From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 15:34:19 +0000 (+0000)
Subject: arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
X-Git-Tag: v4.19~1613^2~24
X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4d8efc2d5ee4c9ccfeb29ee8afd47a8660d0c0ce;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-rpi.git

arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation

Similarly to x86, mitigate speculation past an access_ok() check by
masking the pointer against the address limit before use.

Even if we don't expect speculative writes per se, it is plausible that
a CPU may still speculate at least as far as fetching a cache line for
writing, hence we also harden put_user() and clear_user() for peace of
mind.

Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index f2fc026..e49fe72 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -228,6 +228,26 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the
+ * current addr_limit.
+ */
+#define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr)
+static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
+{
+	void __user *safe_ptr;
+
+	asm volatile(
+	"	bics	xzr, %1, %2\n"
+	"	csel	%0, %1, xzr, eq\n"
+	: "=&r" (safe_ptr)
+	: "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
+	: "cc");
+
+	csdb();
+	return safe_ptr;
+}
+
+/*
  * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address
  * space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()"
  * call.
@@ -297,7 +317,7 @@ do {									\
 	__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr);				\
 	might_fault();							\
 	access_ok(VERIFY_READ, __p, sizeof(*__p)) ?			\
-		__get_user((x), __p) :					\
+		__p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p), __get_user((x), __p) :	\
 		((x) = 0, -EFAULT);					\
 })
 
@@ -361,7 +381,7 @@ do {									\
 	__typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr);				\
 	might_fault();							\
 	access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, __p, sizeof(*__p)) ?			\
-		__put_user((x), __p) :					\
+		__p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p), __put_user((x), __p) :	\
 		-EFAULT;						\
 })
 
@@ -377,7 +397,7 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long
 static inline unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
 {
 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
-		n = __clear_user(to, n);
+		n = __clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
 	return n;
 }