From f1a414537ecc18b5882a57045ce3e4a11e528290 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yafang Shao Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2023 02:56:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Protect probed address based on kptr_restrict setting The probed address can be accessed by userspace through querying the task file descriptor (fd). However, it is crucial to adhere to the kptr_restrict setting and refrain from exposing the address if it is not permitted. Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao Acked-by: Jiri Olsa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230709025630.3735-5-laoar.shao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c index 1b3fa7b..249eb14 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c @@ -1551,7 +1551,10 @@ int bpf_get_kprobe_info(const struct perf_event *event, u32 *fd_type, } else { *symbol = NULL; *probe_offset = 0; - *probe_addr = (unsigned long)tk->rp.kp.addr; + if (kallsyms_show_value(current_cred())) + *probe_addr = (unsigned long)tk->rp.kp.addr; + else + *probe_addr = 0; } return 0; } -- 2.7.4