From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 20:39:32 +0000 (-0500)
Subject: arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option
X-Git-Tag: v4.19.79~10
X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d976344d27f7bfef87703035768e51893ce2bd21;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-rpi.git

arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

commit a111b7c0f20e13b54df2fa959b3dc0bdf1925ae6 upstream.

Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index cc2f5c9..16607b1 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2503,8 +2503,8 @@
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
-			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
@@ -2513,12 +2513,14 @@
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
 					       nospectre_v1 [X86]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index bb28eab..9ccf169 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -355,6 +356,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	/* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
 	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
 		this_cpu_safe = true;
@@ -600,7 +604,7 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 	}
 
 	/* forced off */
-	if (__nospectre_v2) {
+	if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 		__hardenbp_enab = false;
 		return false;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index e636d37..ff5beb5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -907,7 +908,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
 		{ /* sentinel */ }
 	};
-	char const *str = "command line option";
+	char const *str = "kpti command line option";
 	bool meltdown_safe;
 
 	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
@@ -937,6 +938,11 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
+		str = "mitigations=off";
+		__kpti_forced = -1;
+	}
+
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
 		pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
 		return false;