[ Upstream commit
18b44bc5a67275641fb26f2c54ba7eef80ac5950 ]
Commit
db1d1e8b9867 ("IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version")
partially closed an IMA integrity issue when directly modifying a file
on the lower filesystem. If the overlay file is first opened by a user
and later the lower backing file is modified by root, but the extended
attribute is NOT updated, the signature validation succeeds with the old
original signature.
Update the super_block s_iflags to SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE to
force signature reevaluation on every file access until a fine grained
solution can be found.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ovl_trusted_xattr_handlers;
sb->s_fs_info = ofs;
sb->s_flags |= SB_POSIXACL;
- sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_SKIP_SYNC;
+ sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_SKIP_SYNC | SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE;
err = -ENOMEM;
root_dentry = ovl_get_root(sb, upperpath.dentry, oe);