From 5eb596f55cacc2389554a8d7572d90d5e9d4269d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hedberg Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 11:26:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix setting correct security level when initiating SMP We can only determine the final security level when both pairing request and response have been exchanged. When initiating pairing the starting target security level is set to MEDIUM unless explicitly specified to be HIGH, so that we can still perform pairing even if the remote doesn't have MITM capabilities. However, once we've received the pairing response we should re-consult the remote and local IO capabilities and upgrade the target security level if necessary. Without this patch the resulting Long Term Key will occasionally be reported to be unauthenticated when it in reality is an authenticated one. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 51fc7db..f09b6b6 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -494,8 +494,11 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, } /* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */ - if (method != JUST_CFM) + if (method != JUST_CFM) { set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags); + if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH) + hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH; + } /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey. -- 2.7.4