From: Vitaly Kuznetsov Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 17:35:41 +0000 (+0100) Subject: x86/xen: split off enlighten_pv.c X-Git-Tag: v4.12-rc1~16^2~55 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e1dab14cf68d1e03950135969af3faf322f0db04;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-exynos.git x86/xen: split off enlighten_pv.c Basically, enlighten.c is renamed to enlighten_pv.c and some code moved out to common enlighten.c. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross --- diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/Makefile b/arch/x86/xen/Makefile index 1bca75b..5ca8d3eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/xen/Makefile @@ -7,13 +7,13 @@ endif # Make sure early boot has no stackprotector nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) -CFLAGS_enlighten.o := $(nostackp) +CFLAGS_enlighten_pv.o := $(nostackp) CFLAGS_mmu.o := $(nostackp) obj-y := enlighten.o setup.o multicalls.o mmu.o irq.o \ time.o xen-asm.o xen-asm_$(BITS).o \ grant-table.o suspend.o platform-pci-unplug.o \ - p2m.o apic.o pmu.o + p2m.o apic.o pmu.o enlighten_pv.o obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_PVHVM) += enlighten_hvm.o obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_PVH) += enlighten_pvh.o diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c index 5cd454c..41d324c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c @@ -1,93 +1,16 @@ -/* - * Core of Xen paravirt_ops implementation. - * - * This file contains the xen_paravirt_ops structure itself, and the - * implementations for: - * - privileged instructions - * - interrupt flags - * - segment operations - * - booting and setup - * - * Jeremy Fitzhardinge , XenSource Inc, 2007 - */ - #include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - #include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include #include #include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include #include #include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include #include #include -#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#endif - #include "xen-ops.h" -#include "mmu.h" #include "smp.h" -#include "multicalls.h" #include "pmu.h" EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hypercall_page); @@ -134,14 +57,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_start_info); struct shared_info xen_dummy_shared_info; -void *xen_initial_gdt; - -RESERVE_BRK(shared_info_page_brk, PAGE_SIZE); - -static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu); -static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu); -static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu); - /* * Point at some empty memory to start with. We map the real shared_info * page as soon as fixmap is up and running. @@ -163,18 +78,30 @@ struct shared_info *HYPERVISOR_shared_info = &xen_dummy_shared_info; */ int xen_have_vcpu_info_placement = 1; -struct tls_descs { - struct desc_struct desc[3]; -}; +static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu) +{ + xen_init_lock_cpu(cpu); + return 0; +} -/* - * Updating the 3 TLS descriptors in the GDT on every task switch is - * surprisingly expensive so we avoid updating them if they haven't - * changed. Since Xen writes different descriptors than the one - * passed in the update_descriptor hypercall we keep shadow copies to - * compare against. - */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc); +int xen_cpuhp_setup(int (*cpu_up_prepare_cb)(unsigned int), + int (*cpu_dead_cb)(unsigned int)) +{ + int rc; + + rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE, + "x86/xen/hvm_guest:prepare", + cpu_up_prepare_cb, cpu_dead_cb); + if (rc >= 0) { + rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, + "x86/xen/hvm_guest:online", + xen_cpu_up_online, NULL); + if (rc < 0) + cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE); + } + + return rc >= 0 ? 0 : rc; +} static void clamp_max_cpus(void) { @@ -243,1510 +170,81 @@ void xen_vcpu_setup(int cpu) } } -/* - * On restore, set the vcpu placement up again. - * If it fails, then we're in a bad state, since - * we can't back out from using it... - */ -void xen_vcpu_restore(void) +void xen_reboot(int reason) { + struct sched_shutdown r = { .reason = reason }; int cpu; - for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - bool other_cpu = (cpu != smp_processor_id()); - bool is_up = HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_is_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), - NULL); - - if (other_cpu && is_up && - HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_down, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL)) - BUG(); - - xen_setup_runstate_info(cpu); - - if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) - xen_vcpu_setup(cpu); - - if (other_cpu && is_up && - HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL)) - BUG(); - } -} - -static void __init xen_banner(void) -{ - unsigned version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL); - struct xen_extraversion extra; - HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_extraversion, &extra); - - pr_info("Booting paravirtualized kernel %son %s\n", - xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap) ? - "with PVH extensions " : "", pv_info.name); - printk(KERN_INFO "Xen version: %d.%d%s%s\n", - version >> 16, version & 0xffff, extra.extraversion, - xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad) ? " (preserve-AD)" : ""); -} -/* Check if running on Xen version (major, minor) or later */ -bool -xen_running_on_version_or_later(unsigned int major, unsigned int minor) -{ - unsigned int version; - - if (!xen_domain()) - return false; - - version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL); - if ((((version >> 16) == major) && ((version & 0xffff) >= minor)) || - ((version >> 16) > major)) - return true; - return false; -} - -#define CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF 6 -#define APERFMPERF_PRESENT 0 - -static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask = ~0; -static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask = ~0; - -static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask; -static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val; -static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_edx_val; - -static void xen_cpuid(unsigned int *ax, unsigned int *bx, - unsigned int *cx, unsigned int *dx) -{ - unsigned maskebx = ~0; - unsigned maskecx = ~0; - unsigned maskedx = ~0; - unsigned setecx = 0; - /* - * Mask out inconvenient features, to try and disable as many - * unsupported kernel subsystems as possible. - */ - switch (*ax) { - case 1: - maskecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask; - setecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask; - maskedx = cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask; - break; - - case CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF: - /* Synthesize the values.. */ - *ax = 0; - *bx = 0; - *cx = cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val; - *dx = cpuid_leaf5_edx_val; - return; - - case CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF: - /* Disabling APERFMPERF for kernel usage */ - maskecx = ~(1 << APERFMPERF_PRESENT); - break; - - case 0xb: - /* Suppress extended topology stuff */ - maskebx = 0; - break; - } - - asm(XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX "cpuid" - : "=a" (*ax), - "=b" (*bx), - "=c" (*cx), - "=d" (*dx) - : "0" (*ax), "2" (*cx)); - - *bx &= maskebx; - *cx &= maskecx; - *cx |= setecx; - *dx &= maskedx; -} -STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(xen_cpuid); /* XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX */ - -static bool __init xen_check_mwait(void) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI - struct xen_platform_op op = { - .cmd = XENPF_set_processor_pminfo, - .u.set_pminfo.id = -1, - .u.set_pminfo.type = XEN_PM_PDC, - }; - uint32_t buf[3]; - unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx; - unsigned int mwait_mask; - - /* We need to determine whether it is OK to expose the MWAIT - * capability to the kernel to harvest deeper than C3 states from ACPI - * _CST using the processor_harvest_xen.c module. For this to work, we - * need to gather the MWAIT_LEAF values (which the cstate.c code - * checks against). The hypervisor won't expose the MWAIT flag because - * it would break backwards compatibility; so we will find out directly - * from the hardware and hypercall. - */ - if (!xen_initial_domain()) - return false; - - /* - * When running under platform earlier than Xen4.2, do not expose - * mwait, to avoid the risk of loading native acpi pad driver - */ - if (!xen_running_on_version_or_later(4, 2)) - return false; - - ax = 1; - cx = 0; - - native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx); - - mwait_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_EST % 32)) | - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32)); - - if ((cx & mwait_mask) != mwait_mask) - return false; - - /* We need to emulate the MWAIT_LEAF and for that we need both - * ecx and edx. The hypercall provides only partial information. - */ - - ax = CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF; - bx = 0; - cx = 0; - dx = 0; - - native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx); - - /* Ask the Hypervisor whether to clear ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH. If so, - * don't expose MWAIT_LEAF and let ACPI pick the IOPORT version of C3. - */ - buf[0] = ACPI_PDC_REVISION_ID; - buf[1] = 1; - buf[2] = (ACPI_PDC_C_CAPABILITY_SMP | ACPI_PDC_EST_CAPABILITY_SWSMP); - - set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.set_pminfo.pdc, buf); - - if ((HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0) && - (buf[2] & (ACPI_PDC_C_C1_FFH | ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH))) { - cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val = cx; - cpuid_leaf5_edx_val = dx; - } - return true; -#else - return false; -#endif -} -static void __init xen_init_cpuid_mask(void) -{ - unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx; - unsigned int xsave_mask; - - cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask = - ~((1 << X86_FEATURE_MTRR) | /* disable MTRR */ - (1 << X86_FEATURE_ACC)); /* thermal monitoring */ - - if (!xen_initial_domain()) - cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask &= - ~((1 << X86_FEATURE_ACPI)); /* disable ACPI */ - - cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~(1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC % 32)); - - ax = 1; - cx = 0; - cpuid(1, &ax, &bx, &cx, &dx); - - xsave_mask = - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_XSAVE % 32)) | - (1 << (X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE % 32)); - - /* Xen will set CR4.OSXSAVE if supported and not disabled by force */ - if ((cx & xsave_mask) != xsave_mask) - cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~xsave_mask; /* disable XSAVE & OSXSAVE */ - if (xen_check_mwait()) - cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32)); -} - -static void xen_set_debugreg(int reg, unsigned long val) -{ - HYPERVISOR_set_debugreg(reg, val); -} - -static unsigned long xen_get_debugreg(int reg) -{ - return HYPERVISOR_get_debugreg(reg); -} - -static void xen_end_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) -{ - xen_mc_flush(); - paravirt_end_context_switch(next); -} - -static unsigned long xen_store_tr(void) -{ - return 0; -} - -/* - * Set the page permissions for a particular virtual address. If the - * address is a vmalloc mapping (or other non-linear mapping), then - * find the linear mapping of the page and also set its protections to - * match. - */ -static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot) -{ - int level; - pte_t *ptep; - pte_t pte; - unsigned long pfn; - struct page *page; - unsigned char dummy; - - ptep = lookup_address((unsigned long)v, &level); - BUG_ON(ptep == NULL); - - pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep); - page = pfn_to_page(pfn); - - pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot); - - /* - * Careful: update_va_mapping() will fail if the virtual address - * we're poking isn't populated in the page tables. We don't - * need to worry about the direct map (that's always in the page - * tables), but we need to be careful about vmap space. In - * particular, the top level page table can lazily propagate - * entries between processes, so if we've switched mms since we - * vmapped the target in the first place, we might not have the - * top-level page table entry populated. - * - * We disable preemption because we want the same mm active when - * we probe the target and when we issue the hypercall. We'll - * have the same nominal mm, but if we're a kernel thread, lazy - * mm dropping could change our pgd. - * - * Out of an abundance of caution, this uses __get_user() to fault - * in the target address just in case there's some obscure case - * in which the target address isn't readable. - */ - - preempt_disable(); - - probe_kernel_read(&dummy, v, 1); + for_each_online_cpu(cpu) + xen_pmu_finish(cpu); - if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0)) + if (HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_shutdown, &r)) BUG(); - - if (!PageHighMem(page)) { - void *av = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn)); - - if (av != v) - if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)av, pte, 0)) - BUG(); - } else - kmap_flush_unused(); - - preempt_enable(); -} - -static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries) -{ - const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE; - int i; - - /* - * We need to mark the all aliases of the LDT pages RO. We - * don't need to call vm_flush_aliases(), though, since that's - * only responsible for flushing aliases out the TLBs, not the - * page tables, and Xen will flush the TLB for us if needed. - * - * To avoid confusing future readers: none of this is necessary - * to load the LDT. The hypervisor only checks this when the - * LDT is faulted in due to subsequent descriptor access. - */ - - for(i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page) - set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL_RO); } -static void xen_free_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries) -{ - const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE; - int i; - - for(i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page) - set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL); -} - -static void xen_set_ldt(const void *addr, unsigned entries) +void xen_emergency_restart(void) { - struct mmuext_op *op; - struct multicall_space mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op)); - - trace_xen_cpu_set_ldt(addr, entries); - - op = mcs.args; - op->cmd = MMUEXT_SET_LDT; - op->arg1.linear_addr = (unsigned long)addr; - op->arg2.nr_ents = entries; - - MULTI_mmuext_op(mcs.mc, op, 1, NULL, DOMID_SELF); - - xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); + xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot); } -static void xen_load_gdt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr) +static int +xen_panic_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) { - unsigned long va = dtr->address; - unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1; - unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE); - unsigned long frames[pages]; - int f; - - /* - * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192 - * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages.. - */ - - BUG_ON(size > 65536); - BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK); - - for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) { - int level; - pte_t *ptep; - unsigned long pfn, mfn; - void *virt; - - /* - * The GDT is per-cpu and is in the percpu data area. - * That can be virtually mapped, so we need to do a - * page-walk to get the underlying MFN for the - * hypercall. The page can also be in the kernel's - * linear range, so we need to RO that mapping too. - */ - ptep = lookup_address(va, &level); - BUG_ON(ptep == NULL); - - pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep); - mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn); - virt = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn)); - - frames[f] = mfn; - - make_lowmem_page_readonly((void *)va); - make_lowmem_page_readonly(virt); - } - - if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct))) - BUG(); + if (!kexec_crash_loaded()) + xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash); + return NOTIFY_DONE; } -/* - * load_gdt for early boot, when the gdt is only mapped once - */ -static void __init xen_load_gdt_boot(const struct desc_ptr *dtr) -{ - unsigned long va = dtr->address; - unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1; - unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE); - unsigned long frames[pages]; - int f; - - /* - * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192 - * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages.. - */ - - BUG_ON(size > 65536); - BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK); - - for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) { - pte_t pte; - unsigned long pfn, mfn; - - pfn = virt_to_pfn(va); - mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn); - - pte = pfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_RO); - - if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)va, pte, 0)) - BUG(); - - frames[f] = mfn; - } - - if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct))) - BUG(); -} +static struct notifier_block xen_panic_block = { + .notifier_call = xen_panic_event, + .priority = INT_MIN +}; -static inline bool desc_equal(const struct desc_struct *d1, - const struct desc_struct *d2) +int xen_panic_handler_init(void) { - return d1->a == d2->a && d1->b == d2->b; + atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &xen_panic_block); + return 0; } -static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct thread_struct *t, - unsigned int cpu, unsigned int i) +void xen_pin_vcpu(int cpu) { - struct desc_struct *shadow = &per_cpu(shadow_tls_desc, cpu).desc[i]; - struct desc_struct *gdt; - xmaddr_t maddr; - struct multicall_space mc; + static bool disable_pinning; + struct sched_pin_override pin_override; + int ret; - if (desc_equal(shadow, &t->tls_array[i])) + if (disable_pinning) return; - *shadow = t->tls_array[i]; - - gdt = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu); - maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN+i]); - mc = __xen_mc_entry(0); + pin_override.pcpu = cpu; + ret = HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_pin_override, &pin_override); - MULTI_update_descriptor(mc.mc, maddr.maddr, t->tls_array[i]); -} + /* Ignore errors when removing override. */ + if (cpu < 0) + return; -static void xen_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu) -{ - /* - * XXX sleazy hack: If we're being called in a lazy-cpu zone - * and lazy gs handling is enabled, it means we're in a - * context switch, and %gs has just been saved. This means we - * can zero it out to prevent faults on exit from the - * hypervisor if the next process has no %gs. Either way, it - * has been saved, and the new value will get loaded properly. - * This will go away as soon as Xen has been modified to not - * save/restore %gs for normal hypercalls. - * - * On x86_64, this hack is not used for %gs, because gs points - * to KERNEL_GS_BASE (and uses it for PDA references), so we - * must not zero %gs on x86_64 - * - * For x86_64, we need to zero %fs, otherwise we may get an - * exception between the new %fs descriptor being loaded and - * %fs being effectively cleared at __switch_to(). - */ - if (paravirt_get_lazy_mode() == PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - lazy_load_gs(0); -#else - loadsegment(fs, 0); -#endif + switch (ret) { + case -ENOSYS: + pr_warn("Unable to pin on physical cpu %d. In case of problems consider vcpu pinning.\n", + cpu); + disable_pinning = true; + break; + case -EPERM: + WARN(1, "Trying to pin vcpu without having privilege to do so\n"); + disable_pinning = true; + break; + case -EINVAL: + case -EBUSY: + pr_warn("Physical cpu %d not available for pinning. Check Xen cpu configuration.\n", + cpu); + break; + case 0: + break; + default: + WARN(1, "rc %d while trying to pin vcpu\n", ret); + disable_pinning = true; } - - xen_mc_batch(); - - load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 0); - load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 1); - load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 2); - - xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -static void xen_load_gs_index(unsigned int idx) -{ - if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL, idx)) - BUG(); -} -#endif - -static void xen_write_ldt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entrynum, - const void *ptr) -{ - xmaddr_t mach_lp = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entrynum]); - u64 entry = *(u64 *)ptr; - - trace_xen_cpu_write_ldt_entry(dt, entrynum, entry); - - preempt_disable(); - - xen_mc_flush(); - if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(mach_lp.maddr, entry)) - BUG(); - - preempt_enable(); } -static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val, - struct trap_info *info) -{ - unsigned long addr; - - if (val->type != GATE_TRAP && val->type != GATE_INTERRUPT) - return 0; - - info->vector = vector; - - addr = gate_offset(*val); -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - /* - * Look for known traps using IST, and substitute them - * appropriately. The debugger ones are the only ones we care - * about. Xen will handle faults like double_fault, - * so we should never see them. Warn if - * there's an unexpected IST-using fault handler. - */ - if (addr == (unsigned long)debug) - addr = (unsigned long)xen_debug; - else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3) - addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3; - else if (addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment) - addr = (unsigned long)xen_stack_segment; - else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault) { - /* Don't need to handle these */ - return 0; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE - } else if (addr == (unsigned long)machine_check) { - /* - * when xen hypervisor inject vMCE to guest, - * use native mce handler to handle it - */ - ; -#endif - } else if (addr == (unsigned long)nmi) - /* - * Use the native version as well. - */ - ; - else { - /* Some other trap using IST? */ - if (WARN_ON(val->ist != 0)) - return 0; - } -#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ - info->address = addr; - - info->cs = gate_segment(*val); - info->flags = val->dpl; - /* interrupt gates clear IF */ - if (val->type == GATE_INTERRUPT) - info->flags |= 1 << 2; - - return 1; -} - -/* Locations of each CPU's IDT */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct desc_ptr, idt_desc); - -/* Set an IDT entry. If the entry is part of the current IDT, then - also update Xen. */ -static void xen_write_idt_entry(gate_desc *dt, int entrynum, const gate_desc *g) -{ - unsigned long p = (unsigned long)&dt[entrynum]; - unsigned long start, end; - - trace_xen_cpu_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g); - - preempt_disable(); - - start = __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.address); - end = start + __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.size) + 1; - - xen_mc_flush(); - - native_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g); - - if (p >= start && (p + 8) <= end) { - struct trap_info info[2]; - - info[1].address = 0; - - if (cvt_gate_to_trap(entrynum, g, &info[0])) - if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(info)) - BUG(); - } - - preempt_enable(); -} - -static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc, - struct trap_info *traps) -{ - unsigned in, out, count; - - count = (desc->size+1) / sizeof(gate_desc); - BUG_ON(count > 256); - - for (in = out = 0; in < count; in++) { - gate_desc *entry = (gate_desc*)(desc->address) + in; - - if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out])) - out++; - } - traps[out].address = 0; -} - -void xen_copy_trap_info(struct trap_info *traps) -{ - const struct desc_ptr *desc = this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc); - - xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps); -} - -/* Load a new IDT into Xen. In principle this can be per-CPU, so we - hold a spinlock to protect the static traps[] array (static because - it avoids allocation, and saves stack space). */ -static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc) -{ - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); - static struct trap_info traps[257]; - - trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc); - - spin_lock(&lock); - - memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc)); - - xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps); - - xen_mc_flush(); - if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps)) - BUG(); - - spin_unlock(&lock); -} - -/* Write a GDT descriptor entry. Ignore LDT descriptors, since - they're handled differently. */ -static void xen_write_gdt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry, - const void *desc, int type) -{ - trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type); - - preempt_disable(); - - switch (type) { - case DESC_LDT: - case DESC_TSS: - /* ignore */ - break; - - default: { - xmaddr_t maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]); - - xen_mc_flush(); - if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc)) - BUG(); - } - - } - - preempt_enable(); -} - -/* - * Version of write_gdt_entry for use at early boot-time needed to - * update an entry as simply as possible. - */ -static void __init xen_write_gdt_entry_boot(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry, - const void *desc, int type) -{ - trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type); - - switch (type) { - case DESC_LDT: - case DESC_TSS: - /* ignore */ - break; - - default: { - xmaddr_t maddr = virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]); - - if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc)) - dt[entry] = *(struct desc_struct *)desc; - } - - } -} - -static void xen_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, - struct thread_struct *thread) -{ - struct multicall_space mcs; - - mcs = xen_mc_entry(0); - MULTI_stack_switch(mcs.mc, __KERNEL_DS, thread->sp0); - xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); - tss->x86_tss.sp0 = thread->sp0; -} - -void xen_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask) -{ - struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl; - - /* Force the change at ring 0. */ - set_iopl.iopl = (mask == 0) ? 1 : (mask >> 12) & 3; - HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl); -} - -static void xen_io_delay(void) -{ -} - -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, xen_cr0_value); - -static unsigned long xen_read_cr0(void) -{ - unsigned long cr0 = this_cpu_read(xen_cr0_value); - - if (unlikely(cr0 == 0)) { - cr0 = native_read_cr0(); - this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0); - } - - return cr0; -} - -static void xen_write_cr0(unsigned long cr0) -{ - struct multicall_space mcs; - - this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0); - - /* Only pay attention to cr0.TS; everything else is - ignored. */ - mcs = xen_mc_entry(0); - - MULTI_fpu_taskswitch(mcs.mc, (cr0 & X86_CR0_TS) != 0); - - xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); -} - -static void xen_write_cr4(unsigned long cr4) -{ - cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PCE); - - native_write_cr4(cr4); -} -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -static inline unsigned long xen_read_cr8(void) -{ - return 0; -} -static inline void xen_write_cr8(unsigned long val) -{ - BUG_ON(val); -} -#endif - -static u64 xen_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, int *err) -{ - u64 val; - - if (pmu_msr_read(msr, &val, err)) - return val; - - val = native_read_msr_safe(msr, err); - switch (msr) { - case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC - if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & (1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC & 31)))) -#endif - val &= ~X2APIC_ENABLE; - break; - } - return val; -} - -static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high) -{ - int ret; - - ret = 0; - - switch (msr) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - unsigned which; - u64 base; - - case MSR_FS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_FS; goto set; - case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_GS_USER; goto set; - case MSR_GS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL; goto set; - - set: - base = ((u64)high << 32) | low; - if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(which, base) != 0) - ret = -EIO; - break; -#endif - - case MSR_STAR: - case MSR_CSTAR: - case MSR_LSTAR: - case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK: - case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: - case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: - case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: - /* Fast syscall setup is all done in hypercalls, so - these are all ignored. Stub them out here to stop - Xen console noise. */ - break; - - default: - if (!pmu_msr_write(msr, low, high, &ret)) - ret = native_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high); - } - - return ret; -} - -static u64 xen_read_msr(unsigned int msr) -{ - /* - * This will silently swallow a #GP from RDMSR. It may be worth - * changing that. - */ - int err; - - return xen_read_msr_safe(msr, &err); -} - -static void xen_write_msr(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high) -{ - /* - * This will silently swallow a #GP from WRMSR. It may be worth - * changing that. - */ - xen_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high); -} - -void xen_setup_shared_info(void) -{ - if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) { - set_fixmap(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP, - xen_start_info->shared_info); - - HYPERVISOR_shared_info = - (struct shared_info *)fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP); - } else - HYPERVISOR_shared_info = - (struct shared_info *)__va(xen_start_info->shared_info); - -#ifndef CONFIG_SMP - /* In UP this is as good a place as any to set up shared info */ - xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement(); -#endif - - xen_setup_mfn_list_list(); -} - -/* This is called once we have the cpu_possible_mask */ -void xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement(void) -{ - int cpu; - - for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - /* Set up direct vCPU id mapping for PV guests. */ - per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, cpu) = cpu; - xen_vcpu_setup(cpu); - } - - /* - * xen_vcpu_setup managed to place the vcpu_info within the - * percpu area for all cpus, so make use of it. - */ - if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) { - pv_irq_ops.save_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_save_fl_direct); - pv_irq_ops.restore_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_restore_fl_direct); - pv_irq_ops.irq_disable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_disable_direct); - pv_irq_ops.irq_enable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_enable_direct); - pv_mmu_ops.read_cr2 = xen_read_cr2_direct; - } -} - -static unsigned xen_patch(u8 type, u16 clobbers, void *insnbuf, - unsigned long addr, unsigned len) -{ - char *start, *end, *reloc; - unsigned ret; - - start = end = reloc = NULL; - -#define SITE(op, x) \ - case PARAVIRT_PATCH(op.x): \ - if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) { \ - start = (char *)xen_##x##_direct; \ - end = xen_##x##_direct_end; \ - reloc = xen_##x##_direct_reloc; \ - } \ - goto patch_site - - switch (type) { - SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_enable); - SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_disable); - SITE(pv_irq_ops, save_fl); - SITE(pv_irq_ops, restore_fl); -#undef SITE - - patch_site: - if (start == NULL || (end-start) > len) - goto default_patch; - - ret = paravirt_patch_insns(insnbuf, len, start, end); - - /* Note: because reloc is assigned from something that - appears to be an array, gcc assumes it's non-null, - but doesn't know its relationship with start and - end. */ - if (reloc > start && reloc < end) { - int reloc_off = reloc - start; - long *relocp = (long *)(insnbuf + reloc_off); - long delta = start - (char *)addr; - - *relocp += delta; - } - break; - - default_patch: - default: - ret = paravirt_patch_default(type, clobbers, insnbuf, - addr, len); - break; - } - - return ret; -} - -static const struct pv_info xen_info __initconst = { - .shared_kernel_pmd = 0, - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - .extra_user_64bit_cs = FLAT_USER_CS64, -#endif - .name = "Xen", -}; - -static const struct pv_init_ops xen_init_ops __initconst = { - .patch = xen_patch, -}; - -static const struct pv_cpu_ops xen_cpu_ops __initconst = { - .cpuid = xen_cpuid, - - .set_debugreg = xen_set_debugreg, - .get_debugreg = xen_get_debugreg, - - .read_cr0 = xen_read_cr0, - .write_cr0 = xen_write_cr0, - - .read_cr4 = native_read_cr4, - .write_cr4 = xen_write_cr4, - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - .read_cr8 = xen_read_cr8, - .write_cr8 = xen_write_cr8, -#endif - - .wbinvd = native_wbinvd, - - .read_msr = xen_read_msr, - .write_msr = xen_write_msr, - - .read_msr_safe = xen_read_msr_safe, - .write_msr_safe = xen_write_msr_safe, - - .read_pmc = xen_read_pmc, - - .iret = xen_iret, -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - .usergs_sysret64 = xen_sysret64, -#endif - - .load_tr_desc = paravirt_nop, - .set_ldt = xen_set_ldt, - .load_gdt = xen_load_gdt, - .load_idt = xen_load_idt, - .load_tls = xen_load_tls, -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - .load_gs_index = xen_load_gs_index, -#endif - - .alloc_ldt = xen_alloc_ldt, - .free_ldt = xen_free_ldt, - - .store_idt = native_store_idt, - .store_tr = xen_store_tr, - - .write_ldt_entry = xen_write_ldt_entry, - .write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry, - .write_idt_entry = xen_write_idt_entry, - .load_sp0 = xen_load_sp0, - - .set_iopl_mask = xen_set_iopl_mask, - .io_delay = xen_io_delay, - - /* Xen takes care of %gs when switching to usermode for us */ - .swapgs = paravirt_nop, - - .start_context_switch = paravirt_start_context_switch, - .end_context_switch = xen_end_context_switch, -}; - -void xen_reboot(int reason) -{ - struct sched_shutdown r = { .reason = reason }; - int cpu; - - for_each_online_cpu(cpu) - xen_pmu_finish(cpu); - - if (HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_shutdown, &r)) - BUG(); -} - -static void xen_restart(char *msg) -{ - xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot); -} - -void xen_emergency_restart(void) -{ - xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot); -} - -static void xen_machine_halt(void) -{ - xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff); -} - -static void xen_machine_power_off(void) -{ - if (pm_power_off) - pm_power_off(); - xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff); -} - -static void xen_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash); -} - -static int -xen_panic_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) -{ - if (!kexec_crash_loaded()) - xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash); - return NOTIFY_DONE; -} - -static struct notifier_block xen_panic_block = { - .notifier_call= xen_panic_event, - .priority = INT_MIN -}; - -int xen_panic_handler_init(void) -{ - atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &xen_panic_block); - return 0; -} - -static const struct machine_ops xen_machine_ops __initconst = { - .restart = xen_restart, - .halt = xen_machine_halt, - .power_off = xen_machine_power_off, - .shutdown = xen_machine_halt, - .crash_shutdown = xen_crash_shutdown, - .emergency_restart = xen_emergency_restart, -}; - -static unsigned char xen_get_nmi_reason(void) -{ - unsigned char reason = 0; - - /* Construct a value which looks like it came from port 0x61. */ - if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_io_error, - &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason)) - reason |= NMI_REASON_IOCHK; - if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr, - &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason)) - reason |= NMI_REASON_SERR; - - return reason; -} - -static void __init xen_boot_params_init_edd(void) -{ -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EDD) - struct xen_platform_op op; - struct edd_info *edd_info; - u32 *mbr_signature; - unsigned nr; - int ret; - - edd_info = boot_params.eddbuf; - mbr_signature = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer; - - op.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info; - - op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_INFO; - for (nr = 0; nr < EDDMAXNR; nr++) { - struct edd_info *info = edd_info + nr; - - op.u.firmware_info.index = nr; - info->params.length = sizeof(info->params); - set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.edd_params, - &info->params); - ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op); - if (ret) - break; - -#define C(x) info->x = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.x - C(device); - C(version); - C(interface_support); - C(legacy_max_cylinder); - C(legacy_max_head); - C(legacy_sectors_per_track); -#undef C - } - boot_params.eddbuf_entries = nr; - - op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_MBR_SIGNATURE; - for (nr = 0; nr < EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX; nr++) { - op.u.firmware_info.index = nr; - ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op); - if (ret) - break; - mbr_signature[nr] = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_mbr_signature.mbr_signature; - } - boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries = nr; -#endif -} - -/* - * Set up the GDT and segment registers for -fstack-protector. Until - * we do this, we have to be careful not to call any stack-protected - * function, which is most of the kernel. - */ -static void xen_setup_gdt(int cpu) -{ - pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry_boot; - pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt_boot; - - setup_stack_canary_segment(0); - switch_to_new_gdt(0); - - pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry; - pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt; -} - -static void __init xen_dom0_set_legacy_features(void) -{ - x86_platform.legacy.rtc = 1; -} - -int xen_cpuhp_setup(int (*cpu_up_prepare_cb)(unsigned int), - int (*cpu_dead_cb)(unsigned int)) -{ - int rc; - - rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE, - "x86/xen/hvm_guest:prepare", - cpu_up_prepare_cb, cpu_dead_cb); - if (rc >= 0) { - rc = cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, - "x86/xen/hvm_guest:online", - xen_cpu_up_online, NULL); - if (rc < 0) - cpuhp_remove_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_PREPARE); - } - - return rc >= 0 ? 0 : rc; -} - -/* First C function to be called on Xen boot */ -asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void) -{ - struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl; - unsigned long initrd_start = 0; - int rc; - - if (!xen_start_info) - return; - - xen_domain_type = XEN_PV_DOMAIN; - - xen_setup_features(); - - xen_setup_machphys_mapping(); - - /* Install Xen paravirt ops */ - pv_info = xen_info; - pv_init_ops = xen_init_ops; - pv_cpu_ops = xen_cpu_ops; - - x86_platform.get_nmi_reason = xen_get_nmi_reason; - - x86_init.resources.memory_setup = xen_memory_setup; - x86_init.oem.arch_setup = xen_arch_setup; - x86_init.oem.banner = xen_banner; - - xen_init_time_ops(); - - /* - * Set up some pagetable state before starting to set any ptes. - */ - - xen_init_mmu_ops(); - - /* Prevent unwanted bits from being set in PTEs. */ - __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL; - - /* - * Prevent page tables from being allocated in highmem, even - * if CONFIG_HIGHPTE is enabled. - */ - __userpte_alloc_gfp &= ~__GFP_HIGHMEM; - - /* Work out if we support NX */ - x86_configure_nx(); - - /* Get mfn list */ - xen_build_dynamic_phys_to_machine(); - - /* - * Set up kernel GDT and segment registers, mainly so that - * -fstack-protector code can be executed. - */ - xen_setup_gdt(0); - - xen_init_irq_ops(); - xen_init_cpuid_mask(); - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC - /* - * set up the basic apic ops. - */ - xen_init_apic(); -#endif - - if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad)) { - pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_start = xen_ptep_modify_prot_start; - pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_commit = xen_ptep_modify_prot_commit; - } - - machine_ops = xen_machine_ops; - - /* - * The only reliable way to retain the initial address of the - * percpu gdt_page is to remember it here, so we can go and - * mark it RW later, when the initial percpu area is freed. - */ - xen_initial_gdt = &per_cpu(gdt_page, 0); - - xen_smp_init(); - -#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA - /* - * The pages we from Xen are not related to machine pages, so - * any NUMA information the kernel tries to get from ACPI will - * be meaningless. Prevent it from trying. - */ - acpi_numa = -1; -#endif - /* Don't do the full vcpu_info placement stuff until we have a - possible map and a non-dummy shared_info. */ - per_cpu(xen_vcpu, 0) = &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->vcpu_info[0]; - - WARN_ON(xen_cpuhp_setup(xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv, xen_cpu_dead_pv)); - - local_irq_disable(); - early_boot_irqs_disabled = true; - - xen_raw_console_write("mapping kernel into physical memory\n"); - xen_setup_kernel_pagetable((pgd_t *)xen_start_info->pt_base, - xen_start_info->nr_pages); - xen_reserve_special_pages(); - - /* keep using Xen gdt for now; no urgent need to change it */ - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - pv_info.kernel_rpl = 1; - if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel)) - pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0; -#else - pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0; -#endif - /* set the limit of our address space */ - xen_reserve_top(); - - /* - * We used to do this in xen_arch_setup, but that is too late - * on AMD were early_cpu_init (run before ->arch_setup()) calls - * early_amd_init which pokes 0xcf8 port. - */ - set_iopl.iopl = 1; - rc = HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl); - if (rc != 0) - xen_raw_printk("physdev_op failed %d\n", rc); - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - /* set up basic CPUID stuff */ - cpu_detect(&new_cpu_data); - set_cpu_cap(&new_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_FPU); - new_cpu_data.x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = cpuid_edx(1); -#endif - - if (xen_start_info->mod_start) { - if (xen_start_info->flags & SIF_MOD_START_PFN) - initrd_start = PFN_PHYS(xen_start_info->mod_start); - else - initrd_start = __pa(xen_start_info->mod_start); - } - - /* Poke various useful things into boot_params */ - boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader = (9 << 4) | 0; - boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image = initrd_start; - boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size = xen_start_info->mod_len; - boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr = __pa(xen_start_info->cmd_line); - boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch = X86_SUBARCH_XEN; - - if (!xen_initial_domain()) { - add_preferred_console("xenboot", 0, NULL); - add_preferred_console("tty", 0, NULL); - add_preferred_console("hvc", 0, NULL); - if (pci_xen) - x86_init.pci.arch_init = pci_xen_init; - } else { - const struct dom0_vga_console_info *info = - (void *)((char *)xen_start_info + - xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_off); - struct xen_platform_op op = { - .cmd = XENPF_firmware_info, - .interface_version = XENPF_INTERFACE_VERSION, - .u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_KBD_SHIFT_FLAGS, - }; - - x86_platform.set_legacy_features = - xen_dom0_set_legacy_features; - xen_init_vga(info, xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_size); - xen_start_info->console.domU.mfn = 0; - xen_start_info->console.domU.evtchn = 0; - - if (HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0) - boot_params.kbd_status = op.u.firmware_info.u.kbd_shift_flags; - - /* Make sure ACS will be enabled */ - pci_request_acs(); - - xen_acpi_sleep_register(); - - /* Avoid searching for BIOS MP tables */ - x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop; - x86_init.mpparse.get_smp_config = x86_init_uint_noop; - - xen_boot_params_init_edd(); - } -#ifdef CONFIG_PCI - /* PCI BIOS service won't work from a PV guest. */ - pci_probe &= ~PCI_PROBE_BIOS; -#endif - xen_raw_console_write("about to get started...\n"); - - /* Let's presume PV guests always boot on vCPU with id 0. */ - per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, 0) = 0; - - xen_setup_runstate_info(0); - - xen_efi_init(); - - /* Start the world */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - i386_start_kernel(); -#else - cr4_init_shadow(); /* 32b kernel does this in i386_start_kernel() */ - x86_64_start_reservations((char *)__pa_symbol(&boot_params)); -#endif -} - -static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu) -{ - int rc; - - xen_setup_timer(cpu); - - rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu); - if (rc) { - WARN(1, "xen_smp_intr_init() for CPU %d failed: %d\n", - cpu, rc); - return rc; - } - return 0; -} - -static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu) -{ - xen_smp_intr_free(cpu); - - xen_teardown_timer(cpu); - - return 0; -} - -static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu) -{ - xen_init_lock_cpu(cpu); - return 0; -} - -static uint32_t __init xen_platform_pv(void) -{ - if (xen_pv_domain()) - return xen_cpuid_base(); - - return 0; -} - -static void xen_set_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ - clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); - set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV); -} - -void xen_pin_vcpu(int cpu) -{ - static bool disable_pinning; - struct sched_pin_override pin_override; - int ret; - - if (disable_pinning) - return; - - pin_override.pcpu = cpu; - ret = HYPERVISOR_sched_op(SCHEDOP_pin_override, &pin_override); - - /* Ignore errors when removing override. */ - if (cpu < 0) - return; - - switch (ret) { - case -ENOSYS: - pr_warn("Unable to pin on physical cpu %d. In case of problems consider vcpu pinning.\n", - cpu); - disable_pinning = true; - break; - case -EPERM: - WARN(1, "Trying to pin vcpu without having privilege to do so\n"); - disable_pinning = true; - break; - case -EINVAL: - case -EBUSY: - pr_warn("Physical cpu %d not available for pinning. Check Xen cpu configuration.\n", - cpu); - break; - case 0: - break; - default: - WARN(1, "rc %d while trying to pin vcpu\n", ret); - disable_pinning = true; - } -} - -const struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_xen_pv = { - .name = "Xen PV", - .detect = xen_platform_pv, - .set_cpu_features = xen_set_cpu_features, - .pin_vcpu = xen_pin_vcpu, -}; -EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_hyper_xen_pv); - #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU void xen_arch_register_cpu(int num) { diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cb7947 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -0,0 +1,1512 @@ +/* + * Core of Xen paravirt_ops implementation. + * + * This file contains the xen_paravirt_ops structure itself, and the + * implementations for: + * - privileged instructions + * - interrupt flags + * - segment operations + * - booting and setup + * + * Jeremy Fitzhardinge , XenSource Inc, 2007 + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "xen-ops.h" +#include "mmu.h" +#include "smp.h" +#include "multicalls.h" +#include "pmu.h" + +void *xen_initial_gdt; + +RESERVE_BRK(shared_info_page_brk, PAGE_SIZE); + +static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu); +static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu); + +struct tls_descs { + struct desc_struct desc[3]; +}; + +/* + * Updating the 3 TLS descriptors in the GDT on every task switch is + * surprisingly expensive so we avoid updating them if they haven't + * changed. Since Xen writes different descriptors than the one + * passed in the update_descriptor hypercall we keep shadow copies to + * compare against. + */ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc); + +/* + * On restore, set the vcpu placement up again. + * If it fails, then we're in a bad state, since + * we can't back out from using it... + */ +void xen_vcpu_restore(void) +{ + int cpu; + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + bool other_cpu = (cpu != smp_processor_id()); + bool is_up = HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_is_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), + NULL); + + if (other_cpu && is_up && + HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_down, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL)) + BUG(); + + xen_setup_runstate_info(cpu); + + if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) + xen_vcpu_setup(cpu); + + if (other_cpu && is_up && + HYPERVISOR_vcpu_op(VCPUOP_up, xen_vcpu_nr(cpu), NULL)) + BUG(); + } +} + +static void __init xen_banner(void) +{ + unsigned version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL); + struct xen_extraversion extra; + HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_extraversion, &extra); + + pr_info("Booting paravirtualized kernel %son %s\n", + xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap) ? + "with PVH extensions " : "", pv_info.name); + printk(KERN_INFO "Xen version: %d.%d%s%s\n", + version >> 16, version & 0xffff, extra.extraversion, + xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad) ? " (preserve-AD)" : ""); +} +/* Check if running on Xen version (major, minor) or later */ +bool +xen_running_on_version_or_later(unsigned int major, unsigned int minor) +{ + unsigned int version; + + if (!xen_domain()) + return false; + + version = HYPERVISOR_xen_version(XENVER_version, NULL); + if ((((version >> 16) == major) && ((version & 0xffff) >= minor)) || + ((version >> 16) > major)) + return true; + return false; +} + +#define CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF 6 +#define APERFMPERF_PRESENT 0 + +static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask = ~0; +static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask = ~0; + +static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask; +static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val; +static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_edx_val; + +static void xen_cpuid(unsigned int *ax, unsigned int *bx, + unsigned int *cx, unsigned int *dx) +{ + unsigned maskebx = ~0; + unsigned maskecx = ~0; + unsigned maskedx = ~0; + unsigned setecx = 0; + /* + * Mask out inconvenient features, to try and disable as many + * unsupported kernel subsystems as possible. + */ + switch (*ax) { + case 1: + maskecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask; + setecx = cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask; + maskedx = cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask; + break; + + case CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF: + /* Synthesize the values.. */ + *ax = 0; + *bx = 0; + *cx = cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val; + *dx = cpuid_leaf5_edx_val; + return; + + case CPUID_THERM_POWER_LEAF: + /* Disabling APERFMPERF for kernel usage */ + maskecx = ~(1 << APERFMPERF_PRESENT); + break; + + case 0xb: + /* Suppress extended topology stuff */ + maskebx = 0; + break; + } + + asm(XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX "cpuid" + : "=a" (*ax), + "=b" (*bx), + "=c" (*cx), + "=d" (*dx) + : "0" (*ax), "2" (*cx)); + + *bx &= maskebx; + *cx &= maskecx; + *cx |= setecx; + *dx &= maskedx; +} +STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(xen_cpuid); /* XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX */ + +static bool __init xen_check_mwait(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI + struct xen_platform_op op = { + .cmd = XENPF_set_processor_pminfo, + .u.set_pminfo.id = -1, + .u.set_pminfo.type = XEN_PM_PDC, + }; + uint32_t buf[3]; + unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx; + unsigned int mwait_mask; + + /* We need to determine whether it is OK to expose the MWAIT + * capability to the kernel to harvest deeper than C3 states from ACPI + * _CST using the processor_harvest_xen.c module. For this to work, we + * need to gather the MWAIT_LEAF values (which the cstate.c code + * checks against). The hypervisor won't expose the MWAIT flag because + * it would break backwards compatibility; so we will find out directly + * from the hardware and hypercall. + */ + if (!xen_initial_domain()) + return false; + + /* + * When running under platform earlier than Xen4.2, do not expose + * mwait, to avoid the risk of loading native acpi pad driver + */ + if (!xen_running_on_version_or_later(4, 2)) + return false; + + ax = 1; + cx = 0; + + native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx); + + mwait_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_EST % 32)) | + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32)); + + if ((cx & mwait_mask) != mwait_mask) + return false; + + /* We need to emulate the MWAIT_LEAF and for that we need both + * ecx and edx. The hypercall provides only partial information. + */ + + ax = CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF; + bx = 0; + cx = 0; + dx = 0; + + native_cpuid(&ax, &bx, &cx, &dx); + + /* Ask the Hypervisor whether to clear ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH. If so, + * don't expose MWAIT_LEAF and let ACPI pick the IOPORT version of C3. + */ + buf[0] = ACPI_PDC_REVISION_ID; + buf[1] = 1; + buf[2] = (ACPI_PDC_C_CAPABILITY_SMP | ACPI_PDC_EST_CAPABILITY_SWSMP); + + set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.set_pminfo.pdc, buf); + + if ((HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0) && + (buf[2] & (ACPI_PDC_C_C1_FFH | ACPI_PDC_C_C2C3_FFH))) { + cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val = cx; + cpuid_leaf5_edx_val = dx; + } + return true; +#else + return false; +#endif +} +static void __init xen_init_cpuid_mask(void) +{ + unsigned int ax, bx, cx, dx; + unsigned int xsave_mask; + + cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask = + ~((1 << X86_FEATURE_MTRR) | /* disable MTRR */ + (1 << X86_FEATURE_ACC)); /* thermal monitoring */ + + if (!xen_initial_domain()) + cpuid_leaf1_edx_mask &= + ~((1 << X86_FEATURE_ACPI)); /* disable ACPI */ + + cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~(1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC % 32)); + + ax = 1; + cx = 0; + cpuid(1, &ax, &bx, &cx, &dx); + + xsave_mask = + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_XSAVE % 32)) | + (1 << (X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE % 32)); + + /* Xen will set CR4.OSXSAVE if supported and not disabled by force */ + if ((cx & xsave_mask) != xsave_mask) + cpuid_leaf1_ecx_mask &= ~xsave_mask; /* disable XSAVE & OSXSAVE */ + if (xen_check_mwait()) + cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT % 32)); +} + +static void xen_set_debugreg(int reg, unsigned long val) +{ + HYPERVISOR_set_debugreg(reg, val); +} + +static unsigned long xen_get_debugreg(int reg) +{ + return HYPERVISOR_get_debugreg(reg); +} + +static void xen_end_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + xen_mc_flush(); + paravirt_end_context_switch(next); +} + +static unsigned long xen_store_tr(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the page permissions for a particular virtual address. If the + * address is a vmalloc mapping (or other non-linear mapping), then + * find the linear mapping of the page and also set its protections to + * match. + */ +static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot) +{ + int level; + pte_t *ptep; + pte_t pte; + unsigned long pfn; + struct page *page; + unsigned char dummy; + + ptep = lookup_address((unsigned long)v, &level); + BUG_ON(ptep == NULL); + + pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep); + page = pfn_to_page(pfn); + + pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot); + + /* + * Careful: update_va_mapping() will fail if the virtual address + * we're poking isn't populated in the page tables. We don't + * need to worry about the direct map (that's always in the page + * tables), but we need to be careful about vmap space. In + * particular, the top level page table can lazily propagate + * entries between processes, so if we've switched mms since we + * vmapped the target in the first place, we might not have the + * top-level page table entry populated. + * + * We disable preemption because we want the same mm active when + * we probe the target and when we issue the hypercall. We'll + * have the same nominal mm, but if we're a kernel thread, lazy + * mm dropping could change our pgd. + * + * Out of an abundance of caution, this uses __get_user() to fault + * in the target address just in case there's some obscure case + * in which the target address isn't readable. + */ + + preempt_disable(); + + probe_kernel_read(&dummy, v, 1); + + if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0)) + BUG(); + + if (!PageHighMem(page)) { + void *av = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn)); + + if (av != v) + if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)av, pte, 0)) + BUG(); + } else + kmap_flush_unused(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries) +{ + const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE; + int i; + + /* + * We need to mark the all aliases of the LDT pages RO. We + * don't need to call vm_flush_aliases(), though, since that's + * only responsible for flushing aliases out the TLBs, not the + * page tables, and Xen will flush the TLB for us if needed. + * + * To avoid confusing future readers: none of this is necessary + * to load the LDT. The hypervisor only checks this when the + * LDT is faulted in due to subsequent descriptor access. + */ + + for (i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page) + set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL_RO); +} + +static void xen_free_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries) +{ + const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page) + set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL); +} + +static void xen_set_ldt(const void *addr, unsigned entries) +{ + struct mmuext_op *op; + struct multicall_space mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op)); + + trace_xen_cpu_set_ldt(addr, entries); + + op = mcs.args; + op->cmd = MMUEXT_SET_LDT; + op->arg1.linear_addr = (unsigned long)addr; + op->arg2.nr_ents = entries; + + MULTI_mmuext_op(mcs.mc, op, 1, NULL, DOMID_SELF); + + xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); +} + +static void xen_load_gdt(const struct desc_ptr *dtr) +{ + unsigned long va = dtr->address; + unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1; + unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE); + unsigned long frames[pages]; + int f; + + /* + * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192 + * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages.. + */ + + BUG_ON(size > 65536); + BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK); + + for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) { + int level; + pte_t *ptep; + unsigned long pfn, mfn; + void *virt; + + /* + * The GDT is per-cpu and is in the percpu data area. + * That can be virtually mapped, so we need to do a + * page-walk to get the underlying MFN for the + * hypercall. The page can also be in the kernel's + * linear range, so we need to RO that mapping too. + */ + ptep = lookup_address(va, &level); + BUG_ON(ptep == NULL); + + pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep); + mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn); + virt = __va(PFN_PHYS(pfn)); + + frames[f] = mfn; + + make_lowmem_page_readonly((void *)va); + make_lowmem_page_readonly(virt); + } + + if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct))) + BUG(); +} + +/* + * load_gdt for early boot, when the gdt is only mapped once + */ +static void __init xen_load_gdt_boot(const struct desc_ptr *dtr) +{ + unsigned long va = dtr->address; + unsigned int size = dtr->size + 1; + unsigned pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE); + unsigned long frames[pages]; + int f; + + /* + * A GDT can be up to 64k in size, which corresponds to 8192 + * 8-byte entries, or 16 4k pages.. + */ + + BUG_ON(size > 65536); + BUG_ON(va & ~PAGE_MASK); + + for (f = 0; va < dtr->address + size; va += PAGE_SIZE, f++) { + pte_t pte; + unsigned long pfn, mfn; + + pfn = virt_to_pfn(va); + mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn); + + pte = pfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_RO); + + if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)va, pte, 0)) + BUG(); + + frames[f] = mfn; + } + + if (HYPERVISOR_set_gdt(frames, size / sizeof(struct desc_struct))) + BUG(); +} + +static inline bool desc_equal(const struct desc_struct *d1, + const struct desc_struct *d2) +{ + return d1->a == d2->a && d1->b == d2->b; +} + +static void load_TLS_descriptor(struct thread_struct *t, + unsigned int cpu, unsigned int i) +{ + struct desc_struct *shadow = &per_cpu(shadow_tls_desc, cpu).desc[i]; + struct desc_struct *gdt; + xmaddr_t maddr; + struct multicall_space mc; + + if (desc_equal(shadow, &t->tls_array[i])) + return; + + *shadow = t->tls_array[i]; + + gdt = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu); + maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN+i]); + mc = __xen_mc_entry(0); + + MULTI_update_descriptor(mc.mc, maddr.maddr, t->tls_array[i]); +} + +static void xen_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu) +{ + /* + * XXX sleazy hack: If we're being called in a lazy-cpu zone + * and lazy gs handling is enabled, it means we're in a + * context switch, and %gs has just been saved. This means we + * can zero it out to prevent faults on exit from the + * hypervisor if the next process has no %gs. Either way, it + * has been saved, and the new value will get loaded properly. + * This will go away as soon as Xen has been modified to not + * save/restore %gs for normal hypercalls. + * + * On x86_64, this hack is not used for %gs, because gs points + * to KERNEL_GS_BASE (and uses it for PDA references), so we + * must not zero %gs on x86_64 + * + * For x86_64, we need to zero %fs, otherwise we may get an + * exception between the new %fs descriptor being loaded and + * %fs being effectively cleared at __switch_to(). + */ + if (paravirt_get_lazy_mode() == PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU) { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + lazy_load_gs(0); +#else + loadsegment(fs, 0); +#endif + } + + xen_mc_batch(); + + load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 0); + load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 1); + load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 2); + + xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +static void xen_load_gs_index(unsigned int idx) +{ + if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL, idx)) + BUG(); +} +#endif + +static void xen_write_ldt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entrynum, + const void *ptr) +{ + xmaddr_t mach_lp = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entrynum]); + u64 entry = *(u64 *)ptr; + + trace_xen_cpu_write_ldt_entry(dt, entrynum, entry); + + preempt_disable(); + + xen_mc_flush(); + if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(mach_lp.maddr, entry)) + BUG(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static int cvt_gate_to_trap(int vector, const gate_desc *val, + struct trap_info *info) +{ + unsigned long addr; + + if (val->type != GATE_TRAP && val->type != GATE_INTERRUPT) + return 0; + + info->vector = vector; + + addr = gate_offset(*val); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + /* + * Look for known traps using IST, and substitute them + * appropriately. The debugger ones are the only ones we care + * about. Xen will handle faults like double_fault, + * so we should never see them. Warn if + * there's an unexpected IST-using fault handler. + */ + if (addr == (unsigned long)debug) + addr = (unsigned long)xen_debug; + else if (addr == (unsigned long)int3) + addr = (unsigned long)xen_int3; + else if (addr == (unsigned long)stack_segment) + addr = (unsigned long)xen_stack_segment; + else if (addr == (unsigned long)double_fault) { + /* Don't need to handle these */ + return 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE + } else if (addr == (unsigned long)machine_check) { + /* + * when xen hypervisor inject vMCE to guest, + * use native mce handler to handle it + */ + ; +#endif + } else if (addr == (unsigned long)nmi) + /* + * Use the native version as well. + */ + ; + else { + /* Some other trap using IST? */ + if (WARN_ON(val->ist != 0)) + return 0; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + info->address = addr; + + info->cs = gate_segment(*val); + info->flags = val->dpl; + /* interrupt gates clear IF */ + if (val->type == GATE_INTERRUPT) + info->flags |= 1 << 2; + + return 1; +} + +/* Locations of each CPU's IDT */ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct desc_ptr, idt_desc); + +/* Set an IDT entry. If the entry is part of the current IDT, then + also update Xen. */ +static void xen_write_idt_entry(gate_desc *dt, int entrynum, const gate_desc *g) +{ + unsigned long p = (unsigned long)&dt[entrynum]; + unsigned long start, end; + + trace_xen_cpu_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g); + + preempt_disable(); + + start = __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.address); + end = start + __this_cpu_read(idt_desc.size) + 1; + + xen_mc_flush(); + + native_write_idt_entry(dt, entrynum, g); + + if (p >= start && (p + 8) <= end) { + struct trap_info info[2]; + + info[1].address = 0; + + if (cvt_gate_to_trap(entrynum, g, &info[0])) + if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(info)) + BUG(); + } + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static void xen_convert_trap_info(const struct desc_ptr *desc, + struct trap_info *traps) +{ + unsigned in, out, count; + + count = (desc->size+1) / sizeof(gate_desc); + BUG_ON(count > 256); + + for (in = out = 0; in < count; in++) { + gate_desc *entry = (gate_desc *)(desc->address) + in; + + if (cvt_gate_to_trap(in, entry, &traps[out])) + out++; + } + traps[out].address = 0; +} + +void xen_copy_trap_info(struct trap_info *traps) +{ + const struct desc_ptr *desc = this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc); + + xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps); +} + +/* Load a new IDT into Xen. In principle this can be per-CPU, so we + hold a spinlock to protect the static traps[] array (static because + it avoids allocation, and saves stack space). */ +static void xen_load_idt(const struct desc_ptr *desc) +{ + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + static struct trap_info traps[257]; + + trace_xen_cpu_load_idt(desc); + + spin_lock(&lock); + + memcpy(this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc), desc, sizeof(idt_desc)); + + xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps); + + xen_mc_flush(); + if (HYPERVISOR_set_trap_table(traps)) + BUG(); + + spin_unlock(&lock); +} + +/* Write a GDT descriptor entry. Ignore LDT descriptors, since + they're handled differently. */ +static void xen_write_gdt_entry(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry, + const void *desc, int type) +{ + trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type); + + preempt_disable(); + + switch (type) { + case DESC_LDT: + case DESC_TSS: + /* ignore */ + break; + + default: { + xmaddr_t maddr = arbitrary_virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]); + + xen_mc_flush(); + if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc)) + BUG(); + } + + } + + preempt_enable(); +} + +/* + * Version of write_gdt_entry for use at early boot-time needed to + * update an entry as simply as possible. + */ +static void __init xen_write_gdt_entry_boot(struct desc_struct *dt, int entry, + const void *desc, int type) +{ + trace_xen_cpu_write_gdt_entry(dt, entry, desc, type); + + switch (type) { + case DESC_LDT: + case DESC_TSS: + /* ignore */ + break; + + default: { + xmaddr_t maddr = virt_to_machine(&dt[entry]); + + if (HYPERVISOR_update_descriptor(maddr.maddr, *(u64 *)desc)) + dt[entry] = *(struct desc_struct *)desc; + } + + } +} + +static void xen_load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, + struct thread_struct *thread) +{ + struct multicall_space mcs; + + mcs = xen_mc_entry(0); + MULTI_stack_switch(mcs.mc, __KERNEL_DS, thread->sp0); + xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); + tss->x86_tss.sp0 = thread->sp0; +} + +void xen_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask) +{ + struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl; + + /* Force the change at ring 0. */ + set_iopl.iopl = (mask == 0) ? 1 : (mask >> 12) & 3; + HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl); +} + +static void xen_io_delay(void) +{ +} + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, xen_cr0_value); + +static unsigned long xen_read_cr0(void) +{ + unsigned long cr0 = this_cpu_read(xen_cr0_value); + + if (unlikely(cr0 == 0)) { + cr0 = native_read_cr0(); + this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0); + } + + return cr0; +} + +static void xen_write_cr0(unsigned long cr0) +{ + struct multicall_space mcs; + + this_cpu_write(xen_cr0_value, cr0); + + /* Only pay attention to cr0.TS; everything else is + ignored. */ + mcs = xen_mc_entry(0); + + MULTI_fpu_taskswitch(mcs.mc, (cr0 & X86_CR0_TS) != 0); + + xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU); +} + +static void xen_write_cr4(unsigned long cr4) +{ + cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PCE); + + native_write_cr4(cr4); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +static inline unsigned long xen_read_cr8(void) +{ + return 0; +} +static inline void xen_write_cr8(unsigned long val) +{ + BUG_ON(val); +} +#endif + +static u64 xen_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, int *err) +{ + u64 val; + + if (pmu_msr_read(msr, &val, err)) + return val; + + val = native_read_msr_safe(msr, err); + switch (msr) { + case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC + if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & (1 << (X86_FEATURE_X2APIC & 31)))) +#endif + val &= ~X2APIC_ENABLE; + break; + } + return val; +} + +static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high) +{ + int ret; + + ret = 0; + + switch (msr) { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + unsigned which; + u64 base; + + case MSR_FS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_FS; goto set; + case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_GS_USER; goto set; + case MSR_GS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL; goto set; + + set: + base = ((u64)high << 32) | low; + if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(which, base) != 0) + ret = -EIO; + break; +#endif + + case MSR_STAR: + case MSR_CSTAR: + case MSR_LSTAR: + case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK: + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: + /* Fast syscall setup is all done in hypercalls, so + these are all ignored. Stub them out here to stop + Xen console noise. */ + break; + + default: + if (!pmu_msr_write(msr, low, high, &ret)) + ret = native_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high); + } + + return ret; +} + +static u64 xen_read_msr(unsigned int msr) +{ + /* + * This will silently swallow a #GP from RDMSR. It may be worth + * changing that. + */ + int err; + + return xen_read_msr_safe(msr, &err); +} + +static void xen_write_msr(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high) +{ + /* + * This will silently swallow a #GP from WRMSR. It may be worth + * changing that. + */ + xen_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high); +} + +void xen_setup_shared_info(void) +{ + if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) { + set_fixmap(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP, + xen_start_info->shared_info); + + HYPERVISOR_shared_info = + (struct shared_info *)fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP); + } else + HYPERVISOR_shared_info = + (struct shared_info *)__va(xen_start_info->shared_info); + +#ifndef CONFIG_SMP + /* In UP this is as good a place as any to set up shared info */ + xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement(); +#endif + + xen_setup_mfn_list_list(); +} + +/* This is called once we have the cpu_possible_mask */ +void xen_setup_vcpu_info_placement(void) +{ + int cpu; + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + /* Set up direct vCPU id mapping for PV guests. */ + per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, cpu) = cpu; + xen_vcpu_setup(cpu); + } + + /* + * xen_vcpu_setup managed to place the vcpu_info within the + * percpu area for all cpus, so make use of it. + */ + if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) { + pv_irq_ops.save_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_save_fl_direct); + pv_irq_ops.restore_fl = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_restore_fl_direct); + pv_irq_ops.irq_disable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_disable_direct); + pv_irq_ops.irq_enable = __PV_IS_CALLEE_SAVE(xen_irq_enable_direct); + pv_mmu_ops.read_cr2 = xen_read_cr2_direct; + } +} + +static unsigned xen_patch(u8 type, u16 clobbers, void *insnbuf, + unsigned long addr, unsigned len) +{ + char *start, *end, *reloc; + unsigned ret; + + start = end = reloc = NULL; + +#define SITE(op, x) \ + case PARAVIRT_PATCH(op.x): \ + if (xen_have_vcpu_info_placement) { \ + start = (char *)xen_##x##_direct; \ + end = xen_##x##_direct_end; \ + reloc = xen_##x##_direct_reloc; \ + } \ + goto patch_site + + switch (type) { + SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_enable); + SITE(pv_irq_ops, irq_disable); + SITE(pv_irq_ops, save_fl); + SITE(pv_irq_ops, restore_fl); +#undef SITE + + patch_site: + if (start == NULL || (end-start) > len) + goto default_patch; + + ret = paravirt_patch_insns(insnbuf, len, start, end); + + /* Note: because reloc is assigned from something that + appears to be an array, gcc assumes it's non-null, + but doesn't know its relationship with start and + end. */ + if (reloc > start && reloc < end) { + int reloc_off = reloc - start; + long *relocp = (long *)(insnbuf + reloc_off); + long delta = start - (char *)addr; + + *relocp += delta; + } + break; + + default_patch: + default: + ret = paravirt_patch_default(type, clobbers, insnbuf, + addr, len); + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static const struct pv_info xen_info __initconst = { + .shared_kernel_pmd = 0, + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + .extra_user_64bit_cs = FLAT_USER_CS64, +#endif + .name = "Xen", +}; + +static const struct pv_init_ops xen_init_ops __initconst = { + .patch = xen_patch, +}; + +static const struct pv_cpu_ops xen_cpu_ops __initconst = { + .cpuid = xen_cpuid, + + .set_debugreg = xen_set_debugreg, + .get_debugreg = xen_get_debugreg, + + .read_cr0 = xen_read_cr0, + .write_cr0 = xen_write_cr0, + + .read_cr4 = native_read_cr4, + .write_cr4 = xen_write_cr4, + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + .read_cr8 = xen_read_cr8, + .write_cr8 = xen_write_cr8, +#endif + + .wbinvd = native_wbinvd, + + .read_msr = xen_read_msr, + .write_msr = xen_write_msr, + + .read_msr_safe = xen_read_msr_safe, + .write_msr_safe = xen_write_msr_safe, + + .read_pmc = xen_read_pmc, + + .iret = xen_iret, +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + .usergs_sysret64 = xen_sysret64, +#endif + + .load_tr_desc = paravirt_nop, + .set_ldt = xen_set_ldt, + .load_gdt = xen_load_gdt, + .load_idt = xen_load_idt, + .load_tls = xen_load_tls, +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + .load_gs_index = xen_load_gs_index, +#endif + + .alloc_ldt = xen_alloc_ldt, + .free_ldt = xen_free_ldt, + + .store_idt = native_store_idt, + .store_tr = xen_store_tr, + + .write_ldt_entry = xen_write_ldt_entry, + .write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry, + .write_idt_entry = xen_write_idt_entry, + .load_sp0 = xen_load_sp0, + + .set_iopl_mask = xen_set_iopl_mask, + .io_delay = xen_io_delay, + + /* Xen takes care of %gs when switching to usermode for us */ + .swapgs = paravirt_nop, + + .start_context_switch = paravirt_start_context_switch, + .end_context_switch = xen_end_context_switch, +}; + +static void xen_restart(char *msg) +{ + xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_reboot); +} + +static void xen_machine_halt(void) +{ + xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff); +} + +static void xen_machine_power_off(void) +{ + if (pm_power_off) + pm_power_off(); + xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_poweroff); +} + +static void xen_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + xen_reboot(SHUTDOWN_crash); +} + +static const struct machine_ops xen_machine_ops __initconst = { + .restart = xen_restart, + .halt = xen_machine_halt, + .power_off = xen_machine_power_off, + .shutdown = xen_machine_halt, + .crash_shutdown = xen_crash_shutdown, + .emergency_restart = xen_emergency_restart, +}; + +static unsigned char xen_get_nmi_reason(void) +{ + unsigned char reason = 0; + + /* Construct a value which looks like it came from port 0x61. */ + if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_io_error, + &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason)) + reason |= NMI_REASON_IOCHK; + if (test_bit(_XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr, + &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->arch.nmi_reason)) + reason |= NMI_REASON_SERR; + + return reason; +} + +static void __init xen_boot_params_init_edd(void) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EDD) + struct xen_platform_op op; + struct edd_info *edd_info; + u32 *mbr_signature; + unsigned nr; + int ret; + + edd_info = boot_params.eddbuf; + mbr_signature = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer; + + op.cmd = XENPF_firmware_info; + + op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_INFO; + for (nr = 0; nr < EDDMAXNR; nr++) { + struct edd_info *info = edd_info + nr; + + op.u.firmware_info.index = nr; + info->params.length = sizeof(info->params); + set_xen_guest_handle(op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.edd_params, + &info->params); + ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op); + if (ret) + break; + +#define C(x) info->x = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_info.x + C(device); + C(version); + C(interface_support); + C(legacy_max_cylinder); + C(legacy_max_head); + C(legacy_sectors_per_track); +#undef C + } + boot_params.eddbuf_entries = nr; + + op.u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_DISK_MBR_SIGNATURE; + for (nr = 0; nr < EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX; nr++) { + op.u.firmware_info.index = nr; + ret = HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op); + if (ret) + break; + mbr_signature[nr] = op.u.firmware_info.u.disk_mbr_signature.mbr_signature; + } + boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries = nr; +#endif +} + +/* + * Set up the GDT and segment registers for -fstack-protector. Until + * we do this, we have to be careful not to call any stack-protected + * function, which is most of the kernel. + */ +static void xen_setup_gdt(int cpu) +{ + pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry_boot; + pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt_boot; + + setup_stack_canary_segment(0); + switch_to_new_gdt(0); + + pv_cpu_ops.write_gdt_entry = xen_write_gdt_entry; + pv_cpu_ops.load_gdt = xen_load_gdt; +} + +static void __init xen_dom0_set_legacy_features(void) +{ + x86_platform.legacy.rtc = 1; +} + +/* First C function to be called on Xen boot */ +asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_start_kernel(void) +{ + struct physdev_set_iopl set_iopl; + unsigned long initrd_start = 0; + int rc; + + if (!xen_start_info) + return; + + xen_domain_type = XEN_PV_DOMAIN; + + xen_setup_features(); + + xen_setup_machphys_mapping(); + + /* Install Xen paravirt ops */ + pv_info = xen_info; + pv_init_ops = xen_init_ops; + pv_cpu_ops = xen_cpu_ops; + + x86_platform.get_nmi_reason = xen_get_nmi_reason; + + x86_init.resources.memory_setup = xen_memory_setup; + x86_init.oem.arch_setup = xen_arch_setup; + x86_init.oem.banner = xen_banner; + + xen_init_time_ops(); + + /* + * Set up some pagetable state before starting to set any ptes. + */ + + xen_init_mmu_ops(); + + /* Prevent unwanted bits from being set in PTEs. */ + __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_GLOBAL; + + /* + * Prevent page tables from being allocated in highmem, even + * if CONFIG_HIGHPTE is enabled. + */ + __userpte_alloc_gfp &= ~__GFP_HIGHMEM; + + /* Work out if we support NX */ + x86_configure_nx(); + + /* Get mfn list */ + xen_build_dynamic_phys_to_machine(); + + /* + * Set up kernel GDT and segment registers, mainly so that + * -fstack-protector code can be executed. + */ + xen_setup_gdt(0); + + xen_init_irq_ops(); + xen_init_cpuid_mask(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC + /* + * set up the basic apic ops. + */ + xen_init_apic(); +#endif + + if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_mmu_pt_update_preserve_ad)) { + pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_start = xen_ptep_modify_prot_start; + pv_mmu_ops.ptep_modify_prot_commit = xen_ptep_modify_prot_commit; + } + + machine_ops = xen_machine_ops; + + /* + * The only reliable way to retain the initial address of the + * percpu gdt_page is to remember it here, so we can go and + * mark it RW later, when the initial percpu area is freed. + */ + xen_initial_gdt = &per_cpu(gdt_page, 0); + + xen_smp_init(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA + /* + * The pages we from Xen are not related to machine pages, so + * any NUMA information the kernel tries to get from ACPI will + * be meaningless. Prevent it from trying. + */ + acpi_numa = -1; +#endif + /* Don't do the full vcpu_info placement stuff until we have a + possible map and a non-dummy shared_info. */ + per_cpu(xen_vcpu, 0) = &HYPERVISOR_shared_info->vcpu_info[0]; + + WARN_ON(xen_cpuhp_setup(xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv, xen_cpu_dead_pv)); + + local_irq_disable(); + early_boot_irqs_disabled = true; + + xen_raw_console_write("mapping kernel into physical memory\n"); + xen_setup_kernel_pagetable((pgd_t *)xen_start_info->pt_base, + xen_start_info->nr_pages); + xen_reserve_special_pages(); + + /* keep using Xen gdt for now; no urgent need to change it */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + pv_info.kernel_rpl = 1; + if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel)) + pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0; +#else + pv_info.kernel_rpl = 0; +#endif + /* set the limit of our address space */ + xen_reserve_top(); + + /* + * We used to do this in xen_arch_setup, but that is too late + * on AMD were early_cpu_init (run before ->arch_setup()) calls + * early_amd_init which pokes 0xcf8 port. + */ + set_iopl.iopl = 1; + rc = HYPERVISOR_physdev_op(PHYSDEVOP_set_iopl, &set_iopl); + if (rc != 0) + xen_raw_printk("physdev_op failed %d\n", rc); + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + /* set up basic CPUID stuff */ + cpu_detect(&new_cpu_data); + set_cpu_cap(&new_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_FPU); + new_cpu_data.x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = cpuid_edx(1); +#endif + + if (xen_start_info->mod_start) { + if (xen_start_info->flags & SIF_MOD_START_PFN) + initrd_start = PFN_PHYS(xen_start_info->mod_start); + else + initrd_start = __pa(xen_start_info->mod_start); + } + + /* Poke various useful things into boot_params */ + boot_params.hdr.type_of_loader = (9 << 4) | 0; + boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image = initrd_start; + boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size = xen_start_info->mod_len; + boot_params.hdr.cmd_line_ptr = __pa(xen_start_info->cmd_line); + boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch = X86_SUBARCH_XEN; + + if (!xen_initial_domain()) { + add_preferred_console("xenboot", 0, NULL); + add_preferred_console("tty", 0, NULL); + add_preferred_console("hvc", 0, NULL); + if (pci_xen) + x86_init.pci.arch_init = pci_xen_init; + } else { + const struct dom0_vga_console_info *info = + (void *)((char *)xen_start_info + + xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_off); + struct xen_platform_op op = { + .cmd = XENPF_firmware_info, + .interface_version = XENPF_INTERFACE_VERSION, + .u.firmware_info.type = XEN_FW_KBD_SHIFT_FLAGS, + }; + + x86_platform.set_legacy_features = + xen_dom0_set_legacy_features; + xen_init_vga(info, xen_start_info->console.dom0.info_size); + xen_start_info->console.domU.mfn = 0; + xen_start_info->console.domU.evtchn = 0; + + if (HYPERVISOR_platform_op(&op) == 0) + boot_params.kbd_status = op.u.firmware_info.u.kbd_shift_flags; + + /* Make sure ACS will be enabled */ + pci_request_acs(); + + xen_acpi_sleep_register(); + + /* Avoid searching for BIOS MP tables */ + x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.mpparse.get_smp_config = x86_init_uint_noop; + + xen_boot_params_init_edd(); + } +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI + /* PCI BIOS service won't work from a PV guest. */ + pci_probe &= ~PCI_PROBE_BIOS; +#endif + xen_raw_console_write("about to get started...\n"); + + /* Let's presume PV guests always boot on vCPU with id 0. */ + per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, 0) = 0; + + xen_setup_runstate_info(0); + + xen_efi_init(); + + /* Start the world */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + i386_start_kernel(); +#else + cr4_init_shadow(); /* 32b kernel does this in i386_start_kernel() */ + x86_64_start_reservations((char *)__pa_symbol(&boot_params)); +#endif +} + +static int xen_cpu_up_prepare_pv(unsigned int cpu) +{ + int rc; + + xen_setup_timer(cpu); + + rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu); + if (rc) { + WARN(1, "xen_smp_intr_init() for CPU %d failed: %d\n", + cpu, rc); + return rc; + } + return 0; +} + +static int xen_cpu_dead_pv(unsigned int cpu) +{ + xen_smp_intr_free(cpu); + + xen_teardown_timer(cpu); + + return 0; +} + +static uint32_t __init xen_platform_pv(void) +{ + if (xen_pv_domain()) + return xen_cpuid_base(); + + return 0; +} + +static void xen_set_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV); +} + +const struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_xen_pv = { + .name = "Xen PV", + .detect = xen_platform_pv, + .set_cpu_features = xen_set_cpu_features, + .pin_vcpu = xen_pin_vcpu, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_hyper_xen_pv);