libbpf: Fix overflow in BTF sanity checks
authorAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Sat, 23 Oct 2021 00:31:56 +0000 (17:31 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 18 Nov 2021 18:16:39 +0000 (19:16 +0100)
[ Upstream commit 5245dafe3d49efba4d3285cf27ee1cc1eeafafc6 ]

btf_header's str_off+str_len or type_off+type_len can overflow as they
are u32s. This will lead to bypassing the sanity checks during BTF
parsing, resulting in crashes afterwards. Fix by using 64-bit signed
integers for comparison.

Fixes: d8123624506c ("libbpf: Fix BTF data layout checks and allow empty BTF")
Reported-by: Evgeny Vereshchagin <evvers@ya.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211023003157.726961-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
tools/lib/bpf/btf.c

index bf8c867..cfd701d 100644 (file)
@@ -236,12 +236,12 @@ static int btf_parse_hdr(struct btf *btf)
        }
 
        meta_left = btf->raw_size - sizeof(*hdr);
-       if (meta_left < hdr->str_off + hdr->str_len) {
+       if (meta_left < (long long)hdr->str_off + hdr->str_len) {
                pr_debug("Invalid BTF total size:%u\n", btf->raw_size);
                return -EINVAL;
        }
 
-       if (hdr->type_off + hdr->type_len > hdr->str_off) {
+       if ((long long)hdr->type_off + hdr->type_len > hdr->str_off) {
                pr_debug("Invalid BTF data sections layout: type data at %u + %u, strings data at %u + %u\n",
                         hdr->type_off, hdr->type_len, hdr->str_off, hdr->str_len);
                return -EINVAL;