x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in the 32-bit boot-path

Check whether the hypervisor reported the correct C-bit when running
as an SEV guest. Using a wrong C-bit position could be used to leak
sensitive data from the guest to the hypervisor.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210312123824.306-8-joro@8bytes.org

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index ee448ae..91ea0d5 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -183,11 +183,21 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
         */
        call    get_sev_encryption_bit
        xorl    %edx, %edx
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
        testl   %eax, %eax
        jz      1f
        subl    $32, %eax       /* Encryption bit is always above bit 31 */
        bts     %eax, %edx      /* Set encryption mask for page tables */
+       /*
+        * Mark SEV as active in sev_status so that startup32_check_sev_cbit()
+        * will do a check. The sev_status memory will be fully initialized
+        * with the contents of MSR_AMD_SEV_STATUS later in
+        * set_sev_encryption_mask(). For now it is sufficient to know that SEV
+        * is active.
+        */
+       movl    $1, rva(sev_status)(%ebp)
 1:
+#endif
 
        /* Initialize Page tables to 0 */
        leal    rva(pgtable)(%ebx), %edi
@@ -272,6 +282,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
        movl    %esi, %edx
 1:
 #endif
+       /* Check if the C-bit position is correct when SEV is active */
+       call    startup32_check_sev_cbit
+
        pushl   $__KERNEL_CS
        pushl   %eax
 
@@ -872,6 +885,76 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_load_idt)
 SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_load_idt)
 
 /*
+ * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used.
+ *
+ * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is
+ * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND
+ * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the
+ * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here.
+ *
+ * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same
+ * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active
+ * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory.
+ *
+ * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is
+ * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will
+ * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that
+ * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail.
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+       pushl   %eax
+       pushl   %ebx
+       pushl   %ecx
+       pushl   %edx
+
+       /* Check for non-zero sev_status */
+       movl    rva(sev_status)(%ebp), %eax
+       testl   %eax, %eax
+       jz      4f
+
+       /*
+        * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails
+        * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value
+        * can be gathered.
+        */
+1:     rdrand  %eax
+       jnc     1b
+2:     rdrand  %ebx
+       jnc     2b
+
+       /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */
+       movl    %eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
+       movl    %ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
+
+       /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */
+       movl    %cr0, %edx                       /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */
+       movl    $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
+       movl    %ecx, %cr0
+
+       cmpl    %eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
+       jne     3f
+       cmpl    %ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
+       jne     3f
+
+       movl    %edx, %cr0      /* Restore previous %cr0 */
+
+       jmp     4f
+
+3:     /* Check failed - hlt the machine */
+       hlt
+       jmp     3b
+
+4:
+       popl    %edx
+       popl    %ecx
+       popl    %ebx
+       popl    %eax
+#endif
+       ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+
+/*
  * Stack and heap for uncompression
  */
        .bss