From befe4e2915943a086ec3c65dbfe536de674f21a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 15:25:52 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] tls: splice_read: fix record type check [ Upstream commit 520493f66f6822551aef2879cd40207074fe6980 ] We don't support splicing control records. TLS 1.3 changes moved the record type check into the decrypt if(). The skb may already be decrypted and still be an alert. Note that decrypt_skb_update() is idempotent and updates ctx->decrypted so the if() is pointless. Reorder the check for decryption errors with the content type check while touching them. This part is not really a bug, because if decryption failed in TLS 1.3 content type will be DATA, and for TLS 1.2 it will be correct. Nevertheless its strange to touch output before checking if the function has failed. Fixes: fedf201e1296 ("net: tls: Refactor control message handling on recv") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 23 ++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 1b08b87..1715e79 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -2006,21 +2006,18 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos, if (!skb) goto splice_read_end; - if (!ctx->decrypted) { - err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false); - - /* splice does not support reading control messages */ - if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { - err = -EINVAL; - goto splice_read_end; - } + err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false); + if (err < 0) { + tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); + goto splice_read_end; + } - if (err < 0) { - tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG); - goto splice_read_end; - } - ctx->decrypted = 1; + /* splice does not support reading control messages */ + if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto splice_read_end; } + rxm = strp_msg(skb); chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len); -- 2.7.4