From 3d234b3313cd12157946522fe35f5a4574f31169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 12:21:11 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: drop mask=CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC from 'shash' tfm allocations 'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect. Many users therefore already don't pass it, but some still do. This inconsistency can cause confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is somewhat counterintuitive. Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c | 2 +- drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 2 +- drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/mic.c | 6 ++---- fs/ubifs/auth.c | 5 ++--- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 2 +- security/apparmor/crypto.c | 2 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 +-- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 4 ++-- security/keys/trusted.c | 4 ++-- 9 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c index 61c3927..ccfcf00 100644 --- a/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c +++ b/drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c @@ -3623,7 +3623,7 @@ static int receive_protocol(struct drbd_connection *connection, struct packet_in * change. */ - peer_integrity_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(integrity_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + peer_integrity_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(integrity_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(peer_integrity_tfm)) { peer_integrity_tfm = NULL; drbd_err(connection, "peer data-integrity-alg %s not supported\n", diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c index bb3096b..d4ad0bf 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c @@ -2804,7 +2804,7 @@ static int get_mac(struct crypto_shash **hash, struct alg_spec *a, char **error, int r; if (a->alg_string) { - *hash = crypto_alloc_shash(a->alg_string, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + *hash = crypto_alloc_shash(a->alg_string, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(*hash)) { *error = error_alg; r = PTR_ERR(*hash); diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/mic.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/mic.c index 08bc782..709d9ab 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/mic.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/orinoco/mic.c @@ -16,8 +16,7 @@ /********************************************************************/ int orinoco_mic_init(struct orinoco_private *priv) { - priv->tx_tfm_mic = crypto_alloc_shash("michael_mic", 0, - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + priv->tx_tfm_mic = crypto_alloc_shash("michael_mic", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(priv->tx_tfm_mic)) { printk(KERN_DEBUG "orinoco_mic_init: could not allocate " "crypto API michael_mic\n"); @@ -25,8 +24,7 @@ int orinoco_mic_init(struct orinoco_private *priv) return -ENOMEM; } - priv->rx_tfm_mic = crypto_alloc_shash("michael_mic", 0, - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + priv->rx_tfm_mic = crypto_alloc_shash("michael_mic", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(priv->rx_tfm_mic)) { printk(KERN_DEBUG "orinoco_mic_init: could not allocate " "crypto API michael_mic\n"); diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c index 124e965..5bf5fd0 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c @@ -269,8 +269,7 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c) goto out; } - c->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(c->auth_hash_name, 0, - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + c->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(c->auth_hash_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(c->hash_tfm)) { err = PTR_ERR(c->hash_tfm); ubifs_err(c, "Can not allocate %s: %d", @@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c) goto out_free_hash; } - c->hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + c->hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(c->hmac_tfm)) { err = PTR_ERR(c->hmac_tfm); ubifs_err(c, "Can not allocate %s: %d", hmac_name, err); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 1f94a25..621146d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -3912,7 +3912,7 @@ int __init bt_selftest_smp(void) return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes); } - tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) { BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context"); crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes); diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c index 136f2a0..af03d98 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/crypto.c +++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int __init init_profile_hash(void) if (!apparmor_initialized) return 0; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { int error = PTR_ERR(tfm); AA_ERROR("failed to setup profile sha1 hashing: %d\n", error); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 8c25f94..1820099 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) mutex_lock(&mutex); if (*tfm) goto out; - *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, - CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_NOLOAD); + *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD); if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index d92cbf9..a3891ae 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, struct crypto_shash *tfm; int err; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { pr_err("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s transform: %ld\n", hmac_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm)); @@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void) { int ret; - hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) { pr_err("encrypted_key: can't allocate %s transform: %ld\n", hash_alg, PTR_ERR(hash_tfm)); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ff67893..2d4f16b 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1199,14 +1199,14 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) { int ret; - hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hmac_alg); return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); } - hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hash_alg); -- 2.7.4