From: Gustavo A. R. Silva Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 20:10:08 +0000 (-0600) Subject: ip6mr: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability X-Git-Tag: v4.19.14~165 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=32403fd3b529a6e226f41314aa901a192be19af1;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-rpi.git ip6mr: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability [ Upstream commit 69d2c86766da2ded2b70281f1bf242cb0d58a778 ] vr.mifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1845 ip6mr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1919 ip6mr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing vr.mifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table' Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index d0b7e02..fb70bbd 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ #include #include +#include + struct ip6mr_rule { struct fib_rule common; }; @@ -1831,6 +1833,7 @@ int ip6mr_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *arg) return -EFAULT; if (vr.mifi >= mrt->maxvif) return -EINVAL; + vr.mifi = array_index_nospec(vr.mifi, mrt->maxvif); read_lock(&mrt_lock); vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.mifi]; if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.mifi)) { @@ -1905,6 +1908,7 @@ int ip6mr_compat_ioctl(struct sock *sk, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg) return -EFAULT; if (vr.mifi >= mrt->maxvif) return -EINVAL; + vr.mifi = array_index_nospec(vr.mifi, mrt->maxvif); read_lock(&mrt_lock); vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.mifi]; if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.mifi)) {