From e38d1e4f5099d533a833afee89f439853c94f272 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Sanchez Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2016 11:22:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] IB/hfi1: Check P_KEY for all sent packets from user mode Add the P_KEY check for user-context mechanism for both PIO and SDMA. For PIO, the SendCtxtCheckEnable.DisallowKDETHPackets is set by default. When the P_KEY is set, SendCtxtCheckEnable.DisallowKDETHPackets is cleared. For SDMA, a software check was included. This change requires user processes to set the P_KEY before sending any packets, otherwise, the sent packet will fail. The original submission didn't have this check but it's required. Reviewed-by: Dean Luick Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro Reviewed-by: Mikto Haralanov Signed-off-by: Sebastian Sanchez Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford --- drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/chip.c | 1 + drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/hfi.h | 4 ++ drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/user_sdma.c | 7 +++ drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/verbs.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/chip.c b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/chip.c index 56753c6..b0a0a0d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/chip.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/chip.c @@ -13751,6 +13751,7 @@ int hfi1_set_ctxt_pkey(struct hfi1_devdata *dd, unsigned ctxt, u16 pkey) write_kctxt_csr(dd, sctxt, SEND_CTXT_CHECK_PARTITION_KEY, reg); reg = read_kctxt_csr(dd, sctxt, SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE); reg |= SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE_CHECK_PARTITION_KEY_SMASK; + reg &= ~SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE_DISALLOW_KDETH_PACKETS_SMASK; write_kctxt_csr(dd, sctxt, SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE, reg); done: return ret; diff --git a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/hfi.h b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/hfi.h index ff04593..b1d4f60 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/hfi.h +++ b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/hfi.h @@ -1333,6 +1333,9 @@ void process_becn(struct hfi1_pportdata *ppd, u8 sl, u16 rlid, u32 lqpn, void return_cnp(struct hfi1_ibport *ibp, struct rvt_qp *qp, u32 remote_qpn, u32 pkey, u32 slid, u32 dlid, u8 sc5, const struct ib_grh *old_grh); +#define PKEY_CHECK_INVALID -1 +int egress_pkey_check(struct hfi1_pportdata *ppd, __be16 *lrh, __be32 *bth, + u8 sc5, int8_t s_pkey_index); #define PACKET_EGRESS_TIMEOUT 350 static inline void pause_for_credit_return(struct hfi1_devdata *dd) @@ -1776,6 +1779,7 @@ extern struct mutex hfi1_mutex; #define HFI1_PKT_USER_SC_INTEGRITY \ (SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE_DISALLOW_NON_KDETH_PACKETS_SMASK \ + | SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE_DISALLOW_KDETH_PACKETS_SMASK \ | SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE_DISALLOW_BYPASS_SMASK \ | SEND_CTXT_CHECK_ENABLE_DISALLOW_GRH_SMASK) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/user_sdma.c b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/user_sdma.c index 635ddf8..0014c9c 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/user_sdma.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/user_sdma.c @@ -600,6 +600,13 @@ int hfi1_user_sdma_process_request(struct file *fp, struct iovec *iovec, goto free_req; } + /* Checking P_KEY for requests from user-space */ + if (egress_pkey_check(dd->pport, req->hdr.lrh, req->hdr.bth, sc, + PKEY_CHECK_INVALID)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_req; + } + /* * Also should check the BTH.lnh. If it says the next header is GRH then * the RXE parsing will be off and will land in the middle of the KDETH diff --git a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/verbs.c b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/verbs.c index 89f2aad..c56c0cb 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/verbs.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rdma/hfi1/verbs.c @@ -1089,16 +1089,16 @@ bail: /* * egress_pkey_matches_entry - return 1 if the pkey matches ent (ent - * being an entry from the ingress partition key table), return 0 + * being an entry from the partition key table), return 0 * otherwise. Use the matching criteria for egress partition keys * specified in the OPAv1 spec., section 9.1l.7. */ static inline int egress_pkey_matches_entry(u16 pkey, u16 ent) { u16 mkey = pkey & PKEY_LOW_15_MASK; - u16 ment = ent & PKEY_LOW_15_MASK; + u16 mentry = ent & PKEY_LOW_15_MASK; - if (mkey == ment) { + if (mkey == mentry) { /* * If pkey[15] is set (full partition member), * is bit 15 in the corresponding table element @@ -1111,32 +1111,32 @@ static inline int egress_pkey_matches_entry(u16 pkey, u16 ent) return 0; } -/* - * egress_pkey_check - return 0 if hdr's pkey matches according to the - * criteria in the OPAv1 spec., section 9.11.7. +/** + * egress_pkey_check - check P_KEY of a packet + * @ppd: Physical IB port data + * @lrh: Local route header + * @bth: Base transport header + * @sc5: SC for packet + * @s_pkey_index: It will be used for look up optimization for kernel contexts + * only. If it is negative value, then it means user contexts is calling this + * function. + * + * It checks if hdr's pkey is valid. + * + * Return: 0 on success, otherwise, 1 */ -static inline int egress_pkey_check(struct hfi1_pportdata *ppd, - struct hfi1_ib_header *hdr, - struct rvt_qp *qp) +int egress_pkey_check(struct hfi1_pportdata *ppd, __be16 *lrh, __be32 *bth, + u8 sc5, int8_t s_pkey_index) { - struct hfi1_qp_priv *priv = qp->priv; - struct hfi1_other_headers *ohdr; struct hfi1_devdata *dd; - int i = 0; + int i; u16 pkey; - u8 lnh, sc5 = priv->s_sc; + int is_user_ctxt_mechanism = (s_pkey_index < 0); if (!(ppd->part_enforce & HFI1_PART_ENFORCE_OUT)) return 0; - /* locate the pkey within the headers */ - lnh = be16_to_cpu(hdr->lrh[0]) & 3; - if (lnh == HFI1_LRH_GRH) - ohdr = &hdr->u.l.oth; - else - ohdr = &hdr->u.oth; - - pkey = (u16)be32_to_cpu(ohdr->bth[0]); + pkey = (u16)be32_to_cpu(bth[0]); /* If SC15, pkey[0:14] must be 0x7fff */ if ((sc5 == 0xf) && ((pkey & PKEY_LOW_15_MASK) != PKEY_LOW_15_MASK)) @@ -1146,28 +1146,37 @@ static inline int egress_pkey_check(struct hfi1_pportdata *ppd, if ((pkey & PKEY_LOW_15_MASK) == 0) goto bad; - /* The most likely matching pkey has index qp->s_pkey_index */ - if (unlikely(!egress_pkey_matches_entry(pkey, - ppd->pkeys - [qp->s_pkey_index]))) { - /* no match - try the entire table */ - for (; i < MAX_PKEY_VALUES; i++) { - if (egress_pkey_matches_entry(pkey, ppd->pkeys[i])) - break; - } + /* + * For the kernel contexts only, if a qp is passed into the function, + * the most likely matching pkey has index qp->s_pkey_index + */ + if (!is_user_ctxt_mechanism && + egress_pkey_matches_entry(pkey, ppd->pkeys[s_pkey_index])) { + return 0; } - if (i < MAX_PKEY_VALUES) - return 0; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PKEY_VALUES; i++) { + if (egress_pkey_matches_entry(pkey, ppd->pkeys[i])) + return 0; + } bad: - incr_cntr64(&ppd->port_xmit_constraint_errors); - dd = ppd->dd; - if (!(dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.status & OPA_EI_STATUS_SMASK)) { - u16 slid = be16_to_cpu(hdr->lrh[3]); - - dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.status |= OPA_EI_STATUS_SMASK; - dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.slid = slid; - dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.pkey = pkey; + /* + * For the user-context mechanism, the P_KEY check would only happen + * once per SDMA request, not once per packet. Therefore, there's no + * need to increment the counter for the user-context mechanism. + */ + if (!is_user_ctxt_mechanism) { + incr_cntr64(&ppd->port_xmit_constraint_errors); + dd = ppd->dd; + if (!(dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.status & + OPA_EI_STATUS_SMASK)) { + u16 slid = be16_to_cpu(lrh[3]); + + dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.status |= + OPA_EI_STATUS_SMASK; + dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.slid = slid; + dd->err_info_xmit_constraint.pkey = pkey; + } } return 1; } @@ -1227,11 +1236,26 @@ int hfi1_verbs_send(struct rvt_qp *qp, struct hfi1_pkt_state *ps) { struct hfi1_devdata *dd = dd_from_ibdev(qp->ibqp.device); struct hfi1_qp_priv *priv = qp->priv; + struct hfi1_other_headers *ohdr; + struct hfi1_ib_header *hdr; send_routine sr; int ret; + u8 lnh; + + hdr = &ps->s_txreq->phdr.hdr; + /* locate the pkey within the headers */ + lnh = be16_to_cpu(hdr->lrh[0]) & 3; + if (lnh == HFI1_LRH_GRH) + ohdr = &hdr->u.l.oth; + else + ohdr = &hdr->u.oth; sr = get_send_routine(qp, ps->s_txreq); - ret = egress_pkey_check(dd->pport, &ps->s_txreq->phdr.hdr, qp); + ret = egress_pkey_check(dd->pport, + hdr->lrh, + ohdr->bth, + priv->s_sc, + qp->s_pkey_index); if (unlikely(ret)) { /* * The value we are returning here does not get propagated to -- 2.7.4