From: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2023 10:39:34 +0000 (+0200) Subject: x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations X-Git-Tag: v6.1.52~176 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=dae93ed961a8a315cefe64491e8573c5d9e3484e;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-starfive.git x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations commit e9fbc47b818b964ddff5df5b2d5c0f5f32f4a147 upstream. Skip the srso cmd line parsing which is not needed on Zen1/2 with SMT disabled and with the proper microcode applied (latter should be the case anyway) as those are not affected. Fixes: 5a15d8348881 ("x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection") Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230813104517.3346-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c2f8f98..971f289 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2399,8 +2399,10 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) * IBPB microcode has been applied. */ if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) && - (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) + (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); + return; + } } if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) { @@ -2686,6 +2688,9 @@ static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode"));