From: Michal Koutný Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2019 05:30:16 +0000 (-0700) Subject: prctl_set_mm: refactor checks from validate_prctl_map X-Git-Tag: v5.15~6243^2~13 X-Git-Url: http://review.tizen.org/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=11bbd8b416f8abf40900dc5041152892f873d915;p=platform%2Fkernel%2Flinux-starfive.git prctl_set_mm: refactor checks from validate_prctl_map Despite comment of validate_prctl_map claims there are no capability checks, it is not completely true since commit 4d28df6152aa ("prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file"). Extract the check out of the function and make the function perform purely arithmetic checks. This patch should not change any behavior, it is mere refactoring for following patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502125203.24014-2-mkoutny@suse.com Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: Kirill Tkhai Cc: Laurent Dufour Cc: Mateusz Guzik Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Yang Shi Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index bdbfe8d..775bf8d 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1882,13 +1882,14 @@ exit_err: } /* + * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses. + * * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. */ -static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) +static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) { unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error = -EINVAL, i; static const unsigned char offsets[] = { @@ -1949,24 +1950,6 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) prctl_map->start_data)) goto out; - /* - * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. - */ - if (prctl_map->auxv_size) { - if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) - goto out; - } - - /* - * Finally, make sure the caller has the rights to - * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should - * be allowed to. - */ - if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) { - if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - goto out; - } - error = 0; out: return error; @@ -1993,11 +1976,18 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map))) return -EFAULT; - error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map); + error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); if (error) return error; if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { + /* + * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. + */ + if (!prctl_map.auxv || + prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) + return -EINVAL; + memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv)); if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv, @@ -2010,6 +2000,14 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data } if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { + /* + * Make sure the caller has the rights to + * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should + * be allowed to. + */ + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EINVAL; + error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); if (error) return error; @@ -2097,7 +2095,11 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map; + struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { + .auxv = NULL, + .auxv_size = 0, + .exe_fd = -1, + }; struct vm_area_struct *vma; int error; @@ -2139,9 +2141,6 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end; prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start; prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end; - prctl_map.auxv = NULL; - prctl_map.auxv_size = 0; - prctl_map.exe_fd = -1; switch (opt) { case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: @@ -2181,7 +2180,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, goto out; } - error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map); + error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); if (error) goto out;