From: Anderson Briglia Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2011 21:50:45 +0000 (-0300) Subject: Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs X-Git-Tag: upstream/snapshot3+hdmi~9045^2~12^2~42^2~389^2~20 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=f01ead315785768cdb6e928646f90a47640bcdd9;p=platform%2Fadaptation%2Frenesas_rcar%2Frenesas_kernel.git Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs This patch adds initial support for verifying the confirmation value that the remote side has sent. Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan --- diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h index c284be0..b03d9c4 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h @@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ struct l2cap_conn { __u8 disc_reason; + __u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */ + __u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */ + __u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random */ + __u8 pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */ + struct list_head chan_l; rwlock_t chan_lock; }; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 57fc7d0..fa22f4a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; + memcpy(&conn->preq[1], rp, sizeof(*rp)); skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); rp->io_capability = 0x00; @@ -196,17 +198,25 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00; rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM); + conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; + memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp)); + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp); } static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { + struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data; struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); + conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; + memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp)); + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); } @@ -266,6 +276,9 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00; cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM); + conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; + memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); } @@ -303,6 +316,10 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) cp.init_key_dist = 0x00; cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00; cp.auth_req = authreq; + + conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; + memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp); } else { struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;