From 2c8340eda45cee1784f7b29e6d7dcc740ea3d02a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rik van Riel Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 14:36:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 boot init stack canary Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Daniel Micay Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Yoshinori Sato Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h index d9df3a7..141515a 100644 --- a/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h +++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) /* Try to get a semi random initial value. */ get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE; + canary &= CANARY_MASK; current->stack_canary = canary; __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; -- 2.7.4