From: Chuck Lever Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 18:06:02 +0000 (-0500) Subject: nfsd: Lower NFSv4.1 callback message size limit X-Git-Tag: v4.6-rc1~20^2~21 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4500632f60fa0d85e4101c374898cdf9b7b0cfac;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-exynos.git nfsd: Lower NFSv4.1 callback message size limit The maximum size of a backchannel message on RPC-over-RDMA depends on the connection's inline threshold. Today that threshold is typically 1024 bytes, making the maximum message size 996 bytes. The Linux server's CREATE_SESSION operation checks that the size of callback Calls can be as large as 1044 bytes, to accommodate RPCSEC_GSS. Thus CREATE_SESSION fails if a client advertises the true message size maximum of 996 bytes. But the server's backchannel currently does not support RPCSEC_GSS. The actual maximum size it needs is much smaller. It is safe to reduce the limit to enable NFSv4.1 on RDMA backchannel operation. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index d4b0b78..0462eed 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2587,21 +2587,26 @@ static __be32 check_forechannel_attrs(struct nfsd4_channel_attrs *ca, struct nfs return nfs_ok; } +/* + * Server's NFSv4.1 backchannel support is AUTH_SYS-only for now. + * These are based on similar macros in linux/sunrpc/msg_prot.h . + */ +#define RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS \ + (RPC_CALLHDRSIZE + 2 * (2 + UNX_CALLSLACK)) + +#define RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS \ + (RPC_REPHDRSIZE + (2 + NUL_REPLYSLACK)) + #define NFSD_CB_MAX_REQ_SZ ((NFS4_enc_cb_recall_sz + \ - RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH) * sizeof(__be32)) + RPC_MAX_HEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS) * sizeof(__be32)) #define NFSD_CB_MAX_RESP_SZ ((NFS4_dec_cb_recall_sz + \ - RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH) * sizeof(__be32)) + RPC_MAX_REPHEADER_WITH_AUTH_SYS) * \ + sizeof(__be32)) static __be32 check_backchannel_attrs(struct nfsd4_channel_attrs *ca) { ca->headerpadsz = 0; - /* - * These RPC_MAX_HEADER macros are overkill, especially since we - * don't even do gss on the backchannel yet. But this is still - * less than 1k. Tighten up this estimate in the unlikely event - * it turns out to be a problem for some client: - */ if (ca->maxreq_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_REQ_SZ) return nfserr_toosmall; if (ca->maxresp_sz < NFSD_CB_MAX_RESP_SZ) diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h index 1ecf13e..6a241a2 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/auth.h @@ -21,10 +21,17 @@ #include /* + * Maximum size of AUTH_NONE authentication information, in XDR words. + */ +#define NUL_CALLSLACK (4) +#define NUL_REPLYSLACK (2) + +/* * Size of the nodename buffer. RFC1831 specifies a hard limit of 255 bytes, * but Linux hostnames are actually limited to __NEW_UTS_LEN bytes. */ #define UNX_MAXNODENAME __NEW_UTS_LEN +#define UNX_CALLSLACK (21 + XDR_QUADLEN(UNX_MAXNODENAME)) struct rpcsec_gss_info; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c index c2a2b58..8d9eb4d 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_null.c @@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ const struct rpc_authops authnull_ops = { static struct rpc_auth null_auth = { - .au_cslack = 4, - .au_rslack = 2, + .au_cslack = NUL_CALLSLACK, + .au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK, .au_ops = &authnull_ops, .au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_NULL, .au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0), diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c index 548240d..0d3dd36 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c @@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ struct unx_cred { }; #define uc_uid uc_base.cr_uid -#define UNX_WRITESLACK (21 + XDR_QUADLEN(UNX_MAXNODENAME)) - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH #endif @@ -228,8 +226,8 @@ const struct rpc_authops authunix_ops = { static struct rpc_auth unix_auth = { - .au_cslack = UNX_WRITESLACK, - .au_rslack = 2, /* assume AUTH_NULL verf */ + .au_cslack = UNX_CALLSLACK, + .au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK, .au_ops = &authunix_ops, .au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX, .au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0),