seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
authorMickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Fri, 30 Oct 2020 12:38:49 +0000 (13:38 +0100)
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tue, 17 Nov 2020 20:53:22 +0000 (12:53 -0800)
Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with
ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of
ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available.  Let's
use it!

Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net
kernel/seccomp.c

index 8ad7a29..53a7d15 100644 (file)
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/pid.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
         * behavior of privileged children.
         */
        if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
-           security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
-                                    CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+                       !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 
        /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */