Arnd Bergmann [Tue, 5 Sep 2017 07:47:26 +0000 (09:47 +0200)]
drm: gma500: fix logic error
commit
67a3b63a54cbe18944191f43d644686731cf30c7 upstream.
gcc-8 points out a condition that almost certainly doesn't
do what the author had in mind:
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c: In function 'mdfldWaitForPipeEnable':
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/mdfld_intel_display.c:102:37: error: bitwise comparison always evaluates to false [-Werror=tautological-compare]
This changes it to a simple bit mask operation to check
whether the bit is set.
Fixes:
026abc333205 ("gma500: initial medfield merge")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170905074741.435324-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sultan Alsawaf [Wed, 6 Jun 2018 22:56:54 +0000 (15:56 -0700)]
ip_tunnel: Fix name string concatenate in __ip_tunnel_create()
commit
000ade8016400d93b4d7c89970d96b8c14773d45 upstream.
By passing a limit of 2 bytes to strncat, strncat is limited to writing
fewer bytes than what it's supposed to append to the name here.
Since the bounds are checked on the line above this, just remove the string
bounds checks entirely since they're unneeded.
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultanxda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Guenter Roeck [Sun, 1 Jul 2018 20:57:13 +0000 (13:57 -0700)]
kernfs: Replace strncpy with memcpy
commit
166126c1e54d927c2e8efa2702d420e0ce301fd9 upstream.
gcc 8.1.0 complains:
fs/kernfs/symlink.c:91:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying
as many bytes from a string as its length
fs/kernfs/symlink.c: In function 'kernfs_iop_get_link':
fs/kernfs/symlink.c:88:14: note: length computed here
Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to
be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy()
with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 30 Nov 2018 22:45:01 +0000 (14:45 -0800)]
unifdef: use memcpy instead of strncpy
commit
38c7b224ce22c25fed04007839edf974bd13439d upstream.
New versions of gcc reasonably warn about the odd pattern of
strncpy(p, q, strlen(q));
which really doesn't make sense: the strncpy() ends up being just a slow
and odd way to write memcpy() in this case.
There was a comment about _why_ the code used strncpy - to avoid the
terminating NUL byte, but memcpy does the same and avoids the warning.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Takashi Iwai [Wed, 27 Jun 2018 12:59:00 +0000 (14:59 +0200)]
ALSA: intel_hdmi: Use strlcpy() instead of strncpy()
commit
c288248f5b26cd5563112fcdc077bf44964a942d upstream.
hdmi_lpe_audio_probe() copies the pcm name string via strncpy(), but
as a gcc8 warning suggests, it misses a NUL terminator, and unlikely
the expected result.
Use the proper one, strlcpy() instead.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Guenter Roeck [Sun, 1 Jul 2018 20:57:16 +0000 (13:57 -0700)]
kobject: Replace strncpy with memcpy
commit
77d2a24b6107bd9b3bf2403a65c1428a9da83dd0 upstream.
gcc 8.1.0 complains:
lib/kobject.c:128:3: warning:
'strncpy' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many
bytes from a string as its length [-Wstringop-truncation]
lib/kobject.c: In function 'kobject_get_path':
lib/kobject.c:125:13: note: length computed here
Using strncpy() is indeed less than perfect since the length of data to
be copied has already been determined with strlen(). Replace strncpy()
with memcpy() to address the warning and optimize the code a little.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 30 Nov 2018 20:13:15 +0000 (12:13 -0800)]
test_hexdump: use memcpy instead of strncpy
commit
b1286ed7158e9b62787508066283ab0b8850b518 upstream.
New versions of gcc reasonably warn about the odd pattern of
strncpy(p, q, strlen(q));
which really doesn't make sense: the strncpy() ends up being just a slow
and odd way to write memcpy() in this case.
Apparently there was a patch for this floating around earlier, but it
got lost.
Acked-again-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Stephen Rothwell [Thu, 30 Aug 2018 21:47:28 +0000 (07:47 +1000)]
disable stringop truncation warnings for now
commit
217c3e0196758662aa0429863b09d1c13da1c5d6 upstream.
They are too noisy
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Xiongfeng Wang [Thu, 11 Jan 2018 09:22:29 +0000 (17:22 +0800)]
Kbuild: suppress packed-not-aligned warning for default setting only
commit
321cb0308a9e76841394b4bbab6a1107cfedbae0 upstream.
gcc-8 reports many -Wpacked-not-aligned warnings. The below are some
examples.
./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct
ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));
./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct
ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));
./include/linux/ceph/msgr.h:67:1: warning: alignment 1 of 'struct
ceph_entity_addr' is less than 8 [-Wpacked-not-aligned]
} __attribute__ ((packed));
This patch suppresses this kind of warnings for default setting.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Greg Kroah-Hartman [Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:41:27 +0000 (19:41 +0100)]
Linux 4.14.86
Jaegeuk Kim [Fri, 28 Sep 2018 05:15:31 +0000 (22:15 -0700)]
f2fs: fix missing up_read
commit
89d13c38501df730cbb2e02c4499da1b5187119d upstream.
This patch fixes missing up_read call.
Fixes:
c9b60788fc76 ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check with block address in main area")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Ilya Dryomov [Fri, 27 Jul 2018 17:40:30 +0000 (19:40 +0200)]
libceph: check authorizer reply/challenge length before reading
commit
130f52f2b203aa0aec179341916ffb2e905f3afd upstream.
Avoid scribbling over memory if the received reply/challenge is larger
than the buffer supplied with the authorizer.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Ilya Dryomov [Fri, 27 Jul 2018 17:45:36 +0000 (19:45 +0200)]
libceph: weaken sizeof check in ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply()
commit
f1d10e04637924f2b00a0fecdd2ca4565f5cfc3f upstream.
Allow for extending ceph_x_authorize_reply in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Todd Kjos [Tue, 6 Nov 2018 23:55:32 +0000 (15:55 -0800)]
binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live buffer
commit
7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c upstream.
Malicious code can attempt to free buffers using the BC_FREE_BUFFER
ioctl to binder. There are protections against a user freeing a buffer
while in use by the kernel, however there was a window where
BC_FREE_BUFFER could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that
was not completely initialized. This resulted in a use-after-free
detected by KASAN with a malicious test program.
This window is closed by setting the buffer's allow_user_free attribute
to 0 when the buffer is allocated or when the user has previously freed
it instead of waiting for the caller to set it. The problem was that
when the struct buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale and set
to 1 allowing a free to go through.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
YueHaibing [Wed, 14 Nov 2018 01:57:03 +0000 (01:57 +0000)]
misc: mic/scif: fix copy-paste error in scif_create_remote_lookup
commit
6484a677294aa5d08c0210f2f387ebb9be646115 upstream.
gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c: In function 'scif_create_remote_lookup':
drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c:373:25: warning:
variable 'vmalloc_num_pages' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
'vmalloc_num_pages' should be used to determine if the address is
within the vmalloc range.
Fixes:
ba612aa8b487 ("misc: mic: SCIF memory registration and unregistration")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Dexuan Cui [Mon, 26 Nov 2018 02:29:56 +0000 (02:29 +0000)]
Drivers: hv: vmbus: check the creation_status in vmbus_establish_gpadl()
commit
eceb05965489784f24bbf4d61ba60e475a983016 upstream.
This is a longstanding issue: if the vmbus upper-layer drivers try to
consume too many GPADLs, the host may return with an error
0xC0000044 (STATUS_QUOTA_EXCEEDED), but currently we forget to check
the creation_status, and hence we can pass an invalid GPADL handle
into the OPEN_CHANNEL message, and get an error code 0xc0000225 in
open_info->response.open_result.status, and finally we hang in
vmbus_open() -> "goto error_free_info" -> vmbus_teardown_gpadl().
With this patch, we can exit gracefully on STATUS_QUOTA_EXCEEDED.
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Yu Zhao [Fri, 30 Nov 2018 22:09:03 +0000 (14:09 -0800)]
mm: use swp_offset as key in shmem_replace_page()
commit
c1cb20d43728aa9b5393bd8d489bc85c142949b2 upstream.
We changed the key of swap cache tree from swp_entry_t.val to
swp_offset. We need to do so in shmem_replace_page() as well.
Hugh said:
"shmem_replace_page() has been wrong since the day I wrote it: good
enough to work on swap "type" 0, which is all most people ever use
(especially those few who need shmem_replace_page() at all), but
broken once there are any non-0 swp_type bits set in the higher order
bits"
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121215442.138545-1-yuzhao@google.com
Fixes:
f6ab1f7f6b2d ("mm, swap: use offset of swap entry as key of swap cache")
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.9+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Luis Chamberlain [Fri, 30 Nov 2018 22:09:21 +0000 (14:09 -0800)]
lib/test_kmod.c: fix rmmod double free
commit
5618cf031fecda63847cafd1091e7b8bd626cdb1 upstream.
We free the misc device string twice on rmmod; fix this. Without this
we cannot remove the module without crashing.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181124050500.5257-1-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.12+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Martin Kelly [Mon, 29 Oct 2018 03:18:53 +0000 (20:18 -0700)]
iio:st_magn: Fix enable device after trigger
commit
fe5192ac81ad0d4dfe1395d11f393f0513c15f7f upstream.
Currently, we enable the device before we enable the device trigger. At
high frequencies, this can cause interrupts that don't yet have a poll
function associated with them and are thus treated as spurious. At high
frequencies with level interrupts, this can even cause an interrupt storm
of repeated spurious interrupts (~100,000 on my Beagleboard with the
LSM9DS1 magnetometer). If these repeat too much, the interrupt will get
disabled and the device will stop functioning.
To prevent these problems, enable the device prior to enabling the device
trigger, and disable the divec prior to disabling the trigger. This means
there's no window of time during which the device creates interrupts but we
have no trigger to answer them.
Fixes:
90efe055629 ("iio: st_sensors: harden interrupt handling")
Signed-off-by: Martin Kelly <martin@martingkelly.com>
Tested-by: Denis Ciocca <denis.ciocca@st.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Felipe Balbi [Mon, 19 Nov 2018 06:34:04 +0000 (08:34 +0200)]
Revert "usb: dwc3: gadget: skip Set/Clear Halt when invalid"
commit
38317f5c0f2faae5110854f36edad810f841d62f upstream.
This reverts commit
ffb80fc672c3a7b6afd0cefcb1524fb99917b2f3.
Turns out that commit is wrong. Host controllers are allowed to use
Clear Feature HALT as means to sync data toggle between host and
periperal.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Michael Niewöhner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 16:57:33 +0000 (17:57 +0100)]
usb: core: quirks: add RESET_RESUME quirk for Cherry G230 Stream series
commit
effd14f66cc1ef6701a19c5a56e39c35f4d395a5 upstream.
Cherry G230 Stream 2.0 (G85-231) and 3.0 (G85-232) need this quirk to
function correctly. This fixes a but where double pressing numlock locks
up the device completely with need to replug the keyboard.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niewöhner <linux@mniewoehner.de>
Tested-by: Michael Niewöhner <linux@mniewoehner.de>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kai-Heng Feng [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 08:42:19 +0000 (08:42 +0000)]
USB: usb-storage: Add new IDs to ums-realtek
commit
a84a1bcc992f0545a51d2e120b8ca2ef20e2ea97 upstream.
There are two new Realtek card readers require ums-realtek to work
correctly.
Add the new IDs to support them.
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Larry Finger [Fri, 9 Nov 2018 05:30:09 +0000 (23:30 -0600)]
staging: rtl8723bs: Add missing return for cfg80211_rtw_get_station
commit
8561fb31a1f9594e2807681f5c0721894e367f19 upstream.
With Androidx86 8.1, wificond returns "failed to get
nl80211_sta_info_tx_failed" and wificondControl returns "Invalid signal
poll result from wificond". The fix is to OR sinfo->filled with
BIT_ULL(NL80211_STA_INFO_TX_FAILED).
This missing bit is apparently not needed with NetworkManager, but it
does no harm in that case.
Reported-and-Tested-by: youling257 <youling257@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: youling257 <youling257@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Ben Wolsieffer [Sat, 3 Nov 2018 23:32:20 +0000 (19:32 -0400)]
staging: vchiq_arm: fix compat VCHIQ_IOC_AWAIT_COMPLETION
commit
5a96b2d38dc054c0bbcbcd585b116566cbd877fe upstream.
The compatibility ioctl wrapper for VCHIQ_IOC_AWAIT_COMPLETION assumes that
the native ioctl always uses a message buffer and decrements msgbufcount.
Certain message types do not use a message buffer and in this case
msgbufcount is not decremented, and completion->header for the message is
NULL. Because the wrapper unconditionally decrements msgbufcount, the
calling process may assume that a message buffer has been used even when
it has not.
This results in a memory leak in the userspace code that interfaces with
this driver. When msgbufcount is decremented, the userspace code assumes
that the buffer can be freed though the reference in completion->header,
which cannot happen when the reference is NULL.
This patch causes the wrapper to only decrement msgbufcount when the
native ioctl decrements it. Note that we cannot simply copy the native
ioctl's value of msgbufcount, because the wrapper only retrieves messages
from the native ioctl one at a time, while userspace may request multiple
messages.
See https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/pull/2703 for more discussion of
this patch.
Fixes:
5569a1260933 ("staging: vchiq_arm: Add compatibility wrappers for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Ben Wolsieffer <benwolsieffer@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Josef Bacik [Mon, 3 Dec 2018 11:06:57 +0000 (13:06 +0200)]
btrfs: release metadata before running delayed refs
We want to release the unused reservation we have since it refills the
delayed refs reserve, which will make everything go smoother when
running the delayed refs if we're short on our reservation.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Richard Genoud [Tue, 27 Nov 2018 16:06:35 +0000 (17:06 +0100)]
dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix module unloading
commit
77e75fda94d2ebb86aa9d35fb1860f6395bf95de upstream.
of_dma_controller_free() was not called on module onloading.
This lead to a soft lockup:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s!
Modules linked in: at_hdmac [last unloaded: at_hdmac]
when of_dma_request_slave_channel() tried to call ofdma->of_dma_xlate().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding")
Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Richard Genoud [Tue, 27 Nov 2018 16:06:34 +0000 (17:06 +0100)]
dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix memory leak in at_dma_xlate()
commit
98f5f932254b88ce828bc8e4d1642d14e5854caa upstream.
The leak was found when opening/closing a serial port a great number of
time, increasing kmalloc-32 in slabinfo.
Each time the port was opened, dma_request_slave_channel() was called.
Then, in at_dma_xlate(), atslave was allocated with devm_kzalloc() and
never freed. (Well, it was free at module unload, but that's not what we
want).
So, here, kzalloc is more suited for the job since it has to be freed in
atc_free_chan_resources().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding")
Reported-by: Mario Forner <m.forner@be4energy.com>
Suggested-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Heiko Stuebner [Sun, 18 Nov 2018 19:03:02 +0000 (20:03 +0100)]
ARM: dts: rockchip: Remove @0 from the veyron memory node
commit
672e60b72bbe7aace88721db55b380b6a51fb8f9 upstream.
The Coreboot version on veyron ChromeOS devices seems to ignore
memory@0 nodes when updating the available memory and instead
inserts another memory node without the address.
This leads to 4GB systems only ever be using 2GB as the memory@0
node takes precedence. So remove the @0 for veyron devices.
Fixes:
0b639b815f15 ("ARM: dts: rockchip: Add missing unit name to memory nodes in rk3288 boards")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Heikki Lindholm <holin@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pan Bian [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 00:58:02 +0000 (08:58 +0800)]
ext2: fix potential use after free
commit
ecebf55d27a11538ea84aee0be643dd953f830d5 upstream.
The function ext2_xattr_set calls brelse(bh) to drop the reference count
of bh. After that, bh may be freed. However, following brelse(bh),
it reads bh->b_data via macro HDR(bh). This may result in a
use-after-free bug. This patch moves brelse(bh) after reading field.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Anisse Astier [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 16:59:11 +0000 (17:59 +0100)]
ALSA: hda/realtek - fix headset mic detection for MSI MS-B171
commit
8cd65271f8e545ddeed10ecc2e417936bdff168e upstream.
MSI Cubi N 8GL (MS-B171) needs the same fixup as its older model, the
MS-B120, in order for the headset mic to be properly detected.
They both use a single 3-way jack for both mic and headset with an
ALC283 codec, with the same pins used.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anisse Astier <anisse@astier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Kailang Yang [Thu, 8 Nov 2018 08:36:15 +0000 (16:36 +0800)]
ALSA: hda/realtek - Support ALC300
commit
1078bef0cd9291355a20369b21cd823026ab8eaa upstream.
This patch will enable ALC300.
[ It's almost equivalent with other ALC269-compatible ones, and
apparently has no loopback mixer -- tiwai ]
Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang <kailang@realtek.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Takashi Iwai [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 17:18:30 +0000 (18:18 +0100)]
ALSA: sparc: Fix invalid snd_free_pages() at error path
commit
9a20332ab373b1f8f947e0a9c923652b32dab031 upstream.
Some spurious calls of snd_free_pages() have been overlooked and
remain in the error paths of sparc cs4231 driver code. Since
runtime->dma_area is managed by the PCM core helper, we shouldn't
release manually.
Drop the superfluous calls.
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Takashi Iwai [Thu, 22 Nov 2018 13:36:17 +0000 (14:36 +0100)]
ALSA: control: Fix race between adding and removing a user element
commit
e1a7bfe3807974e66f971f2589d4e0197ec0fced upstream.
The procedure for adding a user control element has some window opened
for race against the concurrent removal of a user element. This was
caught by syzkaller, hitting a KASAN use-after-free error.
This patch addresses the bug by wrapping the whole procedure to add a
user control element with the card->controls_rwsem, instead of only
around the increment of card->user_ctl_count.
This required a slight code refactoring, too. The function
snd_ctl_add() is split to two parts: a core function to add the
control element and a part calling it. The former is called from the
function for adding a user control element inside the controls_rwsem.
One change to be noted is that snd_ctl_notify() for adding a control
element gets called inside the controls_rwsem as well while it was
called outside the rwsem. But this should be OK, as snd_ctl_notify()
takes another (finer) rwlock instead of rwsem, and the call of
snd_ctl_notify() inside rwsem is already done in another code path.
Reported-by: syzbot+dc09047bce3820621ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Takashi Iwai [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 14:44:00 +0000 (15:44 +0100)]
ALSA: ac97: Fix incorrect bit shift at AC97-SPSA control write
commit
7194eda1ba0872d917faf3b322540b4f57f11ba5 upstream.
The function snd_ac97_put_spsa() gets the bit shift value from the
associated private_value, but it extracts too much; the current code
extracts 8 bit values in bits 8-15, but this is a combination of two
nibbles (bits 8-11 and bits 12-15) for left and right shifts.
Due to the incorrect bits extraction, the actual shift may go beyond
the 32bit value, as spotted recently by UBSAN check:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c:836:7
shift exponent 68 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
This patch fixes the shift value extraction by masking the properly
with 0x0f instead of 0xff.
Reported-and-tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Takashi Iwai [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 17:16:33 +0000 (18:16 +0100)]
ALSA: wss: Fix invalid snd_free_pages() at error path
commit
7b69154171b407844c273ab4c10b5f0ddcd6aa29 upstream.
Some spurious calls of snd_free_pages() have been overlooked and
remain in the error paths of wss driver code. Since runtime->dma_area
is managed by the PCM core helper, we shouldn't release manually.
Drop the superfluous calls.
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Maximilian Heyne [Fri, 30 Nov 2018 15:35:14 +0000 (08:35 -0700)]
fs: fix lost error code in dio_complete
commit
41e817bca3acd3980efe5dd7d28af0e6f4ab9247 upstream.
commit
e259221763a40403d5bb232209998e8c45804ab8 ("fs: simplify the
generic_write_sync prototype") reworked callers of generic_write_sync(),
and ended up dropping the error return for the directio path. Prior to
that commit, in dio_complete(), an error would be bubbled up the stack,
but after that commit, errors passed on to dio_complete were eaten up.
This was reported on the list earlier, and a fix was proposed in
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
20160921141539.GA17898@infradead.org/, but
never followed up with. We recently hit this bug in our testing where
fencing io errors, which were previously erroring out with EIO, were
being returned as success operations after this commit.
The fix proposed on the list earlier was a little short -- it would have
still called generic_write_sync() in case `ret` already contained an
error. This fix ensures generic_write_sync() is only called when there's
no pending error in the write. Additionally, transferred is replaced
with ret to bring this code in line with other callers.
Fixes:
e259221763a4 ("fs: simplify the generic_write_sync prototype")
Reported-by: Ravi Nankani <rnankani@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Torsten Mehlan <tomeh@amazon.de>
CC: Uwe Dannowski <uwed@amazon.de>
CC: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.de>
CC: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jiri Olsa [Wed, 21 Nov 2018 10:16:11 +0000 (11:16 +0100)]
perf/x86/intel: Add generic branch tracing check to intel_pmu_has_bts()
commit
67266c1080ad56c31af72b9c18355fde8ccc124a upstream.
Currently we check the branch tracing only by checking for the
PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS event of PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE
type. But we can define the same event with the PERF_TYPE_RAW
type.
Changing the intel_pmu_has_bts() code to check on event's final
hw config value, so both HW types are covered.
Adding unlikely to intel_pmu_has_bts() condition calls, because
it was used in the original code in intel_bts_constraints.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121101612.16272-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jiri Olsa [Wed, 21 Nov 2018 10:16:10 +0000 (11:16 +0100)]
perf/x86/intel: Move branch tracing setup to the Intel-specific source file
commit
ed6101bbf6266ee83e620b19faa7c6ad56bb41ab upstream.
Moving branch tracing setup to Intel core object into separate
intel_pmu_bts_config function, because it's Intel specific.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121101612.16272-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior [Tue, 20 Nov 2018 10:26:35 +0000 (11:26 +0100)]
x86/fpu: Disable bottom halves while loading FPU registers
commit
68239654acafe6aad5a3c1dc7237e60accfebc03 upstream.
The sequence
fpu->initialized = 1; /* step A */
preempt_disable(); /* step B */
fpu__restore(fpu);
preempt_enable();
in __fpu__restore_sig() is racy in regard to a context switch.
For 32bit frames, __fpu__restore_sig() prepares the FPU state within
fpu->state. To ensure that a context switch (switch_fpu_prepare() in
particular) does not modify fpu->state it uses fpu__drop() which sets
fpu->initialized to 0.
After fpu->initialized is cleared, the CPU's FPU state is not saved
to fpu->state during a context switch. The new state is loaded via
fpu__restore(). It gets loaded into fpu->state from userland and
ensured it is sane. fpu->initialized is then set to 1 in order to avoid
fpu__initialize() doing anything (overwrite the new state) which is part
of fpu__restore().
A context switch between step A and B above would save CPU's current FPU
registers to fpu->state and overwrite the newly prepared state. This
looks like a tiny race window but the Kernel Test Robot reported this
back in 2016 while we had lazy FPU support. Borislav Petkov made the
link between that report and another patch that has been posted. Since
the removal of the lazy FPU support, this race goes unnoticed because
the warning has been removed.
Disable bottom halves around the restore sequence to avoid the race. BH
need to be disabled because BH is allowed to run (even with preemption
disabled) and might invoke kernel_fpu_begin() by doing IPsec.
[ bp: massage commit message a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120102635.ddv3fvavxajjlfqk@linutronix.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160226074940.GA28911@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Borislav Petkov [Tue, 27 Nov 2018 13:41:37 +0000 (14:41 +0100)]
x86/MCE/AMD: Fix the thresholding machinery initialization order
commit
60c8144afc287ef09ce8c1230c6aa972659ba1bb upstream.
Currently, the code sets up the thresholding interrupt vector and only
then goes about initializing the thresholding banks. Which is wrong,
because an early thresholding interrupt would cause a NULL pointer
dereference when accessing those banks and prevent the machine from
booting.
Therefore, set the thresholding interrupt vector only *after* having
initialized the banks successfully.
Fixes:
18807ddb7f88 ("x86/mce/AMD: Reset Threshold Limit after logging error")
Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Reported-by: John Clemens <clemej@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Rafał Miłecki <rafal@milecki.pl>
Tested-by: John Clemens <john@deater.net>
Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <aravindksg.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181127101700.2964-1-zajec5@gmail.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201291
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Christoph Muellner [Tue, 13 Nov 2018 10:25:35 +0000 (11:25 +0100)]
arm64: dts: rockchip: Fix PCIe reset polarity for rk3399-puma-haikou.
commit
c1d91f86a1b4c9c05854d59c6a0abd5d0f75b849 upstream.
This patch fixes the wrong polarity setting for the PCIe host driver's
pre-reset pin for rk3399-puma-haikou. Without this patch link training
will most likely fail.
Fixes:
60fd9f72ce8a ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add Haikou baseboard with RK3399-Q7 SoM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Muellner <christoph.muellner@theobroma-systems.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Hou Zhiqiang [Wed, 7 Nov 2018 05:16:49 +0000 (05:16 +0000)]
PCI: layerscape: Fix wrong invocation of outbound window disable accessor
commit
c6fd6fe9dea44732cdcd970f1130b8cc50ad685a upstream.
The order of parameters is not correct when invoking the outbound
window disable routine. Fix it.
Fixes:
4a2745d760fa ("PCI: layerscape: Disable outbound windows configured by bootloader")
Signed-off-by: Hou Zhiqiang <Zhiqiang.Hou@nxp.com>
[lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com: commit log]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pan Bian [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 10:10:15 +0000 (18:10 +0800)]
btrfs: relocation: set trans to be NULL after ending transaction
commit
42a657f57628402c73237547f0134e083e2f6764 upstream.
The function relocate_block_group calls btrfs_end_transaction to release
trans when update_backref_cache returns 1, and then continues the loop
body. If btrfs_block_rsv_refill fails this time, it will jump out the
loop and the freed trans will be accessed. This may result in a
use-after-free bug. The patch assigns NULL to trans after trans is
released so that it will not be accessed.
Fixes:
0647bf564f1 ("Btrfs: improve forever loop when doing balance relocation")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Filipe Manana [Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:35:24 +0000 (11:35 +0000)]
Btrfs: ensure path name is null terminated at btrfs_control_ioctl
commit
f505754fd6599230371cb01b9332754ddc104be1 upstream.
We were using the path name received from user space without checking that
it is null terminated. While btrfs-progs is well behaved and does proper
validation and null termination, someone could call the ioctl and pass
a non-null terminated patch, leading to buffer overrun problems in the
kernel. The ioctl is protected by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
So just set the last byte of the path to a null character, similar to what
we do in other ioctls (add/remove/resize device, snapshot creation, etc).
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Max Filippov [Tue, 27 Nov 2018 02:06:01 +0000 (18:06 -0800)]
xtensa: fix coprocessor part of ptrace_{get,set}xregs
commit
38a35a78c5e270cbe53c4fef6b0d3c2da90dd849 upstream.
Layout of coprocessor registers in the elf_xtregs_t and
xtregs_coprocessor_t may be different due to alignment. Thus it is not
always possible to copy data between the xtregs_coprocessor_t structure
and the elf_xtregs_t and get correct values for all registers.
Use a table of offsets and sizes of individual coprocessor register
groups to do coprocessor context copying in the ptrace_getxregs and
ptrace_setxregs.
This fixes incorrect coprocessor register values reading from the user
process by the native gdb on an xtensa core with multiple coprocessors
and registers with high alignment requirements.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Max Filippov [Mon, 26 Nov 2018 23:18:26 +0000 (15:18 -0800)]
xtensa: fix coprocessor context offset definitions
commit
03bc996af0cc71c7f30c384d8ce7260172423b34 upstream.
Coprocessor context offsets are used by the assembly code that moves
coprocessor context between the individual fields of the
thread_info::xtregs_cp structure and coprocessor registers.
This fixes coprocessor context clobbering on flushing and reloading
during normal user code execution and user process debugging in the
presence of more than one coprocessor in the core configuration.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Max Filippov [Mon, 26 Nov 2018 21:29:41 +0000 (13:29 -0800)]
xtensa: enable coprocessors that are being flushed
commit
2958b66694e018c552be0b60521fec27e8d12988 upstream.
coprocessor_flush_all may be called from a context of a thread that is
different from the thread being flushed. In that case contents of the
cpenable special register may not match ti->cpenable of the target
thread, resulting in unhandled coprocessor exception in the kernel
context.
Set cpenable special register to the ti->cpenable of the target register
for the duration of the flush and restore it afterwards.
This fixes the following crash caused by coprocessor register inspection
in native gdb:
(gdb) p/x $w0
Illegal instruction in kernel: sig: 9 [#1] PREEMPT
Call Trace:
___might_sleep+0x184/0x1a4
__might_sleep+0x41/0xac
exit_signals+0x14/0x218
do_exit+0xc9/0x8b8
die+0x99/0xa0
do_illegal_instruction+0x18/0x6c
common_exception+0x77/0x77
coprocessor_flush+0x16/0x3c
arch_ptrace+0x46c/0x674
sys_ptrace+0x2ce/0x3b4
system_call+0x54/0x80
common_exception+0x77/0x77
note: gdb[100] exited with preempt_count 1
Killed
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wanpeng Li [Tue, 20 Nov 2018 08:34:18 +0000 (16:34 +0800)]
KVM: X86: Fix scan ioapic use-before-initialization
commit
e97f852fd4561e77721bb9a4e0ea9d98305b1e93 upstream.
Reported by syzkaller:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
00000000000001c8
PGD
80000003ec4da067 P4D
80000003ec4da067 PUD
3f7bfa067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 5059 Comm: debug Tainted: G OE 4.19.0-rc5 #16
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x1a6/0x1990
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xdb/0x210
_raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x70
kvm_ioapic_scan_entry+0x3e/0x110 [kvm]
vcpu_enter_guest+0x167e/0x1910 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x35c/0x610 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3e9/0x6d0 [kvm]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x690
ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x6e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The reason is that the testcase writes hyperv synic HV_X64_MSR_SINT6 msr
and triggers scan ioapic logic to load synic vectors into EOI exit bitmap.
However, irqchip is not initialized by this simple testcase, ioapic/apic
objects should not be accessed.
This can be triggered by the following program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <endian.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
uint64_t r[3] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};
int main(void)
{
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 3, 0x32, -1, 0);
long res = 0;
memcpy((void*)0x20000040, "/dev/kvm", 9);
res = syscall(__NR_openat, 0xffffffffffffff9c, 0x20000040, 0, 0);
if (res != -1)
r[0] = res;
res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[0], 0xae01, 0);
if (res != -1)
r[1] = res;
res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[1], 0xae41, 0);
if (res != -1)
r[2] = res;
memcpy(
(void*)0x20000080,
"\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x5b\x61\xbb\x96\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00"
"\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b\x77\xd1\x78\x4d\xd8\x3a\xed\xb1\x5c\x2e\x43"
"\xaa\x43\x39\xd6\xff\xf5\xf0\xa8\x98\xf2\x3e\x37\x29\x89\xde\x88\xc6\x33"
"\xfc\x2a\xdb\xb7\xe1\x4c\xac\x28\x61\x7b\x9c\xa9\xbc\x0d\xa0\x63\xfe\xfe"
"\xe8\x75\xde\xdd\x19\x38\xdc\x34\xf5\xec\x05\xfd\xeb\x5d\xed\x2e\xaf\x22"
"\xfa\xab\xb7\xe4\x42\x67\xd0\xaf\x06\x1c\x6a\x35\x67\x10\x55\xcb",
106);
syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0x4008ae89, 0x20000080);
syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0xae80, 0);
return 0;
}
This patch fixes it by bailing out scan ioapic if ioapic is not initialized in
kernel.
Reported-by: Wei Wu <ww9210@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Wei Wu <ww9210@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Liran Alon [Wed, 7 Nov 2018 22:43:06 +0000 (00:43 +0200)]
KVM: x86: Fix kernel info-leak in KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING hypercall
commit
bcbfbd8ec21096027f1ee13ce6c185e8175166f6 upstream.
kvm_pv_clock_pairing() allocates local var
"struct kvm_clock_pairing clock_pairing" on stack and initializes
all it's fields besides padding (clock_pairing.pad[]).
Because clock_pairing var is written completely (including padding)
to guest memory, failure to init struct padding results in kernel
info-leak.
Fix the issue by making sure to also init the padding with zeroes.
Fixes:
55dd00a73a51 ("KVM: x86: add KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING hypercall")
Reported-by: syzbot+a8ef68d71211ba264f56@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jim Mattson [Tue, 22 May 2018 16:54:20 +0000 (09:54 -0700)]
kvm: svm: Ensure an IBPB on all affected CPUs when freeing a vmcb
commit
fd65d3142f734bc4376053c8d75670041903134d upstream.
Previously, we only called indirect_branch_prediction_barrier on the
logical CPU that freed a vmcb. This function should be called on all
logical CPUs that last loaded the vmcb in question.
Fixes:
15d45071523d ("KVM/x86: Add IBPB support")
Reported-by: Neel Natu <neelnatu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Junaid Shahid [Wed, 31 Oct 2018 21:53:57 +0000 (14:53 -0700)]
kvm: mmu: Fix race in emulated page table writes
commit
0e0fee5c539b61fdd098332e0e2cc375d9073706 upstream.
When a guest page table is updated via an emulated write,
kvm_mmu_pte_write() is called to update the shadow PTE using the just
written guest PTE value. But if two emulated guest PTE writes happened
concurrently, it is possible that the guest PTE and the shadow PTE end
up being out of sync. Emulated writes do not mark the shadow page as
unsync-ed, so this inconsistency will not be resolved even by a guest TLB
flush (unless the page was marked as unsync-ed at some other point).
This is fixed by re-reading the current value of the guest PTE after the
MMU lock has been acquired instead of just using the value that was
written prior to calling kvm_mmu_pte_write().
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:56 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options
commit
55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 upstream
Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl'
and 'seccomp'.
Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to
evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:55 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
commit
6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2 upstream
If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.
SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.
The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
(or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.
Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.
While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.
IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:54 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user
commit
7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15 upstream
Now that all prerequisites are in place:
- Add the prctl command line option
- Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl'
- When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the
conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch.
- At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB
evaluation on context switch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:53 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
commit
9137bb27e60e554dab694eafa4cca241fa3a694f upstream
Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.
Invocations:
Check indirect branch speculation status with
- prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);
Enable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
Disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
Force disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:52 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode
commit
6893a959d7fdebbab5f5aa112c277d5a44435ba1 upstream
The upcoming fine grained per task STIBP control needs to be updated on CPU
hotplug as well.
Split out the code which controls the strict mode so the prctl control code
can be added later. Mark the SMP function call argument __unused while at it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.759457117@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Wed, 28 Nov 2018 09:56:57 +0000 (10:56 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
commit
6d991ba509ebcfcc908e009d1db51972a4f7a064 upstream
The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but
only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the
other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch.
This creates the following situation with Process A and B:
Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2
does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the
speculation control TIF bit set.
CPU0 CPU1
MSR bit is set
ProcB.T1 schedules out
ProcA.T2 schedules in
MSR bit is cleared
ProcA.T1
seccomp_update()
set TIF bit on ProcA.T2
ProcB.T1 schedules in
MSR is not updated <-- FAIL
This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update
if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task
are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks
scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever.
In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which
could be migrated is complex and full of races.
The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF
bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state
is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates
already.
Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the
atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous
update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for
updating the current task.
Reported-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811272247140.1875@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:51 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Split out TIF update
commit
e6da8bb6f9abb2628381904b24163c770e630bac upstream
The update of the TIF_SSBD flag and the conditional speculation control MSR
update is done in the ssb_prctl_set() function directly. The upcoming prctl
support for controlling indirect branch speculation via STIBP needs the
same mechanism.
Split the code out and make it reusable. Reword the comment about updates
for other tasks.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.652305076@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:50 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS
commit
46f7ecb1e7359f183f5bbd1e08b90e10e52164f9 upstream
The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality
which was introduced for this.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149393@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:49 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm()
commit
4c71a2b6fd7e42814aa68a6dec88abf3b42ea573 upstream
The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel
switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task
which ran last on the same CPU.
An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be
ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching
directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to
a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot
be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just
adding overhead.
The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space
tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the
following cases:
1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB not set.
2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has
TIF_SPEC_IB set.
This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when
only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the
same process.
The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the
tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because
it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based
mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code.
When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into
the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was
running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of
the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or
not to cover the two cases above.
As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace
check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the
process changes.
Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one
created a hole.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:48 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls
commit
5635d99953f04b550738f6f4c1c532667c3fd872 upstream
The TIF_SPEC_IB bit does not need to be evaluated in the decision to invoke
__switch_to_xtra() when:
- CONFIG_SMP is disabled
- The conditional STIPB mode is disabled
The TIF_SPEC_IB bit still controls IBPB in both cases so the TIF work mask
checks might invoke __switch_to_xtra() for nothing if TIF_SPEC_IB is the
only set bit in the work masks.
Optimize it out by masking the bit at compile time for CONFIG_SMP=n and at
run time when the static key controlling the conditional STIBP mode is
disabled.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.374062201@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:47 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
commit
ff16701a29cba3aafa0bd1656d766813b2d0a811 upstream
Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline
function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit.
Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly
in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the
per_cpu() indirection.
This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch
speculation optimization happens only in one place.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tim Chen [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:46 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
commit
5bfbe3ad5840d941b89bcac54b821ba14f50a0ba upstream
To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task
control of STIBP.
Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if
SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control
code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the
guest/host switch works properly.
This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key
which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control
code.
[ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation
depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional
update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and
IBPB ]
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:45 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation
commit
fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54 upstream
Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation
mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user=
The initial options are:
- on: Unconditionally enabled
- off: Unconditionally disabled
-auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now)
When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this
implies that the application to application control follows that state even
if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied.
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:44 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions
commit
495d470e9828500e0155027f230449ac5e29c025 upstream
There is no point in having two functions and a conditional at the call
site.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.986890749@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:43 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata
commit
30ba72a990f5096ae08f284de17986461efcc408 upstream
No point to keep that around.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.893886356@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:42 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly
commit
8770709f411763884535662744a3786a1806afd3 upstream
checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code:
WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const
Fix up all the string arrays.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.800018931@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:41 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code
commit
15d6b7aab0793b2de8a05d8a828777dd24db424e upstream
Reorder the code so it is better grouped. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.707122879@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:40 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state
commit
130d6f946f6f2a972ee3ec8540b7243ab99abe97 upstream
Use the now exposed real SMT state, not the SMT sysfs control knob
state. This reflects the state of the system when the mitigation status is
queried.
This does not change the warning in the VMX launch code. There the
dependency on the control knob makes sense because siblings could be
brought online anytime after launching the VM.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.613357354@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:39 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change
commit
a74cfffb03b73d41e08f84c2e5c87dec0ce3db9f upstream
arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is
changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the
system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline.
To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT
state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled.
Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU
hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:38 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key
commit
321a874a7ef85655e93b3206d0f36b4a6097f948 upstream
Make the scheduler's 'sched_smt_present' static key globaly available, so
it can be used in the x86 speculation control code.
Provide a query function and a stub for the CONFIG_SMP=n case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.430168326@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:37 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled
commit
dbe733642e01dd108f71436aaea7b328cb28fd87 upstream
CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to
have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is
minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static
key.
This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the
speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be
made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an
unused static key to every other architecture for nothing.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.337452245@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:36 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology
commit
c5511d03ec090980732e929c318a7a6374b5550e upstream
Currently the 'sched_smt_present' static key is enabled when at CPU bringup
SMT topology is observed, but it is never disabled. However there is demand
to also disable the key when the topology changes such that there is no SMT
present anymore.
Implement this by making the key count the number of cores that have SMT
enabled.
In particular, the SMT topology bits are set before interrrupts are enabled
and similarly, are cleared after interrupts are disabled for the last time
and the CPU dies.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.246110444@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tim Chen [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:35 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update
commit
01daf56875ee0cd50ed496a09b20eb369b45dfa5 upstream
The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next
task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out
across multiple functions.
Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into
the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function.
This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits
in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes.
Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.151077005@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:34 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions
commit
26c4d75b234040c11728a8acb796b3a85ba7507c upstream
During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according
to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task.
Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in
SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have
"speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names.
For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be
updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate.
Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No
functional change.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.058866968@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tim Chen [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:33 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use
commit
34bce7c9690b1d897686aac89604ba7adc365556 upstream
If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2
user space exploits from hyperthread sibling.
Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.966801480@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tim Chen [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:32 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common()
commit
a8f76ae41cd633ac00be1b3019b1eb4741be3828 upstream
The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the
various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's
hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to
be made for a particular method.
Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper
functions, so they can be extended later on.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.874479208@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tim Chen [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:31 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common()
commit
b86bda0426853bfe8a3506c7d2a5b332760ae46b upstream
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.783903657@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tim Chen [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:30 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
commit
24848509aa55eac39d524b587b051f4e86df3c12 upstream
Remove the unnecessary 'else' statement in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline()
to save an indentation level.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.688010903@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tim Chen [Sun, 25 Nov 2018 18:33:29 +0000 (19:33 +0100)]
x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment
commit
8eb729b77faf83ac4c1f363a9ad68d042415f24c upstream
"Reduced Data Speculation" is an obsolete term. The correct new name is
"Speculative store bypass disable" - which is abbreviated into SSBD.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.593893901@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Zhenzhong Duan [Fri, 2 Nov 2018 08:45:41 +0000 (01:45 -0700)]
x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support
commit
ef014aae8f1cd2793e4e014bbb102bed53f852b7 upstream
Now that CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depends on compiler support, there is no
reason to keep the minimal retpoline support around which only provided
basic protection in the assembly files.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f06f0a89-5587-45db-8ed2-0a9d6638d5c0@default
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Zhenzhong Duan [Fri, 2 Nov 2018 08:45:41 +0000 (01:45 -0700)]
x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support
commit
4cd24de3a0980bf3100c9dcb08ef65ca7c31af48 upstream
Since retpoline capable compilers are widely available, make
CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depend on the compiler capability.
Break the build when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled and the compiler does not
support it. Emit an error message in that case:
"arch/x86/Makefile:226: *** You are building kernel with non-retpoline
compiler, please update your compiler.. Stop."
[dwmw: Fail the build with non-retpoline compiler]
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>
Cc: <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cca0cb20-f9e2-4094-840b-fb0f8810cd34@default
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Zhenzhong Duan [Tue, 18 Sep 2018 14:45:00 +0000 (07:45 -0700)]
x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant
commit
0cbb76d6285794f30953bfa3ab831714b59dd700 upstream
..so that they match their asm counterpart.
Add the missing ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE in CALL_NOSPEC, while at it.
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Cc: dhaval.giani@oracle.com
Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c3975665-173e-4d70-8dee-06c926ac26ee@default
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jiri Kosina [Tue, 25 Sep 2018 12:39:28 +0000 (14:39 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
commit
bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a upstream
If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch
in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks.
If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jiri Kosina [Tue, 25 Sep 2018 12:38:18 +0000 (14:38 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
commit
dbfe2953f63c640463c630746cd5d9de8b2f63ae upstream
Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.
This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.
In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).
[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
fine-grained ]
Fixes:
18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jiri Kosina [Tue, 25 Sep 2018 12:38:55 +0000 (14:38 +0200)]
x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation
commit
53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream
STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.
Enable this feature if
- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)
After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr
on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit
more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in
idle, etc) if needed.
Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tom Lendacky [Mon, 2 Jul 2018 21:36:02 +0000 (16:36 -0500)]
x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
commit
612bc3b3d4be749f73a513a17d9b3ee1330d3487 upstream
On AMD, the presence of the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature does not imply that the
SSBD mitigation support should use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Other features could
have caused the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature to be set, while a different SSBD
mitigation option is in place.
Update the SSBD support to check for the actual SSBD features that will
use the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes:
6ac2f49edb1e ("x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213602.29202.33151.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tom Lendacky [Mon, 2 Jul 2018 21:35:53 +0000 (16:35 -0500)]
x86/bugs: Update when to check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigation
commit
845d382bb15c6e7dc5026c0ff919c5b13fc7e11b upstream
If either the X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD or X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD features are
present, then there is no need to perform the check for the LS_CFG SSBD
mitigation support.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180702213553.29202.21089.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Fri, 1 Jun 2018 14:59:21 +0000 (10:59 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU features
commit
108fab4b5c8f12064ef86e02cb0459992affb30f upstream
Both AMD and Intel can have SPEC_CTRL_MSR for SSBD.
However AMD also has two more other ways of doing it - which
are !SPEC_CTRL MSR ways.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-4-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Fri, 1 Jun 2018 14:59:20 +0000 (10:59 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage
commit
6ac2f49edb1ef5446089c7c660017732886d62d6 upstream
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using
the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f)
for speculative store bypass disable.
This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD
flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
See the document titled:
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Fri, 1 Jun 2018 14:59:19 +0000 (10:59 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Add AMD's variant of SSB_NO
commit
24809860012e0130fbafe536709e08a22b3e959e upstream
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that the CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[26] will mean that the
speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed.
A copy of this document is available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Peter Zijlstra [Mon, 22 Jan 2018 21:53:28 +0000 (22:53 +0100)]
sched/core: Fix cpu.max vs. cpuhotplug deadlock
commit
ce48c146495a1a50e48cdbfbfaba3e708be7c07c upstream
Tejun reported the following cpu-hotplug lock (percpu-rwsem) read recursion:
tg_set_cfs_bandwidth()
get_online_cpus()
cpus_read_lock()
cfs_bandwidth_usage_inc()
static_key_slow_inc()
cpus_read_lock()
Reported-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180122215328.GP3397@worktop
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bernd Eckstein [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 12:51:26 +0000 (13:51 +0100)]
usbnet: ipheth: fix potential recvmsg bug and recvmsg bug 2
[ Upstream commit
45611c61dd503454b2edae00aabe1e429ec49ebe ]
The bug is not easily reproducable, as it may occur very infrequently
(we had machines with 20minutes heavy downloading before it occurred)
However, on a virual machine (VMWare on Windows 10 host) it occurred
pretty frequently (1-2 seconds after a speedtest was started)
dev->tx_skb mab be freed via dev_kfree_skb_irq on a callback
before it is set.
This causes the following problems:
- double free of the skb or potential memory leak
- in dmesg: 'recvmsg bug' and 'recvmsg bug 2' and eventually
general protection fault
Example dmesg output:
[ 134.841986] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 134.841987] recvmsg bug: copied
9C24A555 seq
9C24B557 rcvnxt
9C25A6B3 fl 0
[ 134.841993] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2629 at /build/linux-hwe-On9fm7/linux-hwe-4.15.0/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1865 tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
[ 134.841994] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
[ 134.842046] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 134.842046] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[ 134.842048] RIP: 0010:tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0
[ 134.842048] RSP: 0018:
ffffa6630422bcc8 EFLAGS:
00010286
[ 134.842049] RAX:
0000000000000000 RBX:
ffff997616f4f200 RCX:
0000000000000006
[ 134.842049] RDX:
0000000000000007 RSI:
0000000000000082 RDI:
ffff9976257d6490
[ 134.842050] RBP:
ffffa6630422bd98 R08:
0000000000000001 R09:
000000000004bba4
[ 134.842050] R10:
0000000001e00c6f R11:
000000000004bba4 R12:
ffff99760dee3000
[ 134.842051] R13:
0000000000000000 R14:
ffff99760dee3514 R15:
0000000000000000
[ 134.842051] FS:
00007fe332347700(0000) GS:
ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:
0000000000000000
[ 134.842052] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:
0000000080050033
[ 134.842053] CR2:
0000000001e41000 CR3:
000000020e9b4006 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[ 134.842055] DR0:
0000000000000000 DR1:
0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[ 134.842055] DR3:
0000000000000000 DR6:
00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[ 134.842057] Call Trace:
[ 134.842060] ? aa_sk_perm+0x53/0x1a0
[ 134.842064] inet_recvmsg+0x51/0xc0
[ 134.842066] sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x50
[ 134.842070] SYSC_recvfrom+0xe4/0x160
[ 134.842072] ? __schedule+0x3de/0x8b0
[ 134.842075] ? ktime_get_ts64+0x4c/0xf0
[ 134.842079] SyS_recvfrom+0xe/0x10
[ 134.842082] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
[ 134.842086] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[ 134.842086] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a81d
[ 134.842088] RSP: 002b:
00007ffe8da98398 EFLAGS:
00000246 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002d
[ 134.842090] RAX:
ffffffffffffffda RBX:
ffffffffffffffff RCX:
00007fe331f5a81d
[ 134.842094] RDX:
00000000000003fb RSI:
0000000001e00874 RDI:
0000000000000003
[ 134.842095] RBP:
00007fe32f642c70 R08:
0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000000
[ 134.842097] R10:
0000000000000000 R11:
0000000000000246 R12:
00007fe332347698
[ 134.842099] R13:
0000000001b7e0a0 R14:
0000000001e00874 R15:
0000000000000000
[ 134.842103] Code: 24 fd ff ff e9 cc fe ff ff 48 89 d8 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 00 44 8b 45 80 48 c7 c7 08 bd 59 8b 48 89 85 68 ff ff ff e8 b3 c4 7d ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 85 68 ff ff ff e9 e9 fe ff ff 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00
[ 134.842126] ---[ end trace
b7138fc08c83147f ]---
[ 134.842144] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 134.842145] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi
[ 134.842161] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 134.842162] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[ 134.842164] RIP: 0010:tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440
[ 134.842165] RSP: 0018:
ffffa6630422bde8 EFLAGS:
00010202
[ 134.842167] RAX:
0000000000000000 RBX:
ffff99760dee3000 RCX:
0000000180400034
[ 134.842168] RDX:
5c4afd407207a6c4 RSI:
ffffe868495bd300 RDI:
ffff997616f4f200
[ 134.842169] RBP:
ffffa6630422be08 R08:
0000000016f4d401 R09:
0000000180400034
[ 134.842169] R10:
ffffa6630422bd98 R11:
0000000000000000 R12:
000000000000600c
[ 134.842170] R13:
0000000000000000 R14:
ffff99760dee30c8 R15:
ffff9975bd44fe00
[ 134.842171] FS:
00007fe332347700(0000) GS:
ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:
0000000000000000
[ 134.842173] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:
0000000080050033
[ 134.842174] CR2:
0000000001e41000 CR3:
000000020e9b4006 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[ 134.842177] DR0:
0000000000000000 DR1:
0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[ 134.842178] DR3:
0000000000000000 DR6:
00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[ 134.842179] Call Trace:
[ 134.842181] inet_release+0x42/0x70
[ 134.842183] __sock_release+0x42/0xb0
[ 134.842184] sock_close+0x15/0x20
[ 134.842187] __fput+0xea/0x220
[ 134.842189] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[ 134.842191] task_work_run+0x8a/0xb0
[ 134.842193] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc4/0xd0
[ 134.842195] do_syscall_64+0xf4/0x130
[ 134.842197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
[ 134.842197] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a560
[ 134.842198] RSP: 002b:
00007ffe8da982e8 EFLAGS:
00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000003
[ 134.842200] RAX:
0000000000000000 RBX:
00007fe32f642c70 RCX:
00007fe331f5a560
[ 134.842201] RDX:
00000000008f5320 RSI:
0000000001cd4b50 RDI:
0000000000000003
[ 134.842202] RBP:
00007fe32f6500f8 R08:
000000000000003c R09:
00000000009343c0
[ 134.842203] R10:
0000000000000000 R11:
0000000000000246 R12:
00007fe32f6500d0
[ 134.842204] R13:
00000000008f5320 R14:
00000000008f5320 R15:
0000000001cd4770
[ 134.842205] Code: c8 00 00 00 45 31 e4 49 39 fe 75 4d eb 50 83 ab d8 00 00 00 01 48 8b 17 48 8b 47 08 48 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 0f b6 57 34 8b 47 2c 2b 47 28 83 e2 01 80
[ 134.842226] RIP: tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 RSP:
ffffa6630422bde8
[ 134.842227] ---[ end trace
b7138fc08c831480 ]---
The proposed patch eliminates a potential racing condition.
Before, usb_submit_urb was called and _after_ that, the skb was attached
(dev->tx_skb). So, on a callback it was possible, however unlikely that the
skb was freed before it was set. That way (because dev->tx_skb was not set
to NULL after it was freed), it could happen that a skb from a earlier
transmission was freed a second time (and the skb we should have freed did
not get freed at all)
Now we free the skb directly in ipheth_tx(). It is not passed to the
callback anymore, eliminating the posibility of a double free of the same
skb. Depending on the retval of usb_submit_urb() we use dev_kfree_skb_any()
respectively dev_consume_skb_any() to free the skb.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Zweigle <Oliver.Zweigle@faro.com>
Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <3ernd.Eckstein@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Julian Wiedmann [Wed, 28 Nov 2018 15:20:50 +0000 (16:20 +0100)]
s390/qeth: fix length check in SNMP processing
[ Upstream commit
9a764c1e59684c0358e16ccaafd870629f2cfe67 ]
The response for a SNMP request can consist of multiple parts, which
the cmd callback stages into a kernel buffer until all parts have been
received. If the callback detects that the staging buffer provides
insufficient space, it bails out with error.
This processing is buggy for the first part of the response - while it
initially checks for a length of 'data_len', it later copies an
additional amount of 'offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)' bytes.
Fix the calculation of 'data_len' for the first part of the response.
This also nicely cleans up the memcpy code.
Fixes:
1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pan Bian [Wed, 28 Nov 2018 06:53:19 +0000 (14:53 +0800)]
rapidio/rionet: do not free skb before reading its length
[ Upstream commit
cfc435198f53a6fa1f656d98466b24967ff457d0 ]
skb is freed via dev_kfree_skb_any, however, skb->len is read then. This
may result in a use-after-free bug.
Fixes:
e6161d64263 ("rapidio/rionet: rework driver initialization and removal")
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Willem de Bruijn [Tue, 20 Nov 2018 18:00:18 +0000 (13:00 -0500)]
packet: copy user buffers before orphan or clone
[ Upstream commit
5cd8d46ea1562be80063f53c7c6a5f40224de623 ]
tpacket_snd sends packets with user pages linked into skb frags. It
notifies that pages can be reused when the skb is released by setting
skb->destructor to tpacket_destruct_skb.
This can cause data corruption if the skb is orphaned (e.g., on
transmit through veth) or cloned (e.g., on mirror to another psock).
Create a kernel-private copy of data in these cases, same as tun/tap
zerocopy transmission. Reuse that infrastructure: mark the skb as
SKBTX_ZEROCOPY_FRAG, which will trigger copy in skb_orphan_frags(_rx).
Unlike other zerocopy packets, do not set shinfo destructor_arg to
struct ubuf_info. tpacket_destruct_skb already uses that ptr to notify
when the original skb is released and a timestamp is recorded. Do not
change this timestamp behavior. The ubuf_info->callback is not needed
anyway, as no zerocopy notification is expected.
Mark destructor_arg as not-a-uarg by setting the lower bit to 1. The
resulting value is not a valid ubuf_info pointer, nor a valid
tpacket_snd frame address. Add skb_zcopy_.._nouarg helpers for this.
The fix relies on features introduced in commit
52267790ef52 ("sock:
add MSG_ZEROCOPY"), so can be backported as is only to 4.14.
Tested with from `./in_netns.sh ./txring_overwrite` from
http://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tests
Fixes:
69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Reported-by: Anand H. Krishnan <anandhkrishnan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Lorenzo Bianconi [Fri, 23 Nov 2018 17:28:01 +0000 (18:28 +0100)]
net: thunderx: set tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue
[ Upstream commit
ef2a7cf1d8831535b8991459567b385661eb4a36 ]
Reset snd_queue tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue routine
since it is used to check if tso dma descriptor queue has been previously
allocated. The issue can be triggered with the following reproducer:
$ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv obj xdp_dummy.o
$ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv off
[ 341.467649] WARNING: CPU: 74 PID: 2158 at mm/vmalloc.c:1511 __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.515010] Hardware name: GIGABYTE H270-T70/MT70-HD0, BIOS T49 02/02/2018
[ 341.521874] pstate:
60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[ 341.526654] pc : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.530132] lr : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.533609] sp :
ffff00001c5db860
[ 341.536913] x29:
ffff00001c5db860 x28:
0000000000020000
[ 341.542214] x27:
ffff810feb5090b0 x26:
ffff000017e57000
[ 341.547515] x25:
0000000000000000 x24:
00000000fbd00000
[ 341.552816] x23:
0000000000000000 x22:
ffff810feb5090b0
[ 341.558117] x21:
0000000000000000 x20:
0000000000000000
[ 341.563418] x19:
ffff000017e57000 x18:
0000000000000000
[ 341.568719] x17:
0000000000000000 x16:
0000000000000000
[ 341.574020] x15:
0000000000000010 x14:
ffffffffffffffff
[ 341.579321] x13:
ffff00008985eb27 x12:
ffff00000985eb2f
[ 341.584622] x11:
ffff0000096b3000 x10:
ffff00001c5db510
[ 341.589923] x9 :
00000000ffffffd0 x8 :
ffff0000086868e8
[ 341.595224] x7 :
3430303030303030 x6 :
00000000000006ef
[ 341.600525] x5 :
00000000003fffff x4 :
0000000000000000
[ 341.605825] x3 :
0000000000000000 x2 :
ffffffffffffffff
[ 341.611126] x1 :
ffff0000096b3728 x0 :
0000000000000038
[ 341.616428] Call trace:
[ 341.618866] __vunmap+0x98/0xe0
[ 341.621997] vunmap+0x3c/0x50
[ 341.624961] arch_dma_free+0x68/0xa0
[ 341.628534] dma_direct_free+0x50/0x80
[ 341.632285] nicvf_free_resources+0x160/0x2d8 [nicvf]
[ 341.637327] nicvf_config_data_transfer+0x174/0x5e8 [nicvf]
[ 341.642890] nicvf_stop+0x298/0x340 [nicvf]
[ 341.647066] __dev_close_many+0x9c/0x108
[ 341.650977] dev_close_many+0xa4/0x158
[ 341.654720] rollback_registered_many+0x140/0x530
[ 341.659414] rollback_registered+0x54/0x80
[ 341.663499] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x9c/0xe8
[ 341.668192] unregister_netdev+0x28/0x38
[ 341.672106] nicvf_remove+0xa4/0xa8 [nicvf]
[ 341.676280] nicvf_shutdown+0x20/0x30 [nicvf]
[ 341.680630] pci_device_shutdown+0x44/0x88
[ 341.684720] device_shutdown+0x144/0x250
[ 341.688640] kernel_restart_prepare+0x44/0x50
[ 341.692986] kernel_restart+0x20/0x68
[ 341.696638] __se_sys_reboot+0x210/0x238
[ 341.700550] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x24/0x30
[ 341.704555] el0_svc_handler+0x94/0x110
[ 341.708382] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 341.711252] ---[ end trace
3f4019c8439959c9 ]---
[ 341.715874] page:
ffff7e0003ef4000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:
0000000000000000 index:0x4
[ 341.723872] flags: 0x1fffe000000000()
[ 341.727527] raw:
001fffe000000000 ffff7e0003f1a008 ffff7e0003ef4048 0000000000000000
[ 341.735263] raw:
0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 341.742994] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0)
where xdp_dummy.c is a simple bpf program that forwards the incoming
frames to the network stack (available here:
https://github.com/altoor/xdp_walkthrough_examples/blob/master/sample_1/xdp_dummy.c)
Fixes:
05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
Fixes:
4863dea3fab0 ("net: Adding support for Cavium ThunderX network controller")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jason Wang [Thu, 22 Nov 2018 06:36:31 +0000 (14:36 +0800)]
virtio-net: fail XDP set if guest csum is negotiated
[ Upstream commit
18ba58e1c234ea1a2d9835ac8c1735d965ce4640 ]
We don't support partial csumed packet since its metadata will be lost
or incorrect during XDP processing. So fail the XDP set if guest_csum
feature is negotiated.
Fixes:
f600b6905015 ("virtio_net: Add XDP support")
Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Jason Wang [Thu, 22 Nov 2018 06:36:30 +0000 (14:36 +0800)]
virtio-net: disable guest csum during XDP set
[ Upstream commit
e59ff2c49ae16e1d179de679aca81405829aee6c ]
We don't disable VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM if XDP was set. This means we
can receive partial csumed packets with metadata kept in the
vnet_hdr. This may have several side effects:
- It could be overridden by header adjustment, thus is might be not
correct after XDP processing.
- There's no way to pass such metadata information through
XDP_REDIRECT to another driver.
- XDP does not support checksum offload right now.
So simply disable guest csum if possible in this the case of XDP.
Fixes:
3f93522ffab2d ("virtio-net: switch off offloads on demand if possible on XDP set")
Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Popa <pashinho1990@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Lorenzo Bianconi [Wed, 21 Nov 2018 15:32:10 +0000 (16:32 +0100)]
net: thunderx: set xdp_prog to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails
[ Upstream commit
6d0f60b0f8588fd4380ea5df9601e12fddd55ce2 ]
Set xdp_prog pointer to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails since that routine
reports the error code instead of NULL in case of failure and xdp_prog
pointer value is used in the driver to verify if XDP is currently
enabled.
Moreover report the error code to userspace if nicvf_xdp_setup fails
Fixes:
05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>