staging: vchiq_arm: fix compat VCHIQ_IOC_AWAIT_COMPLETION

commit 5a96b2d38dc054c0bbcbcd585b116566cbd877fe upstream.

The compatibility ioctl wrapper for VCHIQ_IOC_AWAIT_COMPLETION assumes that
the native ioctl always uses a message buffer and decrements msgbufcount.
Certain message types do not use a message buffer and in this case
msgbufcount is not decremented, and completion->header for the message is
NULL. Because the wrapper unconditionally decrements msgbufcount, the
calling process may assume that a message buffer has been used even when
it has not.

This results in a memory leak in the userspace code that interfaces with
this driver. When msgbufcount is decremented, the userspace code assumes
that the buffer can be freed though the reference in completion->header,
which cannot happen when the reference is NULL.

This patch causes the wrapper to only decrement msgbufcount when the
native ioctl decrements it. Note that we cannot simply copy the native
ioctl's value of msgbufcount, because the wrapper only retrieves messages
from the native ioctl one at a time, while userspace may request multiple
messages.

See https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/pull/2703 for more discussion of
this patch.

Fixes: 5569a1260933 ("staging: vchiq_arm: Add compatibility wrappers for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Ben Wolsieffer <benwolsieffer@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

btrfs: release metadata before running delayed refs

We want to release the unused reservation we have since it refills the
delayed refs reserve, which will make everything go smoother when
running the delayed refs if we're short on our reservation.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix module unloading

commit 77e75fda94d2ebb86aa9d35fb1860f6395bf95de upstream.

of_dma_controller_free() was not called on module onloading.
This lead to a soft lockup:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s!
Modules linked in: at_hdmac [last unloaded: at_hdmac]
when of_dma_request_slave_channel() tried to call ofdma->of_dma_xlate().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding")
Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix memory leak in at_dma_xlate()

commit 98f5f932254b88ce828bc8e4d1642d14e5854caa upstream.

The leak was found when opening/closing a serial port a great number of
time, increasing kmalloc-32 in slabinfo.

Each time the port was opened, dma_request_slave_channel() was called.
Then, in at_dma_xlate(), atslave was allocated with devm_kzalloc() and
never freed. (Well, it was free at module unload, but that's not what we
want).
So, here, kzalloc is more suited for the job since it has to be freed in
atc_free_chan_resources().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding")
Reported-by: Mario Forner <m.forner@be4energy.com>
Suggested-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ARM: dts: rockchip: Remove @0 from the veyron memory node

commit 672e60b72bbe7aace88721db55b380b6a51fb8f9 upstream.

The Coreboot version on veyron ChromeOS devices seems to ignore
memory@0 nodes when updating the available memory and instead
inserts another memory node without the address.

This leads to 4GB systems only ever be using 2GB as the memory@0
node takes precedence. So remove the @0 for veyron devices.

Fixes: 0b639b815f15 ("ARM: dts: rockchip: Add missing unit name to memory nodes in rk3288 boards")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Heikki Lindholm <holin@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ext2: fix potential use after free

commit ecebf55d27a11538ea84aee0be643dd953f830d5 upstream.

The function ext2_xattr_set calls brelse(bh) to drop the reference count
of bh. After that, bh may be freed. However, following brelse(bh),
it reads bh->b_data via macro HDR(bh). This may result in a
use-after-free bug. This patch moves brelse(bh) after reading field.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ALSA: hda/realtek - fix headset mic detection for MSI MS-B171

commit 8cd65271f8e545ddeed10ecc2e417936bdff168e upstream.

MSI Cubi N 8GL (MS-B171) needs the same fixup as its older model, the
MS-B120, in order for the headset mic to be properly detected.

They both use a single 3-way jack for both mic and headset with an
ALC283 codec, with the same pins used.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anisse Astier <anisse@astier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ALSA: hda/realtek - Support ALC300

commit 1078bef0cd9291355a20369b21cd823026ab8eaa upstream.

This patch will enable ALC300.

[ It's almost equivalent with other ALC269-compatible ones, and
  apparently has no loopback mixer -- tiwai ]

Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang <kailang@realtek.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ALSA: sparc: Fix invalid snd_free_pages() at error path

commit 9a20332ab373b1f8f947e0a9c923652b32dab031 upstream.

Some spurious calls of snd_free_pages() have been overlooked and
remain in the error paths of sparc cs4231 driver code.  Since
runtime->dma_area is managed by the PCM core helper, we shouldn't
release manually.

Drop the superfluous calls.

Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ALSA: control: Fix race between adding and removing a user element

commit e1a7bfe3807974e66f971f2589d4e0197ec0fced upstream.

The procedure for adding a user control element has some window opened
for race against the concurrent removal of a user element.  This was
caught by syzkaller, hitting a KASAN use-after-free error.

This patch addresses the bug by wrapping the whole procedure to add a
user control element with the card->controls_rwsem, instead of only
around the increment of card->user_ctl_count.

This required a slight code refactoring, too.  The function
snd_ctl_add() is split to two parts: a core function to add the
control element and a part calling it.  The former is called from the
function for adding a user control element inside the controls_rwsem.

One change to be noted is that snd_ctl_notify() for adding a control
element gets called inside the controls_rwsem as well while it was
called outside the rwsem.  But this should be OK, as snd_ctl_notify()
takes another (finer) rwlock instead of rwsem, and the call of
snd_ctl_notify() inside rwsem is already done in another code path.

Reported-by: syzbot+dc09047bce3820621ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ALSA: ac97: Fix incorrect bit shift at AC97-SPSA control write

commit 7194eda1ba0872d917faf3b322540b4f57f11ba5 upstream.

The function snd_ac97_put_spsa() gets the bit shift value from the
associated private_value, but it extracts too much; the current code
extracts 8 bit values in bits 8-15, but this is a combination of two
nibbles (bits 8-11 and bits 12-15) for left and right shifts.
Due to the incorrect bits extraction, the actual shift may go beyond
the 32bit value, as spotted recently by UBSAN check:
 UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c:836:7
 shift exponent 68 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'

This patch fixes the shift value extraction by masking the properly
with 0x0f instead of 0xff.

Reported-and-tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ALSA: wss: Fix invalid snd_free_pages() at error path

commit 7b69154171b407844c273ab4c10b5f0ddcd6aa29 upstream.

Some spurious calls of snd_free_pages() have been overlooked and
remain in the error paths of wss driver code.  Since runtime->dma_area
is managed by the PCM core helper, we shouldn't release manually.

Drop the superfluous calls.

Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

fs: fix lost error code in dio_complete

commit 41e817bca3acd3980efe5dd7d28af0e6f4ab9247 upstream.

commit e259221763a40403d5bb232209998e8c45804ab8 ("fs: simplify the
generic_write_sync prototype") reworked callers of generic_write_sync(),
and ended up dropping the error return for the directio path. Prior to
that commit, in dio_complete(), an error would be bubbled up the stack,
but after that commit, errors passed on to dio_complete were eaten up.

This was reported on the list earlier, and a fix was proposed in
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160921141539.GA17898@infradead.org/, but
never followed up with.  We recently hit this bug in our testing where
fencing io errors, which were previously erroring out with EIO, were
being returned as success operations after this commit.

The fix proposed on the list earlier was a little short -- it would have
still called generic_write_sync() in case `ret` already contained an
error. This fix ensures generic_write_sync() is only called when there's
no pending error in the write. Additionally, transferred is replaced
with ret to bring this code in line with other callers.

Fixes: e259221763a4 ("fs: simplify the generic_write_sync prototype")
Reported-by: Ravi Nankani <rnankani@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Torsten Mehlan <tomeh@amazon.de>
CC: Uwe Dannowski <uwed@amazon.de>
CC: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.de>
CC: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

perf/x86/intel: Add generic branch tracing check to intel_pmu_has_bts()

commit 67266c1080ad56c31af72b9c18355fde8ccc124a upstream.

Currently we check the branch tracing only by checking for the
PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS event of PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE
type. But we can define the same event with the PERF_TYPE_RAW
type.

Changing the intel_pmu_has_bts() code to check on event's final
hw config value, so both HW types are covered.

Adding unlikely to intel_pmu_has_bts() condition calls, because
it was used in the original code in intel_bts_constraints.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121101612.16272-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

perf/x86/intel: Move branch tracing setup to the Intel-specific source file

commit ed6101bbf6266ee83e620b19faa7c6ad56bb41ab upstream.

Moving branch tracing setup to Intel core object into separate
intel_pmu_bts_config function, because it's Intel specific.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121101612.16272-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/fpu: Disable bottom halves while loading FPU registers

commit 68239654acafe6aad5a3c1dc7237e60accfebc03 upstream.

The sequence

  fpu->initialized = 1; /* step A */
  preempt_disable(); /* step B */
  fpu__restore(fpu);
  preempt_enable();

in __fpu__restore_sig() is racy in regard to a context switch.

For 32bit frames, __fpu__restore_sig() prepares the FPU state within
fpu->state. To ensure that a context switch (switch_fpu_prepare() in
particular) does not modify fpu->state it uses fpu__drop() which sets
fpu->initialized to 0.

After fpu->initialized is cleared, the CPU's FPU state is not saved
to fpu->state during a context switch. The new state is loaded via
fpu__restore(). It gets loaded into fpu->state from userland and
ensured it is sane. fpu->initialized is then set to 1 in order to avoid
fpu__initialize() doing anything (overwrite the new state) which is part
of fpu__restore().

A context switch between step A and B above would save CPU's current FPU
registers to fpu->state and overwrite the newly prepared state. This
looks like a tiny race window but the Kernel Test Robot reported this
back in 2016 while we had lazy FPU support. Borislav Petkov made the
link between that report and another patch that has been posted. Since
the removal of the lazy FPU support, this race goes unnoticed because
the warning has been removed.

Disable bottom halves around the restore sequence to avoid the race. BH
need to be disabled because BH is allowed to run (even with preemption
disabled) and might invoke kernel_fpu_begin() by doing IPsec.

 [ bp: massage commit message a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120102635.ddv3fvavxajjlfqk@linutronix.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160226074940.GA28911@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/MCE/AMD: Fix the thresholding machinery initialization order

commit 60c8144afc287ef09ce8c1230c6aa972659ba1bb upstream.

Currently, the code sets up the thresholding interrupt vector and only
then goes about initializing the thresholding banks. Which is wrong,
because an early thresholding interrupt would cause a NULL pointer
dereference when accessing those banks and prevent the machine from
booting.

Therefore, set the thresholding interrupt vector only *after* having
initialized the banks successfully.

Fixes: 18807ddb7f88 ("x86/mce/AMD: Reset Threshold Limit after logging error")
Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Reported-by: John Clemens <clemej@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Tested-by: John Clemens <john@deater.net>
Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravindksg.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181127101700.2964-1-zajec5@gmail.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201291
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

arm64: dts: rockchip: Fix PCIe reset polarity for rk3399-puma-haikou.

commit c1d91f86a1b4c9c05854d59c6a0abd5d0f75b849 upstream.

This patch fixes the wrong polarity setting for the PCIe host driver's
pre-reset pin for rk3399-puma-haikou. Without this patch link training
will most likely fail.

Fixes: 60fd9f72ce8a ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add Haikou baseboard with RK3399-Q7 SoM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Muellner <christoph.muellner@theobroma-systems.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

PCI: layerscape: Fix wrong invocation of outbound window disable accessor

commit c6fd6fe9dea44732cdcd970f1130b8cc50ad685a upstream.

The order of parameters is not correct when invoking the outbound
window disable routine. Fix it.

Fixes: 4a2745d760fa ("PCI: layerscape: Disable outbound windows configured by bootloader")
Signed-off-by: Hou Zhiqiang <Zhiqiang.Hou@nxp.com>
[lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com: commit log]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

btrfs: relocation: set trans to be NULL after ending transaction

commit 42a657f57628402c73237547f0134e083e2f6764 upstream.

The function relocate_block_group calls btrfs_end_transaction to release
trans when update_backref_cache returns 1, and then continues the loop
body. If btrfs_block_rsv_refill fails this time, it will jump out the
loop and the freed trans will be accessed. This may result in a
use-after-free bug. The patch assigns NULL to trans after trans is
released so that it will not be accessed.

Fixes: 0647bf564f1 ("Btrfs: improve forever loop when doing balance relocation")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Btrfs: ensure path name is null terminated at btrfs_control_ioctl

commit f505754fd6599230371cb01b9332754ddc104be1 upstream.

We were using the path name received from user space without checking that
it is null terminated. While btrfs-progs is well behaved and does proper
validation and null termination, someone could call the ioctl and pass
a non-null terminated patch, leading to buffer overrun problems in the
kernel.  The ioctl is protected by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

So just set the last byte of the path to a null character, similar to what
we do in other ioctls (add/remove/resize device, snapshot creation, etc).

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

xtensa: fix coprocessor part of ptrace_{get,set}xregs

commit 38a35a78c5e270cbe53c4fef6b0d3c2da90dd849 upstream.

Layout of coprocessor registers in the elf_xtregs_t and
xtregs_coprocessor_t may be different due to alignment. Thus it is not
always possible to copy data between the xtregs_coprocessor_t structure
and the elf_xtregs_t and get correct values for all registers.
Use a table of offsets and sizes of individual coprocessor register
groups to do coprocessor context copying in the ptrace_getxregs and
ptrace_setxregs.
This fixes incorrect coprocessor register values reading from the user
process by the native gdb on an xtensa core with multiple coprocessors
and registers with high alignment requirements.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

xtensa: fix coprocessor context offset definitions

commit 03bc996af0cc71c7f30c384d8ce7260172423b34 upstream.

Coprocessor context offsets are used by the assembly code that moves
coprocessor context between the individual fields of the
thread_info::xtregs_cp structure and coprocessor registers.
This fixes coprocessor context clobbering on flushing and reloading
during normal user code execution and user process debugging in the
presence of more than one coprocessor in the core configuration.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

xtensa: enable coprocessors that are being flushed

commit 2958b66694e018c552be0b60521fec27e8d12988 upstream.

coprocessor_flush_all may be called from a context of a thread that is
different from the thread being flushed. In that case contents of the
cpenable special register may not match ti->cpenable of the target
thread, resulting in unhandled coprocessor exception in the kernel
context.
Set cpenable special register to the ti->cpenable of the target register
for the duration of the flush and restore it afterwards.
This fixes the following crash caused by coprocessor register inspection
in native gdb:

  (gdb) p/x $w0
  Illegal instruction in kernel: sig: 9 [#1] PREEMPT
  Call Trace:
    ___might_sleep+0x184/0x1a4
    __might_sleep+0x41/0xac
    exit_signals+0x14/0x218
    do_exit+0xc9/0x8b8
    die+0x99/0xa0
    do_illegal_instruction+0x18/0x6c
    common_exception+0x77/0x77
    coprocessor_flush+0x16/0x3c
    arch_ptrace+0x46c/0x674
    sys_ptrace+0x2ce/0x3b4
    system_call+0x54/0x80
    common_exception+0x77/0x77
  note: gdb[100] exited with preempt_count 1
  Killed

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

KVM: X86: Fix scan ioapic use-before-initialization

commit e97f852fd4561e77721bb9a4e0ea9d98305b1e93 upstream.

Reported by syzkaller:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
 PGD 80000003ec4da067 P4D 80000003ec4da067 PUD 3f7bfa067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 7 PID: 5059 Comm: debug Tainted: G           OE     4.19.0-rc5 #16
 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x1a6/0x1990
 Call Trace:
  lock_acquire+0xdb/0x210
  _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x70
  kvm_ioapic_scan_entry+0x3e/0x110 [kvm]
  vcpu_enter_guest+0x167e/0x1910 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x35c/0x610 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3e9/0x6d0 [kvm]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x690
  ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x83/0x6e0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The reason is that the testcase writes hyperv synic HV_X64_MSR_SINT6 msr
and triggers scan ioapic logic to load synic vectors into EOI exit bitmap.
However, irqchip is not initialized by this simple testcase, ioapic/apic
objects should not be accessed.
This can be triggered by the following program:

    #define _GNU_SOURCE

    #include <endian.h>
    #include <stdint.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <sys/syscall.h>
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <unistd.h>

    uint64_t r[3] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};

    int main(void)
    {
     syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 3, 0x32, -1, 0);
     long res = 0;
     memcpy((void*)0x20000040, "/dev/kvm", 9);
     res = syscall(__NR_openat, 0xffffffffffffff9c, 0x20000040, 0, 0);
     if (res != -1)
     r[0] = res;
     res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[0], 0xae01, 0);
     if (res != -1)
     r[1] = res;
     res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[1], 0xae41, 0);
     if (res != -1)
     r[2] = res;
     memcpy(
     (void*)0x20000080,
     "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x5b\x61\xbb\x96\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00"
     "\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b\x77\xd1\x78\x4d\xd8\x3a\xed\xb1\x5c\x2e\x43"
     "\xaa\x43\x39\xd6\xff\xf5\xf0\xa8\x98\xf2\x3e\x37\x29\x89\xde\x88\xc6\x33"
     "\xfc\x2a\xdb\xb7\xe1\x4c\xac\x28\x61\x7b\x9c\xa9\xbc\x0d\xa0\x63\xfe\xfe"
     "\xe8\x75\xde\xdd\x19\x38\xdc\x34\xf5\xec\x05\xfd\xeb\x5d\xed\x2e\xaf\x22"
     "\xfa\xab\xb7\xe4\x42\x67\xd0\xaf\x06\x1c\x6a\x35\x67\x10\x55\xcb",
     106);
     syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0x4008ae89, 0x20000080);
     syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0xae80, 0);
     return 0;
    }

This patch fixes it by bailing out scan ioapic if ioapic is not initialized in
kernel.

Reported-by: Wei Wu <ww9210@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Wei Wu <ww9210@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

KVM: x86: Fix kernel info-leak in KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING hypercall

commit bcbfbd8ec21096027f1ee13ce6c185e8175166f6 upstream.

kvm_pv_clock_pairing() allocates local var
"struct kvm_clock_pairing clock_pairing" on stack and initializes
all it's fields besides padding (clock_pairing.pad[]).

Because clock_pairing var is written completely (including padding)
to guest memory, failure to init struct padding results in kernel
info-leak.

Fix the issue by making sure to also init the padding with zeroes.

Fixes: 55dd00a73a51 ("KVM: x86: add KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING hypercall")
Reported-by: syzbot+a8ef68d71211ba264f56@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

kvm: svm: Ensure an IBPB on all affected CPUs when freeing a vmcb

commit fd65d3142f734bc4376053c8d75670041903134d upstream.

Previously, we only called indirect_branch_prediction_barrier on the
logical CPU that freed a vmcb. This function should be called on all
logical CPUs that last loaded the vmcb in question.

Fixes: 15d45071523d ("KVM/x86: Add IBPB support")
Reported-by: Neel Natu <neelnatu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

kvm: mmu: Fix race in emulated page table writes

commit 0e0fee5c539b61fdd098332e0e2cc375d9073706 upstream.

When a guest page table is updated via an emulated write,
kvm_mmu_pte_write() is called to update the shadow PTE using the just
written guest PTE value. But if two emulated guest PTE writes happened
concurrently, it is possible that the guest PTE and the shadow PTE end
up being out of sync. Emulated writes do not mark the shadow page as
unsync-ed, so this inconsistency will not be resolved even by a guest TLB
flush (unless the page was marked as unsync-ed at some other point).

This is fixed by re-reading the current value of the guest PTE after the
MMU lock has been acquired instead of just using the value that was
written prior to calling kvm_mmu_pte_write().

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options

commit 55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 upstream

Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.

Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode

commit 6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2 upstream

If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.

SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.

The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:

   Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
   prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
   processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
   (or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.

Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.

While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.

IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user

commit 7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15 upstream

Now that all prerequisites are in place:

 - Add the prctl command line option

 - Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl'

 - When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the
   conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch.

 - At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB
   evaluation on context switch.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation

commit 9137bb27e60e554dab694eafa4cca241fa3a694f upstream

Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.

Invocations:
 Check indirect branch speculation status with
 - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);

 Enable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);

 Disable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);

 Force disable indirect branch speculation with
 - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);

See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode

commit 6893a959d7fdebbab5f5aa112c277d5a44435ba1 upstream

The upcoming fine grained per task STIBP control needs to be updated on CPU
hotplug as well.

Split out the code which controls the strict mode so the prctl control code
can be added later. Mark the SMP function call argument __unused while at it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.759457117@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content

commit 6d991ba509ebcfcc908e009d1db51972a4f7a064 upstream

The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but
only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the
other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch.

This creates the following situation with Process A and B:

Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2
does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the
speculation control TIF bit set.

CPU0 CPU1
MSR bit is set
ProcB.T1 schedules out
ProcA.T2 schedules in
MSR bit is cleared
ProcA.T1
  seccomp_update()
  set TIF bit on ProcA.T2
ProcB.T1 schedules in
MSR is not updated  <-- FAIL

This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update
if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task
are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks
scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever.

In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which
could be migrated is complex and full of races.

The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF
bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state
is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates
already.

Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the
atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous
update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for
updating the current task.

Reported-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811272247140.1875@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Split out TIF update

commit e6da8bb6f9abb2628381904b24163c770e630bac upstream

The update of the TIF_SSBD flag and the conditional speculation control MSR
update is done in the ssb_prctl_set() function directly. The upcoming prctl
support for controlling indirect branch speculation via STIBP needs the
same mechanism.

Split the code out and make it reusable. Reword the comment about updates
for other tasks.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.652305076@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS

commit 46f7ecb1e7359f183f5bbd1e08b90e10e52164f9 upstream

The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality
which was introduced for this.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149393@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()

commit 4c71a2b6fd7e42814aa68a6dec88abf3b42ea573 upstream

The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel
switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task
which ran last on the same CPU.

An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be
ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching
directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to
a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot
be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just
adding overhead.

The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space
tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the
following cases:

  1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB not set.

  2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
     TIF_SPEC_IB set.

This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when
only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the
same process.

The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the
tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because
it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based
mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code.

When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into
the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was
running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of
the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or
not to cover the two cases above.

As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace
check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the
process changes.

Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one
created a hole.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls

commit 5635d99953f04b550738f6f4c1c532667c3fd872 upstream

The TIF_SPEC_IB bit does not need to be evaluated in the decision to invoke
__switch_to_xtra() when:

 - CONFIG_SMP is disabled

 - The conditional STIPB mode is disabled

The TIF_SPEC_IB bit still controls IBPB in both cases so the TIF work mask
checks might invoke __switch_to_xtra() for nothing if TIF_SPEC_IB is the
only set bit in the work masks.

Optimize it out by masking the bit at compile time for CONFIG_SMP=n and at
run time when the static key controlling the conditional STIBP mode is
disabled.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.374062201@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code

commit ff16701a29cba3aafa0bd1656d766813b2d0a811 upstream

Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline
function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit.

Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly
in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the
per_cpu() indirection.

This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch
speculation optimization happens only in one place.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control

commit 5bfbe3ad5840d941b89bcac54b821ba14f50a0ba upstream

To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task
control of STIBP.

Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if
SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control
code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the
guest/host switch works properly.

This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key
which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control
code.

[ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation
   depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional
   update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and
   IBPB ]

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation

commit fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54 upstream

Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=

The initial options are:

    -  on:   Unconditionally enabled
    - off:   Unconditionally disabled
    -auto:   Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)

When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.

Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions

commit 495d470e9828500e0155027f230449ac5e29c025 upstream

There is no point in having two functions and a conditional at the call
site.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.986890749@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata

commit 30ba72a990f5096ae08f284de17986461efcc408 upstream

No point to keep that around.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.893886356@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly

commit 8770709f411763884535662744a3786a1806afd3 upstream

checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code:
 WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const

Fix up all the string arrays.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.800018931@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code

commit 15d6b7aab0793b2de8a05d8a828777dd24db424e upstream

Reorder the code so it is better grouped. No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.707122879@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state

commit 130d6f946f6f2a972ee3ec8540b7243ab99abe97 upstream

Use the now exposed real SMT state, not the SMT sysfs control knob
state. This reflects the state of the system when the mitigation status is
queried.

This does not change the warning in the VMX launch code. There the
dependency on the control knob makes sense because siblings could be
brought online anytime after launching the VM.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.613357354@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change

commit a74cfffb03b73d41e08f84c2e5c87dec0ce3db9f upstream

arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is
changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the
system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline.

To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT
state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled.

Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU
hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key

commit 321a874a7ef85655e93b3206d0f36b4a6097f948 upstream

Make the scheduler's 'sched_smt_present' static key globaly available, so
it can be used in the x86 speculation control code.

Provide a query function and a stub for the CONFIG_SMP=n case.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.430168326@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled

commit dbe733642e01dd108f71436aaea7b328cb28fd87 upstream

CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to
have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is
minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static
key.

This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the
speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be
made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an
unused static key to every other architecture for nothing.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.337452245@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology

commit c5511d03ec090980732e929c318a7a6374b5550e upstream

Currently the 'sched_smt_present' static key is enabled when at CPU bringup
SMT topology is observed, but it is never disabled. However there is demand
to also disable the key when the topology changes such that there is no SMT
present anymore.

Implement this by making the key count the number of cores that have SMT
enabled.

In particular, the SMT topology bits are set before interrrupts are enabled
and similarly, are cleared after interrupts are disabled for the last time
and the CPU dies.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.246110444@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update

commit 01daf56875ee0cd50ed496a09b20eb369b45dfa5 upstream

The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next
task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out
across multiple functions.

Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into
the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function.

This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits
in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes.

Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.151077005@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions

commit 26c4d75b234040c11728a8acb796b3a85ba7507c upstream

During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according
to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task.

Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in
SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have
"speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names.

For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be
updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate.

Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No
functional change.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.058866968@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use

commit 34bce7c9690b1d897686aac89604ba7adc365556 upstream

If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2
user space exploits from hyperthread sibling.

Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.966801480@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common()

commit a8f76ae41cd633ac00be1b3019b1eb4741be3828 upstream

The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the
various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's
hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to
be made for a particular method.

Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper
functions, so they can be extended later on.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.874479208@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common()

commit b86bda0426853bfe8a3506c7d2a5b332760ae46b upstream

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.783903657@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()

commit 24848509aa55eac39d524b587b051f4e86df3c12 upstream

Remove the unnecessary 'else' statement in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
to save an indentation level.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.688010903@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment

commit 8eb729b77faf83ac4c1f363a9ad68d042415f24c upstream

"Reduced Data Speculation" is an obsolete term. The correct new name is
"Speculative store bypass disable" - which is abbreviated into SSBD.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.593893901@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support

commit ef014aae8f1cd2793e4e014bbb102bed53f852b7 upstream

Now that CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depends on compiler support, there is no
reason to keep the minimal retpoline support around which only provided
basic protection in the assembly files.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f06f0a89-5587-45db-8ed2-0a9d6638d5c0@default
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support

commit 4cd24de3a0980bf3100c9dcb08ef65ca7c31af48 upstream

Since retpoline capable compilers are widely available, make
CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depend on the compiler capability.

Break the build when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled and the compiler does not
support it. Emit an error message in that case:

 "arch/x86/Makefile:226: *** You are building kernel with non-retpoline
  compiler, please update your compiler..  Stop."

[dwmw: Fail the build with non-retpoline compiler]

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cca0cb20-f9e2-4094-840b-fb0f8810cd34@default
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant

commit 0cbb76d6285794f30953bfa3ab831714b59dd700 upstream

..so that they match their asm counterpart.

Add the missing ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE in CALL_NOSPEC, while at it.

Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Cc: dhaval.giani@oracle.com
Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c3975665-173e-4d70-8dee-06c926ac26ee@default
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs

commit bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a upstream

If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch
in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks.

If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak

commit dbfe2953f63c640463c630746cd5d9de8b2f63ae upstream

Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.

This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.

In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).

[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
  PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
  fine-grained ]

Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation

commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream

STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.

Enable this feature if

- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)

After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.

Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR

commit 612bc3b3d4be749f73a513a17d9b3ee1330d3487 upstream

On AMD, the presence of the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature does not imply that the
SSBD mitigation support should use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Other features could
have caused the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature to be set, while a different SSBD
mitigation option is in place.

Update the SSBD support to check for the actual SSBD features that will
use the SPEC_CTRL MSR.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 6ac2f49edb1e ("x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213602.29202.33151.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/bugs: Update when to check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigation

commit 845d382bb15c6e7dc5026c0ff919c5b13fc7e11b upstream

If either the X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD or X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD features are
present, then there is no need to perform the check for the LS_CFG SSBD
mitigation support.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213553.29202.21089.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU features

commit 108fab4b5c8f12064ef86e02cb0459992affb30f upstream

Both AMD and Intel can have SPEC_CTRL_MSR for SSBD.

However AMD also has two more other ways of doing it - which
are !SPEC_CTRL MSR ways.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-4-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage

commit 6ac2f49edb1ef5446089c7c660017732886d62d6 upstream

The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using
the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f)
for speculative store bypass disable.

This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD
flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR.

See the document titled:
   124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf

A copy of this document is available at
   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

x86/bugs: Add AMD's variant of SSB_NO

commit 24809860012e0130fbafe536709e08a22b3e959e upstream

The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that the CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[26] will mean that the
speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed.

A copy of this document is available at:
    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

sched/core: Fix cpu.max vs. cpuhotplug deadlock

commit ce48c146495a1a50e48cdbfbfaba3e708be7c07c upstream

Tejun reported the following cpu-hotplug lock (percpu-rwsem) read recursion:

  tg_set_cfs_bandwidth()
    get_online_cpus()
      cpus_read_lock()

    cfs_bandwidth_usage_inc()
      static_key_slow_inc()
        cpus_read_lock()

Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180122215328.GP3397@worktop
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

usbnet: ipheth: fix potential recvmsg bug and recvmsg bug 2

[ Upstream commit 45611c61dd503454b2edae00aabe1e429ec49ebe ]

The bug is not easily reproducable, as it may occur very infrequently
(we had machines with 20minutes heavy downloading before it occurred)
However, on a virual machine (VMWare on Windows 10 host) it occurred
pretty frequently (1-2 seconds after a speedtest was started)

dev->tx_skb mab be freed via dev_kfree_skb_irq on a callback
before it is set.

This causes the following problems:
- double free of the skb or potential memory leak
- in dmesg: 'recvmsg bug' and 'recvmsg bug 2' and eventually
  general protection fault

Example dmesg output:
[  134.841986] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  134.841987] recvmsg bug: copied 9C24A555 seq 9C24B557 rcvnxt 9C25A6B3 fl 0
[  134.841993] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2629 at /build/linux-hwe-On9fm7/linux-hwe-4.15.0/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1865 tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
[  134.841994] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
[  134.842046] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G        W  OE    4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
[  134.842046] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[  134.842048] RIP: 0010:tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
[  134.842048] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bcc8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  134.842049] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff997616f4f200 RCX: 0000000000000006
[  134.842049] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffff9976257d6490
[  134.842050] RBP: ffffa6630422bd98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000004bba4
[  134.842050] R10: 0000000001e00c6f R11: 000000000004bba4 R12: ffff99760dee3000
[  134.842051] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee3514 R15: 0000000000000000
[  134.842051] FS:  00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  134.842052] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  134.842053] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[  134.842055] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  134.842055] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  134.842057] Call Trace:
[  134.842060]  ? aa_sk_perm+0x53/0x1a0
[  134.842064]  inet_recvmsg+0x51/0xc0
[  134.842066]  sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x50
[  134.842070]  SYSC_recvfrom+0xe4/0x160
[  134.842072]  ? __schedule+0x3de/0x8b0
[  134.842075]  ? ktime_get_ts64+0x4c/0xf0
[  134.842079]  SyS_recvfrom+0xe/0x10
[  134.842082]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
[  134.842086]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[  134.842086] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a81d
[  134.842088] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da98398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
[  134.842090] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 00007fe331f5a81d
[  134.842094] RDX: 00000000000003fb RSI: 0000000001e00874 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  134.842095] RBP: 00007fe32f642c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  134.842097] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe332347698
[  134.842099] R13: 0000000001b7e0a0 R14: 0000000001e00874 R15: 0000000000000000
[  134.842103] Code: 24 fd ff ff e9 cc fe ff ff 48 89 d8 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 00 44 8b 45 80 48 c7 c7 08 bd 59 8b 48 89 85 68 ff ff ff e8 b3 c4 7d ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 85 68 ff ff ff e9 e9 fe ff ff 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00
[  134.842126] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c83147f ]---
[  134.842144] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  134.842145] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
[  134.842161] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G        W  OE    4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
[  134.842162] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[  134.842164] RIP: 0010:tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440
[  134.842165] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bde8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  134.842167] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99760dee3000 RCX: 0000000180400034
[  134.842168] RDX: 5c4afd407207a6c4 RSI: ffffe868495bd300 RDI: ffff997616f4f200
[  134.842169] RBP: ffffa6630422be08 R08: 0000000016f4d401 R09: 0000000180400034
[  134.842169] R10: ffffa6630422bd98 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000600c
[  134.842170] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee30c8 R15: ffff9975bd44fe00
[  134.842171] FS:  00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  134.842173] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  134.842174] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[  134.842177] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  134.842178] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  134.842179] Call Trace:
[  134.842181]  inet_release+0x42/0x70
[  134.842183]  __sock_release+0x42/0xb0
[  134.842184]  sock_close+0x15/0x20
[  134.842187]  __fput+0xea/0x220
[  134.842189]  ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  134.842191]  task_work_run+0x8a/0xb0
[  134.842193]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc4/0xd0
[  134.842195]  do_syscall_64+0xf4/0x130
[  134.842197]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[  134.842197] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a560
[  134.842198] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da982e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[  134.842200] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fe32f642c70 RCX: 00007fe331f5a560
[  134.842201] RDX: 00000000008f5320 RSI: 0000000001cd4b50 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  134.842202] RBP: 00007fe32f6500f8 R08: 000000000000003c R09: 00000000009343c0
[  134.842203] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe32f6500d0
[  134.842204] R13: 00000000008f5320 R14: 00000000008f5320 R15: 0000000001cd4770
[  134.842205] Code: c8 00 00 00 45 31 e4 49 39 fe 75 4d eb 50 83 ab d8 00 00 00 01 48 8b 17 48 8b 47 08 48 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 0f b6 57 34 8b 47 2c 2b 47 28 83 e2 01 80
[  134.842226] RIP: tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 RSP: ffffa6630422bde8
[  134.842227] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c831480 ]---

The proposed patch eliminates a potential racing condition.
Before, usb_submit_urb was called and _after_ that, the skb was attached
(dev->tx_skb). So, on a callback it was possible, however unlikely that the
skb was freed before it was set. That way (because dev->tx_skb was not set
to NULL after it was freed), it could happen that a skb from a earlier
transmission was freed a second time (and the skb we should have freed did
not get freed at all)

Now we free the skb directly in ipheth_tx(). It is not passed to the
callback anymore, eliminating the posibility of a double free of the same
skb. Depending on the retval of usb_submit_urb() we use dev_kfree_skb_any()
respectively dev_consume_skb_any() to free the skb.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Zweigle <Oliver.Zweigle@faro.com>
Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <3ernd.Eckstein@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

s390/qeth: fix length check in SNMP processing

[ Upstream commit 9a764c1e59684c0358e16ccaafd870629f2cfe67 ]

The response for a SNMP request can consist of multiple parts, which
the cmd callback stages into a kernel buffer until all parts have been
received. If the callback detects that the staging buffer provides
insufficient space, it bails out with error.
This processing is buggy for the first part of the response - while it
initially checks for a length of 'data_len', it later copies an
additional amount of 'offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)' bytes.

Fix the calculation of 'data_len' for the first part of the response.
This also nicely cleans up the memcpy code.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

rapidio/rionet: do not free skb before reading its length

[ Upstream commit cfc435198f53a6fa1f656d98466b24967ff457d0 ]

skb is freed via dev_kfree_skb_any, however, skb->len is read then. This
may result in a use-after-free bug.

Fixes: e6161d64263 ("rapidio/rionet: rework driver initialization and removal")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

packet: copy user buffers before orphan or clone

[ Upstream commit 5cd8d46ea1562be80063f53c7c6a5f40224de623 ]

tpacket_snd sends packets with user pages linked into skb frags. It
notifies that pages can be reused when the skb is released by setting
skb->destructor to tpacket_destruct_skb.

This can cause data corruption if the skb is orphaned (e.g., on
transmit through veth) or cloned (e.g., on mirror to another psock).

Create a kernel-private copy of data in these cases, same as tun/tap
zerocopy transmission. Reuse that infrastructure: mark the skb as
SKBTX_ZEROCOPY_FRAG, which will trigger copy in skb_orphan_frags(_rx).

Unlike other zerocopy packets, do not set shinfo destructor_arg to
struct ubuf_info. tpacket_destruct_skb already uses that ptr to notify
when the original skb is released and a timestamp is recorded. Do not
change this timestamp behavior. The ubuf_info->callback is not needed
anyway, as no zerocopy notification is expected.

Mark destructor_arg as not-a-uarg by setting the lower bit to 1. The
resulting value is not a valid ubuf_info pointer, nor a valid
tpacket_snd frame address. Add skb_zcopy_.._nouarg helpers for this.

The fix relies on features introduced in commit 52267790ef52 ("sock:
add MSG_ZEROCOPY"), so can be backported as is only to 4.14.

Tested with from `./in_netns.sh ./txring_overwrite` from
http://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tests

Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Reported-by: Anand H. Krishnan <anandhkrishnan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

net: thunderx: set tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue

[ Upstream commit ef2a7cf1d8831535b8991459567b385661eb4a36 ]

Reset snd_queue tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue routine
since it is used to check if tso dma descriptor queue has been previously
allocated. The issue can be triggered with the following reproducer:

$ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv obj xdp_dummy.o
$ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv off

[  341.467649] WARNING: CPU: 74 PID: 2158 at mm/vmalloc.c:1511 __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[  341.515010] Hardware name: GIGABYTE H270-T70/MT70-HD0, BIOS T49 02/02/2018
[  341.521874] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[  341.526654] pc : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[  341.530132] lr : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[  341.533609] sp : ffff00001c5db860
[  341.536913] x29: ffff00001c5db860 x28: 0000000000020000
[  341.542214] x27: ffff810feb5090b0 x26: ffff000017e57000
[  341.547515] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000fbd00000
[  341.552816] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff810feb5090b0
[  341.558117] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000
[  341.563418] x19: ffff000017e57000 x18: 0000000000000000
[  341.568719] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[  341.574020] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: ffffffffffffffff
[  341.579321] x13: ffff00008985eb27 x12: ffff00000985eb2f
[  341.584622] x11: ffff0000096b3000 x10: ffff00001c5db510
[  341.589923] x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 x8 : ffff0000086868e8
[  341.595224] x7 : 3430303030303030 x6 : 00000000000006ef
[  341.600525] x5 : 00000000003fffff x4 : 0000000000000000
[  341.605825] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff
[  341.611126] x1 : ffff0000096b3728 x0 : 0000000000000038
[  341.616428] Call trace:
[  341.618866]  __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[  341.621997]  vunmap+0x3c/0x50
[  341.624961]  arch_dma_free+0x68/0xa0
[  341.628534]  dma_direct_free+0x50/0x80
[  341.632285]  nicvf_free_resources+0x160/0x2d8 [nicvf]
[  341.637327]  nicvf_config_data_transfer+0x174/0x5e8 [nicvf]
[  341.642890]  nicvf_stop+0x298/0x340 [nicvf]
[  341.647066]  __dev_close_many+0x9c/0x108
[  341.650977]  dev_close_many+0xa4/0x158
[  341.654720]  rollback_registered_many+0x140/0x530
[  341.659414]  rollback_registered+0x54/0x80
[  341.663499]  unregister_netdevice_queue+0x9c/0xe8
[  341.668192]  unregister_netdev+0x28/0x38
[  341.672106]  nicvf_remove+0xa4/0xa8 [nicvf]
[  341.676280]  nicvf_shutdown+0x20/0x30 [nicvf]
[  341.680630]  pci_device_shutdown+0x44/0x88
[  341.684720]  device_shutdown+0x144/0x250
[  341.688640]  kernel_restart_prepare+0x44/0x50
[  341.692986]  kernel_restart+0x20/0x68
[  341.696638]  __se_sys_reboot+0x210/0x238
[  341.700550]  __arm64_sys_reboot+0x24/0x30
[  341.704555]  el0_svc_handler+0x94/0x110
[  341.708382]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[  341.711252] ---[ end trace 3f4019c8439959c9 ]---
[  341.715874] page:ffff7e0003ef4000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x4
[  341.723872] flags: 0x1fffe000000000()
[  341.727527] raw: 001fffe000000000 ffff7e0003f1a008 ffff7e0003ef4048 0000000000000000
[  341.735263] raw: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  341.742994] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0)

where xdp_dummy.c is a simple bpf program that forwards the incoming
frames to the network stack (available here:
https://github.com/altoor/xdp_walkthrough_examples/blob/master/sample_1/xdp_dummy.c)

Fixes: 05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
Fixes: 4863dea3fab0 ("net: Adding support for Cavium ThunderX network controller")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

virtio-net: fail XDP set if guest csum is negotiated

[ Upstream commit 18ba58e1c234ea1a2d9835ac8c1735d965ce4640 ]

We don't support partial csumed packet since its metadata will be lost
or incorrect during XDP processing. So fail the XDP set if guest_csum
feature is negotiated.

Fixes: f600b6905015 ("virtio_net: Add XDP support")
Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

virtio-net: disable guest csum during XDP set

[ Upstream commit e59ff2c49ae16e1d179de679aca81405829aee6c ]

We don't disable VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM if XDP was set. This means we
can receive partial csumed packets with metadata kept in the
vnet_hdr. This may have several side effects:

- It could be overridden by header adjustment, thus is might be not
  correct after XDP processing.
- There's no way to pass such metadata information through
  XDP_REDIRECT to another driver.
- XDP does not support checksum offload right now.

So simply disable guest csum if possible in this the case of XDP.

Fixes: 3f93522ffab2d ("virtio-net: switch off offloads on demand if possible on XDP set")
Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

net: thunderx: set xdp_prog to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails

[ Upstream commit 6d0f60b0f8588fd4380ea5df9601e12fddd55ce2 ]

Set xdp_prog pointer to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails since that routine
reports the error code instead of NULL in case of failure and xdp_prog
pointer value is used in the driver to verify if XDP is currently
enabled.
Moreover report the error code to userspace if nicvf_xdp_setup fails

Fixes: 05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

net: skb_scrub_packet(): Scrub offload_fwd_mark

[ Upstream commit b5dd186d10ba59e6b5ba60e42b3b083df56df6f3 ]

When a packet is trapped and the corresponding SKB marked as
already-forwarded, it retains this marking even after it is forwarded
across veth links into another bridge. There, since it ingresses the
bridge over veth, which doesn't have offload_fwd_mark, it triggers a
warning in nbp_switchdev_frame_mark().

Then nbp_switchdev_allowed_egress() decides not to allow egress from
this bridge through another veth, because the SKB is already marked, and
the mark (of 0) of course matches. Thus the packet is incorrectly
blocked.

Solve by resetting offload_fwd_mark() in skb_scrub_packet(). That
function is called from tunnels and also from veth, and thus catches the
cases where traffic is forwarded between bridges and transformed in a
way that invalidates the marking.

Fixes: 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices")
Fixes: abf4bb6b63d0 ("skbuff: Add the offload_mr_fwd_mark field")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com>
Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Revert "wlcore: Add missing PM call for wlcore_cmd_wait_for_event_or_timeout()"

This reverts commit e87efc44dd36ba3db59847c418354711ebad779b which was
upstream commit 4ec7cece87b3ed21ffcd407c62fb2f151a366bc1.

From Dietmar May's report on the stable mailing list
(https://www.spinics.net/lists/stable/msg272201.html):

> I've run into some problems which appear due to (a) recent patch(es) on
> the wlcore wifi driver.
>
> 4.4.160 - commit 3fdd34643ffc378b5924941fad40352c04610294
> 4.9.131 - commit afeeecc764436f31d4447575bb9007732333818c
>
> Earlier versions (4.9.130 and 4.4.159 - tested back to 4.4.49) do not
> exhibit this problem. It is still present in 4.9.141.
>
> master as of 4.20.0-rc4 does not exhibit this problem.
>
> Basically, during client association when in AP mode (running hostapd),
> handshake may or may not complete following a noticeable delay. If
> successful, then the driver fails consistently in warn_slowpath_null
> during disassociation. If unsuccessful, the wifi client attempts multiple
> times, sometimes failing repeatedly. I've had clients unable to connect
> for 3-5 minutes during testing, with the syslog filled with dozens of
> backtraces. syslog details are below.
>
> I'm working on an embedded device with a TI 3352 ARM processor and a
> murata wl1271 module in sdio mode. We're running a fully patched ubuntu
> 18.04 ARM build, with a kernel built from kernel.org's stable/linux repo <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-4.9.y&id=afeeecc764436f31d4447575bb9007732333818c>.
> Relevant parts of the kernel config are included below.
>
> The commit message states:
>
> > /I've only seen this few times with the runtime PM patches enabled so
> > this one is probably not needed before that. This seems to work
> > currently based on the current PM implementation timer. Let's apply
> > this separately though in case others are hitting this issue./
> We're not doing anything explicit with power management. The device is an
> IoT edge gateway with battery backup, normally running on wall power. The
> battery is currently used solely to shut down the system cleanly to avoid
> filesystem corruption.
>
> The device tree is configured to keep power in suspend; but the device
> should never suspend, so in our case, there is no need to call
> wl1271_ps_elp_wakeup() or wl1271_ps_elp_sleep(), as occurs in the patch.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

xfs: don't fail when converting shortform attr to long form during ATTR_REPLACE

commit 7b38460dc8e4eafba06c78f8e37099d3b34d473c upstream.

Kanda Motohiro reported that expanding a tiny xattr into a large xattr
fails on XFS because we remove the tiny xattr from a shortform fork and
then try to re-add it after converting the fork to extents format having
not removed the ATTR_REPLACE flag.  This fails because the attr is no
longer present, causing a fs shutdown.

This is derived from the patch in his bug report, but we really
shouldn't ignore a nonzero retval from the remove call.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199119
Reported-by: kanda.motohiro@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: fix to do sanity check with cp_pack_start_sum

commit e494c2f995d6181d6e29c4927d68e0f295ecf75b upstream.

After fuzzing, cp_pack_start_sum could be corrupted, so current log's
summary info should be wrong due to loading incorrect summary block.
Then, if segment's type in current log is exceeded NR_CURSEG_TYPE, it
can lead accessing invalid dirty_i->dirty_segmap bitmap finally.

Add sanity check for cp_pack_start_sum to fix this issue.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200419

- Reproduce

- Kernel message (f2fs-dev w/ KASAN)
[ 3117.578432] F2FS-fs (loop0): Invalid log blocks per segment (8)

[ 3117.578445] F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 2th superblock
[ 3117.581364] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc_offset: 30716
[ 3117.583564] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1225 at fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:90 __get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.583570] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.584014] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.584017] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.584022] RIP: 0010:__get_meta_page+0x448/0x4b0
[ 3117.584023] Code: 00 49 8d bc 24 84 00 00 00 e8 74 54 da ff 41 83 8c 24 84 00 00 00 08 4c 89 f6 4c 89 ef e8 c0 d9 95 00 48 89 ef e8 18 e3 00 00 <0f> 0b f0 80 4d 48 04 e9 0f fe ff ff 0f 0b 48 89 c7 48 89 04 24 e8
[ 3117.584072] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb678c0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 3117.584082] RAX: ffff88018f0a6a78 RBX: ffffea0007a46600 RCX: ffffffff9314d1b2
[ 3117.584085] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0a6a98
[ 3117.584087] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 3117.584090] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed00326e4450 R12: ffff880193722200
[ 3117.584092] R13: ffff88018ebe9afc R14: 0000000000000206 R15: ffff88018eb67900
[ 3117.584096] FS:  00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.584098] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.584101] CR2: 00000000016f21b8 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.584112] Call Trace:
[ 3117.584121]  ? f2fs_set_meta_page_dirty+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.584127]  ? f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xbf9/0x3190
[ 3117.584133]  ? f2fs_npages_for_summary_flush+0x75/0x120
[ 3117.584145]  f2fs_build_segment_manager+0xda8/0x3190
[ 3117.584151]  ? f2fs_get_valid_checkpoint+0x298/0xa00
[ 3117.584156]  ? f2fs_flush_sit_entries+0x10e0/0x10e0
[ 3117.584184]  ? map_id_range_down+0x17c/0x1b0
[ 3117.584188]  ? __put_user_ns+0x30/0x30
[ 3117.584206]  ? find_next_bit+0x53/0x90
[ 3117.584237]  ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20
[ 3117.584249]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.584258]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584279]  ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.584296]  ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.584302]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.584305]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.584310]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.584320]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.584330]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.584343]  ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.584347]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.584357]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.584362]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.584373]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.584377]  ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.584383]  ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.584396]  ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.584401]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.584405]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.584427]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.584440]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.584455] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584456] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.584505] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.584510] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.584512] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584514] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.584516] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.584519] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.584523] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf31 ]---
[ 3117.685663] F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_check_nid_range: out-of-range nid=2, run fsck to fix.
[ 3117.685673] F2FS-fs (loop0): recover_data: ino = 2 (i_size: recover) recovered = 1, err = 0
[ 3117.685707] ==================================================================
[ 3117.685955] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686175] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88018f0a63d0 by task mount/1225

[ 3117.686477] CPU: 0 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G        W         4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.686481] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.686483] Call Trace:
[ 3117.686494]  dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 3117.686512]  print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 3117.686517]  kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 3117.686522]  ? __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686527]  __remove_dirty_segment+0xdd/0x1e0
[ 3117.686532]  locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.686538]  f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.686543]  recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.686547]  ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.686553]  ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686564]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.686567]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.686571]  ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.686592]  ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.686597]  ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.686602]  ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.686606]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.686618]  ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.686633]  ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.686648]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.686656]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.686660]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.686664]  f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.686670]  ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.686674]  ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.686678]  ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.686683]  ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.686686]  ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.686695]  ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.686700]  ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.686707]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.686728]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686735]  ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.686740]  ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.686745]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.686748]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.686753]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.686758]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.686762]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.686769]  ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.686773]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.686777]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.686780]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.686786]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.686790]  ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.686795]  ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.686801]  ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.686804]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.686809]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.686816]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.686824]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.686829] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686830] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.686887] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.686892] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.686894] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686896] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.686899] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.686901] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003

[ 3117.687005] Allocated by task 1225:
[ 3117.687152]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.687157]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfd/0x200
[ 3117.687161]  f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x2d09/0x3190
[ 3117.687165]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1948/0x2b40
[ 3117.687168]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.687171]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.687174]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.687177]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.687180]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.687182]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.687186]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.687190]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[ 3117.687285] Freed by task 19:
[ 3117.687412]  __kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x190
[ 3117.687416]  kfree+0x8b/0x1b0
[ 3117.687460]  ttm_bo_man_put_node+0x61/0x80 [ttm]
[ 3117.687476]  ttm_bo_cleanup_refs+0x15f/0x250 [ttm]
[ 3117.687492]  ttm_bo_delayed_delete+0x2f0/0x300 [ttm]
[ 3117.687507]  ttm_bo_delayed_workqueue+0x17/0x50 [ttm]
[ 3117.687528]  process_one_work+0x2f9/0x740
[ 3117.687531]  worker_thread+0x78/0x6b0
[ 3117.687541]  kthread+0x177/0x1c0
[ 3117.687545]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

[ 3117.687638] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018f0a6300
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 3117.688014] The buggy address is located 16 bytes to the right of
                192-byte region [ffff88018f0a6300, ffff88018f0a63c0)
[ 3117.688382] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 3117.688554] page:ffffea00063c2980 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f3403180 index:0x0
[ 3117.688788] flags: 0x17fff8000000100(slab)
[ 3117.688944] raw: 017fff8000000100 ffffea00063c2840 0000000e0000000e ffff8801f3403180
[ 3117.689166] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 3117.689386] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[ 3117.689653] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 3117.689816]  ffff88018f0a6280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690027]  ffff88018f0a6300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690239] >ffff88018f0a6380: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.690448]                                                  ^
[ 3117.690644]  ffff88018f0a6400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3117.690868]  ffff88018f0a6480: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 3117.691077] ==================================================================
[ 3117.691290] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 3117.693893] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
[ 3117.694120] PGD 80000001f01bc067 P4D 80000001f01bc067 PUD 1d9638067 PMD 0
[ 3117.694338] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 3117.694490] CPU: 1 PID: 1225 Comm: mount Tainted: G    B   W         4.17.0+ #1
[ 3117.694703] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 3117.695073] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.695246] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.695793] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.695969] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.696182] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.696391] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.696604] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.696813] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.697032] FS:  00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3117.697280] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3117.702357] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 3117.707235] Call Trace:
[ 3117.712077]  locate_dirty_segment+0x189/0x190
[ 3117.716891]  f2fs_allocate_new_segments+0xa9/0xe0
[ 3117.721617]  recover_data+0x703/0x2c20
[ 3117.726316]  ? f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x48f/0xd50
[ 3117.730957]  ? ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.735573]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[ 3117.740198]  ? policy_node+0x56/0x70
[ 3117.744829]  ? add_fsync_inode+0xf0/0xf0
[ 3117.749487]  ? blk_finish_plug+0x44/0x60
[ 3117.754152]  ? f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x38b/0x5e0
[ 3117.758831]  ? find_inode_fast+0xac/0xc0
[ 3117.763448]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x320/0x320
[ 3117.768046]  ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x150/0x150
[ 3117.772603]  ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 3117.777159]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x29/0x410
[ 3117.781648]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x176/0x1e0
[ 3117.786067]  ? f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr+0x11d/0x320
[ 3117.790476]  f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0xc23/0xd50
[ 3117.794790]  ? f2fs_space_for_roll_forward+0x60/0x60
[ 3117.799086]  ? rb_insert_color+0x323/0x3d0
[ 3117.803304]  ? f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes+0xa5/0x700
[ 3117.807563]  ? proc_register+0x153/0x1d0
[ 3117.811766]  ? f2fs_remove_orphan_inode+0x10/0x10
[ 3117.815947]  ? f2fs_attr_store+0x50/0x50
[ 3117.820087]  ? proc_create_single_data+0x52/0x60
[ 3117.824262]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1d06/0x2b40
[ 3117.828367]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.832432]  ? sget_userns+0x65e/0x690
[ 3117.836500]  ? set_blocksize+0x88/0x130
[ 3117.840501]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 3117.844420]  mount_bdev+0x1c0/0x200
[ 3117.848275]  mount_fs+0x5c/0x190
[ 3117.852053]  vfs_kern_mount+0x64/0x190
[ 3117.855810]  do_mount+0x2e4/0x1450
[ 3117.859441]  ? lockref_put_return+0x130/0x130
[ 3117.862996]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[ 3117.866417]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 3117.869719]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 3117.872948]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x16/0x90
[ 3117.876121]  ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x196/0x210
[ 3117.879333]  ? _copy_from_user+0x61/0x90
[ 3117.882467]  ? memdup_user+0x3e/0x60
[ 3117.885604]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[ 3117.888700]  __x64_sys_mount+0x62/0x70
[ 3117.891742]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 3117.894692]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 3117.897669] RIP: 0033:0x7f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.900563] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 3117.906922] RSP: 002b:00007fff27346488 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[ 3117.910159] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016e2030 RCX: 00007f5693f14b9a
[ 3117.913469] RDX: 00000000016e2210 RSI: 00000000016e3f30 RDI: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.916764] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[ 3117.920071] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000016ee040
[ 3117.923393] R13: 00000000016e2210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[ 3117.926680] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 3117.949979] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.954283] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf32 ]---
[ 3117.958575] RIP: 0010:__remove_dirty_segment+0xe2/0x1e0
[ 3117.962810] Code: c4 48 89 c7 e8 cf bb d7 ff 45 0f b6 24 24 41 83 e4 3f 44 88 64 24 07 41 83 e4 3f 4a 8d 7c e3 08 e8 b3 bc d7 ff 4a 8b 4c e3 08 <f0> 4c 0f b3 29 0f 82 94 00 00 00 48 8d bd 20 04 00 00 e8 97 bb d7
[ 3117.971789] RSP: 0018:ffff88018eb67638 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 3117.976333] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88018f0a6300 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 3117.980926] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297
[ 3117.985497] RBP: ffff88018ebe9980 R08: ffffed003e743ebb R09: ffffed003e743ebb
[ 3117.990098] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e743eba R12: 0000000000000019
[ 3117.994761] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000320 R15: ffff88018ebe99e0
[ 3117.999392] FS:  00007f5694636840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3118.004096] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3118.008816] CR2: 00007fe89bb1a000 CR3: 0000000191c22000 CR4: 00000000000006e0

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L775
if (test_and_clear_bit(segno, dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t]))
dirty_i->nr_dirty[t]--;
Here dirty_i->dirty_segmap[t] can be NULL which leads to crash in test_and_clear_bit()

Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: The function is called sanity_check_ckpt()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: fix to do sanity check with i_extra_isize

commit 18dd6470c2d14d10f5a2dd926925dc80dbd3abfd upstream.

If inode.i_extra_isize was fuzzed to an abnormal value, when
calculating inline data size, the result will overflow, result
in accessing invalid memory area when operating inline data.

Let's do sanity check with i_extra_isize during inode loading
for fixing.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200421

- Reproduce

- POC (poc.c)
    #define _GNU_SOURCE
    #include <sys/types.h>
    #include <sys/mount.h>
    #include <sys/mman.h>
    #include <sys/stat.h>
    #include <sys/xattr.h>

    #include <dirent.h>
    #include <errno.h>
    #include <error.h>
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <unistd.h>

    #include <linux/falloc.h>
    #include <linux/loop.h>

    static void activity(char *mpoint) {

      char *foo_bar_baz;
      char *foo_baz;
      char *xattr;
      int err;

      err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
      err = asprintf(&foo_baz, "%s/foo/baz", mpoint);
      err = asprintf(&xattr, "%s/foo/bar/xattr", mpoint);

      rename(foo_bar_baz, foo_baz);

      char buf2[113];
      memset(buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2));
      listxattr(xattr, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
      removexattr(xattr, "user.mime_type");

    }

    int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
      activity(argv[1]);
      return 0;
    }

- Kernel message
Umount the image will leave the following message
[ 2910.995489] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[ 2918.416465] ==================================================================
[ 2918.416807] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_iget+0xcb9/0x1a80
[ 2918.417009] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88018efc2068 by task a.out/1229

[ 2918.417311] CPU: 1 PID: 1229 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.17.0+ #1
[ 2918.417314] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 2918.417323] Call Trace:
[ 2918.417366]  dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[ 2918.417401]  print_address_description+0x6b/0x290
[ 2918.417407]  kasan_report+0x28e/0x390
[ 2918.417411]  ? f2fs_iget+0xcb9/0x1a80
[ 2918.417415]  f2fs_iget+0xcb9/0x1a80
[ 2918.417422]  ? f2fs_lookup+0x2e7/0x580
[ 2918.417425]  f2fs_lookup+0x2e7/0x580
[ 2918.417433]  ? __recover_dot_dentries+0x400/0x400
[ 2918.417447]  ? legitimize_path.isra.29+0x5a/0xa0
[ 2918.417453]  __lookup_slow+0x11c/0x220
[ 2918.417457]  ? may_delete+0x2a0/0x2a0
[ 2918.417475]  ? deref_stack_reg+0xe0/0xe0
[ 2918.417479]  ? __lookup_hash+0xb0/0xb0
[ 2918.417483]  lookup_slow+0x3e/0x60
[ 2918.417488]  walk_component+0x3ac/0x990
[ 2918.417492]  ? generic_permission+0x51/0x1e0
[ 2918.417495]  ? inode_permission+0x51/0x1d0
[ 2918.417499]  ? pick_link+0x3e0/0x3e0
[ 2918.417502]  ? link_path_walk+0x4b1/0x770
[ 2918.417513]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
[ 2918.417518]  ? walk_component+0x990/0x990
[ 2918.417522]  ? path_init+0x2e6/0x580
[ 2918.417526]  path_lookupat+0x13f/0x430
[ 2918.417531]  ? trailing_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 2918.417534]  ? do_renameat2+0x270/0x7b0
[ 2918.417538]  ? __kasan_slab_free+0x14c/0x190
[ 2918.417541]  ? do_renameat2+0x270/0x7b0
[ 2918.417553]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x85/0x1e0
[ 2918.417558]  ? do_renameat2+0x270/0x7b0
[ 2918.417563]  filename_lookup+0x13c/0x280
[ 2918.417567]  ? filename_parentat+0x2b0/0x2b0
[ 2918.417572]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x31/0x40
[ 2918.417575]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 2918.417593]  ? strncpy_from_user+0xaa/0x1c0
[ 2918.417598]  ? getname_flags+0x101/0x2b0
[ 2918.417614]  ? path_listxattr+0x87/0x110
[ 2918.417619]  path_listxattr+0x87/0x110
[ 2918.417623]  ? listxattr+0xc0/0xc0
[ 2918.417637]  ? mm_fault_error+0x1b0/0x1b0
[ 2918.417654]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 2918.417660]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 2918.417676] RIP: 0033:0x7f2f3a3480d7
[ 2918.417677] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d be dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 b8 c2 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 91 dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 2918.417732] RSP: 002b:00007fff4095b7d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000c2
[ 2918.417744] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f2f3a3480d7
[ 2918.417746] RDX: 0000000000000071 RSI: 00007fff4095b810 RDI: 000000000126a0c0
[ 2918.417749] RBP: 00007fff4095b890 R08: 000000000126a010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 2918.417751] R10: 00000000000001ab R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000004005e0
[ 2918.417753] R13: 00007fff4095b990 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

[ 2918.417853] Allocated by task 329:
[ 2918.418002]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0
[ 2918.418007]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x1e0
[ 2918.418023]  mempool_init_node+0x194/0x230
[ 2918.418027]  mempool_init+0x12/0x20
[ 2918.418042]  bioset_init+0x2bd/0x380
[ 2918.418052]  blk_alloc_queue_node+0xe9/0x540
[ 2918.418075]  dm_create+0x2c0/0x800
[ 2918.418080]  dev_create+0xd2/0x530
[ 2918.418083]  ctl_ioctl+0x2a3/0x5b0
[ 2918.418087]  dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10
[ 2918.418092]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x13e/0x8c0
[ 2918.418095]  ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
[ 2918.418098]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3d/0x50
[ 2918.418102]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x160
[ 2918.418106]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[ 2918.418204] Freed by task 0:
[ 2918.418301] (stack is not available)

[ 2918.418521] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018efc0000
                which belongs to the cache biovec-max of size 8192
[ 2918.418894] The buggy address is located 104 bytes to the right of
                8192-byte region [ffff88018efc0000, ffff88018efc2000)
[ 2918.419257] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2918.419431] page:ffffea00063bf000 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f2242540 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 2918.419702] flags: 0x17fff8000008100(slab|head)
[ 2918.419879] raw: 017fff8000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff8801f2242540
[ 2918.420101] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000030003 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2918.420322] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[ 2918.420599] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2918.420764]  ffff88018efc1f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2918.420975]  ffff88018efc1f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2918.421194] >ffff88018efc2000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2918.421406]                                                           ^
[ 2918.421627]  ffff88018efc2080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2918.421838]  ffff88018efc2100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2918.422046] ==================================================================
[ 2918.422264] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[ 2923.901641] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88018f0db000
[ 2923.901884] PGD 22226a067 P4D 22226a067 PUD 222273067 PMD 18e642063 PTE 800000018f0db061
[ 2923.902120] Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 2923.902274] CPU: 1 PID: 1231 Comm: umount Tainted: G    B             4.17.0+ #1
[ 2923.902490] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 2923.902761] RIP: 0010:__memset+0x24/0x30
[ 2923.902906] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 66 90 66 90 49 89 f9 48 89 d1 83 e2 07 48 c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 <f3> 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 f3
[ 2923.903446] RSP: 0018:ffff88018ddf7ae0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 2923.903622] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801d549d888 RCX: 1ffffffffffdaffb
[ 2923.903833] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0daffc
[ 2923.904062] RBP: ffff88018efc206c R08: 1ffff10031df840d R09: ffff88018efc206c
[ 2923.904273] R10: ffffffffffffe1ee R11: ffffed0031df65fa R12: 0000000000000000
[ 2923.904485] R13: ffff8801d549dc98 R14: 00000000ffffc3db R15: ffffea00063bec80
[ 2923.904693] FS:  00007fa8b2f8a840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2923.904937] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2923.910080] CR2: ffff88018f0db000 CR3: 000000018f892000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 2923.914930] Call Trace:
[ 2923.919724]  f2fs_truncate_inline_inode+0x114/0x170
[ 2923.924487]  f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x11b/0x7c0
[ 2923.929178]  ? f2fs_truncate_data_blocks+0x10/0x10
[ 2923.933834]  ? dqget+0x670/0x670
[ 2923.938437]  ? f2fs_destroy_extent_tree+0xd6/0x270
[ 2923.943107]  ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x2f/0x150
[ 2923.947772]  f2fs_truncate+0xd4/0x1a0
[ 2923.952491]  f2fs_evict_inode+0x5ab/0x610
[ 2923.957204]  evict+0x15f/0x280
[ 2923.961898]  __dentry_kill+0x161/0x250
[ 2923.966634]  shrink_dentry_list+0xf3/0x250
[ 2923.971897]  shrink_dcache_parent+0xa9/0x100
[ 2923.976561]  ? shrink_dcache_sb+0x1f0/0x1f0
[ 2923.981177]  ? wait_for_completion+0x8a/0x210
[ 2923.985781]  ? migrate_swap_stop+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ 2923.990332]  do_one_tree+0xe/0x40
[ 2923.994735]  shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x3a/0xa0
[ 2923.999077]  generic_shutdown_super+0x3e/0x1c0
[ 2924.003350]  kill_block_super+0x4b/0x70
[ 2924.007619]  deactivate_locked_super+0x65/0x90
[ 2924.011812]  cleanup_mnt+0x5c/0xa0
[ 2924.015995]  task_work_run+0xce/0xf0
[ 2924.020174]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0x115/0x120
[ 2924.024293]  do_syscall_64+0x12f/0x160
[ 2924.028479]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 2924.032709] RIP: 0033:0x7fa8b2868487
[ 2924.036888] Code: 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 f6 e9 09 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 c9 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 2924.045750] RSP: 002b:00007ffc39824d58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 2924.050190] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000008ea030 RCX: 00007fa8b2868487
[ 2924.054604] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000008f4360
[ 2924.058940] RBP: 00000000008f4360 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[ 2924.063186] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fa8b2d7183c
[ 2924.067418] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000008ea210 R15: 00007ffc39824fe0
[ 2924.071534] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_timer joydev input_leds serio_raw snd soundcore mac_hid i2c_piix4 ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core configfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress xxhash raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too qxl ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel psmouse aes_x86_64 8139cp crypto_simd cryptd mii glue_helper pata_acpi floppy
[ 2924.098044] CR2: ffff88018f0db000
[ 2924.102520] ---[ end trace a8e0d899985faf31 ]---
[ 2924.107012] RIP: 0010:__memset+0x24/0x30
[ 2924.111448] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 66 90 66 90 49 89 f9 48 89 d1 83 e2 07 48 c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 <f3> 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 f3
[ 2924.120724] RSP: 0018:ffff88018ddf7ae0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 2924.125312] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801d549d888 RCX: 1ffffffffffdaffb
[ 2924.129931] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88018f0daffc
[ 2924.134537] RBP: ffff88018efc206c R08: 1ffff10031df840d R09: ffff88018efc206c
[ 2924.139175] R10: ffffffffffffe1ee R11: ffffed0031df65fa R12: 0000000000000000
[ 2924.143825] R13: ffff8801d549dc98 R14: 00000000ffffc3db R15: ffffea00063bec80
[ 2924.148500] FS:  00007fa8b2f8a840(0000) GS:ffff8801f3b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2924.153247] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2924.158003] CR2: ffff88018f0db000 CR3: 000000018f892000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 2924.164641] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:00000000fa04621e idx:0 val:4
[ 2924.170007] BUG: Bad rss-counter
tate mm:00000000fa04621e idx:1 val:2

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc3/source/fs/f2fs/inline.c#L78
memset(addr + from, 0, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode) - from);
Here the length can be negative.

Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area

commit c9b60788fc760d136211853f10ce73dc152d1f4a upstream.

This patch add to do sanity check with below field:
- cp_pack_total_block_count
- blkaddr of data/node
- extent info

- Overview
BUG() in verify_block_addr() when writing to a corrupted f2fs image

- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)

- POC (poc.c)

static void activity(char *mpoint) {

  char *foo_bar_baz;
  int err;

  static int buf[8192];
  memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));

  err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);

  int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
  if (fd >= 0) {
    write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
    fdatasync(fd);
    close(fd);
  }
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  activity(argv[1]);
  return 0;
}

- Kernel message
[  689.349473] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
[  699.728662] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1309 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2860 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[  699.728670] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[  699.729056] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  699.729064] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  699.729074] RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x232/0x240
[  699.729076] Code: ff e9 cf fe ff ff 49 8d 7d 10 e8 39 45 ad ff 4d 8b 7d 10 be 04 00 00 00 49 8d 7f 48 e8 07 49 ad ff 45 8b 7f 48 e9 fb fe ff ff <0f> 0b f0 41 80 4d 48 04 e9 65 fe ff ff 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 8d
[  699.729130] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af568 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  699.729139] RAX: 000000000000003f RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88c9113
[  699.729142] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8802024e5540
[  699.729144] RBP: ffff8801f43af590 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: ffffffffffffffe8
[  699.729147] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039b0596a R12: ffff8802024e5540
[  699.729149] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a700 R15: ffff8801e1ee4450
[  699.729154] FS:  00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  699.729156] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  699.729159] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  699.729171] Call Trace:
[  699.729192]  f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[  699.729203]  ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[  699.729238]  ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[  699.729269]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[  699.729276]  __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[  699.729291]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  699.729310]  ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[  699.729321]  ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[  699.729327]  ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[  699.729331]  ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[  699.729345]  ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[  699.729351]  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[  699.729358]  ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[  699.729374]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[  699.729380]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  699.729391]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[  699.729403]  ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[  699.729413]  ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[  699.729418]  ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[  699.729423]  ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[  699.729428]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[  699.729433]  ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[  699.729438]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.729454]  ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[  699.729459]  ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[  699.729464]  do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.729468]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.729472]  ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.729478]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[  699.729483]  ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[  699.729496]  ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[  699.729501]  file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[  699.729506]  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[  699.729511]  ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[  699.729521]  ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[  699.729526]  ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[  699.729530]  f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[  699.729534]  ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[  699.729548]  vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[  699.729554]  ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[  699.729558]  do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[  699.729562]  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[  699.729585]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  699.729595]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  699.729613] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[  699.729615] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[  699.729668] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[  699.729673] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[  699.729675] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  699.729678] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  699.729680] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[  699.729683] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  699.729687] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[  699.729782] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  699.729785] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:654!
[  699.731055] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  699.732104] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G        W         4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  699.733684] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  699.735611] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[  699.736649] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[  699.740524] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[  699.741573] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[  699.743006] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[  699.744426] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[  699.745833] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[  699.747256] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[  699.748683] FS:  00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  699.750293] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  699.751462] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  699.752874] Call Trace:
[  699.753386]  ? f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x93/0x240
[  699.754341]  f2fs_inplace_write_data+0xd2/0x240
[  699.755271]  f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x2e2/0xe00
[  699.756214]  ? f2fs_should_update_outplace+0xd0/0xd0
[  699.757215]  ? memcg_drain_all_list_lrus+0x280/0x280
[  699.758209]  ? __radix_tree_replace+0xa3/0x120
[  699.759164]  __write_data_page+0x5c7/0xe30
[  699.760002]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  699.760823]  ? page_mapped+0x8a/0x110
[  699.761573]  ? page_mkclean+0xe9/0x160
[  699.762345]  ? f2fs_do_write_data_page+0xe00/0xe00
[  699.763332]  ? invalid_page_referenced_vma+0x130/0x130
[  699.764374]  ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[  699.765347]  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x4ca/0x860
[  699.766276]  ? __write_data_page+0xe30/0xe30
[  699.767161]  ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x22/0xa0
[  699.768112]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  699.768951]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40
[  699.769739]  ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync.part.18+0x16/0x30
[  699.770885]  ? iov_iter_advance+0x113/0x640
[  699.771743]  ? f2fs_write_end+0x133/0x2e0
[  699.772569]  ? balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited+0x239/0x640
[  699.773680]  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x329/0x520
[  699.774603]  ? generic_perform_write+0x250/0x320
[  699.775544]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.776510]  ? current_time+0x110/0x110
[  699.777299]  ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x1ef/0x370
[  699.778279]  do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.779026]  ? f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x860/0x860
[  699.779978]  ? do_writepages+0x37/0xb0
[  699.780755]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x19a/0x1f0
[  699.781746]  ? delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x4e0/0x4e0
[  699.782820]  ? __vfs_write+0x2b2/0x410
[  699.783597]  file_write_and_wait_range+0x66/0xb0
[  699.784540]  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1f9/0xd90
[  699.785381]  ? truncate_partial_data_page+0x290/0x290
[  699.786415]  ? __sb_end_write+0x30/0x50
[  699.787204]  ? vfs_write+0x20f/0x260
[  699.787941]  f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[  699.788694]  ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[  699.789572]  vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[  699.790360]  ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[  699.791128]  do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[  699.791779]  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[  699.792614]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  699.793371]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  699.794406] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[  699.795134] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 49 bf 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 4b 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be 78 01 00 48 89 04 24
[  699.798960] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[  699.800483] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[  699.801923] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  699.803373] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  699.804798] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[  699.806233] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  699.807667] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[  699.817079] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df6 ]---
[  699.818068] RIP: 0010:f2fs_submit_page_bio+0x29b/0x730
[  699.819114] Code: 54 49 8d bd 18 04 00 00 e8 b2 59 af ff 41 8b 8d 18 04 00 00 8b 45 b8 41 d3 e6 44 01 f0 4c 8d 73 14 41 39 c7 0f 82 37 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 65 8b 05 2c 04 77 47 89 c0 48 0f a3 05 52 c1 d5 01 0f 92 c0
[  699.822919] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f43af508 EFLAGS: 00010283
[  699.823977] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8801f43af7b8 RCX: ffffffffb88a7cef
[  699.825436] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3e7a64c
[  699.826881] RBP: ffff8801f43af558 R08: ffffed003e066b55 R09: ffffed003e066b55
[  699.828292] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e066b54 R12: ffffea0007876940
[  699.829750] R13: ffff8801f0335500 R14: ffff8801e3e7a600 R15: 0000000000000001
[  699.831192] FS:  00007f9bf97f5700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  699.832793] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  699.833981] CR2: 00007f9bf925d170 CR3: 00000001f0c34000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  699.835556] ==================================================================
[  699.837029] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[  699.838462] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801f43af970 by task a.out/1309

[  699.840086] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: a.out Tainted: G      D W         4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  699.841603] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  699.843475] Call Trace:
[  699.843982]  dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[  699.844661]  print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[  699.845607]  kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[  699.846351]  ? update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[  699.853831]  __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[  699.854569]  update_stack_state+0x38c/0x3e0
[  699.855428]  ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.7+0x20/0x20
[  699.856601]  ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[  699.857476]  unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x18e/0x490
[  699.858448]  ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290
[  699.859217]  ? clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x332/0x450
[  699.860185]  __unwind_start+0x106/0x190
[  699.860974]  __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[  699.861808]  ? __save_stack_trace+0x5e/0x100
[  699.862691]  ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[  699.863525]  save_stack_trace+0x1f/0x30
[  699.864312]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[  699.864993]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1420/0x1420
[  699.865990]  ? flush_tlb_mm_range+0x15e/0x220
[  699.866889]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  699.867724]  ? __dec_node_state+0x92/0xb0
[  699.868543]  ? lock_page_memcg+0x85/0xf0
[  699.869350]  ? unlock_page_memcg+0x16/0x80
[  699.870185]  ? page_remove_rmap+0x198/0x520
[  699.871048]  ? mark_page_accessed+0x133/0x200
[  699.871930]  ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[  699.872700]  ? unmap_page_range+0xcd4/0xe50
[  699.873551]  ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[  699.874217]  ? rb_next+0x58/0x80
[  699.874895]  __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0
[  699.875734]  ? unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[  699.876563]  kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[  699.877315]  kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0
[  699.878095]  unlink_anon_vmas+0xba/0x2c0
[  699.878913]  free_pgtables+0x101/0x1b0
[  699.879677]  exit_mmap+0x146/0x2a0
[  699.880378]  ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[  699.881214]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  699.882052]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[  699.882985]  mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[  699.883602]  do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[  699.884288]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[  699.885212]  ? f2fs_sync_file+0x9a/0xb0
[  699.885995]  ? f2fs_do_sync_file+0xd90/0xd90
[  699.886877]  ? vfs_fsync_range+0x68/0x100
[  699.887694]  ? __fget_light+0xc9/0xe0
[  699.888442]  ? do_fsync+0x3d/0x70
[  699.889118]  ? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x24/0x30
[  699.889996]  rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[  699.890860] RIP: 0033:0x7f9bf930d800
[  699.891585] Code: Bad RIP value.
[  699.892268] RSP: 002b:00007ffee3606c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[  699.893781] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9bf930d800
[  699.895220] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 00000000006010a0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  699.896643] RBP: 00007ffee3606ca0 R08: 0000000001503010 R09: 0000000000000000
[  699.898069] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400610
[  699.899505] R13: 00007ffee3606da0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

[  699.901241] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  699.902215] page:ffffea0007d0ebc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[  699.903811] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[  699.904585] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff07d00101 0000000000000000
[  699.906125] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  699.907673] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  699.909108] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  699.910077]  ffff8801f43af800: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00
[  699.911528]  ffff8801f43af880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  699.912953] >ffff8801f43af900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 01 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2
[  699.914392]                                                              ^
[  699.915758]  ffff8801f43af980: f2 00 f4 f4 00 00 00 00 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  699.917193]  ffff8801f43afa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
[  699.918634] ==================================================================

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L644

Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
 - Error label is different in validate_checkpoint() due to the earlier
   backport of "f2fs: fix invalid memory access"
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: fix to do sanity check with node footer and iblocks

commit e34438c903b653daca2b2a7de95aed46226f8ed3 upstream.

This patch adds to do sanity check with below fields of inode to
avoid reported panic.
- node footer
- iblocks

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200223

- Overview
BUG() triggered in f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks() when un-mounting a mounted f2fs image after writing to it

- Reproduce

- POC (poc.c)

static void activity(char *mpoint) {

  char *foo_bar_baz;
  int err;

  static int buf[8192];
  memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));

  err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);

  // open / write / read
  int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDWR | O_TRUNC, 0777);
  if (fd >= 0) {
    write(fd, (char *)buf, 517);
    write(fd, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf));
    close(fd);
  }

}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  activity(argv[1]);
  return 0;
}

- Kernel meesage
[  552.479723] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2
[  556.451891] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  556.451899] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:987!
[  556.452920] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  556.453936] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  556.455213] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  556.457140] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[  556.458280] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[  556.462015] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  556.463068] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[  556.464479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[  556.465901] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[  556.467311] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[  556.468706] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[  556.470117] FS:  00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  556.471702] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  556.472838] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  556.474265] Call Trace:
[  556.474782]  ? f2fs_alloc_nid_failed+0xf0/0xf0
[  556.475686]  ? truncate_nodes+0x980/0x980
[  556.476516]  ? pagecache_get_page+0x21f/0x2f0
[  556.477412]  ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[  556.478153]  ? __get_node_page+0x331/0x5b0
[  556.478992]  ? reweight_entity+0x1e6/0x3b0
[  556.479826]  f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x55e/0x740
[  556.480709]  ? f2fs_truncate_data_blocks+0x20/0x20
[  556.481689]  ? __radix_tree_lookup+0x34/0x160
[  556.482630]  ? radix_tree_lookup+0xd/0x10
[  556.483445]  f2fs_truncate+0xd4/0x1a0
[  556.484206]  f2fs_evict_inode+0x5ce/0x630
[  556.485032]  evict+0x16f/0x290
[  556.485664]  iput+0x280/0x300
[  556.486300]  dentry_unlink_inode+0x165/0x1e0
[  556.487169]  __dentry_kill+0x16a/0x260
[  556.487936]  dentry_kill+0x70/0x250
[  556.488651]  shrink_dentry_list+0x125/0x260
[  556.489504]  shrink_dcache_parent+0xc1/0x110
[  556.490379]  ? shrink_dcache_sb+0x200/0x200
[  556.491231]  ? bit_wait_timeout+0xc0/0xc0
[  556.492047]  do_one_tree+0x12/0x40
[  556.492743]  shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x3f/0xa0
[  556.493656]  generic_shutdown_super+0x43/0x1c0
[  556.494561]  kill_block_super+0x52/0x80
[  556.495341]  kill_f2fs_super+0x62/0x70
[  556.496105]  deactivate_locked_super+0x6f/0xa0
[  556.497004]  deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[  556.497785]  cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[  556.498492]  __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[  556.499218]  task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[  556.499949]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[  556.500846]  do_syscall_64+0x138/0x170
[  556.501609]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  556.502659] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[  556.503384] Code: 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 f6 e9 09 00 00 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 c9 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  556.507137] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[  556.508637] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[  556.510069] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[  556.511481] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[  556.512892] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[  556.514320] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820
[  556.515745] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[  556.529276] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[  556.530340] RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x4a7/0x6f0
[  556.531513] Code: e8 ae ea ff ff 41 89 c7 c1 e8 1f 84 c0 74 0a 41 83 ff fe 0f 85 35 ff ff ff 81 85 b0 fe ff ff fb 03 00 00 e9 f7 fd ff ff 0f 0b <0f> 0b e8 62 b7 9a 00 48 8b bd a0 fe ff ff e8 56 54 ae ff 48 8b b5
[  556.535330] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f292f808 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  556.536395] RAX: ffffed003e73242d RBX: ffff8801f292f958 RCX: ffffffffb88b81bc
[  556.537824] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff8801f3992164
[  556.539290] RBP: ffff8801f292f980 R08: ffffed003e73242d R09: ffffed003e73242d
[  556.540709] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003e73242c R12: 00000000fffffc64
[  556.542131] R13: ffff8801f3992000 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 00000000ffff8801
[  556.543579] FS:  00007f8029297840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  556.545180] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  556.546338] CR2: 000055f5f57305d8 CR3: 00000001f18b0000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  556.547809] ==================================================================
[  556.549248] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[  556.550672] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8801f292fd10 by task umount/1310

[  556.552338] CPU: 1 PID: 1310 Comm: umount Tainted: G      D           4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  556.553886] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  556.555756] Call Trace:
[  556.556264]  dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[  556.556944]  print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[  556.557903]  kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[  556.558649]  ? arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[  556.559537]  __asan_store8+0x57/0x90
[  556.560268]  arch_tlb_gather_mmu+0x52/0x170
[  556.561110]  tlb_gather_mmu+0x12/0x40
[  556.561862]  exit_mmap+0x123/0x2a0
[  556.562555]  ? __ia32_sys_munmap+0x50/0x50
[  556.563384]  ? exit_aio+0x98/0x230
[  556.564079]  ? __x32_compat_sys_io_submit+0x260/0x260
[  556.565099]  ? taskstats_exit+0x1f4/0x640
[  556.565925]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[  556.566739]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x322/0x380
[  556.567652]  mmput+0x8b/0x1d0
[  556.568260]  do_exit+0x43a/0x1390
[  556.568937]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[  556.569855]  ? deactivate_super+0x5e/0x80
[  556.570668]  ? cleanup_mnt+0x61/0xa0
[  556.571395]  ? __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[  556.572156]  ? task_work_run+0xc8/0xf0
[  556.572917]  ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x125/0x130
[  556.573861]  rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20
[  556.574707] RIP: 0033:0x7f8028b77487
[  556.575428] Code: Bad RIP value.
[  556.576106] RSP: 002b:00007fff9f2e3598 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[  556.577599] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000ebd030 RCX: 00007f8028b77487
[  556.579020] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000ec41e0
[  556.580422] RBP: 0000000000ec41e0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000014
[  556.581833] R10: 00000000000006b2 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f802908083c
[  556.583252] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000ebd210 R15: 00007fff9f2e3820

[  556.584983] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  556.585961] page:ffffea0007ca4bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[  556.587540] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[  556.588296] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[  556.589822] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  556.591359] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  556.592786] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  556.593753]  ffff8801f292fc00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  556.595191]  ffff8801f292fc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00
[  556.596613] >ffff8801f292fd00: 00 00 f3 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 f4 f4 f4
[  556.598044]                          ^
[  556.598797]  ffff8801f292fd80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  556.600225]  ffff8801f292fe00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f4 f4 f4
[  556.601647] ==================================================================

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/node.c#L987
case NODE_DIND_BLOCK:
err = truncate_nodes(&dn, nofs, offset[1], 3);
cont = 0;
break;

default:
BUG(); <---
}

Reported-by Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: fix to do sanity check with user_block_count

commit 9dc956b2c8523aed39d1e6508438be9fea28c8fc upstream.

This patch fixs to do sanity check with user_block_count.

- Overview
Divide zero in utilization when mount() a corrupted f2fs image

- Reproduce (4.18 upstream kernel)

- Kernel message
[  564.099503] F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
[  564.101991] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  564.103103] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  564.104584] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  564.106624] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[  564.107692] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[  564.111686] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  564.112775] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[  564.114250] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[  564.115706] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[  564.117177] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[  564.118634] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[  564.120094] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  564.121748] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  564.122923] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  564.124383] Call Trace:
[  564.124924]  ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[  564.125882]  ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[  564.126756]  ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[  564.127620]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[  564.128412]  kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[  564.129105]  ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[  564.130029]  ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0x150/0x150
[  564.131033]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[  564.131794] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[  564.141798] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[  564.142773] RIP: 0010:issue_discard_thread+0x248/0x5c0
[  564.143885] Code: ff ff 48 8b bd e8 fe ff ff 41 8b 9d 4c 04 00 00 e8 cd b8 ad ff 41 8b 85 50 04 00 00 31 d2 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 80 48 c1 e0 02 <48> f7 f3 83 f8 50 7e 16 41 c7 86 7c ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 41 c7 86
[  564.147776] RSP: 0018:ffff8801f3117dc0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[  564.148856] RAX: 0000000000000384 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb88c1e03
[  564.150424] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e3aa4850
[  564.151906] RBP: ffff8801f3117f00 R08: 1ffffffff751a1d0 R09: fffffbfff751a1d0
[  564.153463] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff751a1d0 R12: 00000000fffffffc
[  564.154915] R13: ffff8801e3aa4400 R14: ffff8801f3117ed8 R15: ffff8801e2050000
[  564.156405] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801f6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  564.158070] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  564.159279] CR2: 000000000202b078 CR3: 00000001f11ac000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  564.161043] ==================================================================
[  564.162587] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[  564.163994] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801f3117c84 by task f2fs_discard-7:/1298

[  564.165852] CPU: 1 PID: 1298 Comm: f2fs_discard-7: Tainted: G      D           4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  564.167593] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  564.169522] Call Trace:
[  564.170057]  dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[  564.170778]  print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[  564.171765]  kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[  564.172540]  ? from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[  564.173408]  __asan_load4+0x78/0x80
[  564.174148]  from_kuid_munged+0x1d/0x50
[  564.174962]  do_notify_parent+0x1f5/0x4f0
[  564.175808]  ? send_sigqueue+0x390/0x390
[  564.176639]  ? css_set_move_task+0x152/0x340
[  564.184197]  do_exit+0x1290/0x1390
[  564.184950]  ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[  564.185884]  ? mm_update_next_owner+0x380/0x380
[  564.186829]  ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[  564.187672]  ? __kthread_parkme+0xcb/0x100
[  564.188528]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x70/0x70
[  564.189333]  ? kthread+0x180/0x1d0
[  564.190052]  ? __issue_discard_cmd+0x480/0x480
[  564.190983]  rewind_stack_do_exit+0x17/0x20

[  564.192190] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  564.193213] page:ffffea0007cc45c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
[  564.194856] flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
[  564.195644] raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000200 0000000000000000
[  564.197247] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  564.198826] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  564.200299] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  564.201306]  ffff8801f3117b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  564.202779]  ffff8801f3117c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
[  564.204252] >ffff8801f3117c80: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[  564.205742]                    ^
[  564.206424]  ffff8801f3117d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  564.207908]  ffff8801f3117d80: f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  564.209389] ==================================================================
[  564.231795] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 2

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.18-rc1/source/fs/f2fs/segment.h#L586
return div_u64((u64)valid_user_blocks(sbi) * 100,
sbi->user_block_count);
Missing checks on sbi->user_block_count.

Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: fix to do sanity check with extra_attr feature

commit 76d56d4ab4f2a9e4f085c7d77172194ddaccf7d2 upstream.

If FI_EXTRA_ATTR is set in inode by fuzzing, inode.i_addr[0] will be
parsed as inode.i_extra_isize, then in __recover_inline_status, inline
data address will beyond boundary of page, result in accessing invalid
memory.

So in this condition, during reading inode page, let's do sanity check
with EXTRA_ATTR feature of fs and extra_attr bit of inode, if they're
inconsistent, deny to load this inode.

- Overview
Out-of-bound access in f2fs_iget() when mounting a corrupted f2fs image

- Reproduce

The following message will be got in KASAN build of 4.18 upstream kernel.
[  819.392227] ==================================================================
[  819.393901] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530
[  819.395329] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801f099c968 by task mount/1292

[  819.397079] CPU: 1 PID: 1292 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  819.397082] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  819.397088] Call Trace:
[  819.397124]  dump_stack+0x7b/0xb5
[  819.397154]  print_address_description+0x70/0x290
[  819.397159]  kasan_report+0x291/0x390
[  819.397163]  ? f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530
[  819.397176]  check_memory_region+0x139/0x190
[  819.397182]  __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[  819.397185]  f2fs_iget+0x736/0x1530
[  819.397197]  f2fs_fill_super+0x1b4f/0x2b40
[  819.397202]  ? f2fs_fill_super+0x1b4f/0x2b40
[  819.397208]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[  819.397227]  ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[  819.397241]  mount_bdev+0x1c5/0x210
[  819.397245]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[  819.397252]  f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[  819.397256]  mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[  819.397267]  ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[  819.397272]  vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[  819.397282]  do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[  819.397300]  ? lockref_put_or_lock+0xcf/0x160
[  819.397306]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[  819.397318]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[  819.397324]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  819.397334]  ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[  819.397353]  ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[  819.397359]  ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[  819.397365]  __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[  819.397388]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  819.397403]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  819.397422] RIP: 0033:0x7f54c667cb9a
[  819.397424] Code: 48 8b 0d 01 c3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ce c2 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  819.397483] RSP: 002b:00007ffd8f46cd08 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[  819.397496] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000dfa030 RCX: 00007f54c667cb9a
[  819.397498] RDX: 0000000000dfa210 RSI: 0000000000dfbf30 RDI: 0000000000e02ec0
[  819.397501] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[  819.397503] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000e02ec0
[  819.397505] R13: 0000000000dfa210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003

[  819.397866] Allocated by task 139:
[  819.398702]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[  819.398705]  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[  819.398709]  kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20
[  819.398713]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xd1/0x1e0
[  819.398717]  dup_fd+0x50/0x4c0
[  819.398740]  copy_process.part.37+0xbed/0x32e0
[  819.398744]  _do_fork+0x16e/0x590
[  819.398748]  __x64_sys_clone+0x69/0x80
[  819.398752]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  819.398756]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[  819.399097] Freed by task 159:
[  819.399743]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[  819.399747]  __kasan_slab_free+0x13c/0x1a0
[  819.399750]  kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[  819.399754]  kmem_cache_free+0x89/0x1e0
[  819.399757]  put_files_struct+0x132/0x150
[  819.399761]  exit_files+0x62/0x70
[  819.399766]  do_exit+0x47b/0x1390
[  819.399770]  do_group_exit+0x86/0x130
[  819.399774]  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x2c/0x30
[  819.399778]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  819.399782]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[  819.400115] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801f099c680
                which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 704
[  819.403234] The buggy address is located 40 bytes to the right of
                704-byte region [ffff8801f099c680, ffff8801f099c940)
[  819.405689] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  819.406709] page:ffffea0007c26700 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801f69a3340 index:0xffff8801f099d380 compound_mapcount: 0
[  819.408984] flags: 0x2ffff0000008100(slab|head)
[  819.409932] raw: 02ffff0000008100 ffffea00077fb600 0000000200000002 ffff8801f69a3340
[  819.411514] raw: ffff8801f099d380 0000000080130000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  819.413073] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[  819.414539] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  819.415521]  ffff8801f099c800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  819.416981]  ffff8801f099c880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  819.418454] >ffff8801f099c900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  819.419921]                                                           ^
[  819.421265]  ffff8801f099c980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  819.422745]  ffff8801f099ca00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  819.424206] ==================================================================
[  819.425668] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[  819.457463] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3

The kernel still mounts the image. If you run the following program on the mounted folder mnt,

(poc.c)

static void activity(char *mpoint) {

  char *foo_bar_baz;
  int err;

  static int buf[8192];
  memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));

  err = asprintf(&foo_bar_baz, "%s/foo/bar/baz", mpoint);
    int fd = open(foo_bar_baz, O_RDONLY, 0);
  if (fd >= 0) {
      read(fd, (char *)buf, 11);
      close(fd);
  }
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  activity(argv[1]);
  return 0;
}

You can get kernel crash:
[  819.457463] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 3
[  918.028501] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffed0048000d82
[  918.044020] PGD 23ffee067 P4D 23ffee067 PUD 23fbef067 PMD 0
[  918.045207] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  918.046048] CPU: 0 PID: 1309 Comm: poc Tainted: G    B             4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  918.047573] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  918.049552] RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5e/0x190
[  918.050565] Code: f8 49 c1 e8 03 49 89 db 49 c1 eb 03 4d 01 cb 4d 01 c1 4d 8d 63 01 4c 89 c8 4d 89 e2 4d 29 ca 49 83 fa 10 7f 3d 4d 85 d2 74 32 <41> 80 39 00 75 23 48 b8 01 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 01 d1 49 01 c0
[  918.054322] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e3a1f258 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  918.055400] RAX: ffffed0048000d82 RBX: ffff880240006c11 RCX: ffffffffb8867d14
[  918.056832] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff880240006c10
[  918.058253] RBP: ffff8801e3a1f268 R08: 1ffff10048000d82 R09: ffffed0048000d82
[  918.059717] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0048000d82 R12: ffffed0048000d83
[  918.061159] R13: ffff8801e3a1f390 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880240006c08
[  918.062614] FS:  00007fac9732c700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  918.064246] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  918.065412] CR2: ffffed0048000d82 CR3: 00000001df77a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  918.066882] Call Trace:
[  918.067410]  __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
[  918.068149]  f2fs_find_target_dentry+0xf4/0x270
[  918.069083]  ? __get_node_page+0x331/0x5b0
[  918.069925]  f2fs_find_in_inline_dir+0x24b/0x310
[  918.070881]  ? f2fs_recover_inline_data+0x4c0/0x4c0
[  918.071905]  ? unwind_next_frame.part.5+0x34f/0x490
[  918.072901]  ? unwind_dump+0x290/0x290
[  918.073695]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0xe/0x20
[  918.074566]  __f2fs_find_entry+0x599/0x670
[  918.075408]  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[  918.076315]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[  918.077100]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x55/0xa0
[  918.077998]  ? f2fs_find_target_dentry+0x270/0x270
[  918.079006]  ? d_set_d_op+0x30/0x100
[  918.079749]  ? __d_lookup_rcu+0x69/0x2e0
[  918.080556]  ? __d_alloc+0x275/0x450
[  918.081297]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  918.082135]  ? memset+0x31/0x40
[  918.082820]  ? fscrypt_setup_filename+0x1ec/0x4c0
[  918.083782]  ? d_alloc_parallel+0x5bb/0x8c0
[  918.084640]  f2fs_find_entry+0xe9/0x110
[  918.085432]  ? __f2fs_find_entry+0x670/0x670
[  918.086308]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  918.087163]  f2fs_lookup+0x297/0x590
[  918.087902]  ? f2fs_link+0x2b0/0x2b0
[  918.088646]  ? legitimize_path.isra.29+0x61/0xa0
[  918.089589]  __lookup_slow+0x12e/0x240
[  918.090371]  ? may_delete+0x2b0/0x2b0
[  918.091123]  ? __nd_alloc_stack+0xa0/0xa0
[  918.091944]  lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
[  918.092642]  walk_component+0x3ee/0xa40
[  918.093428]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0xe/0x20
[  918.094283]  ? pick_link+0x3e0/0x3e0
[  918.095047]  ? in_group_p+0xa5/0xe0
[  918.095771]  ? generic_permission+0x53/0x1e0
[  918.096666]  ? security_inode_permission+0x1d/0x70
[  918.097646]  ? inode_permission+0x7a/0x1f0
[  918.098497]  link_path_walk+0x2a2/0x7b0
[  918.099298]  ? apparmor_capget+0x3d0/0x3d0
[  918.100140]  ? walk_component+0xa40/0xa40
[  918.100958]  ? path_init+0x2e6/0x580
[  918.101695]  path_openat+0x1bb/0x2160
[  918.102471]  ? __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
[  918.103352]  ? save_stack+0xb5/0xd0
[  918.104070]  ? vfs_unlink+0x250/0x250
[  918.104822]  ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[  918.105538]  ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20
[  918.106370]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd1/0x1e0
[  918.107213]  ? getname_flags+0x76/0x2c0
[  918.107997]  ? getname+0x12/0x20
[  918.108677]  ? do_sys_open+0x14b/0x2c0
[  918.109450]  ? __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[  918.110255]  ? do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  918.111083]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  918.112148]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  918.113204]  ? f2fs_empty_inline_dir+0x1e0/0x1e0
[  918.114150]  ? timespec64_trunc+0x5c/0x90
[  918.114993]  ? wb_io_lists_depopulated+0x1a/0xc0
[  918.115937]  ? inode_io_list_move_locked+0x102/0x110
[  918.116949]  do_filp_open+0x12b/0x1d0
[  918.117709]  ? may_open_dev+0x50/0x50
[  918.118475]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[  918.119246]  do_sys_open+0x17c/0x2c0
[  918.119983]  ? do_sys_open+0x17c/0x2c0
[  918.120751]  ? filp_open+0x60/0x60
[  918.121463]  ? task_work_run+0x4d/0xf0
[  918.122237]  __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60
[  918.123001]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  918.123759]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  918.124802] RIP: 0033:0x7fac96e3e040
[  918.125537] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 09 27 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 7e e0 01 00 48 89 04 24
[  918.129341] RSP: 002b:00007fff1b37f848 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
[  918.130870] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fac96e3e040
[  918.132295] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000122d080
[  918.133748] RBP: 00007fff1b37f9b0 R08: 00007fac9710bbd8 R09: 0000000000000001
[  918.135209] R10: 000000000000069d R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400c20
[  918.136650] R13: 00007fff1b37fab0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  918.138093] Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd mac_hid i2c_piix4 soundcore ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid1 raid0 multipath linear 8139too crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul qxl drm_kms_helper syscopyarea aesni_intel sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd 8139cp glue_helper mii pata_acpi floppy
[  918.147924] CR2: ffffed0048000d82
[  918.148619] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[  918.149563] RIP: 0010:check_memory_region+0x5e/0x190
[  918.150576] Code: f8 49 c1 e8 03 49 89 db 49 c1 eb 03 4d 01 cb 4d 01 c1 4d 8d 63 01 4c 89 c8 4d 89 e2 4d 29 ca 49 83 fa 10 7f 3d 4d 85 d2 74 32 <41> 80 39 00 75 23 48 b8 01 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 01 d1 49 01 c0
[  918.154360] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e3a1f258 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  918.155411] RAX: ffffed0048000d82 RBX: ffff880240006c11 RCX: ffffffffb8867d14
[  918.156833] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff880240006c10
[  918.158257] RBP: ffff8801e3a1f268 R08: 1ffff10048000d82 R09: ffffed0048000d82
[  918.159722] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0048000d82 R12: ffffed0048000d83
[  918.161149] R13: ffff8801e3a1f390 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880240006c08
[  918.162587] FS:  00007fac9732c700(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  918.164203] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  918.165356] CR2: ffffed0048000d82 CR3: 00000001df77a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: Add sanity_check_inode() function

This was done as part of commit 5d64600d4f33 "f2fs: avoid bug_on on
corrupted inode" upstream, but the specific check that commit added is
not applicable to 4.14.

Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: fix to do sanity check with secs_per_zone

commit 42bf546c1fe3f3654bdf914e977acbc2b80a5be5 upstream.

As Wen Xu reported in below link:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200183

- Overview
Divide zero in reset_curseg() when mounting a crafted f2fs image

- Reproduce

- Kernel message
[  588.281510] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  588.282701] CPU: 0 PID: 1293 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #4
[  588.284000] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  588.286178] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[  588.298166] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  588.299360] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[  588.300809] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[  588.305272] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[  588.306822] FS:  00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  588.308456] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  588.309623] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  588.311085] Call Trace:
[  588.311637]  f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x103f/0x3410
[  588.316136]  ? f2fs_commit_super+0x1b0/0x1b0
[  588.317031]  ? set_blocksize+0x90/0x140
[  588.319473]  f2fs_mount+0x15/0x20
[  588.320166]  mount_fs+0x60/0x1a0
[  588.320847]  ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x309/0x360
[  588.321647]  vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x1a0
[  588.322432]  do_mount+0x34a/0x18c0
[  588.323175]  ? strndup_user+0x46/0x70
[  588.323937]  ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20
[  588.324793]  ? memcg_kmem_put_cache+0x1b/0xa0
[  588.325702]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[  588.326562]  ? _copy_from_user+0x6a/0x90
[  588.327375]  ? memdup_user+0x42/0x60
[  588.328118]  ksys_mount+0x83/0xd0
[  588.328808]  __x64_sys_mount+0x67/0x80
[  588.329607]  do_syscall_64+0x78/0x170
[  588.330400]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  588.331461] RIP: 0033:0x7fad848e8b9a
[  588.336022] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c5b6be8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[  588.337547] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000016f8030 RCX: 00007fad848e8b9a
[  588.338999] RDX: 00000000016f8210 RSI: 00000000016f9f30 RDI: 0000000001700ec0
[  588.340442] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000013
[  588.341887] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000001700ec0
[  588.343341] R13: 00000000016f8210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
[  588.354891] ---[ end trace 4ce02f25ff7d3df5 ]---
[  588.355862] RIP: 0010:reset_curseg+0x94/0x1a0
[  588.360742] RSP: 0018:ffff8801e88d7940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  588.361812] RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: ffff8801e1d46d00 RCX: ffffffffb88bf60b
[  588.363485] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8801e1d46d64
[  588.365213] RBP: ffff8801e88d7968 R08: ffffed003c32266f R09: ffffed003c32266f
[  588.366661] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003c32266e R12: ffff8801f0337700
[  588.368110] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000014 R15: 0000000000000000
[  588.370057] FS:  00007fad85008840(0000) GS:ffff8801f6e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  588.372099] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  588.373291] CR2: 0000000001705078 CR3: 00000001f30f8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

- Location
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/fs/f2fs/segment.c#L2147
        curseg->zone = GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG(sbi, curseg->segno);

If secs_per_zone is corrupted due to fuzzing test, it will cause divide
zero operation when using GET_ZONE_FROM_SEG macro, so we should do more
sanity check with secs_per_zone during mount to avoid this issue.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: introduce and spread verify_blkaddr

commit e1da7872f6eda977bd812346bf588c35e4495a1e upstream.

This patch introduces verify_blkaddr to check meta/data block address
with valid range to detect bug earlier.

In addition, once we encounter an invalid blkaddr, notice user to run
fsck to fix, and let the kernel panic.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: I skipped an earlier renaming of
 is_valid_meta_blkaddr() to f2fs_is_valid_meta_blkaddr()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: clean up with is_valid_blkaddr()

commit 7b525dd01365c6764018e374d391c92466be1b7a upstream.

- rename is_valid_blkaddr() to is_valid_meta_blkaddr() for readability.
- introduce is_valid_blkaddr() for cleanup.

No logic change in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: enhance sanity_check_raw_super() to avoid potential overflow

commit 0cfe75c5b011994651a4ca6d74f20aa997bfc69a upstream.

In order to avoid the below overflow issue, we should have checked the
boundaries in superblock before reaching out to allocation. As Linus suggested,
the right place should be sanity_check_raw_super().

Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect reported:

There are integer overflows with using the cp_payload superblock field in the
f2fs filesystem potentially leading to memory corruption.

include/linux/f2fs_fs.h

struct f2fs_super_block {
...
        __le32 cp_payload;

fs/f2fs/f2fs.h

typedef u32 block_t;    /*
                         * should not change u32, since it is the on-disk block
                         * address format, __le32.
                         */
...

static inline block_t __cp_payload(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
        return le32_to_cpu(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->cp_payload);
}

fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c

        block_t start_blk, orphan_blocks, i, j;
...
        start_blk = __start_cp_addr(sbi) + 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
        orphan_blocks = __start_sum_addr(sbi) - 1 - __cp_payload(sbi);

+++ integer overflows

...
        unsigned int cp_blks = 1 + __cp_payload(sbi);
...
        sbi->ckpt = kzalloc(cp_blks * blk_size, GFP_KERNEL);

+++ integer overflow leading to incorrect heap allocation.

        int cp_payload_blks = __cp_payload(sbi);
...
        ckpt->cp_pack_start_sum = cpu_to_le32(1 + cp_payload_blks +
                        orphan_blocks);

+++ sign bug and integer overflow

...
        for (i = 1; i < 1 + cp_payload_blks; i++)

+++ integer overflow

...

      sbi->max_orphans = (sbi->blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS -
                        NR_CURSEG_TYPE - __cp_payload(sbi)) *
                                F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK;

+++ integer overflow

Reported-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Reported-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: No hot file extension support]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: sanity check on sit entry

commit b2ca374f33bd33fd822eb871876e4888cf79dc97 upstream.

syzbot hit the following crash on upstream commit
87ef12027b9b1dd0e0b12cf311fbcb19f9d92539 (Wed Apr 18 19:48:17 2018 +0000)
Merge tag 'ceph-for-4.17-rc2' of git://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=83699adeb2d13579c31e
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?id=5805208181407744
syzkaller reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?id=6005073343676416
Raw console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?id=6555047731134464
Kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?id=1808800213120130118
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)

IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+83699adeb2d13579c31e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
It will help syzbot understand when the bug is fixed. See footer for details.
If you forward the report, please keep this part and the footer.

F2FS-fs (loop0): Magic Mismatch, valid(0xf2f52010) - read(0x0)
F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock
F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffed006b2a50c0
PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21fbeb067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 4514 Comm: syzkaller989480 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1+ #8
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline]
RIP: 0010:build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852
RSP: 0018:ffff8801b102e5b0 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: 1ffff1006b2a50c0 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8801ac74243e
RBP: ffff8801b102f410 R08: ffff8801acbd46c0 R09: fffffbfff14d9af8
R10: fffffbfff14d9af8 R11: ffff8801acbd46c0 R12: ffff8801ac742a80
R13: ffff8801d9519100 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff880359528600
FS:  0000000001e04880(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0 CR3: 00000001ac6ac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 f2fs_fill_super+0x4095/0x7bf0 fs/f2fs/super.c:2803
 mount_bdev+0x30c/0x3e0 fs/super.c:1165
 f2fs_mount+0x34/0x40 fs/f2fs/super.c:3020
 mount_fs+0xae/0x328 fs/super.c:1268
 vfs_kern_mount.part.34+0xd4/0x4d0 fs/namespace.c:1037
 vfs_kern_mount fs/namespace.c:1027 [inline]
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2517 [inline]
 do_mount+0x564/0x3070 fs/namespace.c:2847
 ksys_mount+0x12d/0x140 fs/namespace.c:3063
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3077 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3074 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0xbe/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3074
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x443d6a
RSP: 002b:00007ffd312813c8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000c00 RCX: 0000000000443d6a
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffd312813d0
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000020016a00 R09: 000000000000000a
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000402c60 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
RIP: build_sit_entries fs/f2fs/segment.c:3653 [inline] RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
RIP: build_segment_manager+0x7ef7/0xbf70 fs/f2fs/segment.c:3852 RSP: ffff8801b102e5b0
CR2: ffffed006b2a50c0
---[ end trace a2034989e196ff17 ]---

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+83699adeb2d13579c31e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

f2fs: check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a bio

commit 0833721ec3658a4e9d5e58b6fa82cf9edc431e59 upstream.

This patch check blkaddr more accuratly before issue a
write or read bio.

Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

btrfs: tree-checker: Fix misleading group system information

commit 761333f2f50ccc887aa9957ae829300262c0d15b upstream.

block_group_err shows the group system as a decimal value with a '0x'
prefix, which is somewhat misleading.

Fix it to print hexadecimal, as was intended.

Fixes: fce466eab7ac6 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item")
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

btrfs: tree-checker: Check level for leaves and nodes

commit f556faa46eb4e96d0d0772e74ecf66781e132f72 upstream.

Although we have tree level check at tree read runtime, it's completely
based on its parent level.
We still need to do accurate level check to avoid invalid tree blocks
sneak into kernel space.

The check itself is simple, for leaf its level should always be 0.
For nodes its level should be in range [1, BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL - 1].

Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
 - Pass root instead of fs_info to generic_err()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

btrfs: Check that each block group has corresponding chunk at mount time

commit 514c7dca85a0bf40be984dab0b477403a6db901f upstream.

A crafted btrfs image with incorrect chunk<->block group mapping will
trigger a lot of unexpected things as the mapping is essential.

Although the problem can be caught by block group item checker
added in "btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item", it's still not
sufficient.  A sufficiently valid block group item can pass the check
added by the mentioned patch but could fail to match the existing chunk.

This patch will add extra block group -> chunk mapping check, to ensure
we have a completely matching (start, len, flags) chunk for each block
group at mount time.

Here we reuse the original helper find_first_block_group(), which is
already doing the basic bg -> chunk checks, adding further checks of the
start/len and type flags.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199837
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Su Yue <suy.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

btrfs: tree-checker: Detect invalid and empty essential trees

commit ba480dd4db9f1798541eb2d1c423fc95feee8d36 upstream.

A crafted image has empty root tree block, which will later cause NULL
pointer dereference.

The following trees should never be empty:
1) Tree root
   Must contain at least root items for extent tree, device tree and fs
   tree

2) Chunk tree
   Or we can't even bootstrap as it contains the mapping.

3) Fs tree
   At least inode item for top level inode (.).

4) Device tree
   Dev extents for chunks

5) Extent tree
   Must have corresponding extent for each chunk.

If any of them is empty, we are sure the fs is corrupted and no need to
mount it.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199847
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: Pass root instead of fs_info to generic_err()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item

commit fce466eab7ac6baa9d2dcd88abcf945be3d4a089 upstream.

A crafted image with invalid block group items could make free space cache
code to cause panic.

We could detect such invalid block group item by checking:
1) Item size
   Known fixed value.
2) Block group size (key.offset)
   We have an upper limit on block group item (10G)
3) Chunk objectid
   Known fixed value.
4) Type
   Only 4 valid type values, DATA, METADATA, SYSTEM and DATA|METADATA.
   No more than 1 bit set for profile type.
5) Used space
   No more than the block group size.

This should allow btrfs to detect and refuse to mount the crafted image.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199849
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gu Jinxiang <gujx@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
 - In check_leaf_item(), pass root->fs_info to check_block_group_item()
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

btrfs: tree-check: reduce stack consumption in check_dir_item

commit e2683fc9d219430f5b78889b50cde7f40efeba7b upstream.

I've noticed that the updated item checker stack consumption increased
dramatically in 542f5385e20cf97447 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add checker
for dir item")

tree-checker.c:check_leaf                    +552 (176 -> 728)

The array is 255 bytes long, dynamic allocation would slow down the
sanity checks so it's more reasonable to keep it on-stack. Moving the
variable to the scope of use reduces the stack usage again

tree-checker.c:check_leaf                    -264 (728 -> 464)

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>