From: Rik van Riel Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 21:36:20 +0000 (-0700) Subject: fork,random: use get_random_canary() to set tsk->stack_canary X-Git-Tag: v4.14-rc1~476^2~30 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7cd815bce828220deffd1654265f0ef891567774;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-rpi.git fork,random: use get_random_canary() to set tsk->stack_canary Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-3-riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Daniel Micay Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Yoshinori Sato Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index ade237a..17921b0 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary(); #endif /*