From b87f5fcafc64ff4a6ad8f1eac69fa7e00b51ec46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Zeuthen Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2012 13:24:39 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Small updates to the "Writing polkit applications" chapter Signed-off-by: David Zeuthen --- docs/polkit/overview.xml | 235 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 161 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/polkit/overview.xml b/docs/polkit/overview.xml index 19834d2..a979172 100644 --- a/docs/polkit/overview.xml +++ b/docs/polkit/overview.xml @@ -20,16 +20,14 @@ Writing polkit applications - polkit applications are privileged mechanisms (typically) using - the polkit authority as a decider component. They do this by - installing a .policy file - into the - /usr/share/polkit-1/actions + polkit applications are applications using the polkit authority + as a decider component. They do this by installing a .policy file into the /usr/share/polkit-1/actions directory and communicating with the polkit authority at runtime - (either via the - D-Bus API or indirectly - via the - libpolkit-gobject-1 library or the + (either via the D-Bus API or + indirectly through the libpolkit-gobject-1 library or the pkcheck command). @@ -37,55 +35,139 @@ Best practices - - DO use polkit if you are writing a mechanism that is intended to be used by unprivileged programs. - + + + DO use polkit if you are + writing a privileged mechanism (that is, running as + root or otherwise has special + permissions) that is intended to be used by unprivileged + programs. + + - - DO carefully consider what actions to define. In many cases there is not a 1:1 mapping between operations and polkit actions (often a polkit action has more to do with the object the operation is acting on than the operation itself). It is important to strike the right balance between too fine-grained and too coarse-grained. - + + + DO carefully consider + what actions to define. In many cases there isn't a 1:1 + mapping between operations and polkit actions. Often a + polkit action has more to do with the object the operation + is acting on than the operation itself. It is important to + strike the right balance between too fine-grained and too + coarse-grained. + + - - DO try to pick actions and implicit authorizations so applications using your mechanism will work out-of-the box for users logged in at the console (e.g. without interrupting the user with authentication dialogs). - + + + DO try to pick actions + and implicit authorizations so applications using your + mechanism will work out-of-the box for users logged in at + the console. Not interrupting console users with + authentication dialogs should be considered a + priority. For example, it is not wise to require console + users to authenticate for such mundane tasks as adding a + printer queue (if the administrator really wants the OS to + act this way, he can always deploy suitable authorization + rules). + + - - DO pass polkit variables along with - CheckAuthorization() -requests so it's possible to write authorization rules matching on these. Also document these variables in your documentation (for example, see the -udisks2 actions and variables). - + + + DO pass polkit variables + along with CheckAuthorization() + requests so it's possible to write authorization + rules matching on these. Also document these + variables in your documentation (for example, see the + udisks2 + actions and variables). + + - - DO pass a customized authentication message (using the polkit.message and polkit.gettext_domain variables) that includes more detailed information about the request than whatever is declared in the .policy file's message element. For example, it's better to show Authentication is needed to format INTEL SSDSA2MH080G1GC (/dev/sda) than just Authentication is needed to format the device. - + + + DO pass a customized + authentication message (using the + polkit.message and + polkit.gettext_domain variables) that + include more detailed information about the request than + whatever is declared in the .policy file's + message element. For example, it's + better to show Authentication is needed to format + INTEL SSDSA2MH080G1GC (/dev/sda) than just + Authentication is needed to format the + device. + + - - DON'T use polkit if your program isn't intended to be used by unprivileged programs. For example, if you are writing developer tools or low-level core OS command it's fine to just require the user to be root. Users can always run your tool through e.g. -sudo8, -pkexec1 -or write a simple polkit-using mechanism that allows access to a (safe) subset of your tool. - + + + DON'T use polkit if your + program isn't intended to be used by unprivileged + programs. For example, if you are writing developer tools + or low-level core OS command-line tools it's fine to just + require the user to be root. Users can always run your + tool through e.g. + sudo8, + pkexec1 + or write a simple polkit-using mechanism that allows + access to a (safe) subset of your tool. + + - - DON'T use polkit unless you actually have to. In other words, not every single privileged program providing a service to an unprivileged programs has to use polkit. For example, if you have a small well-written setuid helper to help deal with some implementation-detail of the OS (such as elevating the priority of the sound server process to real-time for sessions on local seats) it's not really helpful to define a polkit action for this since no-one is going to choose to not grant the privilige (in the example, no-one is going run the sound server process without real-time priority). - + + + DON'T use polkit unless + you actually have to. In other words, not every single + privileged program providing service to unprivileged + programs has to use polkit. For example, if you have a + small well-written setuid + helper to help deal with some implementation-detail of the + OS (such as elevating the priority of the sound server + process to real-time for console users) it's not really + helpful to define a polkit action for this since, + realistically, no-one is going to choose to + not grant the privilege. Remember, a + secure program is often one with little amount of code and + few dependencies. + + - - DON'T call - CheckAuthorization() - for all your actions every time the authority emits the - Changed signal. Not only is this a waste of resources, the result may also be inaccurate as authorization rules can return whatever they want, whenever they want. - + + + DON'T call CheckAuthorization() + for all your actions every time the authority emits the + Changed + signal. Not only is this a waste of resources, the result + may also be inaccurate as authorization rules can return + whatever they want, whenever they want. + + - - DON'T block the main thread in your mechanism (e.g. the one used to service IPC requests from unprivileged programs) while waiting for the authority to reply - calls to - CheckAuthorization() - may take a very long time (seconds, even minutes) to complete as user interaction may be involved. - Instead, use either the asynchronous API or - a dedicated thread with the synchronous API. - + + + DON'T block the main + thread in your mechanism (e.g. the one used to service IPC + requests from unprivileged programs) while waiting for the + authority to reply - calls to CheckAuthorization() + may take a very long time (seconds, even minutes) to + complete as user interaction may be involved. Instead, + use either the asynchronous + API or a dedicated thread with the synchronous + API. + + @@ -94,30 +176,32 @@ or write a simple polkit-using mechanism that allows access to a (safe) subset o Usage in unprivileged programs - Unprivileged programs consuming privileged mechanisms normally - does use polkit directly - they simply call into the mechanism - and the mechanism either renders service (or refuses the - request) after checking with polkit (which may include - presenting an authentication dialog). In either case, the - unprivileged program in question is oblivious to the fact that - polkit is being used - it simply just waits for the privileged - mechanism to carry out the request (which, if authentication - dialogs are involved may take many seconds). + An unprivileged program normally does not use polkit directly + - it simply calls into a privileged mechanism and the + mechanism either renders service (or refuses the request) + after checking with polkit (which may include presenting an + authentication dialog). In this setup, the unprivileged + program is oblivious to the fact that polkit is being used - + it simply just waits for the privileged mechanism to carry out + the request (which, if authentication dialogs are involved may + take many seconds). This is a good thing because not worrying + about implementation details like polkit, helps simplify the + unprivileged program. - Note that unprivileged programs often need to disable, modify - or remove UI elements to e.g. convey to the user that a certain - action cannot be carried out (because e.g. the user is not + Occasionally unprivileged programs need to disable, modify or + remove UI elements to convey to the user that a certain action + cannot be carried out (because e.g. the user is not authorized) or authentication is needed (by e.g. displaying a - padlock icon in the UI). - In this case, the best approach is + padlock icon in the UI). In this case, the best approach is usually to have the unprivileged program get this information - from the privileged mechanism - especially because there often - is no reliable way that the unprivileged program can know what - polkit action is going to be used. In general, there is no - guarantee that operations (such as D-Bus methods) map 1:1: to - polkit action - for example, a disk manager service's - Format() method may check for the action + from the privileged mechanism instead of polkit. This is + especially true because often there is no reliable way that + the unprivileged program can know what polkit action is going + to be used. In general, there is no guarantee that operations + (such as D-Bus methods) map 1:1: to polkit action - for + example, a disk manager service's Format() + method may check for the action net.company.diskmanager.format-removable if the disk is removable and net.company.diskmanager.format-fixed @@ -128,7 +212,7 @@ or write a simple polkit-using mechanism that allows access to a (safe) subset o org.freedesktop.policykit.imply annotation (see the polkit8 man page), - it does make sense for an unprivileged program to query the + it is meaningful for an unprivileged program to query the polkit authority (to e.g. update UI elements) and it is in fact allowed to do so as long as the unprivileged program doesn't pass any variables along with the CheckAuthorization() @@ -138,13 +222,16 @@ or write a simple polkit-using mechanism that allows access to a (safe) subset o PolkitPermission type (which is derived from GPermission) that can be used together with - GtkLockButton - (often used to implement an - instant apply - paradigm). + GtkLockButton. Note that for GtkLockButton to work well, the polkit action backing it should use auth_self_keep or auth_admin_keep for its implicit authorizations. + This is often used to implement an instant + apply paradigm whereby the user + unlocks (by authenticating) e.g. a + preference pane window and is then free to change settings + until the authorization expires or is revoked. -- 2.7.4