From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 16:28:17 +0000 (-0700) Subject: tcp: free batches of packets in tcp_prune_ofo_queue() X-Git-Tag: v4.14.59~21 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=f3a5ba6310e11df370f6888ed716d1486896d983;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-rpi.git tcp: free batches of packets in tcp_prune_ofo_queue() [ Upstream commit 72cd43ba64fc172a443410ce01645895850844c8 ] Juha-Matti Tilli reported that malicious peers could inject tiny packets in out_of_order_queue, forcing very expensive calls to tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() and tcp_prune_ofo_queue() for every incoming packet. out_of_order_queue rb-tree can contain thousands of nodes, iterating over all of them is not nice. Before linux-4.9, we would have pruned all packets in ofo_queue in one go, every XXXX packets. XXXX depends on sk_rcvbuf and skbs truesize, but is about 7000 packets with tcp_rmem[2] default of 6 MB. Since we plan to increase tcp_rmem[2] in the future to cope with modern BDP, can not revert to the old behavior, without great pain. Strategy taken in this patch is to purge ~12.5 % of the queue capacity. Fixes: 36a6503fedda ("tcp: refine tcp_prune_ofo_queue() to not drop all packets") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Juha-Matti Tilli Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h index 9cf971c..6dd7776 100644 --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h @@ -3167,6 +3167,8 @@ static inline int __skb_grow_rcsum(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len) return __skb_grow(skb, len); } +#define rb_to_skb(rb) rb_entry_safe(rb, struct sk_buff, rbnode) + #define skb_queue_walk(queue, skb) \ for (skb = (queue)->next; \ skb != (struct sk_buff *)(queue); \ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 03fd2ff..1e7175b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4924,6 +4924,7 @@ new_range: * 2) not add too big latencies if thousands of packets sit there. * (But if application shrinks SO_RCVBUF, we could still end up * freeing whole queue here) + * 3) Drop at least 12.5 % of sk_rcvbuf to avoid malicious attacks. * * Return true if queue has shrunk. */ @@ -4931,20 +4932,26 @@ static bool tcp_prune_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct rb_node *node, *prev; + int goal; if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&tp->out_of_order_queue)) return false; NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_OFOPRUNED); + goal = sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3; node = &tp->ooo_last_skb->rbnode; do { prev = rb_prev(node); rb_erase(node, &tp->out_of_order_queue); + goal -= rb_to_skb(node)->truesize; tcp_drop(sk, rb_entry(node, struct sk_buff, rbnode)); - sk_mem_reclaim(sk); - if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf && - !tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk)) - break; + if (!prev || goal <= 0) { + sk_mem_reclaim(sk); + if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf && + !tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk)) + break; + goal = sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3; + } node = prev; } while (node); tp->ooo_last_skb = rb_entry(prev, struct sk_buff, rbnode);