CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials

Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
     replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred).  This means that
     all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
     of no return with no possibility of failure.

     I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:

cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)

     but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
     (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
     be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).

     The following sequence of events now happens:

     (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
       locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
       creds that we make.

     (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
       task's credentials and prepare it.  This copy is then assigned to
       bprm->cred.

    This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
       unnecessary, and so they've been removed.

     (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
       after (a) rather than later on in the code.  The result is stored in
       bprm->unsafe for future reference.

     (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.

       (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
           attached to bprm->cred.  Personality bit clearance is recorded,
           but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
           fail.

         (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds().  This should
     calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.

     This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
     security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
     Anything that might fail must be done at this point.

         (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.

     bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
     calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes.  This allows SELinux
     in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
     not on the interpreter.

     (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution.  This
       performs the following steps with regard to credentials:

 (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
     may not be covered by commit_creds().

         (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
             (c.i).

     (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
       new credentials.  This performs the following steps with regard to
       credentials:

         (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
             requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
             must be done before the credentials are changed.

     This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
     security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
     This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
     must have been done in (c.ii).

         (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
             assignment (more or less).  Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
             should be part of struct creds.

 (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
     PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.

         (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
             are now immutable.

         (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
             alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
             SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.

     (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
       to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
       cred_replace_mutex.  No changes to the credentials will have been
       made.

 (2) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
     (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()

       Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()

       Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
       security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()

       Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()

       New.  The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
       as appropriate.  bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
       second and subsequent calls.

     (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()

       New.  Apply the security effects of the new credentials.  This
       includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux.  This function may not
       fail.  When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
       to the process; when the latter is called, they have.

   The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.

 (3) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
       the credentials-under-construction approach.

     (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
       to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials

Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

       Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

       New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
       creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
       creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
       new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

       Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
       killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

       Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

       New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

       New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

       New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
       security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

       Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

       Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
       cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
       setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
       than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

       Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
       directly to init's credentials.

 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

       Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
       refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
       all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
       They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
       rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
       thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
       keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
       the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
       credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
       process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
       current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
       that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
       the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
       until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
       lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()

Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.

The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Make inode_has_perm() and file_has_perm() take a cred pointer

Make inode_has_perm() and file_has_perm() take a cred pointer rather than a
task pointer.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Rename is_single_threaded() to is_wq_single_threaded()

Rename is_single_threaded() to is_wq_single_threaded() so that a new
is_single_threaded() can be created that refers to tasks rather than
waitqueues.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct

Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct and dangle their anchor
from the cred struct rather than the signal_struct.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap access to SELinux's task SID

Wrap access to SELinux's task SID, using task_sid() and current_sid() as
appropriate.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds

Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors

Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Detach the credentials from task_struct

Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct

Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks

Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Neuter sys_capset()

Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument

Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments.  Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist.  This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.

This patch alters the behaviour such that:

 (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
     keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used.

 (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
     special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
     (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then:

     (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the
       key will be attached to that keyring.

     (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being
       instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by
       keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().

 (3) No extra link will be made.

Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators
who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so
as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.

Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that
get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the
instantiator to request that the key is retained.  This is mainly useful for
situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which
should be retained by the initial requestor:

+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
|           |        |              |        |              |
| Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator |
|           |        |              |        |              |
+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
           request_key()           request_key()

This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch.  The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator.  To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

KEYS: Disperse linux/key_ui.h

Disperse the bits of linux/key_ui.h as the reason they were put here (keyfs)
didn't get in.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the capabilities code

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the key management code

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the networking subsystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UNIX socket protocol

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SunRPC protocol

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ROSE protocol

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-hams@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the netrom protocol

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-hams@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the IPv6 protocol

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the AX25 protocol

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-hams@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SYSV IPC subsystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the filesystem subsystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: xfs@oss.sgi.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UDF filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the UBIFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind@infradead.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <ext-adrian.hunter@nokia.com>
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SYSV filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the SMBFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ReiserFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the RAMFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the OMFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
Cc: linux-karma-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the OCFS2 filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NFS daemon

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NCPFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Petr Vandrovec <vandrove@vc.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Minix filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the JFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com>
Cc: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the hugetlbfs filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: William Irwin <wli@holomorphy.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HPFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HFSplus filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the HFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the GFS2 filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: cluster-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the FUSE filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the FAT filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext4 filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: adilger@sun.com
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext3 filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Tweedie <sct@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: adilger@sun.com
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Ext2 filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the eCryptFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net>
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the devpts filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the Coda filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: codalist@coda.cs.cmu.edu
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the CIFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: linux-cifs-client@lists.samba.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the BFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Tigran A. Aivazian <tigran@aivazian.fsnet.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the autofs4 filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: autofs@linux.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the autofs filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: autofs@linux.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the AFFS filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in 9P2000 filesystem

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the USB driver

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the network device drivers

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the ISDN drivers

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Cc: isdn4linux@listserv.isdn4linux.de
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the tty driver

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the block loopback driver

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the x86 arch

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the S390 arch

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the PowerPC arch

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the PA-RISC arch

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>
Cc: Grant Grundler <grundler@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the MIPS arch

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the IA64 arch

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

security: remove broken and useless declarations

Remove broken declarations for security_capable* functions,
which were not needed anyway.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility
check when determining if a process has additional powers to override
memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels.  Use
the new noaudit call instead.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The oomkiller calculations make decisions based on capabilities.  Since
these are not security decisions and LSMs should not record if they fall
the request they should use the new has_capability_noaudit() interface so
the denials will not be recorded.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to
make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision.  Currently
this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
likely to be killed.  These types of security system requests should not be
audited or logged since they are not really security decisions.  It would be
possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
indirection.

This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Capabilities: BUG when an invalid capability is requested

If an invalid (large) capability is requested the capabilities system
may panic as it is dereferencing an array of fixed (short) length.  Its
possible (and actually often happens) that the capability system
accidentally stumbled into a valid memory region but it also regularly
happens that it hits invalid memory and BUGs.  If such an operation does
get past cap_capable then the selinux system is sure to have problems as
it already does a (simple) validity check and BUG.  This is known to
happen by the broken and buggy firegl driver.

This patch cleanly checks all capable calls and BUG if a call is for an
invalid capability.  This will likely break the firegl driver for some
situations, but it is the right thing to do.  Garbage into a security
system gets you killed/bugged

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record the
actual capbilities being added/removed.  This patch adds a new record type
which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.

example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Any time fcaps or a setuid app under SECURE_NOROOT is used to result in a
non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set
of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion
and includes the process's pE, pI, pP.  Before and after the bprm capability
are applied.  This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.

an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:

setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236):  cwd="/home/test"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch will print cap_permitted and cap_inheritable data in the PATH
records of any file that has file capabilities set.  Files which do not
have fcaps set will not have different PATH records.

An example audit record if you run:
setcap "cap_net_admin+pie" /bin/bash
/bin/bash

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=2119230 a1=210da30 a2=20ee290 a3=8 items=2 ppid=2149 pid=2923 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="www.google.com"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225741937.363:230):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0104755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fi=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch add a generic cpu endian caps structure and externally available
functions which retrieve fcaps information from disk.  This information is
necessary so fcaps information can be collected and recorded by the audit
system.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Document the order of arguments for cap_issubset.  It's not instantly clear
which order the argument should be in.  So give an example.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

SELinux: Use unknown perm handling to handle unknown netlink msg types

Currently when SELinux has not been updated to handle a netlink message
type the operation is denied with EINVAL.  This patch will leave the
audit/warning message so things get fixed but if policy chose to allow
unknowns this will allow the netlink operation.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

file capabilities: add no_file_caps switch (v4)

Add a no_file_caps boot option when file capabilities are
compiled into the kernel (CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y).

This allows distributions to ship a kernel with file capabilities
compiled in, without forcing users to use (and understand and
trust) them.

When no_file_caps is specified at boot, then when a process executes
a file, any file capabilities stored with that file will not be
used in the calculation of the process' new capability sets.

This means that booting with the no_file_caps boot option will
not be the same as booting a kernel with file capabilities
compiled out - in particular a task with  CAP_SETPCAP will not
have any chance of passing capabilities to another task (which
isn't "really" possible anyway, and which may soon by killed
altogether by David Howells in any case), and it will instead
be able to put new capabilities in its pI.  However since fI
will always be empty and pI is masked with fI, it gains the
task nothing.

We also support the extra prctl options, setting securebits and
dropping capabilities from the per-process bounding set.

The other remaining difference is that killpriv, task_setscheduler,
setioprio, and setnice will continue to be hooked.  That will
be noticable in the case where a root task changed its uid
while keeping some caps, and another task owned by the new uid
tries to change settings for the more privileged task.

Changelog:
Nov 05 2008: (v4) trivial port on top of always-start-\
with-clear-caps patch
Sep 23 2008: nixed file_caps_enabled when file caps are
not compiled in as it isn't used.
Document no_file_caps in kernel-parameters.txt.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Merge branch 'master' into next

selinux: recognize netlink messages for 'ip addrlabel'

In enforcing mode '/sbin/ip addrlabel' results in a SELinux error:
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1225698822.073:42): SELinux:  unrecognized
netlink message type=74 for sclass=43

The problem is missing RTM_*ADDRLABEL entries in SELinux's netlink
message types table.

Reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=469423

Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

SELinux: hold tasklist_lock and siglock while waking wait_chldexit

SELinux has long been calling wake_up_interruptible() on
current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit without holding any locks.  It
appears that this operation should hold the tasklist_lock to dereference
current->parent and we should hold the siglock when waking up the
signal->wait_chldexit.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Merge git://git./linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6:
  xfrm: Fix xfrm_policy_gc_lock handling.
  niu: Use pci_ioremap_bar().
  bnx2x: Version Update
  bnx2x: Calling netif_carrier_off at the end of the probe
  bnx2x: PCI configuration bug on big-endian
  bnx2x: Removing the PMF indication when unloading
  mv643xx_eth: fix SMI bus access timeouts
  net: kconfig cleanup
  fs_enet: fix polling
  XFRM: copy_to_user_kmaddress() reports local address twice
  SMC91x: Fix compilation on some platforms.
  udp: Fix the SNMP counter of UDP_MIB_INERRORS
  udp: Fix the SNMP counter of UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS
  drivers/net/smc911x.c: Fix lockdep warning on xmit.

Merge branch 'upstream-linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/jgarzik/libata-dev

* 'upstream-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jgarzik/libata-dev:
  libata: mask off DET when restoring SControl for detach
  libata: implement ATA_HORKAGE_ATAPI_MOD16_DMA and apply it
  libata: Fix a potential race condition in ata_scsi_park_show()
  sata_nv: fix generic, nf2/3 detection regression
  sata_via: restore vt*_prepare_host error handling
  sata_promise: add ATA engine reset to reset ops

drivers: remove duplicated #include

Signed-off-by: Jianjun Kong <jianjun@zeuux.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

libata: mask off DET when restoring SControl for detach

libata restores SControl on detach; however, trying to restore
non-zero DET can cause undeterministic behavior including PMP device
going offline till power cycling.  Mask off DET when restoring
SControl.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

libata: implement ATA_HORKAGE_ATAPI_MOD16_DMA and apply it

libata always uses PIO for ATAPI commands when the number of bytes to
transfer isn't multiple of 16 but quantum DAT72 chokes on odd bytes
PIO transfers.  Implement a horkage to skip the mod16 check and apply
it to the quantum device.

This is reported by John Clark in the following thread.

  http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.ide/34748

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: John Clark <clarkjc@runbox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

libata: Fix a potential race condition in ata_scsi_park_show()

Peter Moulder has pointed out that there is a slight chance that a
negative value might be passed to jiffies_to_msecs() in
ata_scsi_park_show(). This is fixed by saving the value of jiffies in a
local variable, thus also reducing code since the volatile variable
jiffies is accessed only once.

Signed-off-by: Elias Oltmanns <eo@nebensachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

sata_nv: fix generic, nf2/3 detection regression

All three flavors of sata_nv's are different in how their hardreset
behaves.

* generic: Hardreset is not reliable.  Link often doesn't come online
  after hardreset.

* nf2/3: A little bit better - link comes online with longer debounce
  timing.  However, nf2/3 can't reliable wait for the first D2H
  Register FIS, so it can't wait for device readiness or classify the
  device after hardreset.  Follow-up SRST required.

* ck804: Hardreset finally works.

The core layer change to prefer hardreset and follow up changes
exposed the above issues and caused various detection regressions for
all three flavors.  This patch, hopefully, fixes all the known issues
and should make sata_nv error handling more reliable.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

sata_via: restore vt*_prepare_host error handling

commit b9d5b89b487517cbd4cb4702da829e07ef9e4432 (sata_via: fix support
for 5287) accidently (?) removed vt*_prepare_host error handling - restore it

catched by gcc:
drivers/ata/sata_via.c: In function 'svia_init_one':
drivers/ata/sata_via.c:567: warning: 'host' may be used uninitialized in this function

Signed-off-by: Marcin Slusarz <marcin.slusarz@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Joseph Chan <JosephChan@via.com.tw>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

sata_promise: add ATA engine reset to reset ops

Promise ATA engines need to be reset when errors occur.
That's currently done for errors detected by sata_promise itself,
but it's not done for errors like timeouts detected outside of
the low-level driver.

The effect of this omission is that a timeout tends to result
in a sequence of failed COMRESETs after which libata EH gives
up and disables the port. At that point the port's ATA engine
hangs and even reloading the driver will not resume it.

To fix this, make sata_promise override ->hardreset on SATA
ports with code which calls pdc_reset_port() on the port in
question before calling libata's hardreset. PATA ports don't
use ->hardreset, so for those we override ->softreset instead.

Signed-off-by: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

xfrm: Fix xfrm_policy_gc_lock handling.

From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>

Based upon a lockdep trace by Simon Arlott.

xfrm_policy_kill() can be called from both BH and
non-BH contexts, so we have to grab xfrm_policy_gc_lock
with BH disabling.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

niu: Use pci_ioremap_bar().

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

bnx2x: Version Update

Updating the version

Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

bnx2x: Calling netif_carrier_off at the end of the probe

netif_carrier_off was called too early at the probe. In case of failure
or simply bad timing, this can cause a fatal error since linkwatch_event
might run too soon.

Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

bnx2x: PCI configuration bug on big-endian

The current code read nothing but zeros on big-endian (wrong part of the
32bits). This caused poor performance on big-endian machines. Though this
issue did not cause the system to crash, the performance is significantly
better with the fix so I view it as critical bug fix.

Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>