From: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 03:29:48 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: loop: fix no-unmap write-zeroes request behavior
X-Git-Tag: v5.4.7~222
X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=1fca505614091c9a0b95968cd7f8485732f53bfc;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-rpi.git

loop: fix no-unmap write-zeroes request behavior

[ Upstream commit efcfec579f6139528c9e6925eca2bc4a36da65c6 ]

Currently, if the loop device receives a WRITE_ZEROES request, it asks
the underlying filesystem to punch out the range.  This behavior is
correct if unmapping is allowed.  However, a NOUNMAP request means that
the caller doesn't want us to free the storage backing the range, so
punching out the range is incorrect behavior.

To satisfy a NOUNMAP | WRITE_ZEROES request, loop should ask the
underlying filesystem to FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE, which is (according to
the fallocate documentation) required to ensure that the entire range is
backed by real storage, which suffices for our purposes.

Fixes: 19372e2769179dd ("loop: implement REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---

diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c
index f6f77ea..ef6e251 100644
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -417,18 +417,20 @@ out_free_page:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int lo_discard(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq, loff_t pos)
+static int lo_fallocate(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq, loff_t pos,
+			int mode)
 {
 	/*
-	 * We use punch hole to reclaim the free space used by the
-	 * image a.k.a. discard. However we do not support discard if
-	 * encryption is enabled, because it may give an attacker
-	 * useful information.
+	 * We use fallocate to manipulate the space mappings used by the image
+	 * a.k.a. discard/zerorange. However we do not support this if
+	 * encryption is enabled, because it may give an attacker useful
+	 * information.
 	 */
 	struct file *file = lo->lo_backing_file;
-	int mode = FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE;
 	int ret;
 
+	mode |= FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE;
+
 	if ((!file->f_op->fallocate) || lo->lo_encrypt_key_size) {
 		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		goto out;
@@ -596,9 +598,17 @@ static int do_req_filebacked(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq)
 	switch (req_op(rq)) {
 	case REQ_OP_FLUSH:
 		return lo_req_flush(lo, rq);
-	case REQ_OP_DISCARD:
 	case REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES:
-		return lo_discard(lo, rq, pos);
+		/*
+		 * If the caller doesn't want deallocation, call zeroout to
+		 * write zeroes the range.  Otherwise, punch them out.
+		 */
+		return lo_fallocate(lo, rq, pos,
+			(rq->cmd_flags & REQ_NOUNMAP) ?
+				FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE :
+				FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE);
+	case REQ_OP_DISCARD:
+		return lo_fallocate(lo, rq, pos, FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE);
 	case REQ_OP_WRITE:
 		if (lo->transfer)
 			return lo_write_transfer(lo, rq, pos);