From: Lukas Bulwahn Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 17:19:40 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization X-Git-Tag: accepted/tizen/unified/20230118.172025~2977 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b791ffcb23c90285140fd3aba7e04ac850183487;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-rpi.git Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream. The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within the same sentence. Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to the config that provides that. Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index e05e581..985181d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits using the firmware. - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.