From 00aa27ac13d0b65547d175064083687eb5f7c1c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 17:51:47 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings. The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed without unprivileged mappings. It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for all other users. This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other security issues with new_idmap_permitted. The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be established without privielge that would allow anything that would not be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue. Change-Id: I66a4970dab52327190bc2c4540c4558219703267 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 80a57af..e382fcd 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -804,7 +804,9 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *new_map) { - /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */ + /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't + * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings. + */ if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) { u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { -- 2.7.4