From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 10:40:27 +0000 (+0100) Subject: futex: Handle user space corruption gracefully X-Git-Tag: v2.6.33-rc7~13^2~1 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=51246bfd189064079c54421507236fd2723b18f3;p=profile%2Fcommon%2Fkernel-common.git futex: Handle user space corruption gracefully If the owner of a PI futex dies we fix up the pi_state and set pi_state->owner to NULL. When a malicious or just sloppy programmed user space application sets the futex value to 0 e.g. by calling pthread_mutex_init(), then the futex can be acquired again. A new waiter manages to enqueue itself on the pi_state w/o damage, but on unlock the kernel dereferences pi_state->owner and oopses. Prevent this by checking pi_state->owner in the unlock path. If pi_state->owner is not current we know that user space manipulated the futex value. Ignore the mess and return -EINVAL. This catches the above case and also the case where a task hijacks the futex by setting the tid value and then tries to unlock it. Reported-by: Jermome Marchand Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Darren Hart Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: --- diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 1782803..06e8240 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -758,6 +758,13 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_q *this) if (!pi_state) return -EINVAL; + /* + * If current does not own the pi_state then the futex is + * inconsistent and user space fiddled with the futex value. + */ + if (pi_state->owner != current) + return -EINVAL; + raw_spin_lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock); new_owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);