platform/kernel/linux-rpi.git
6 years agox86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 12:00:11 +0000 (14:00 +0200)]
x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force

commit 2207def700f902f169fc237b717252c326f9e464 upstream

nosmt on the kernel command line merely prevents the onlining of the
secondary SMT siblings.

nosmt=force makes the APIC detection code ignore the secondary SMT siblings
completely, so they even do not show up as possible CPUs. That reduces the
amount of memory allocations for per cpu variables and saves other
resources from being allocated too large.

This is not fully equivalent to disabling SMT in the BIOS because the low
level SMT enabling in the BIOS can result in partitioning of resources
between the siblings, which is not undone by just ignoring them. Some CPUs
can use the full resources when their sibling is not onlined, but this is
depending on the CPU family and model and it's not well documented whether
this applies to all partitioned resources. That means depending on the
workload disabling SMT in the BIOS might result in better performance.

Linus analysis of the Intel manual:

  The intel optimization manual is not very clear on what the partitioning
  rules are.

  I find:

    "In general, the buffers for staging instructions between major pipe
     stages  are partitioned. These buffers include µop queues after the
     execution trace cache, the queues after the register rename stage, the
     reorder buffer which stages instructions for retirement, and the load
     and store buffers.

     In the case of load and store buffers, partitioning also provided an
     easier implementation to maintain memory ordering for each logical
     processor and detect memory ordering violations"

  but some of that partitioning may be relaxed if the HT thread is "not
  active":

    "In Intel microarchitecture code name Sandy Bridge, the micro-op queue
     is statically partitioned to provide 28 entries for each logical
     processor,  irrespective of software executing in single thread or
     multiple threads. If one logical processor is not active in Intel
     microarchitecture code name Ivy Bridge, then a single thread executing
     on that processor  core can use the 56 entries in the micro-op queue"

  but I do not know what "not active" means, and how dynamic it is. Some of
  that partitioning may be entirely static and depend on the early BIOS
  disabling of HT, and even if we park the cores, the resources will just be
  wasted.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:57:38 +0000 (00:57 +0200)]
x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early

commit 1e1d7e25fd759eddf96d8ab39d0a90a1979b2d8c upstream

To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. amd_get_topology() cannot be called before the APIC
driver is selected, so split out the part which initializes
smp_num_siblings and invoke it from amd_early_init().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info
Borislav Petkov [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 18:48:39 +0000 (20:48 +0200)]
x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info

commit 119bff8a9c9bb00116a844ec68be7bc4b1c768f5 upstream

Old code used to check whether CPUID ext max level is >= 0x80000008 because
that last leaf contains the number of cores of the physical CPU.  The three
functions called there now do not depend on that leaf anymore so the check
can go.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 23:00:55 +0000 (01:00 +0200)]
x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early

commit 1910ad5624968f93be48e8e265513c54d66b897c upstream

Make use of the new early detection function to initialize smp_num_siblings
on the boot cpu before the MP-Table or ACPI/MADT scan happens. That's
required for force disabling SMT.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early()
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:55:39 +0000 (00:55 +0200)]
x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early()

commit 95f3d39ccf7aaea79d1ffdac1c887c2e100ec1b6 upstream

To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. detect_extended_topology() cannot be called before
the APIC driver is selected, so split out the part which initializes
smp_num_siblings.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early()
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:53:57 +0000 (00:53 +0200)]
x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early()

commit 545401f4448a807b963ff17b575e0a393e68b523 upstream

To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. detect_ht() cannot be called before the APIC driver
is selected, so split out the part which initializes smp_num_siblings.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:47:10 +0000 (00:47 +0200)]
x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call

commit 44ca36de56d1bf196dca2eb67cd753a46961ffe6 upstream

Real 32bit AMD CPUs do not have SMT and the only value of the call was to
reach the magic printout which got removed.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:36:15 +0000 (00:36 +0200)]
x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout

commit 55e6d279abd92cfd7576bba031e7589be8475edb upstream

The value of this printout is dubious at best and there is no point in
having it in two different places along with convoluted ways to reach it.

Remove it completely.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agocpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 15:48:27 +0000 (17:48 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT

commit 05736e4ac13c08a4a9b1ef2de26dd31a32cbee57 upstream

Provide a command line and a sysfs knob to control SMT.

The command line options are:

 'nosmt': Enumerate secondary threads, but do not online them

 'nosmt=force': Ignore secondary threads completely during enumeration
  via MP table and ACPI/MADT.

The sysfs control file has the following states (read/write):

 'on':  SMT is enabled. Secondary threads can be freely onlined
 'off':  SMT is disabled. Secondary threads, even if enumerated
   cannot be onlined
 'forceoff':  SMT is permanentely disabled. Writes to the control
   file are rejected.
 'notsupported': SMT is not supported by the CPU

The command line option 'nosmt' sets the sysfs control to 'off'. This
can be changed to 'on' to reenable SMT during runtime.

The command line option 'nosmt=force' sets the sysfs control to
'forceoff'. This cannot be changed during runtime.

When SMT is 'on' and the control file is changed to 'off' then all online
secondary threads are offlined and attempts to online a secondary thread
later on are rejected.

When SMT is 'off' and the control file is changed to 'on' then secondary
threads can be onlined again. The 'off' -> 'on' transition does not
automatically online the secondary threads.

When the control file is set to 'forceoff', the behaviour is the same as
setting it to 'off', but the operation is irreversible and later writes to
the control file are rejected.

When the control status is 'notsupported' then writes to the control file
are rejected.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agocpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down()
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 15:49:05 +0000 (17:49 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down()

commit cc1fe215e1efa406b03aa4389e6269b61342dec5 upstream

Split out the inner workings of do_cpu_down() to allow reuse of that
function for the upcoming SMT disabling mechanism.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agocpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 17:05:25 +0000 (19:05 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric

commit c4de65696d865c225fda3b9913b31284ea65ea96 upstream

The asymmetry caused a warning to trigger if the bootup was stopped in state
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE. The warning no longer triggers as kthread_park() can
now be invoked on already or still parked threads. But there is still no
reason to have this be asymmetric.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported()
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 21 Jun 2018 08:37:20 +0000 (10:37 +0200)]
x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported()

commit f048c399e0f7490ab7296bc2c255d37eb14a9675 upstream

Provide information whether SMT is supoorted by the CPUs. Preparatory patch
for SMT control mechanism.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread()
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 15:50:22 +0000 (17:50 +0200)]
x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread()

commit 6a4d2657e048f096c7ffcad254010bd94891c8c0 upstream

If the CPU is supporting SMT then the primary thread can be found by
checking the lower APIC ID bits for zero. smp_num_siblings is used to build
the mask for the APIC ID bits which need to be taken into account.

This uses the MPTABLE or ACPI/MADT supplied APIC ID, which can be different
than the initial APIC ID in CPUID. But according to AMD the lower bits have
to be consistent. Intel gave a tentative confirmation as well.

Preparatory patch to support disabling SMT at boot/runtime.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agosched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime
Peter Zijlstra [Tue, 29 May 2018 14:43:46 +0000 (16:43 +0200)]
sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime

commit ba2591a5993eabcc8e874e30f361d8ffbb10d6d4 upstream

The static key sched_smt_present is only updated at boot time when SMT
siblings have been detected. Booting with maxcpus=1 and bringing the
siblings online after boot rebuilds the scheduling domains correctly but
does not update the static key, so the SMT code is not enabled.

Let the key be updated in the scheduler CPU hotplug code to fix this.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 20 Jun 2018 20:42:57 +0000 (16:42 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly

commit 56563f53d3066afa9e63d6c997bf67e76a8b05c0 upstream

The pr_warn in l1tf_select_mitigation would have used the prior pr_fmt
which was defined as "Spectre V2 : ".

Move the function to be past SSBD and also define the pr_fmt.

Fixes: 17dbca119312 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:28 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2

commit 377eeaa8e11fe815b1d07c81c4a0e2843a8c15eb upstream

For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below
MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point
to valid memory.

Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check
in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that
enforces that limit.

The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF.

In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system
with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so
it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or
partitions.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:27 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings

commit 42e4089c7890725fcd329999252dc489b72f2921 upstream

For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.

Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.

To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.

Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.

It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.

For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().

For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:26 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf

commit 17dbca119312b4e8173d4e25ff64262119fcef38 upstream

L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.

- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
  vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
  vulnerable to L1TF

- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
  for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits

- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
  workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
  because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
  memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
  vulnerable.

Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.

[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:25 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved

commit 10a70416e1f067f6c4efda6ffd8ea96002ac4223 upstream

The L1TF workaround doesn't make any attempt to mitigate speculate accesses
to the first physical page for zeroed PTEs. Normally it only contains some
data from the early real mode BIOS.

It's not entirely clear that the first page is reserved in all
configurations, so add an extra reservation call to make sure it is really
reserved. In most configurations (e.g.  with the standard reservations)
it's likely a nop.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:24 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation

commit 6b28baca9b1f0d4a42b865da7a05b1c81424bd5c upstream

When PTEs are set to PROT_NONE the kernel just clears the Present bit and
preserves the PFN, which creates attack surface for L1TF speculation
speculation attacks.

This is important inside guests, because L1TF speculation bypasses physical
page remapping. While the host has its own migitations preventing leaking
data from other VMs into the guest, this would still risk leaking the wrong
page inside the current guest.

This uses the same technique as Linus' swap entry patch: while an entry is
is in PROTNONE state invert the complete PFN part part of it. This ensures
that the the highest bit will point to non existing memory.

The invert is done by pte/pmd_modify and pfn/pmd/pud_pte for PROTNONE and
pte/pmd/pud_pfn undo it.

This assume that no code path touches the PFN part of a PTE directly
without using these primitives.

This doesn't handle the case that MMIO is on the top of the CPU physical
memory. If such an MMIO region was exposed by an unpriviledged driver for
mmap it would be possible to attack some real memory.  However this
situation is all rather unlikely.

For 32bit non PAE the inversion is not done because there are really not
enough bits to protect anything.

Q: Why does the guest need to be protected when the HyperVisor already has
   L1TF mitigations?

A: Here's an example:

   Physical pages 1 2 get mapped into a guest as
   GPA 1 -> PA 2
   GPA 2 -> PA 1
   through EPT.

   The L1TF speculation ignores the EPT remapping.

   Now the guest kernel maps GPA 1 to process A and GPA 2 to process B, and
   they belong to different users and should be isolated.

   A sets the GPA 1 PA 2 PTE to PROT_NONE to bypass the EPT remapping and
   gets read access to the underlying physical page. Which in this case
   points to PA 2, so it can read process B's data, if it happened to be in
   L1, so isolation inside the guest is broken.

   There's nothing the hypervisor can do about this. This mitigation has to
   be done in the guest itself.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF
Linus Torvalds [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:23 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF

commit 2f22b4cd45b67b3496f4aa4c7180a1271c6452f6 upstream

With L1 terminal fault the CPU speculates into unmapped PTEs, and resulting
side effects allow to read the memory the PTE is pointing too, if its
values are still in the L1 cache.

For swapped out pages Linux uses unmapped PTEs and stores a swap entry into
them.

To protect against L1TF it must be ensured that the swap entry is not
pointing to valid memory, which requires setting higher bits (between bit
36 and bit 45) that are inside the CPUs physical address space, but outside
any real memory.

To do this invert the offset to make sure the higher bits are always set,
as long as the swap file is not too big.

Note there is no workaround for 32bit !PAE, or on systems which have more
than MAX_PA/2 worth of memory. The later case is very unlikely to happen on
real systems.

[AK: updated description and minor tweaks by. Split out from the original
     patch ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry
Linus Torvalds [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:22 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry

commit bcd11afa7adad8d720e7ba5ef58bdcd9775cf45f upstream

If pages are swapped out, the swap entry is stored in the corresponding
PTE, which has the Present bit cleared. CPUs vulnerable to L1TF speculate
on PTE entries which have the present bit set and would treat the swap
entry as phsyical address (PFN). To mitigate that the upper bits of the PTE
must be set so the PTE points to non existent memory.

The swap entry stores the type and the offset of a swapped out page in the
PTE. type is stored in bit 9-13 and offset in bit 14-63. The hardware
ignores the bits beyond the phsyical address space limit, so to make the
mitigation effective its required to start 'offset' at the lowest possible
bit so that even large swap offsets do not reach into the physical address
space limit bits.

Move offset to bit 9-58 and type to bit 59-63 which are the bits that
hardware generally doesn't care about.

That, in turn, means that if you on desktop chip with only 40 bits of
physical addressing, now that the offset starts at bit 9, there needs to be
30 bits of offset actually *in use* until bit 39 ends up being set, which
means when inverted it will again point into existing memory.

So that's 4 terabyte of swap space (because the offset is counted in pages,
so 30 bits of offset is 42 bits of actual coverage). With bigger physical
addressing, that obviously grows further, until the limit of the offset is
hit (at 50 bits of offset - 62 bits of actual swap file coverage).

This is a preparatory change for the actual swap entry inversion to protect
against L1TF.

[ AK: Updated description and minor tweaks. Split into two parts ]
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:21 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT

commit 50896e180c6aa3a9c61a26ced99e15d602666a4c upstream

L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) is a speculation related vulnerability. The CPU
speculates on PTE entries which do not have the PRESENT bit set, if the
content of the resulting physical address is available in the L1D cache.

The OS side mitigation makes sure that a !PRESENT PTE entry points to a
physical address outside the actually existing and cachable memory
space. This is achieved by inverting the upper bits of the PTE. Due to the
address space limitations this only works for 64bit and 32bit PAE kernels,
but not for 32bit non PAE.

This mitigation applies to both host and guest kernels, but in case of a
64bit host (hypervisor) and a 32bit PAE guest, inverting the upper bits of
the PAE address space (44bit) is not enough if the host has more than 43
bits of populated memory address space, because the speculation treats the
PTE content as a physical host address bypassing EPT.

The host (hypervisor) protects itself against the guest by flushing L1D as
needed, but pages inside the guest are not protected against attacks from
other processes inside the same guest.

For the guest the inverted PTE mask has to match the host to provide the
full protection for all pages the host could possibly map into the
guest. The hosts populated address space is not known to the guest, so the
mask must cover the possible maximal host address space, i.e. 52 bit.

On 32bit PAE the maximum PTE mask is currently set to 44 bit because that
is the limit imposed by 32bit unsigned long PFNs in the VMs. This limits
the mask to be below what the host could possible use for physical pages.

The L1TF PROT_NONE protection code uses the PTE masks to determine which
bits to invert to make sure the higher bits are set for unmapped entries to
prevent L1TF speculation attacks against EPT inside guests.

In order to invert all bits that could be used by the host, increase
__PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT to 52 to match 64bit.

The real limit for a 32bit PAE kernel is still 44 bits because all Linux
PTEs are created from unsigned long PFNs, so they cannot be higher than 44
bits on a 32bit kernel. So these extra PFN bits should be never set. The
only users of this macro are using it to look at PTEs, so it's safe.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl
Nick Desaulniers [Fri, 3 Aug 2018 17:05:50 +0000 (10:05 -0700)]
x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl

commit 208cbb32558907f68b3b2a081ca2337ac3744794 upstream.

It was reported that the commit d0a8d9378d16 is causing users of gcc < 4.9
to observe -Werror=missing-prototypes errors.

Indeed, it seems that:
extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl(void) { return 0; }

compiled with -Werror=missing-prototypes produces this warning in gcc <
4.9, but not gcc >= 4.9.

Fixes: d0a8d9378d16 ("x86/paravirt: Make native_save_fl() extern inline").
Reported-by: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Reported-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: jgross@suse.com
Cc: kstewart@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: astrachan@google.com
Cc: mka@chromium.org
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: tstellar@redhat.com
Cc: sedat.dilek@gmail.com
Cc: David.Laight@aculab.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180803170550.164688-1-ndesaulniers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agokprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages
Masami Hiramatsu [Sat, 28 Apr 2018 12:37:03 +0000 (21:37 +0900)]
kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages

commit 0ea063306eecf300fcf06d2f5917474b580f666f upstream.

Remove all %p uses in error messages in kprobes/x86.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S . Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jon Medhurst <tixy@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tobin C . Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/152491902310.9916.13355297638917767319.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
Jiri Kosina [Thu, 26 Jul 2018 11:14:55 +0000 (13:14 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB

commit fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346 upstream.

The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).

Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Peter Zijlstra [Fri, 3 Aug 2018 14:41:39 +0000 (16:41 +0200)]
x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests

commit 5800dc5c19f34e6e03b5adab1282535cb102fafd upstream.

Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.

The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.

Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.

Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.

PRE:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
   0xffffffff817be970 <+0>:     push   %rbp
   0xffffffff817be971 <+1>:     mov    %rdi,%rbp
   0xffffffff817be974 <+4>:     push   %rbx
   0xffffffff817be975 <+5>:     lea    0x88(%rbp),%rbx
   0xffffffff817be97c <+12>:    callq  0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
   0xffffffff817be981 <+17>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be984 <+20>:    callq  0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
   0xffffffff817be989 <+25>:    mov    0x8c(%rbp),%eax
   0xffffffff817be98f <+31>:    test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff817be991 <+33>:    jne    0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
   0xffffffff817be993 <+35>:    movl   $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
   0xffffffff817be99d <+45>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>:    callq  *0xffffffff822299e8
   0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>:    pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>:    pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>:    mov    $0x200,%esi
   0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>:    mov    $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>:    jmpq   0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
   0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>:    mov    %rbp,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>:    callq  0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
   0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>:    jmp    0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.

POST:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
   0xffffffff817be970 <+0>:     push   %rbp
   0xffffffff817be971 <+1>:     mov    %rdi,%rbp
   0xffffffff817be974 <+4>:     push   %rbx
   0xffffffff817be975 <+5>:     lea    0x88(%rbp),%rbx
   0xffffffff817be97c <+12>:    callq  0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
   0xffffffff817be981 <+17>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be984 <+20>:    callq  0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
   0xffffffff817be989 <+25>:    mov    0x8c(%rbp),%eax
   0xffffffff817be98f <+31>:    test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff817be991 <+33>:    jne    0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
   0xffffffff817be993 <+35>:    movl   $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
   0xffffffff817be99d <+45>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>:    callq  0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
   0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>:    xchg   %ax,%ax
   0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>:    pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>:    pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>:    mov    $0x200,%esi
   0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>:    mov    $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>:    jmpq   0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
   0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>:    mov    %rbp,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>:    callq  0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
   0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>:    jmp    0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.

NATIVE:

(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
   0xffffffff817be970 <+0>:     push   %rbp
   0xffffffff817be971 <+1>:     mov    %rdi,%rbp
   0xffffffff817be974 <+4>:     push   %rbx
   0xffffffff817be975 <+5>:     lea    0x88(%rbp),%rbx
   0xffffffff817be97c <+12>:    callq  0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
   0xffffffff817be981 <+17>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be984 <+20>:    callq  0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
   0xffffffff817be989 <+25>:    mov    0x8c(%rbp),%eax
   0xffffffff817be98f <+31>:    test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff817be991 <+33>:    jne    0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
   0xffffffff817be993 <+35>:    movl   $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
   0xffffffff817be99d <+45>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>:    movb   $0x0,(%rdi)
   0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>:    nopl   0x0(%rax)
   0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>:    pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>:    pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>:    mov    $0x200,%esi
   0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>:    mov    $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>:    jmpq   0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
   0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>:    mov    %rbp,%rdi
   0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>:    callq  0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
   0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>:    jmp    0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.

Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoARM: dts: imx6sx: fix irq for pcie bridge
Oleksij Rempel [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 07:41:29 +0000 (09:41 +0200)]
ARM: dts: imx6sx: fix irq for pcie bridge

commit 1bcfe0564044be578841744faea1c2f46adc8178 upstream.

Use the correct IRQ line for the MSI controller in the PCIe host
controller. Apparently a different IRQ line is used compared to other
i.MX6 variants. Without this change MSI IRQs aren't properly propagated
to the upstream interrupt controller.

Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Fixes: b1d17f68e5c5 ("ARM: dts: imx: add initial imx6sx device tree source")
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoBluetooth: hci_serdev: Init hci_uart proto_lock to avoid oops
Lukas Wunner [Thu, 16 Nov 2017 23:54:53 +0000 (00:54 +0100)]
Bluetooth: hci_serdev: Init hci_uart proto_lock to avoid oops

commit d73e172816652772114827abaa2dbc053eecbbd7 upstream.

John Stultz reports a boot time crash with the HiKey board (which uses
hci_serdev) occurring in hci_uart_tx_wakeup().  That function is
contained in hci_ldisc.c, but also called from the newer hci_serdev.c.
It acquires the proto_lock in struct hci_uart and it turns out that we
forgot to init the lock in the serdev code path, thus causing the crash.

John bisected the crash to commit 67d2f8781b9f ("Bluetooth: hci_ldisc:
Allow sleeping while proto locks are held"), but the issue was present
before and the commit merely exposed it.  (Perhaps by luck, the crash
did not occur with rwlocks.)

Init the proto_lock in the serdev code path to avoid the oops.

Stack trace for posterity:

Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at 406f127000
[000000406f127000] user address but active_mm is swapper
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Hardware name: HiKey Development Board (DT)
Call trace:
 hci_uart_tx_wakeup+0x38/0x148
 hci_uart_send_frame+0x28/0x38
 hci_send_frame+0x64/0xc0
 hci_cmd_work+0x98/0x110
 process_one_work+0x134/0x330
 worker_thread+0x130/0x468
 kthread+0xf8/0x128
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/908
Reported-and-tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Ronald Tschalär <ronald@innovation.ch>
Cc: Rob Herring <rob.herring@linaro.org>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoBluetooth: hci_ldisc: Allow sleeping while proto locks are held.
Ronald Tschalär [Thu, 26 Oct 2017 05:14:53 +0000 (22:14 -0700)]
Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Allow sleeping while proto locks are held.

commit 67d2f8781b9f00d1089aafcfa3dc09fcd0f343e2 upstream.

Commit dec2c92880cc5435381d50e3045ef018a762a917 ("Bluetooth: hci_ldisc:
Use rwlocking to avoid closing proto races") introduced locks in
hci_ldisc that are held while calling the proto functions. These locks
are rwlock's, and hence do not allow sleeping while they are held.
However, the proto functions that hci_bcm registers use mutexes and
hence need to be able to sleep.

In more detail: hci_uart_tty_receive() and hci_uart_dequeue() both
acquire the rwlock, after which they call proto->recv() and
proto->dequeue(), respectively. In the case of hci_bcm these point to
bcm_recv() and bcm_dequeue(). The latter both acquire the
bcm_device_lock, which is a mutex, so doing so results in a call to
might_sleep(). But since we're holding a rwlock in hci_ldisc, that
results in the following BUG (this for the dequeue case - a similar
one for the receive case is omitted for brevity):

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 7303, name: kworker/7:3
  INFO: lockdep is turned off.
  CPU: 7 PID: 7303 Comm: kworker/7:3 Tainted: G        W  OE   4.13.2+ #17
  Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookPro13,3/Mac-A5C67F76ED83108C, BIOS MBP133.8
  Workqueue: events hci_uart_write_work [hci_uart]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x8e/0xd6
   ___might_sleep+0x164/0x250
   __might_sleep+0x4a/0x80
   __mutex_lock+0x59/0xa00
   ? lock_acquire+0xa3/0x1f0
   ? lock_acquire+0xa3/0x1f0
   ? hci_uart_write_work+0xd3/0x160 [hci_uart]
   mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
   ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
   bcm_dequeue+0x21/0xc0 [hci_uart]
   hci_uart_write_work+0xe6/0x160 [hci_uart]
   process_one_work+0x253/0x6a0
   worker_thread+0x4d/0x3b0
   kthread+0x133/0x150

We can't replace the mutex in hci_bcm, because there are other calls
there that might sleep. Therefore this replaces the rwlock's in
hci_ldisc with rw_semaphore's (which allow sleeping). This is a safer
approach anyway as it reduces the restrictions on the proto callbacks.
Also, because acquiring write-lock is very rare compared to acquiring
the read-lock, the percpu variant of rw_semaphore is used.

Lastly, because hci_uart_tx_wakeup() may be called from an IRQ context,
we can't block (sleep) while trying acquire the read lock there, so we
use the trylock variant.

Signed-off-by: Ronald Tschalär <ronald@innovation.ch>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agophy: phy-mtk-tphy: use auto instead of force to bypass utmi signals
Chunfeng Yun [Thu, 7 Dec 2017 11:53:34 +0000 (19:53 +0800)]
phy: phy-mtk-tphy: use auto instead of force to bypass utmi signals

commit 00c0092c5f62147b7d85f0c6f1cf245a0a1ff3b6 upstream.

When system is running, if usb2 phy is forced to bypass utmi signals,
all PLL will be turned off, and it can't detect device connection
anymore, so replace force mode with auto mode which can bypass utmi
signals automatically if no device attached for normal flow.
But keep the force mode to fix RX sensitivity degradation issue.

Signed-off-by: Chunfeng Yun <chunfeng.yun@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agomtd: nand: qcom: Add a NULL check for devm_kasprintf()
Fabio Estevam [Fri, 5 Jan 2018 20:02:55 +0000 (18:02 -0200)]
mtd: nand: qcom: Add a NULL check for devm_kasprintf()

commit 069f05346d01e7298939f16533953cdf52370be3 upstream.

devm_kasprintf() may fail, so we should better add a NULL check
and propagate an error on failure.

Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agofix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race
Al Viro [Thu, 9 Aug 2018 21:51:32 +0000 (17:51 -0400)]
fix __legitimize_mnt()/mntput() race

commit 119e1ef80ecfe0d1deb6378d4ab41f5b71519de1 upstream.

__legitimize_mnt() has two problems - one is that in case of success
the check of mount_lock is not ordered wrt preceding increment of
refcount, making it possible to have successful __legitimize_mnt()
on one CPU just before the otherwise final mntpu() on another,
with __legitimize_mnt() not seeing mntput() taking the lock and
mntput() not seeing the increment done by __legitimize_mnt().
Solved by a pair of barriers.

Another is that failure of __legitimize_mnt() on the second
read_seqretry() leaves us with reference that'll need to be
dropped by caller; however, if that races with final mntput()
we can end up with caller dropping rcu_read_lock() and doing
mntput() to release that reference - with the first mntput()
having freed the damn thing just as rcu_read_lock() had been
dropped.  Solution: in "do mntput() yourself" failure case
grab mount_lock, check if MNT_DOOMED has been set by racing
final mntput() that has missed our increment and if it has -
undo the increment and treat that as "failure, caller doesn't
need to drop anything" case.

It's not easy to hit - the final mntput() has to come right
after the first read_seqretry() in __legitimize_mnt() *and*
manage to miss the increment done by __legitimize_mnt() before
the second read_seqretry() in there.  The things that are almost
impossible to hit on bare hardware are not impossible on SMP
KVM, though...

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Fixes: 48a066e72d97 ("RCU'd vsfmounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agofix mntput/mntput race
Al Viro [Thu, 9 Aug 2018 21:21:17 +0000 (17:21 -0400)]
fix mntput/mntput race

commit 9ea0a46ca2c318fcc449c1e6b62a7230a17888f1 upstream.

mntput_no_expire() does the calculation of total refcount under mount_lock;
unfortunately, the decrement (as well as all increments) are done outside
of it, leading to false positives in the "are we dropping the last reference"
test.  Consider the following situation:
* mnt is a lazy-umounted mount, kept alive by two opened files.  One
of those files gets closed.  Total refcount of mnt is 2.  On CPU 42
mntput(mnt) (called from __fput()) drops one reference, decrementing component
* After it has looked at component #0, the process on CPU 0 does
mntget(), incrementing component #0, gets preempted and gets to run again -
on CPU 69.  There it does mntput(), which drops the reference (component #69)
and proceeds to spin on mount_lock.
* On CPU 42 our first mntput() finishes counting.  It observes the
decrement of component #69, but not the increment of component #0.  As the
result, the total it gets is not 1 as it should've been - it's 0.  At which
point we decide that vfsmount needs to be killed and proceed to free it and
shut the filesystem down.  However, there's still another opened file
on that filesystem, with reference to (now freed) vfsmount, etc. and we are
screwed.

It's not a wide race, but it can be reproduced with artificial slowdown of
the mnt_get_count() loop, and it should be easier to hit on SMP KVM setups.

Fix consists of moving the refcount decrement under mount_lock; the tricky
part is that we want (and can) keep the fast case (i.e. mount that still
has non-NULL ->mnt_ns) entirely out of mount_lock.  All places that zero
mnt->mnt_ns are dropping some reference to mnt and they call synchronize_rcu()
before that mntput().  IOW, if mntput() observes (under rcu_read_lock())
a non-NULL ->mnt_ns, it is guaranteed that there is another reference yet to
be dropped.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 48a066e72d97 ("RCU'd vsfmounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agomake sure that __dentry_kill() always invalidates d_seq, unhashed or not
Al Viro [Thu, 9 Aug 2018 14:15:54 +0000 (10:15 -0400)]
make sure that __dentry_kill() always invalidates d_seq, unhashed or not

commit 4c0d7cd5c8416b1ef41534d19163cb07ffaa03ab upstream.

RCU pathwalk relies upon the assumption that anything that changes
->d_inode of a dentry will invalidate its ->d_seq.  That's almost
true - the one exception is that the final dput() of already unhashed
dentry does *not* touch ->d_seq at all.  Unhashing does, though,
so for anything we'd found by RCU dcache lookup we are fine.
Unfortunately, we can *start* with an unhashed dentry or jump into
it.

We could try and be careful in the (few) places where that could
happen.  Or we could just make the final dput() invalidate the damn
thing, unhashed or not.  The latter is much simpler and easier to
backport, so let's do it that way.

Reported-by: "Dae R. Jeong" <threeearcat@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoroot dentries need RCU-delayed freeing
Al Viro [Mon, 6 Aug 2018 13:03:58 +0000 (09:03 -0400)]
root dentries need RCU-delayed freeing

commit 90bad5e05bcdb0308cfa3d3a60f5c0b9c8e2efb3 upstream.

Since mountpoint crossing can happen without leaving lazy mode,
root dentries do need the same protection against having their
memory freed without RCU delay as everything else in the tree.

It's partially hidden by RCU delay between detaching from the
mount tree and dropping the vfsmount reference, but the starting
point of pathwalk can be on an already detached mount, in which
case umount-caused RCU delay has already passed by the time the
lazy pathwalk grabs rcu_read_lock().  If the starting point
happens to be at the root of that vfsmount *and* that vfsmount
covers the entire filesystem, we get trouble.

Fixes: 48a066e72d97 ("RCU'd vsfmounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoinit: rename and re-order boot_cpu_state_init()
Linus Torvalds [Sun, 12 Aug 2018 19:19:42 +0000 (12:19 -0700)]
init: rename and re-order boot_cpu_state_init()

commit b5b1404d0815894de0690de8a1ab58269e56eae6 upstream.

This is purely a preparatory patch for upcoming changes during the 4.19
merge window.

We have a function called "boot_cpu_state_init()" that isn't really
about the bootup cpu state: that is done much earlier by the similarly
named "boot_cpu_init()" (note lack of "state" in name).

This function initializes some hotplug CPU state, and needs to run after
the percpu data has been properly initialized.  It even has a comment to
that effect.

Except it _doesn't_ actually run after the percpu data has been properly
initialized.  On x86 it happens to do that, but on at least arm and
arm64, the percpu base pointers are initialized by the arch-specific
'smp_prepare_boot_cpu()' hook, which ran _after_ boot_cpu_state_init().

This had some unexpected results, and in particular we have a patch
pending for the merge window that did the obvious cleanup of using
'this_cpu_write()' in the cpu hotplug init code:

  -       per_cpu_ptr(&cpuhp_state, smp_processor_id())->state = CPUHP_ONLINE;
  +       this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);

which is obviously the right thing to do.  Except because of the
ordering issue, it actually failed miserably and unexpectedly on arm64.

So this just fixes the ordering, and changes the name of the function to
be 'boot_cpu_hotplug_init()' to make it obvious that it's about cpu
hotplug state, because the core CPU state was supposed to have already
been done earlier.

Marked for stable, since the (not yet merged) patch that will show this
problem is marked for stable.

Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <yousaf.kaukab@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: qla2xxx: Fix memory leak for allocating abort IOCB
Quinn Tran [Thu, 26 Jul 2018 23:34:44 +0000 (16:34 -0700)]
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix memory leak for allocating abort IOCB

commit 5e53be8e476a3397ed5383c23376f299555a2b43 upstream.

In the case of IOCB QFull, Initiator code can leave behind a stale pointer
to an SRB structure on the outstanding command array.

Fixes: 82de802ad46e ("scsi: qla2xxx: Preparation for Target MQ.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.16+
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: sr: Avoid that opening a CD-ROM hangs with runtime power management enabled
Bart Van Assche [Thu, 2 Aug 2018 17:44:42 +0000 (10:44 -0700)]
scsi: sr: Avoid that opening a CD-ROM hangs with runtime power management enabled

commit 1214fd7b497400d200e3f4e64e2338b303a20949 upstream.

Surround scsi_execute() calls with scsi_autopm_get_device() and
scsi_autopm_put_device(). Note: removing sr_mutex protection from the
scsi_cd_get() and scsi_cd_put() calls is safe because the purpose of
sr_mutex is to serialize cdrom_*() calls.

This patch avoids that complaints similar to the following appear in the
kernel log if runtime power management is enabled:

INFO: task systemd-udevd:650 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
     Not tainted 4.18.0-rc7-dbg+ #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
systemd-udevd   D28176   650    513 0x00000104
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x444/0xfe0
schedule+0x4e/0xe0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x30
__mutex_lock+0x41c/0xc70
mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
__blkdev_get+0x106/0x970
blkdev_get+0x22c/0x5a0
blkdev_open+0xe9/0x100
do_dentry_open.isra.19+0x33e/0x570
vfs_open+0x7c/0xd0
path_openat+0x6e3/0x1120
do_filp_open+0x11c/0x1c0
do_sys_open+0x208/0x2d0
__x64_sys_openat+0x59/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x77/0x230
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Cc: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoxen/netfront: don't cache skb_shinfo()
Juergen Gross [Thu, 9 Aug 2018 14:42:16 +0000 (16:42 +0200)]
xen/netfront: don't cache skb_shinfo()

commit d472b3a6cf63cd31cae1ed61930f07e6cd6671b5 upstream.

skb_shinfo() can change when calling __pskb_pull_tail(): Don't cache
its return value.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agostop_machine: Disable preemption after queueing stopper threads
Isaac J. Manjarres [Tue, 17 Jul 2018 19:35:29 +0000 (12:35 -0700)]
stop_machine: Disable preemption after queueing stopper threads

commit 2610e88946632afb78aa58e61f11368ac4c0af7b upstream.

This commit:

  9fb8d5dc4b64 ("stop_machine, Disable preemption when waking two stopper threads")

does not fully address the race condition that can occur
as follows:

On one CPU, call it CPU 3, thread 1 invokes
cpu_stop_queue_two_works(2, 3,...), and the execution is such
that thread 1 queues the works for migration/2 and migration/3,
and is preempted after releasing the locks for migration/2 and
migration/3, but before waking the threads.

Then, On CPU 2, a kworker, call it thread 2, is running,
and it invokes cpu_stop_queue_two_works(1, 2,...), such that
thread 2 queues the works for migration/1 and migration/2.
Meanwhile, on CPU 3, thread 1 resumes execution, and wakes
migration/2 and migration/3. This means that when CPU 2
releases the locks for migration/1 and migration/2, but before
it wakes those threads, it can be preempted by migration/2.

If thread 2 is preempted by migration/2, then migration/2 will
execute the first work item successfully, since migration/3
was woken up by CPU 3, but when it goes to execute the second
work item, it disables preemption, calls multi_cpu_stop(),
and thus, CPU 2 will wait forever for migration/1, which should
have been woken up by thread 2. However migration/1 cannot be
woken up by thread 2, since it is a kworker, so it is affine to
CPU 2, but CPU 2 is running migration/2 with preemption
disabled, so thread 2 will never run.

Disable preemption after queueing works for stopper threads
to ensure that the operation of queueing the works and waking
the stopper threads is atomic.

Co-Developed-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org>
Co-Developed-by: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacm@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Fixes: 9fb8d5dc4b64 ("stop_machine, Disable preemption when waking two stopper threads")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531856129-9871-1-git-send-email-isaacm@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoMark HI and TASKLET softirq synchronous
Linus Torvalds [Mon, 8 Jan 2018 19:51:04 +0000 (11:51 -0800)]
Mark HI and TASKLET softirq synchronous

commit 3c53776e29f81719efcf8f7a6e30cdf753bee94d upstream.

Way back in 4.9, we committed 4cd13c21b207 ("softirq: Let ksoftirqd do
its job"), and ever since we've had small nagging issues with it.  For
example, we've had:

  1ff688209e2e ("watchdog: core: make sure the watchdog_worker is not deferred")
  8d5755b3f77b ("watchdog: softdog: fire watchdog even if softirqs do not get to run")
  217f69743681 ("net: busy-poll: allow preemption in sk_busy_loop()")

all of which worked around some of the effects of that commit.

The DVB people have also complained that the commit causes excessive USB
URB latencies, which seems to be due to the USB code using tasklets to
schedule USB traffic.  This seems to be an issue mainly when already
living on the edge, but waiting for ksoftirqd to handle it really does
seem to cause excessive latencies.

Now Hanna Hawa reports that this issue isn't just limited to USB URB and
DVB, but also causes timeout problems for the Marvell SoC team:

 "I'm facing kernel panic issue while running raid 5 on sata disks
  connected to Macchiatobin (Marvell community board with Armada-8040
  SoC with 4 ARMv8 cores of CA72) Raid 5 built with Marvell DMA engine
  and async_tx mechanism (ASYNC_TX_DMA [=y]); the DMA driver (mv_xor_v2)
  uses a tasklet to clean the done descriptors from the queue"

The latency problem causes a panic:

  mv_xor_v2 f0400000.xor: dma_sync_wait: timeout!
  Kernel panic - not syncing: async_tx_quiesce: DMA error waiting for transaction

We've discussed simply just reverting the original commit entirely, and
also much more involved solutions (with per-softirq threads etc).  This
patch is intentionally stupid and fairly limited, because the issue
still remains, and the other solutions either got sidetracked or had
other issues.

We should probably also consider the timer softirqs to be synchronous
and not be delayed to ksoftirqd (since they were the issue with the
earlier watchdog problems), but that should be done as a separate patch.
This does only the tasklet cases.

Reported-and-tested-by: Hanna Hawa <hannah@marvell.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Josef Griebichler <griebichler.josef@gmx.at>
Reported-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agokasan: add no_sanitize attribute for clang builds
Andrey Konovalov [Fri, 20 Apr 2018 21:55:52 +0000 (14:55 -0700)]
kasan: add no_sanitize attribute for clang builds

commit 12c8f25a016dff69ee284aa3338bebfd2cfcba33 upstream.

KASAN uses the __no_sanitize_address macro to disable instrumentation of
particular functions.  Right now it's defined only for GCC build, which
causes false positives when clang is used.

This patch adds a definition for clang.

Note, that clang's revision 329612 or higher is required.

[andreyknvl@google.com: remove redundant #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN check]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c79aa31a2a2790f6131ed607c58b0dd45dd62a6c.1523967959.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4ad725cc903f8534f8c8a60f0daade5e3d674f8d.1523554166.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sodagudi Prasad <psodagud@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: virtio_scsi: fix IO hang caused by automatic irq vector affinity
Ming Lei [Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:42:42 +0000 (17:42 +0800)]
scsi: virtio_scsi: fix IO hang caused by automatic irq vector affinity

commit b5b6e8c8d3b4cbeb447a0f10c7d5de3caa573299 upstream.

Since commit 84676c1f21e8ff5 ("genirq/affinity: assign vectors to all
possible CPUs") it is possible to end up in a scenario where only
offline CPUs are mapped to an interrupt vector.

This is only an issue for the legacy I/O path since with blk-mq/scsi-mq
an I/O can't be submitted to a hardware queue if the queue isn't mapped
to an online CPU.

Fix this issue by forcing virtio-scsi to use blk-mq.

[mkp: commit desc]

Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>,
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
Cc: James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Cc: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com>
Cc: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Fixes: 84676c1f21e8 ("genirq/affinity: assign vectors to all possible CPUs")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: core: introduce force_blk_mq
Ming Lei [Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:42:41 +0000 (17:42 +0800)]
scsi: core: introduce force_blk_mq

commit 2f31115e940c4afd49b99c33123534e2ac924ffb upstream.

This patch introduces 'force_blk_mq' to the scsi_host_template so that
drivers that have no desire to support the legacy I/O path can signal
blk-mq only support.

[mkp: commit desc]

Cc: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>,
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
Cc: James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Cc: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com>
Cc: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: hpsa: fix selection of reply queue
Ming Lei [Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:42:39 +0000 (17:42 +0800)]
scsi: hpsa: fix selection of reply queue

commit 8b834bff1b73dce46f4e9f5e84af6f73fed8b0ef upstream.

Since commit 84676c1f21e8 ("genirq/affinity: assign vectors to all
possible CPUs") we could end up with an MSI-X vector that did not have
any online CPUs mapped. This would lead to I/O hangs since there was no
CPU to receive the completion.

Retrieve IRQ affinity information using pci_irq_get_affinity() and use
this mapping to choose a reply queue.

[mkp: tweaked commit desc]

Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>,
Cc: James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Cc: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com>
Cc: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com>
Cc: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Cc: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@intel.com>
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Fixes: 84676c1f21e8 ("genirq/affinity: assign vectors to all possible CPUs")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com>
Tested-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@intel.com>
Acked-by: Don Brace <don.brace@microsemi.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoparisc: Define mb() and add memory barriers to assembler unlock sequences
John David Anglin [Sun, 5 Aug 2018 17:30:31 +0000 (13:30 -0400)]
parisc: Define mb() and add memory barriers to assembler unlock sequences

commit fedb8da96355f5f64353625bf96dc69423ad1826 upstream.

For years I thought all parisc machines executed loads and stores in
order. However, Jeff Law recently indicated on gcc-patches that this is
not correct. There are various degrees of out-of-order execution all the
way back to the PA7xxx processor series (hit-under-miss). The PA8xxx
series has full out-of-order execution for both integer operations, and
loads and stores.

This is described in the following article:
http://web.archive.org/web/20040214092531/http://www.cpus.hp.com/technical_references/advperf.shtml

For this reason, we need to define mb() and to insert a memory barrier
before the store unlocking spinlocks. This ensures that all memory
accesses are complete prior to unlocking. The ldcw instruction performs
the same function on entry.

Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoparisc: Enable CONFIG_MLONGCALLS by default
Helge Deller [Sat, 28 Jul 2018 09:47:17 +0000 (11:47 +0200)]
parisc: Enable CONFIG_MLONGCALLS by default

commit 66509a276c8c1d19ee3f661a41b418d101c57d29 upstream.

Enable the -mlong-calls compiler option by default, because otherwise in most
cases linking the vmlinux binary fails due to truncations of R_PARISC_PCREL22F
relocations. This fixes building the 64-bit defconfig.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoLinux 4.14.62 v4.14.62
Greg Kroah-Hartman [Thu, 9 Aug 2018 10:16:40 +0000 (12:16 +0200)]
Linux 4.14.62

6 years agojfs: Fix inconsistency between memory allocation and ea_buf->max_size
Shankara Pailoor [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 13:33:27 +0000 (08:33 -0500)]
jfs: Fix inconsistency between memory allocation and ea_buf->max_size

commit 92d34134193e5b129dc24f8d79cb9196626e8d7a upstream.

The code is assuming the buffer is max_size length, but we weren't
allocating enough space for it.

Signed-off-by: Shankara Pailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoxfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
Eric Sandeen [Fri, 8 Jun 2018 16:53:49 +0000 (09:53 -0700)]
xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp

commit bb3d48dcf86a97dc25fe9fc2c11938e19cb4399a upstream.

xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range.  In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.

This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoxfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
Dave Chinner [Wed, 18 Apr 2018 00:17:34 +0000 (17:17 -0700)]
xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated

commit afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff upstream.

A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
 lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
 walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
 link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
 path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
 filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
 user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
 path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
 SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.

The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.

We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.

Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoxfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch corruption
Dave Chinner [Fri, 23 Mar 2018 17:22:53 +0000 (10:22 -0700)]
xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch corruption

commit ee457001ed6c6f31ddad69c24c1da8f377d8472d upstream.

We recently came across a V4 filesystem causing memory corruption
due to a newly allocated inode being setup twice and being added to
the superblock inode list twice. From code inspection, the only way
this could happen is if a newly allocated inode was not marked as
free on disk (i.e. di_mode wasn't zero).

Running the metadump on an upstream debug kernel fails during inode
allocation like so:

XFS: Assertion failed: ip->i_d.di_nblocks == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_inod=
e.c, line: 838
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:114!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 11 PID: 3496 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 4.16.0-rc5-dgc #442
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/0=
1/2014
RIP: 0010:assfail+0x28/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000236fc80 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffea RBX: 0000000000004000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000ffffffc0 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffffffff8227211b
RBP: ffffc9000236fce8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000bec R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffffc9000236fd30
R13: ffff8805c76bab80 R14: ffff8805c77ac800 R15: ffff88083fb12e10
FS:  00007fac8cbff040(0000) GS:ffff88083fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000=
000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffa6783ff8 CR3: 00000005c6e2b003 CR4: 00000000000606e0
Call Trace:
 xfs_ialloc+0x383/0x570
 xfs_dir_ialloc+0x6a/0x2a0
 xfs_create+0x412/0x670
 xfs_generic_create+0x1f7/0x2c0
 ? capable_wrt_inode_uidgid+0x3f/0x50
 vfs_mkdir+0xfb/0x1b0
 SyS_mkdir+0xcf/0xf0
 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

Extracting the inode number we crashed on from an event trace and
looking at it with xfs_db:

xfs_db> inode 184452204
xfs_db> p
core.magic = 0x494e
core.mode = 0100644
core.version = 2
core.format = 2 (extents)
core.nlinkv2 = 1
core.onlink = 0
.....

Confirms that it is not a free inode on disk. xfs_repair
also trips over this inode:

.....
zero length extent (off = 0, fsbno = 0) in ino 184452204
correcting nextents for inode 184452204
bad attribute fork in inode 184452204, would clear attr fork
bad nblocks 1 for inode 184452204, would reset to 0
bad anextents 1 for inode 184452204, would reset to 0
imap claims in-use inode 184452204 is free, would correct imap
would have cleared inode 184452204
.....
disconnected inode 184452204, would move to lost+found

And so we have a situation where the directory structure and the
inobt thinks the inode is free, but the inode on disk thinks it is
still in use. Where this corruption came from is not possible to
diagnose, but we can detect it and prevent the kernel from oopsing
on lookup. The reproducer now results in:

$ sudo mkdir /mnt/scratch/{0,1,2,3,4,5}{0,1,2,3,4,5}
mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/00=E2=80=99: File ex=
ists
mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/01=E2=80=99: File ex=
ists
mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/03=E2=80=99: Structu=
re needs cleaning
mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/04=E2=80=99: Input/o=
utput error
mkdir: cannot create directory =E2=80=98/mnt/scratch/05=E2=80=99: Input/o=
utput error
....

And this corruption shutdown:

[   54.843517] XFS (loop0): Corruption detected! Free inode 0xafe846c not=
 marked free on disk
[   54.845885] XFS (loop0): Internal error xfs_trans_cancel at line 1023 =
of file fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c.  Caller xfs_create+0x425/0x670
[   54.848994] CPU: 10 PID: 3541 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 4.16.0-rc5-dgc #=
443
[   54.850753] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIO=
S 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[   54.852859] Call Trace:
[   54.853531]  dump_stack+0x85/0xc5
[   54.854385]  xfs_trans_cancel+0x197/0x1c0
[   54.855421]  xfs_create+0x425/0x670
[   54.856314]  xfs_generic_create+0x1f7/0x2c0
[   54.857390]  ? capable_wrt_inode_uidgid+0x3f/0x50
[   54.858586]  vfs_mkdir+0xfb/0x1b0
[   54.859458]  SyS_mkdir+0xcf/0xf0
[   54.860254]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x1a0
[   54.861193]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
[   54.862492] RIP: 0033:0x7fb73bddf547
[   54.863358] RSP: 002b:00007ffdaa553338 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000=
000000000053
[   54.865133] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdaa55449a RCX: 00007fb73=
bddf547
[   54.866766] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000000001ff RDI: 00007ffda=
a55449a
[   54.868432] RBP: 00007ffdaa55449a R08: 00000000000001ff R09: 00005623a=
8670dd0
[   54.870110] R10: 00007fb73be72d5b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000=
00001ff
[   54.871752] R13: 00007ffdaa5534b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffda=
a553500
[   54.873429] XFS (loop0): xfs_do_force_shutdown(0x8) called from line 1=
024 of file fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c.  Return address = ffffffff814cd050
[   54.882790] XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data detected.  Shutt=
ing down filesystem
[   54.884597] XFS (loop0): Please umount the filesystem and rectify the =
problem(s)

Note that this crash is only possible on v4 filesystemsi or v5
filesystems mounted with the ikeep mount option. For all other V5
filesystems, this problem cannot occur because we don't read inodes
we are allocating from disk - we simply overwrite them with the new
inode information.

Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agointel_idle: Graceful probe failure when MWAIT is disabled
Len Brown [Thu, 9 Nov 2017 07:19:39 +0000 (02:19 -0500)]
intel_idle: Graceful probe failure when MWAIT is disabled

commit a4c447533a18ee86e07232d6344ba12b1f9c5077 upstream.

When MWAIT is disabled, intel_idle refuses to probe.
But it may mis-lead the user by blaming this on the model number:

intel_idle: does not run on family 6 modesl 79

So defer the check for MWAIT until after the model# white-list check succeeds,
and if the MWAIT check fails, tell the user how to fix it:

intel_idle: Please enable MWAIT in BIOS SETUP

Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonvmet-fc: fix target sgl list on large transfers
James Smart [Mon, 16 Jul 2018 21:38:14 +0000 (14:38 -0700)]
nvmet-fc: fix target sgl list on large transfers

commit d082dc1562a2ff0947b214796f12faaa87e816a9 upstream.

The existing code to carve up the sg list expected an sg element-per-page
which can be very incorrect with iommu's remapping multiple memory pages
to fewer bus addresses. To hit this error required a large io payload
(greater than 256k) and a system that maps on a per-page basis. It's
possible that large ios could get by fine if the system condensed the
sgl list into the first 64 elements.

This patch corrects the sg list handling by specifically walking the
sg list element by element and attempting to divide the transfer up
on a per-sg element boundary. While doing so, it still tries to keep
sequences under 256k, but will exceed that rule if a single sg element
is larger than 256k.

Fixes: 48fa362b6c3f ("nvmet-fc: simplify sg list handling")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonvme-pci: Fix queue double allocations
Keith Busch [Tue, 23 Jan 2018 16:16:19 +0000 (09:16 -0700)]
nvme-pci: Fix queue double allocations

commit 62314e405fa101dbb82563394f9dfc225e3f1167 upstream.

The queue count says the highest queue that's been allocated, so don't
reallocate a queue lower than that.

Fixes: 147b27e4bd0 ("nvme-pci: allocate device queues storage space at probe")
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonvme-pci: allocate device queues storage space at probe
Sagi Grimberg [Sun, 14 Jan 2018 10:39:01 +0000 (12:39 +0200)]
nvme-pci: allocate device queues storage space at probe

commit 147b27e4bd08406a6abebedbb478b431ec197be1 upstream.

It may cause race by setting 'nvmeq' in nvme_init_request()
because .init_request is called inside switching io scheduler, which
may happen when the NVMe device is being resetted and its nvme queues
are being freed and created. We don't have any sync between the two
pathes.

This patch changes the nvmeq allocation to occur at probe time so
there is no way we can dereference it at init_request.

[   93.268391] kernel BUG at drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:408!
[   93.274146] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[   93.278618] Modules linked in: nfsv3 nfs_acl rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss
nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc ipmi_ssif vfat fat
intel_rapl sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel
kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel iTCO_wdt
intel_cstate ipmi_si iTCO_vendor_support intel_uncore mxm_wmi mei_me
ipmi_devintf intel_rapl_perf pcspkr sg ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich dcdbas mei
shpchp acpi_power_meter wmi dm_multipath ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt
fb_sys_fops ttm drm ahci libahci nvme libata crc32c_intel nvme_core tg3
megaraid_sas ptp i2c_core pps_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[   93.349071] CPU: 5 PID: 1842 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.15.0-rc2.ming+ #4
[   93.356256] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730xd/072T6D, BIOS 2.5.5 08/16/2017
[   93.364801] task: 00000000fb8abf2a task.stack: 0000000028bd82d1
[   93.371408] RIP: 0010:nvme_init_request+0x36/0x40 [nvme]
[   93.377333] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002537ca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   93.383161] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000008
[   93.391122] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880276ae0000 RDI: ffff88047bae9008
[   93.399084] RBP: ffff88047bae9008 R08: ffff88047bae9008 R09: 0000000009dabc00
[   93.407045] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000000000000299c R12: ffff880186bc1f00
[   93.415007] R13: ffff880276ae0000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000071
[   93.422969] FS:  00007f33cf288740(0000) GS:ffff88047ba80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   93.431996] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   93.438407] CR2: 00007f33cf28e000 CR3: 000000047e5bb006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
[   93.446368] Call Trace:
[   93.449103]  blk_mq_alloc_rqs+0x231/0x2a0
[   93.453579]  blk_mq_sched_alloc_tags.isra.8+0x42/0x80
[   93.459214]  blk_mq_init_sched+0x7e/0x140
[   93.463687]  elevator_switch+0x5a/0x1f0
[   93.467966]  ? elevator_get.isra.17+0x52/0xc0
[   93.472826]  elv_iosched_store+0xde/0x150
[   93.477299]  queue_attr_store+0x4e/0x90
[   93.481580]  kernfs_fop_write+0xfa/0x180
[   93.485958]  __vfs_write+0x33/0x170
[   93.489851]  ? __inode_security_revalidate+0x4c/0x60
[   93.495390]  ? selinux_file_permission+0xda/0x130
[   93.500641]  ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
[   93.504815]  vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0
[   93.508512]  SyS_write+0x52/0xc0
[   93.512113]  do_syscall_64+0x61/0x1a0
[   93.516199]  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
[   93.521351] RIP: 0033:0x7f33ce96aab0
[   93.525337] RSP: 002b:00007ffe57570238 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   93.533785] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00007f33ce96aab0
[   93.541746] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 00007f33cf28e000 RDI: 0000000000000001
[   93.549707] RBP: 00007f33cf28e000 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00007f33cf288740
[   93.557669] R10: 00007f33cf288740 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f33cec42400
[   93.565630] R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
[   93.573592] Code: 4c 8d 40 08 4c 39 c7 74 16 48 8b 00 48 8b 04 08 48 85 c0
74 16 48 89 86 78 01 00 00 31 c0 c3 8d 4a 01 48 63 c9 48 c1 e1 03 eb de <0f>
0b 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 f6 53 48 89
[   93.594676] RIP: nvme_init_request+0x36/0x40 [nvme] RSP: ffffc90002537ca8
[   93.602273] ---[ end trace 810dde3993e5f14e ]---

Reported-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoBtrfs: fix file data corruption after cloning a range and fsync
Filipe Manana [Thu, 12 Jul 2018 00:36:43 +0000 (01:36 +0100)]
Btrfs: fix file data corruption after cloning a range and fsync

commit bd3599a0e142cd73edd3b6801068ac3f48ac771a upstream.

When we clone a range into a file we can end up dropping existing
extent maps (or trimming them) and replacing them with new ones if the
range to be cloned overlaps with a range in the destination inode.
When that happens we add the new extent maps to the list of modified
extents in the inode's extent map tree, so that a "fast" fsync (the flag
BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC not set in the inode) will see the extent maps
and log corresponding extent items. However, at the end of range cloning
operation we do truncate all the pages in the affected range (in order to
ensure future reads will not get stale data). Sometimes this truncation
will release the corresponding extent maps besides the pages from the page
cache. If this happens, then a "fast" fsync operation will miss logging
some extent items, because it relies exclusively on the extent maps being
present in the inode's extent tree, leading to data loss/corruption if
the fsync ends up using the same transaction used by the clone operation
(that transaction was not committed in the meanwhile). An extent map is
released through the callback btrfs_invalidatepage(), which gets called by
truncate_inode_pages_range(), and it calls __btrfs_releasepage(). The
later ends up calling try_release_extent_mapping() which will release the
extent map if some conditions are met, like the file size being greater
than 16Mb, gfp flags allow blocking and the range not being locked (which
is the case during the clone operation) nor being the extent map flagged
as pinned (also the case for cloning).

The following example, turned into a test for fstests, reproduces the
issue:

  $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
  $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt

  $ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0x18 9000K 6908K" /mnt/foo
  $ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0x20 2572K 156K" /mnt/bar

  $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/bar
  # reflink destination offset corresponds to the size of file bar,
  # 2728Kb minus 4Kb.
  $ xfs_io -c ""reflink ${SCRATCH_MNT}/foo 0 2724K 15908K" /mnt/bar
  $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/bar

  $ md5sum /mnt/bar
  95a95813a8c2abc9aa75a6c2914a077e  /mnt/bar

  <power fail>

  $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
  $ md5sum /mnt/bar
  207fd8d0b161be8a84b945f0df8d5f8d  /mnt/bar
  # digest should be 95a95813a8c2abc9aa75a6c2914a077e like before the
  # power failure

In the above example, the destination offset of the clone operation
corresponds to the size of the "bar" file minus 4Kb. So during the clone
operation, the extent map covering the range from 2572Kb to 2728Kb gets
trimmed so that it ends at offset 2724Kb, and a new extent map covering
the range from 2724Kb to 11724Kb is created. So at the end of the clone
operation when we ask to truncate the pages in the range from 2724Kb to
2724Kb + 15908Kb, the page invalidation callback ends up removing the new
extent map (through try_release_extent_mapping()) when the page at offset
2724Kb is passed to that callback.

Fix this by setting the bit BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC whenever an extent
map is removed at try_release_extent_mapping(), forcing the next fsync to
search for modified extents in the fs/subvolume tree instead of relying on
the presence of extent maps in memory. This way we can continue doing a
"fast" fsync if the destination range of a clone operation does not
overlap with an existing range or if any of the criteria necessary to
remove an extent map at try_release_extent_mapping() is not met (file
size not bigger then 16Mb or gfp flags do not allow blocking).

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.16+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoi2c: imx: Fix reinit_completion() use
Esben Haabendal [Mon, 9 Jul 2018 09:43:01 +0000 (11:43 +0200)]
i2c: imx: Fix reinit_completion() use

commit 9f9e3e0d4dd3338b3f3dde080789f71901e1e4ff upstream.

Make sure to call reinit_completion() before dma is started to avoid race
condition where reinit_completion() is called after complete() and before
wait_for_completion_timeout().

Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <eha@deif.com>
Fixes: ce1a78840ff7 ("i2c: imx: add DMA support for freescale i2c driver")
Reviewed-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoring_buffer: tracing: Inherit the tracing setting to next ring buffer
Masami Hiramatsu [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 16:28:15 +0000 (01:28 +0900)]
ring_buffer: tracing: Inherit the tracing setting to next ring buffer

commit 73c8d8945505acdcbae137c2e00a1232e0be709f upstream.

Maintain the tracing on/off setting of the ring_buffer when switching
to the trace buffer snapshot.

Taking a snapshot is done by swapping the backup ring buffer
(max_tr_buffer). But since the tracing on/off setting is defined
by the ring buffer, when swapping it, the tracing on/off setting
can also be changed. This causes a strange result like below:

  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  1
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 0 > tracing_on
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  0
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 1 > snapshot
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  1
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # echo 1 > snapshot
  /sys/kernel/debug/tracing # cat tracing_on
  0

We don't touch tracing_on, but snapshot changes tracing_on
setting each time. This is an anomaly, because user doesn't know
that each "ring_buffer" stores its own tracing-enable state and
the snapshot is done by swapping ring buffers.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153149929558.11274.11730609978254724394.stgit@devbox
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hiraku Toyooka <hiraku.toyooka@cybertrust.co.jp>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: debdd57f5145 ("tracing: Make a snapshot feature available from userspace")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
[ Updated commit log and comment in the code ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoACPI / PCI: Bail early in acpi_pci_add_bus() if there is no ACPI handle
Vitaly Kuznetsov [Thu, 14 Sep 2017 14:50:14 +0000 (16:50 +0200)]
ACPI / PCI: Bail early in acpi_pci_add_bus() if there is no ACPI handle

commit a0040c0145945d3bd203df8fa97f6dfa819f3f7d upstream.

Hyper-V instances support PCI pass-through which is implemented through PV
pci-hyperv driver. When a device is passed through, a new root PCI bus is
created in the guest. The bus sits on top of VMBus and has no associated
information in ACPI. acpi_pci_add_bus() in this case proceeds all the way
to acpi_evaluate_dsm(), which reports

  ACPI: \: failed to evaluate _DSM (0x1001)

While acpi_pci_slot_enumerate() and acpiphp_enumerate_slots() are protected
against ACPI_HANDLE() being NULL and do nothing, acpi_evaluate_dsm() is not
and gives us the error. It seems the correct fix is to not do anything in
acpi_pci_add_bus() in such cases.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoext4: fix false negatives *and* false positives in ext4_check_descriptors()
Theodore Ts'o [Sun, 8 Jul 2018 23:35:02 +0000 (19:35 -0400)]
ext4: fix false negatives *and* false positives in ext4_check_descriptors()

commit 44de022c4382541cebdd6de4465d1f4f465ff1dd upstream.

Ext4_check_descriptors() was getting called before s_gdb_count was
initialized.  So for file systems w/o the meta_bg feature, allocation
bitmaps could overlap the block group descriptors and ext4 wouldn't
notice.

For file systems with the meta_bg feature enabled, there was a
fencepost error which would cause the ext4_check_descriptors() to
incorrectly believe that the block allocation bitmap overlaps with the
block group descriptor blocks, and it would reject the mount.

Fix both of these problems.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gilbert <bgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonetlink: Don't shift on 64 for ngroups
Dmitry Safonov [Sun, 5 Aug 2018 00:35:53 +0000 (01:35 +0100)]
netlink: Don't shift on 64 for ngroups

commit 91874ecf32e41b5d86a4cb9d60e0bee50d828058 upstream.

It's legal to have 64 groups for netlink_sock.

As user-supplied nladdr->nl_groups is __u32, it's possible to subscribe
only to first 32 groups.

The check for correctness of .bind() userspace supplied parameter
is done by applying mask made from ngroups shift. Which broke Android
as they have 64 groups and the shift for mask resulted in an overflow.

Fixes: 61f4b23769f0 ("netlink: Don't shift with UB on nlk->ngroups")
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonohz: Fix missing tick reprogram when interrupting an inline softirq
Frederic Weisbecker [Fri, 3 Aug 2018 13:31:34 +0000 (15:31 +0200)]
nohz: Fix missing tick reprogram when interrupting an inline softirq

commit 0a0e0829f990120cef165bbb804237f400953ec2 upstream.

The full nohz tick is reprogrammed in irq_exit() only if the exit is not in
a nesting interrupt. This stands as an optimization: whether a hardirq or a
softirq is interrupted, the tick is going to be reprogrammed when necessary
at the end of the inner interrupt, with even potential new updates on the
timer queue.

When soft interrupts are interrupted, it's assumed that they are executing
on the tail of an interrupt return. In that case tick_nohz_irq_exit() is
called after softirq processing to take care of the tick reprogramming.

But the assumption is wrong: softirqs can be processed inline as well, ie:
outside of an interrupt, like in a call to local_bh_enable() or from
ksoftirqd.

Inline softirqs don't reprogram the tick once they are done, as opposed to
interrupt tail softirq processing. So if a tick interrupts an inline
softirq processing, the next timer will neither be reprogrammed from the
interrupting tick's irq_exit() nor after the interrupted softirq
processing. This situation may leave the tick unprogrammed while timers are
armed.

To fix this, simply keep reprogramming the tick even if a softirq has been
interrupted. That can be optimized further, but for now correctness is more
important.

Note that new timers enqueued in nohz_full mode after a softirq gets
interrupted will still be handled just fine through self-IPIs triggered by
the timer code.

Reported-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533303094-15855-1-git-send-email-frederic@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonohz: Fix local_timer_softirq_pending()
Anna-Maria Gleixner [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 16:13:58 +0000 (18:13 +0200)]
nohz: Fix local_timer_softirq_pending()

commit 80d20d35af1edd632a5e7a3b9c0ab7ceff92769e upstream.

local_timer_softirq_pending() checks whether the timer softirq is
pending with: local_softirq_pending() & TIMER_SOFTIRQ.

This is wrong because TIMER_SOFTIRQ is the softirq number and not a
bitmask. So the test checks for the wrong bit.

Use BIT(TIMER_SOFTIRQ) instead.

Fixes: 5d62c183f9e9 ("nohz: Prevent a timer interrupt storm in tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick()")
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731161358.29472-1-anna-maria@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agogenirq: Make force irq threading setup more robust
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 3 Aug 2018 12:44:59 +0000 (14:44 +0200)]
genirq: Make force irq threading setup more robust

commit d1f0301b3333eef5efbfa1fe0f0edbea01863d5d upstream.

The support of force threading interrupts which are set up with both a
primary and a threaded handler wreckaged the setup of regular requested
threaded interrupts (primary handler == NULL).

The reason is that it does not check whether the primary handler is set to
the default handler which wakes the handler thread. Instead it replaces the
thread handler with the primary handler as it would do with force threaded
interrupts which have been requested via request_irq(). So both the primary
and the thread handler become the same which then triggers the warnon that
the thread handler tries to wakeup a not configured secondary thread.

Fortunately this only happens when the driver omits the IRQF_ONESHOT flag
when requesting the threaded interrupt, which is normaly caught by the
sanity checks when force irq threading is disabled.

Fix it by skipping the force threading setup when a regular threaded
interrupt is requested. As a consequence the interrupt request which lacks
the IRQ_ONESHOT flag is rejected correctly instead of silently wreckaging
it.

Fixes: 2a1d3ab8986d ("genirq: Handle force threading of irqs with primary and thread handler")
Reported-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt.kanzenbach@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt.kanzenbach@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: qla2xxx: Return error when TMF returns
Anil Gurumurthy [Wed, 18 Jul 2018 21:29:55 +0000 (14:29 -0700)]
scsi: qla2xxx: Return error when TMF returns

commit b4146c4929ef61d5afca011474d59d0918a0cd82 upstream.

Propagate the task management completion status properly to avoid
unnecessary waits for commands to complete.

Fixes: faef62d13463 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Fix Task Management command asynchronous handling")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anil Gurumurthy <anil.gurumurthy@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: qla2xxx: Fix ISP recovery on unload
Quinn Tran [Wed, 18 Jul 2018 21:29:54 +0000 (14:29 -0700)]
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix ISP recovery on unload

commit b08abbd9f5996309f021684f9ca74da30dcca36a upstream.

During unload process, the chip can encounter problem where a FW dump would
be captured. For this case, the full reset sequence will be skip to bring
the chip back to full operational state.

Fixes: e315cd28b9ef ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Code changes for qla data structure refactoring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: qla2xxx: Fix NPIV deletion by calling wait_for_sess_deletion
Quinn Tran [Wed, 18 Jul 2018 21:29:52 +0000 (14:29 -0700)]
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix NPIV deletion by calling wait_for_sess_deletion

commit efa93f48fa9d423fda166bc3b6c0cbb09682492e upstream.

Add wait for session deletion to finish before freeing an NPIV scsi host.

Fixes: 726b85487067 ("qla2xxx: Add framework for async fabric discovery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoscsi: qla2xxx: Fix unintialized List head crash
Quinn Tran [Wed, 18 Jul 2018 21:29:51 +0000 (14:29 -0700)]
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix unintialized List head crash

commit e3dde080ebbdbb4bda8eee35d770714fee8c59ac upstream.

In case of IOCB Queue full or system where memory is low and driver
receives large number of RSCN storm, the stale sp pointer can stay on
gpnid_list resulting in page_fault.

This patch fixes this issue by initializing the sp->elem list head and
removing sp->elem before memory is freed.

Following stack trace is seen

 9 [ffff987b37d1bc60] page_fault at ffffffffad516768 [exception RIP: qla24xx_async_gpnid+496]
10 [ffff987b37d1bd10] qla24xx_async_gpnid at ffffffffc039866d [qla2xxx]
11 [ffff987b37d1bd80] qla2x00_do_work at ffffffffc036169c [qla2xxx]
12 [ffff987b37d1be38] qla2x00_do_dpc_all_vps at ffffffffc03adfed [qla2xxx]
13 [ffff987b37d1be78] qla2x00_do_dpc at ffffffffc036458a [qla2xxx]
14 [ffff987b37d1bec8] kthread at ffffffffacebae31

Fixes: 2d73ac6102d9 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Serialize GPNID for multiple RSCN")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoLinux 4.14.61 v4.14.61
Greg Kroah-Hartman [Mon, 6 Aug 2018 14:20:52 +0000 (16:20 +0200)]
Linux 4.14.61

6 years agoscsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error path
Tony Battersby [Thu, 12 Jul 2018 20:30:45 +0000 (16:30 -0400)]
scsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error path

commit c170e5a8d222537e98aa8d4fddb667ff7a2ee114 upstream.

Fix a minor memory leak when there is an error opening a /dev/sg device.

Fixes: cc833acbee9d ("sg: O_EXCL and other lock handling")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agodrm/vc4: Reset ->{x, y}_scaling[1] when dealing with uniplanar formats
Boris Brezillon [Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:36:01 +0000 (15:36 +0200)]
drm/vc4: Reset ->{x, y}_scaling[1] when dealing with uniplanar formats

commit a6a00918d4ad8718c3ccde38c02cec17f116b2fd upstream.

This is needed to ensure ->is_unity is correct when the plane was
previously configured to output a multi-planar format with scaling
enabled, and is then being reconfigured to output a uniplanar format.

Fixes: fc04023fafec ("drm/vc4: Add support for YUV planes.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180724133601.32114-1-boris.brezillon@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agocrypto: padlock-aes - Fix Nano workaround data corruption
Herbert Xu [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 08:12:32 +0000 (16:12 +0800)]
crypto: padlock-aes - Fix Nano workaround data corruption

commit 46d8c4b28652d35dc6cfb5adf7f54e102fc04384 upstream.

This was detected by the self-test thanks to Ard's chunking patch.

I finally got around to testing this out on my ancient Via box.  It
turns out that the workaround got the assembly wrong and we end up
doing count + initial cycles of the loop instead of just count.

This obviously causes corruption, either by overwriting the source
that is yet to be processed, or writing over the end of the buffer.

On CPUs that don't require the workaround only ECB is affected.
On Nano CPUs both ECB and CBC are affected.

This patch fixes it by doing the subtraction prior to the assembly.

Fixes: a76c1c23d0c3 ("crypto: padlock-aes - work around Nano CPU...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Jamie Heilman <jamie@audible.transient.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoRDMA/uverbs: Expand primary and alt AV port checks
Jack Morgenstein [Wed, 11 Jul 2018 08:23:52 +0000 (11:23 +0300)]
RDMA/uverbs: Expand primary and alt AV port checks

commit addb8a6559f0f8b5a37582b7ca698358445a55bf upstream.

The commit cited below checked that the port numbers provided in the
primary and alt AVs are legal.

That is sufficient to prevent a kernel panic. However, it is not
sufficient for correct operation.

In Linux, AVs (both primary and alt) must be completely self-described.
We do not accept an AV from userspace without an embedded port number.
(This has been the case since kernel 3.14 commit dbf727de7440
("IB/core: Use GID table in AH creation and dmac resolution")).

For the primary AV, this embedded port number must match the port number
specified with IB_QP_PORT.

We also expect the port number embedded in the alt AV to match the
alt_port_num value passed by the userspace driver in the modify_qp command
base structure.

Add these checks to modify_qp.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.16
Fixes: 5d4c05c3ee36 ("RDMA/uverbs: Sanitize user entered port numbers prior to access it")
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoiwlwifi: add more card IDs for 9000 series
Emmanuel Grumbach [Tue, 17 Jul 2018 10:43:56 +0000 (13:43 +0300)]
iwlwifi: add more card IDs for 9000 series

commit 0a5257bc6d89c2ae69b9bf955679cb4f89261874 upstream.

Add new device IDs for the 9000 series.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agouserfaultfd: remove uffd flags from vma->vm_flags if UFFD_EVENT_FORK fails
Mike Rapoport [Thu, 2 Aug 2018 22:36:09 +0000 (15:36 -0700)]
userfaultfd: remove uffd flags from vma->vm_flags if UFFD_EVENT_FORK fails

commit 31e810aa1033a7db50a2746cd34a2432237f6420 upstream.

The fix in commit 0cbb4b4f4c44 ("userfaultfd: clear the
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx if UFFD_EVENT_FORK fails") cleared the
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx but kept userfaultfd flags in vma->vm_flags
that were copied from the parent process VMA.

As the result, there is an inconsistency between the values of
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx and vma->vm_flags which triggers BUG_ON
in userfaultfd_release().

Clearing the uffd flags from vma->vm_flags in case of UFFD_EVENT_FORK
failure resolves the issue.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532931975-25473-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Fixes: 0cbb4b4f4c44 ("userfaultfd: clear the vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx if UFFD_EVENT_FORK fails")
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+121be635a7a35ddb7dcb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoaudit: fix potential null dereference 'context->module.name'
Yi Wang [Wed, 25 Jul 2018 02:26:19 +0000 (10:26 +0800)]
audit: fix potential null dereference 'context->module.name'

commit b305f7ed0f4f494ad6f3ef5667501535d5a8fa31 upstream.

The variable 'context->module.name' may be null pointer when
kmalloc return null, so it's better to check it before using
to avoid null dereference.
Another one more thing this patch does is using kstrdup instead
of (kmalloc + strcpy), and signal a lost record via audit_log_lost.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agokvm: x86: vmx: fix vpid leak
Roman Kagan [Thu, 19 Jul 2018 18:59:07 +0000 (21:59 +0300)]
kvm: x86: vmx: fix vpid leak

commit 63aff65573d73eb8dda4732ad4ef222dd35e4862 upstream.

VPID for the nested vcpu is allocated at vmx_create_vcpu whenever nested
vmx is turned on with the module parameter.

However, it's only freed if the L1 guest has executed VMXON which is not
a given.

As a result, on a system with nested==on every creation+deletion of an
L1 vcpu without running an L2 guest results in leaking one vpid.  Since
the total number of vpids is limited to 64k, they can eventually get
exhausted, preventing L2 from starting.

Delay allocation of the L2 vpid until VMXON emulation, thus matching its
freeing.

Fixes: 5c614b3583e7b6dab0c86356fa36c2bcbb8322a0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit
Andy Lutomirski [Sun, 22 Jul 2018 18:05:09 +0000 (11:05 -0700)]
x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit

commit b3681dd548d06deb2e1573890829dff4b15abf46 upstream.

error_entry and error_exit communicate the user vs. kernel status of
the frame using %ebx.  This is unnecessary -- the information is in
regs->cs.  Just use regs->cs.

This makes error_entry simpler and makes error_exit more robust.

It also fixes a nasty bug.  Before all the Spectre nonsense, the
xen_failsafe_callback entry point returned like this:

        ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
        SAVE_C_REGS
        SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
        ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
        jmp     error_exit

And it did not go through error_entry.  This was bogus: RBX
contained garbage, and error_exit expected a flag in RBX.

Fortunately, it generally contained *nonzero* garbage, so the
correct code path was used.  As part of the Spectre fixes, code was
added to clear RBX to mitigate certain speculation attacks.  Now,
depending on kernel configuration, RBX got zeroed and, when running
some Wine workloads, the kernel crashes.  This was introduced by:

    commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")

With this patch applied, RBX is no longer needed as a flag, and the
problem goes away.

I suspect that malicious userspace could use this bug to crash the
kernel even without the offending patch applied, though.

[ Historical note: I wrote this patch as a cleanup before I was aware
  of the bug it fixed. ]

[ Note to stable maintainers: this should probably get applied to all
  kernels.  If you're nervous about that, a more conservative fix to
  add xorl %ebx,%ebx; incl %ebx before the jump to error_exit should
  also fix the problem. ]

Reported-and-tested-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Fixes: 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5010a090d3586b2d6e06c7ad3ec5542d1241c45.1532282627.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agox86/apic: Future-proof the TSC_DEADLINE quirk for SKX
Len Brown [Sat, 21 Jul 2018 21:19:19 +0000 (17:19 -0400)]
x86/apic: Future-proof the TSC_DEADLINE quirk for SKX

commit d9e6dbcf28f383bf08e6a3180972f5722e514a54 upstream.

All SKX with stepping higher than 4 support the TSC_DEADLINE,
no matter the microcode version.

Without this patch, upcoming SKX steppings will not be able to use
their TSC_DEADLINE timer.

Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # v4.14+
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 616dd5872e ("x86/apic: Update TSC_DEADLINE quirk with additional SKX stepping")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d0c7129e509660be9ec6b233284b8d42d90659e8.1532207856.git.len.brown@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agovirtio_balloon: fix another race between migration and ballooning
Jiang Biao [Wed, 18 Jul 2018 02:29:28 +0000 (10:29 +0800)]
virtio_balloon: fix another race between migration and ballooning

commit 89da619bc18d79bca5304724c11d4ba3b67ce2c6 upstream.

Kernel panic when with high memory pressure, calltrace looks like,

PID: 21439 TASK: ffff881be3afedd0 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "java"
 #0 [ffff881ec7ed7630] machine_kexec at ffffffff81059beb
 #1 [ffff881ec7ed7690] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81105942
 #2 [ffff881ec7ed7760] crash_kexec at ffffffff81105a30
 #3 [ffff881ec7ed7778] oops_end at ffffffff816902c8
 #4 [ffff881ec7ed77a0] no_context at ffffffff8167ff46
 #5 [ffff881ec7ed77f0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167ffdc
 #6 [ffff881ec7ed7838] __node_set at ffffffff81680300
 #7 [ffff881ec7ed7860] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8169320f
 #8 [ffff881ec7ed78c0] do_page_fault at ffffffff816932b5
 #9 [ffff881ec7ed78f0] page_fault at ffffffff8168f4c8
    [exception RIP: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+47]
    RIP: ffffffff8168edef RSP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 RFLAGS: 00010046
    RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffffea0019740d00 RCX: ffff881ec7ed7fd8
    RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 0000000000000016 RDI: 0000000000000008
    RBP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 R8: 0000000000000246 R9: 000000000001a098
    R10: ffff88107ffda000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff881ec7ed7a80 R15: ffff881be3afedd0
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018

It happens in the pagefault and results in double pagefault
during compacting pages when memory allocation fails.

Analysed the vmcore, the page leads to second pagefault is corrupted
with _mapcount=-256, but private=0.

It's caused by the race between migration and ballooning, and lock
missing in virtballoon_migratepage() of virtio_balloon driver.
This patch fix the bug.

Fixes: e22504296d4f64f ("virtio_balloon: introduce migration primitives to balloon pages")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huang Chong <huang.chong@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonet: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall
Jeremy Cline [Fri, 27 Jul 2018 22:43:01 +0000 (22:43 +0000)]
net: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall

commit c8e8cd579bb4265651df8223730105341e61a2d1 upstream.

'call' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize the array index after the
bounds check to avoid speculating past the bounds of the 'nargs' array.

Found with the help of Smatch:

net/socket.c:2508 __do_sys_socketcall() warn: potential spectre issue
'nargs' [r] (local cap)

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agocan: ems_usb: Fix memory leak on ems_usb_disconnect()
Anton Vasilyev [Fri, 27 Jul 2018 15:50:42 +0000 (18:50 +0300)]
can: ems_usb: Fix memory leak on ems_usb_disconnect()

commit 72c05f32f4a5055c9c8fe889bb6903ec959c0aad upstream.

ems_usb_probe() allocates memory for dev->tx_msg_buffer, but there
is no its deallocation in ems_usb_disconnect().

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Anton Vasilyev <vasilyev@ispras.ru>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agosquashfs: more metadata hardenings
Linus Torvalds [Thu, 2 Aug 2018 15:43:35 +0000 (08:43 -0700)]
squashfs: more metadata hardenings

commit 71755ee5350b63fb1f283de8561cdb61b47f4d1d upstream.

The squashfs fragment reading code doesn't actually verify that the
fragment is inside the fragment table.  The end result _is_ verified to
be inside the image when actually reading the fragment data, but before
that is done, we may end up taking a page fault because the fragment
table itself might not even exist.

Another report from Anatoly and his endless squashfs image fuzzing.

Reported-by: Анатолий Тросиненко <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Acked-by:: Phillip Lougher <phillip.lougher@gmail.com>,
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agosquashfs: more metadata hardening
Linus Torvalds [Mon, 30 Jul 2018 21:27:15 +0000 (14:27 -0700)]
squashfs: more metadata hardening

commit d512584780d3e6a7cacb2f482834849453d444a1 upstream.

Anatoly reports another squashfs fuzzing issue, where the decompression
parameters themselves are in a compressed block.

This causes squashfs_read_data() to be called in order to read the
decompression options before the decompression stream having been set
up, making squashfs go sideways.

Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip.lougher@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonet/mlx5e: E-Switch, Initialize eswitch only if eswitch manager
Eli Cohen [Mon, 16 Jul 2018 08:49:27 +0000 (11:49 +0300)]
net/mlx5e: E-Switch, Initialize eswitch only if eswitch manager

[ Upstream commit 5f5991f36dce1e69dd8bd7495763eec2e28f08e7 ]

Execute mlx5_eswitch_init() only if we have MLX5_ESWITCH_MANAGER
capabilities.
Do the same for mlx5_eswitch_cleanup().

Fixes: a9f7705ffd66 ("net/mlx5: Unify vport manager capability check")
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agorxrpc: Fix user call ID check in rxrpc_service_prealloc_one
YueHaibing [Wed, 1 Aug 2018 12:27:23 +0000 (13:27 +0100)]
rxrpc: Fix user call ID check in rxrpc_service_prealloc_one

[ Upstream commit c01f6c9b3207e52fc9973a066a856ddf7a0538d8 ]

There just check the user call ID isn't already in use, hence should
compare user_call_ID with xcall->user_call_ID, which is current
node's user_call_ID.

Fixes: 540b1c48c37a ("rxrpc: Fix deadlock between call creation and sendmsg/recvmsg")
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonet: stmmac: Fix WoL for PCI-based setups
Jose Abreu [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 14:08:20 +0000 (15:08 +0100)]
net: stmmac: Fix WoL for PCI-based setups

[ Upstream commit b7d0f08e9129c45ed41bc0cfa8e77067881e45fd ]

WoL won't work in PCI-based setups because we are not saving the PCI EP
state before entering suspend state and not allowing D3 wake.

Fix this by using a wrapper around stmmac_{suspend/resume} which
correctly sets the PCI EP state.

Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <joabreu@synopsys.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Joao Pinto <jpinto@synopsys.com>
Cc: Giuseppe Cavallaro <peppe.cavallaro@st.com>
Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@st.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonetlink: Fix spectre v1 gadget in netlink_create()
Jeremy Cline [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 21:13:16 +0000 (21:13 +0000)]
netlink: Fix spectre v1 gadget in netlink_create()

[ Upstream commit bc5b6c0b62b932626a135f516a41838c510c6eba ]

'protocol' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize it after the bounds
check to avoid using it for speculative out-of-bounds access to arrays
indexed by it.

This addresses the following accesses detected with the help of smatch:

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:654 __netlink_create() warn: potential
  spectre issue 'nlk_cb_mutex_keys' [w]

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:654 __netlink_create() warn: potential
  spectre issue 'nlk_cb_mutex_key_strings' [w]

* net/netlink/af_netlink.c:685 netlink_create() warn: potential spectre
  issue 'nl_table' [w] (local cap)

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agonet: dsa: Do not suspend/resume closed slave_dev
Florian Fainelli [Wed, 1 Aug 2018 00:12:52 +0000 (17:12 -0700)]
net: dsa: Do not suspend/resume closed slave_dev

[ Upstream commit a94c689e6c9e72e722f28339e12dff191ee5a265 ]

If a DSA slave network device was previously disabled, there is no need
to suspend or resume it.

Fixes: 2446254915a7 ("net: dsa: allow switch drivers to implement suspend/resume hooks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoipv4: frags: handle possible skb truesize change
Eric Dumazet [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 04:50:29 +0000 (21:50 -0700)]
ipv4: frags: handle possible skb truesize change

[ Upstream commit 4672694bd4f1aebdab0ad763ae4716e89cb15221 ]

ip_frag_queue() might call pskb_pull() on one skb that
is already in the fragment queue.

We need to take care of possible truesize change, or we
might have an imbalance of the netns frags memory usage.

IPv6 is immune to this bug, because RFC5722, Section 4,
amended by Errata ID 3089 states :

  When reassembling an IPv6 datagram, if
  one or more its constituent fragments is determined to be an
  overlapping fragment, the entire datagram (and any constituent
  fragments) MUST be silently discarded.

Fixes: 158f323b9868 ("net: adjust skb->truesize in pskb_expand_head()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoinet: frag: enforce memory limits earlier
Eric Dumazet [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 03:09:11 +0000 (20:09 -0700)]
inet: frag: enforce memory limits earlier

[ Upstream commit 56e2c94f055d328f5f6b0a5c1721cca2f2d4e0a1 ]

We currently check current frags memory usage only when
a new frag queue is created. This allows attackers to first
consume the memory budget (default : 4 MB) creating thousands
of frag queues, then sending tiny skbs to exceed high_thresh
limit by 2 to 3 order of magnitude.

Note that before commit 648700f76b03 ("inet: frags: use rhashtables
for reassembly units"), work queue could be starved under DOS,
getting no cpu cycles.
After commit 648700f76b03, only the per frag queue timer can eventually
remove an incomplete frag queue and its skbs.

Fixes: b13d3cbfb8e8 ("inet: frag: move eviction of queues to work queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agobonding: avoid lockdep confusion in bond_get_stats()
Eric Dumazet [Tue, 31 Jul 2018 13:30:54 +0000 (06:30 -0700)]
bonding: avoid lockdep confusion in bond_get_stats()

[ Upstream commit 7e2556e40026a1b0c16f37446ab398d5a5a892e4 ]

syzbot found that the following sequence produces a LOCKDEP splat [1]

ip link add bond10 type bond
ip link add bond11 type bond
ip link set bond11 master bond10

To fix this, we can use the already provided nest_level.

This patch also provides correct nesting for dev->addr_list_lock

[1]
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
4.18.0-rc6+ #167 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor751/4439 is trying to acquire lock:
(____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline]
(____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426

but task is already holding lock:
(____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline]
(____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock);
  lock(&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by syz-executor751/4439:
 #0: (____ptrval____) (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:77
 #1: (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline]
 #1: (____ptrval____) (&(&bond->stats_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426
 #2: (____ptrval____) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: bond_get_stats+0x0/0x560 include/linux/compiler.h:215

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 4439 Comm: syz-executor751 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc6+ #167
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1765 [inline]
 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1809 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2405 [inline]
 __lock_acquire.cold.64+0x1fb/0x486 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3435
 lock_acquire+0x1e4/0x540 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3924
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:144
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:310 [inline]
 bond_get_stats+0xb4/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3426
 dev_get_stats+0x10f/0x470 net/core/dev.c:8316
 bond_get_stats+0x232/0x560 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3432
 dev_get_stats+0x10f/0x470 net/core/dev.c:8316
 rtnl_fill_stats+0x4d/0xac0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1169
 rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x1aa6/0x3fb0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1611
 rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0xc8/0x190 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3268
 rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.30+0x45/0xe0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3300
 rtmsg_ifinfo_event net/core/rtnetlink.c:3297 [inline]
 rtnetlink_event+0x144/0x170 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4716
 notifier_call_chain+0x180/0x390 kernel/notifier.c:93
 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline]
 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1735
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1753 [inline]
 netdev_features_change net/core/dev.c:1321 [inline]
 netdev_change_features+0xb3/0x110 net/core/dev.c:7759
 bond_compute_features.isra.47+0x585/0xa50 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1120
 bond_enslave+0x1b25/0x5da0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1755
 bond_do_ioctl+0x7cb/0xae0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3528
 dev_ifsioc+0x43c/0xb30 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:327
 dev_ioctl+0x1b5/0xcc0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:493
 sock_do_ioctl+0x1d3/0x3e0 net/socket.c:992
 sock_ioctl+0x30d/0x680 net/socket.c:1093
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
 file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:500 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x1720 fs/ioctl.c:684
 ksys_ioctl+0xa9/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:701
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:708 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:706 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:706
 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440859
Code: e8 2c af 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b 10 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffc51a92878 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000440859
RDX: 0000000020000040 RSI: 0000000000008990 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000022d5880 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000007390
R13: 0000000000401db0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agoLinux 4.14.60 v4.14.60
Greg Kroah-Hartman [Fri, 3 Aug 2018 05:50:45 +0000 (07:50 +0200)]
Linux 4.14.60

6 years agotcp: add one more quick ack after after ECN events
Eric Dumazet [Wed, 27 Jun 2018 15:47:21 +0000 (08:47 -0700)]
tcp: add one more quick ack after after ECN events

[ Upstream commit 15ecbe94a45ef88491ca459b26efdd02f91edb6d ]

Larry Brakmo proposal ( https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/935233/
tcp: force cwnd at least 2 in tcp_cwnd_reduction) made us rethink
about our recent patch removing ~16 quick acks after ECN events.

tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk, 1) makes sure one immediate ack is sent,
but in the case the sender cwnd was lowered to 1, we do not want
to have a delayed ack for the next packet we will receive.

Fixes: 522040ea5fdd ("tcp: do not aggressively quick ack after ECN events")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agotcp: refactor tcp_ecn_check_ce to remove sk type cast
Yousuk Seung [Mon, 4 Jun 2018 22:29:51 +0000 (15:29 -0700)]
tcp: refactor tcp_ecn_check_ce to remove sk type cast

[ Upstream commit f4c9f85f3b2cb7669830cd04d0be61192a4d2436 ]

Refactor tcp_ecn_check_ce and __tcp_ecn_check_ce to accept struct sock*
instead of tcp_sock* to clean up type casts. This is a pure refactor
patch.

Signed-off-by: Yousuk Seung <ysseung@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agotcp: do not aggressively quick ack after ECN events
Eric Dumazet [Mon, 21 May 2018 22:08:57 +0000 (15:08 -0700)]
tcp: do not aggressively quick ack after ECN events

[ Upstream commit 522040ea5fdd1c33bbf75e1d7c7c0422b96a94ef ]

ECN signals currently forces TCP to enter quickack mode for
up to 16 (TCP_MAX_QUICKACKS) following incoming packets.

We believe this is not needed, and only sending one immediate ack
for the current packet should be enough.

This should reduce the extra load noticed in DCTCP environments,
after congestion events.

This is part 2 of our effort to reduce pure ACK packets.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agotcp: add max_quickacks param to tcp_incr_quickack and tcp_enter_quickack_mode
Eric Dumazet [Mon, 21 May 2018 22:08:56 +0000 (15:08 -0700)]
tcp: add max_quickacks param to tcp_incr_quickack and tcp_enter_quickack_mode

[ Upstream commit 9a9c9b51e54618861420093ae6e9b50a961914c5 ]

We want to add finer control of the number of ACK packets sent after
ECN events.

This patch is not changing current behavior, it only enables following
change.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
6 years agotcp: do not force quickack when receiving out-of-order packets
Eric Dumazet [Thu, 17 May 2018 21:47:25 +0000 (14:47 -0700)]
tcp: do not force quickack when receiving out-of-order packets

[ Upstream commit a3893637e1eb0ef5eb1bbc52b3a8d2dfa317a35d ]

As explained in commit 9f9843a751d0 ("tcp: properly handle stretch
acks in slow start"), TCP stacks have to consider how many packets
are acknowledged in one single ACK, because of GRO, but also
because of ACK compression or losses.

We plan to add SACK compression in the following patch, we
must therefore not call tcp_enter_quickack_mode()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>