We already call everything except do_proc_readlink outside of the BKL in
proc_pid_followlink, and there appears to be nothing in do_proc_readlink that
needs any special protection.
So remove this leftover from one of the BKL cleanup efforts.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
struct dentry *de;
struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
- lock_kernel();
if (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && !capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
goto out;
dput(de);
mntput(mnt);
out:
- unlock_kernel();
return error;
}