- a/sys-utils/swapon.8 +++ b/sys-utils/swapon.8 @@ -69,6 +69,22 @@ flag is given, swapping is disabled on all known swap devices and files .I /proc/swaps or .IR /etc/fstab ). +.PP +If +.I loop=/dev/loop? +and +.I encryption=AES128 +options are present in +.I /etc/fstab +then +.BR "swapon -a" +will set up loop devices using random keys, run +.BR "mkswap" +on them, and enable encrypted swap on specified loop devices. Encrypted loop +devices are set up with page size offset so that unencrypted swap signatures +on first page of swap devices are not touched. +.BR "swapoff -a" +will tear down such loop devices. .SH OPTIONS .TP diff --git a/sys-utils/swapon.c b/sys-utils/swapon.c index 97acf1e..06354e5 100644 --- a/sys-utils/swapon.c +++ b/sys-utils/swapon.c @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include #include @@ -16,6 +18,8 @@ #include "c.h" #include "nls.h" +#include "loop.h" +#include "../libmount/src/sha512.h" #include "bitops.h" #include "blkdev.h" #include "pathnames.h" @@ -716,8 +720,449 @@ static int parse_options(struct swap_prop *props, const char *options) return 0; } +static int +prepare_encrypted_swap(char *partition, char *loop, char *encryption) +{ + int x, y, fd, ffd; + int page_size; + sha512_context s; + unsigned char b[4096], multiKeyBits[65][32]; + char *a[10], *apiName; + struct loop_info64 loopinfo; + FILE *f; + size_t ignoreThis = 0; + + /* + * Some sanity checks + */ + if(strlen(partition) < 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: invalid swap device name\n")); + return 0; + } + if(strlen(loop) < 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: invalid loop device name\n")); + return 0; + } + if(strlen(encryption) < 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: invalid encryption type\n")); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Abort if loop device does not exist or is already in use + */ + sync(); + if((fd = open(loop, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open loop device %s\n"), loop); + return 0; + } + if(is_unused_loop_device(fd) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: loop device %s already in use\n"), loop); + goto errout0; + } + + /* + * Compute SHA-512 over first 40 KB of old swap data. This data + * is mostly unknown data encrypted using unknown key. SHA-512 hash + * output is then used as entropy for new swap encryption key. + */ + if(!(f = fopen(partition, "r+"))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open swap device %s\n"), partition); + goto errout0; + } + page_size = getpagesize(); + fseek(f, (long)page_size, SEEK_SET); + __loDev_sha512_init(&s); + for(x = 0; x < 10; x++) { + if(fread(&b[0], sizeof(b), 1, f) != 1) break; + __loDev_sha512_write(&s, &b[0], sizeof(b)); + } + __loDev_sha512_final(&s); + + /* + * Overwrite 40 KB of old swap data 20 times so that recovering + * SHA-512 output beyond this point is difficult and expensive. + */ + for(y = 0; y < 20; y++) { + int z; + struct { + struct timeval tv; + unsigned char h[64]; + int x,y,z; + } j; + if(fseek(f, (long)page_size, SEEK_SET)) break; + memcpy(&j.h[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + gettimeofday(&j.tv, NULL); + j.y = y; + for(x = 0; x < 10; x++) { + j.x = x; + for(z = 0; z < (int) sizeof(b); z += 64) { + j.z = z; + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer((unsigned char *)&j, sizeof(j), &b[z], 64); + } + if(fwrite(&b[0], sizeof(b), 1, f) != 1) break; + } + memset(&j, 0, sizeof(j)); + if(fflush(f)) break; + if(fsync(fileno(f))) break; + } + fclose(f); + + /* + * Use all 512 bits of hash output + */ + memcpy(&b[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); + + /* + * Read 32 bytes of random entropy from kernel's random + * number generator. This code may be executed early on startup + * scripts and amount of random entropy may be non-existent. + * SHA-512 of old swap data is used as workaround for missing + * entropy in kernel's random number generator. + */ + if(!(f = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open /dev/urandom\n")); + goto errout0; + } + ignoreThis += fread(&b[64], 32, 1, f); + + /* + * Set up struct loop_info64 + */ + if((ffd = open(partition, O_RDWR)) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open swap device %s\n"), partition); + goto errout1; + } + memset(&loopinfo, 0, sizeof(loopinfo)); + strncpy((char *)loopinfo.lo_file_name, partition, LO_NAME_SIZE - 1); + loopinfo.lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE - 1] = 0; + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type = loop_crypt_type(encryption, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size, &apiName); + if(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type <= 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unsupported swap encryption type %s\n"), encryption); +errout2: + close(ffd); +errout1: + fclose(f); +errout0: + close(fd); + memset(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], 0, sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + memset(&multiKeyBits[0][0], 0, sizeof(multiKeyBits)); + return 0; + } + loopinfo.lo_offset = page_size; + /* single-key hash */ + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(&b[0], 64+32, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + /* multi-key hash */ + x = 0; + while(x < 65) { + ignoreThis += fread(&b[64+32], 16, 1, f); + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(&b[0], 64+32+16, &multiKeyBits[x][0], 32); + x++; + } + + /* + * Try to set up single-key loop + */ + if(ioctl(fd, LOOP_SET_FD, ffd) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: LOOP_SET_FD failed\n")); + goto errout2; + } + if ((loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type == 18) || (loop_set_status64_ioctl(fd, &loopinfo) < 0)) { + if(try_cryptoapi_loop_interface(fd, &loopinfo, apiName) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: LOOP_SET_STATUS failed\n")); + ioctl(fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0); + goto errout2; + } + } + + /* + * Try to put loop to multi-key v3 or v2 mode. + * If this fails, then let it operate in single-key mode. + */ + if(ioctl(fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP_V3, &multiKeyBits[0][0]) < 0) { + ioctl(fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP, &multiKeyBits[0][0]); + } + + /* + * Loop is now set up. Clean up the keys. + */ + memset(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], 0, sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + memset(&multiKeyBits[0][0], 0, sizeof(multiKeyBits)); + close(ffd); + fclose(f); + close(fd); + + /* + * Write 40 KB of zeroes to loop device. That same data is written + * to underlying partition in encrypted form. This is done to guarantee + * that next time encrypted swap is initialized, the SHA-512 hash will + * be different. And, if encrypted swap data writes over this data, that's + * even better. + */ + if(!(f = fopen(loop, "r+"))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open loop device %s\n"), loop); + return 0; + } + memset(&b[0], 0, sizeof(b)); + for(x = 0; x < 10; x++) { + if(fwrite(&b[0], sizeof(b), 1, f) != 1) break; + } + fflush(f); + fsync(fileno(f)); + fclose(f); + sync(); + + /* + * Run mkswap on loop device so that kernel understands it as swap. + * Redirect stderr to /dev/null and ignore exit value. + */ + if(!(x = fork())) { + if((x = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) >= 0) { + dup2(x, 2); + close(x); + } + a[0] = "mkswap"; + a[1] = loop; + a[2] = 0; + execvp(a[0], &a[0]); + execv("/sbin/mkswap", &a[0]); + /* error to stdout, stderr is directed to /dev/null */ + printf(_("swapon: unable to execute mkswap\n")); + exit(1); + } + if(x == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: fork failed\n")); + return 0; + } + waitpid(x, &y, 0); + sync(); + + return 1; +} + +static int +prepare_encrypted_swap(char *partition, char *loop, char *encryption) +{ + int x, y, fd, ffd; + int page_size; + sha512_context s; + unsigned char b[4096], multiKeyBits[65][32]; + char *a[10], *apiName; + struct loop_info64 loopinfo; + FILE *f; + size_t ignoreThis = 0; + + /* + * Some sanity checks + */ + if(strlen(partition) < 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: invalid swap device name\n")); + return 0; + } + if(strlen(loop) < 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: invalid loop device name\n")); + return 0; + } + if(strlen(encryption) < 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: invalid encryption type\n")); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Abort if loop device does not exist or is already in use + */ + sync(); + if((fd = open(loop, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open loop device %s\n"), loop); + return 0; + } + if(is_unused_loop_device(fd) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: loop device %s already in use\n"), loop); + goto errout0; + } + + /* + * Compute SHA-512 over first 40 KB of old swap data. This data + * is mostly unknown data encrypted using unknown key. SHA-512 hash + * output is then used as entropy for new swap encryption key. + */ + if(!(f = fopen(partition, "r+"))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open swap device %s\n"), partition); + goto errout0; + } + page_size = getpagesize(); + fseek(f, (long)page_size, SEEK_SET); + __loDev_sha512_init(&s); + for(x = 0; x < 10; x++) { + if(fread(&b[0], sizeof(b), 1, f) != 1) break; + __loDev_sha512_write(&s, &b[0], sizeof(b)); + } + __loDev_sha512_final(&s); + + /* + * Overwrite 40 KB of old swap data 20 times so that recovering + * SHA-512 output beyond this point is difficult and expensive. + */ + for(y = 0; y < 20; y++) { + int z; + struct { + struct timeval tv; + unsigned char h[64]; + int x,y,z; + } j; + if(fseek(f, (long)page_size, SEEK_SET)) break; + memcpy(&j.h[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + gettimeofday(&j.tv, NULL); + j.y = y; + for(x = 0; x < 10; x++) { + j.x = x; + for(z = 0; z < (int) sizeof(b); z += 64) { + j.z = z; + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer((unsigned char *)&j, sizeof(j), &b[z], 64); + } + if(fwrite(&b[0], sizeof(b), 1, f) != 1) break; + } + memset(&j, 0, sizeof(j)); + if(fflush(f)) break; + if(fsync(fileno(f))) break; + } + fclose(f); + + /* + * Use all 512 bits of hash output + */ + memcpy(&b[0], &s.sha_out[0], 64); + memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); + + /* + * Read 32 bytes of random entropy from kernel's random + * number generator. This code may be executed early on startup + * scripts and amount of random entropy may be non-existent. + * SHA-512 of old swap data is used as workaround for missing + * entropy in kernel's random number generator. + */ + if(!(f = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open /dev/urandom\n")); + goto errout0; + } + ignoreThis += fread(&b[64], 32, 1, f); + + /* + * Set up struct loop_info64 + */ + if((ffd = open(partition, O_RDWR)) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open swap device %s\n"), partition); + goto errout1; + } + memset(&loopinfo, 0, sizeof(loopinfo)); + strncpy((char *)loopinfo.lo_file_name, partition, LO_NAME_SIZE - 1); + loopinfo.lo_file_name[LO_NAME_SIZE - 1] = 0; + loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type = loop_crypt_type(encryption, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key_size, &apiName); + if(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type <= 1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unsupported swap encryption type %s\n"), encryption); +errout2: + close(ffd); +errout1: + fclose(f); +errout0: + close(fd); + memset(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], 0, sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + memset(&multiKeyBits[0][0], 0, sizeof(multiKeyBits)); + return 0; + } + loopinfo.lo_offset = page_size; + /* single-key hash */ + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(&b[0], 64+32, &loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + /* multi-key hash */ + x = 0; + while(x < 65) { + ignoreThis += fread(&b[64+32], 16, 1, f); + __loDev_sha512_hash_buffer(&b[0], 64+32+16, &multiKeyBits[x][0], 32); + x++; + } -static int swapon_all(struct swapon_ctl *ctl) + /* + * Try to set up single-key loop + */ + if(ioctl(fd, LOOP_SET_FD, ffd) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: LOOP_SET_FD failed\n")); + goto errout2; + } + if ((loopinfo.lo_encrypt_type == 18) || (loop_set_status64_ioctl(fd, &loopinfo) < 0)) { + if(try_cryptoapi_loop_interface(fd, &loopinfo, apiName) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: LOOP_SET_STATUS failed\n")); + ioctl(fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0); + goto errout2; + } + } + + /* + * Try to put loop to multi-key v3 or v2 mode. + * If this fails, then let it operate in single-key mode. + */ + if(ioctl(fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP_V3, &multiKeyBits[0][0]) < 0) { + ioctl(fd, LOOP_MULTI_KEY_SETUP, &multiKeyBits[0][0]); + } + + /* + * Loop is now set up. Clean up the keys. + */ + memset(&loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key[0], 0, sizeof(loopinfo.lo_encrypt_key)); + memset(&multiKeyBits[0][0], 0, sizeof(multiKeyBits)); + close(ffd); + fclose(f); + close(fd); + + /* + * Write 40 KB of zeroes to loop device. That same data is written + * to underlying partition in encrypted form. This is done to guarantee + * that next time encrypted swap is initialized, the SHA-512 hash will + * be different. And, if encrypted swap data writes over this data, that's + * even better. + */ + if(!(f = fopen(loop, "r+"))) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: unable to open loop device %s\n"), loop); + return 0; + } + memset(&b[0], 0, sizeof(b)); + for(x = 0; x < 10; x++) { + if(fwrite(&b[0], sizeof(b), 1, f) != 1) break; + } + fflush(f); + fsync(fileno(f)); + fclose(f); + sync(); + + /* + * Run mkswap on loop device so that kernel understands it as swap. + * Redirect stderr to /dev/null and ignore exit value. + */ + if(!(x = fork())) { + if((x = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY)) >= 0) { + dup2(x, 2); + close(x); + } + a[0] = "mkswap"; + a[1] = loop; + a[2] = 0; + execvp(a[0], &a[0]); + execv("/sbin/mkswap", &a[0]); + /* error to stdout, stderr is directed to /dev/null */ + printf(_("swapon: unable to execute mkswap\n")); + exit(1); + } + if(x == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("swapon: fork failed\n")); + return 0; + } + waitpid(x, &y, 0); + sync(); + + return 1; +} + +static int swapon_all(void) { struct libmnt_table *tb = get_fstab(); struct libmnt_iter *itr; @@ -733,14 +1178,32 @@ static int swapon_all(struct swapon_ctl *ctl) while (mnt_table_find_next_fs(tb, itr, match_swap, NULL, &fs) == 0) { /* defaults */ - const char *opts; - const char *device; - struct swap_prop prop; /* per device setting */ + int pri = priority, dsc = discard, nofail = ifexists; + char *p, *src, *dscarg; + char *loop = NULL, *encryption = NULL; + char *val = NULL; + size_t len = 0; if (mnt_fs_get_option(fs, "noauto", NULL, NULL) == 0) { if (ctl->verbose) warnx(_("%s: noauto option -- ignored"), mnt_fs_get_source(fs)); continue; + if(mnt_fs_get_option(fs, "loop", &val, &len) == 0 && val && len) + loop = strndup(val, len); + if(mnt_fs_get_option(fs, "encryption", &val, &len) == 0 && val && len) + encryption = strndup(val, len); + + if (mnt_fs_get_option(fs, "discard", &dscarg, NULL) == 0) { + dsc |= SWAP_FLAG_DISCARD; + if (dscarg) { + /* only single-time discards are wanted */ + if (strcmp(dscarg, "once") == 0) + dsc |= SWAP_FLAG_DISCARD_ONCE; + + /* do discard for every released swap page */ + if (strcmp(dscarg, "pages") == 0) + dsc |= SWAP_FLAG_DISCARD_PAGES; + } } /* default setting */ @@ -756,23 +1219,28 @@ static int swapon_all(struct swapon_ctl *ctl) if (!device) { if (!prop.no_fail) status |= cannot_find(mnt_fs_get_source(fs)); - continue; + goto do_free; } - if (is_active_swap(device)) { - if (ctl->verbose) - warnx(_("%s: already active -- ignored"), device); - continue; + if (loop && encryption) { + if (!is_active_swap(loop) && (!nofail || !access(src, R_OK))) { + if(!prepare_encrypted_swap((char*)src, loop, encryption)) { + status |= -1; + goto do_free; + } + status |= do_swapon(loop, pri, dsc, CANONIC); + + } + goto do_free; } - if (prop.no_fail && access(device, R_OK) != 0) { - if (ctl->verbose) - warnx(_("%s: unaccessible -- ignored"), device); - continue; + if (!is_active_swap(src) && (!nofail || !access(src, R_OK))) { + status |= do_swapon(src, pri, dsc, CANONIC); } - /* swapon */ - status |= do_swapon(ctl, &prop, device, TRUE); + do_free: + if(loop) free(loop); + if(encryption) free(encryption); } mnt_free_iter(itr); diff --git a/term-utils/Makemodule.am b/term-utils/Makemodule.am index ea1affc..44663fe 100644 --- a/term-utils/Makemodule.am +++ b/term-utils/Makemodule.am @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ if BUILD_AGETTY sbin_PROGRAMS += agetty dist_man_MANS += term-utils/agetty.8 agetty_SOURCES = term-utils/agetty.c +agetty_CFLAGS = $(SUID_CFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) +agetty_LDFLAGS = $(SUID_LDFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) agetty_LDADD = $(LDADD) libcommon.la if BSD agetty_LDADD += -lutil -- 2.7.4