-The OpenSSL project depends on volunteer efforts and financial support from
-the end user community. That support comes in the form of donations and paid
-sponsorships, software support contracts, paid consulting services
-and commissioned software development.
-
-Since all these activities support the continued development and improvement
-of OpenSSL we consider all these clients and customers as sponsors of the
-OpenSSL project.
-
-We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
-or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
-
-Major support:
-
- Qualys http://www.qualys.com/
-
-Very significant support:
-
- OpenGear: http://www.opengear.com/
-
-Significant support:
-
- PSW Group: http://www.psw.net/
- Acano Ltd. http://acano.com/
-
-Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
-we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.
-
-Additional sponsorship or financial support is always welcome: for more
-information please contact the OpenSSL Software Foundation.
+Please https://www.openssl.org/community/thanks.html for the current
+acknowledgements.
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+ * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+ provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
+ is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
+ "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+ users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+ will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ or
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
+ explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+ server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+ recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+ ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+ (CVE-2016-0800)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+ A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+ keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+ that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
+ considered rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2016-0705)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+ Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+ was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+ is configured.
+
+ Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+ also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+ invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+ credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+ guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+ that of a valid user.
+ (CVE-2016-0798)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+ In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+ int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+ large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+ memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+ field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+ of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+ In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+ is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+ in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+ is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+ This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+ All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+ to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+ arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+ on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+ consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0797)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+ The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+ the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+ string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+ Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+ OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+ memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+ the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+ could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+ also occur.
+
+ The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+ These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+ is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+ in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+ functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+ applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+ untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+ vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+ as command line arguments.
+
+ Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+ received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+ trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0799)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+ A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+ the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+ of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+ an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+ hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+ Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+ http://cachebleed.info.
+ (CVE-2016-0702)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+ if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+ omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+ apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+
+ *) DH small subgroups
+
+ Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+ primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+ generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
+ support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+ application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
+ not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
+ DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
+ handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
+ this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
+ reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+
+ OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
+ TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
+ reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
+ would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
+ applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+
+ The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
+ available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
+ only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
+ ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
+ default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
+ (CVE-2016-0701)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+
+ A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+ the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+ been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+ and Sebastian Schinzel.
+ (CVE-2015-3197)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
*) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
[Emilia Käsper]
*) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
- return an error
+ use a random seed, as already documented.
[Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
# library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library.
# sctp include SCTP support
# 386 generate 80386 code
+# enable-weak-ssl-ciphers
+# Enable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3 ciphers that are disabled by
+# default. Note, weak SSLv2 ciphers are unconditionally
+# disabled.
# no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code, above option implies no-sse2
# no-<cipher> build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...)
# -<xxx> +<xxx> compiler options are passed through
# -Wextended-offsetof
my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
+# Warn that "make depend" should be run?
+my $warn_make_depend = 0;
+
my $strict_warnings = 0;
my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL";
"md2" => "default",
"rc5" => "default",
"rfc3779" => "default",
- "sctp" => "default",
+ "sctp" => "default",
"shared" => "default",
"ssl-trace" => "default",
+ "ssl2" => "default",
"store" => "experimental",
"unit-test" => "default",
+ "weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default",
"zlib" => "default",
"zlib-dynamic" => "default"
);
# linker only when --prefix is not /usr.
if ($target =~ /^BSD\-/)
{
- $shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
+ $shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
}
if ($sys_id ne "")
&dofile("apps/CA.pl",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s');
}
if ($depflags ne $default_depflags && !$make_depend) {
- print <<EOF;
-
-Since you've disabled or enabled at least one algorithm, you need to do
-the following before building:
-
- make depend
-EOF
- }
+ $warn_make_depend++;
+ }
}
# create the ms/version32.rc file if needed
print <<\EOF if ($no_shared_warn);
-You gave the option 'shared'. Normally, that would give you shared libraries.
-Unfortunately, the OpenSSL configuration doesn't include shared library support
-for this platform yet, so it will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If
-you can inform the developpers (openssl-dev\@openssl.org) how to support shared
-libraries on this platform, they will at least look at it and try their best
-(but please first make sure you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
+You gave the option 'shared', which is not supported on this platform, so
+we will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If you know how to implement
+shared libraries, please let us know (but please first make sure you have
+tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
+EOF
+
+print <<EOF if ($warn_make_depend);
+
+*** Because of configuration changes, you MUST do the following before
+*** building:
+
+ make depend
EOF
exit(0);
standard headers). If it is a problem with OpenSSL itself, please
report the problem to <openssl-bugs@openssl.org> (note that your
message will be recorded in the request tracker publicly readable
- via http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html and will be forwarded to a
- public mailing list). Include the output of "make report" in your message.
- Please check out the request tracker. Maybe the bug was already
- reported or has already been fixed.
+ at https://www.openssl.org/community/index.html#bugs and will be
+ forwarded to a public mailing list). Include the output of "make
+ report" in your message. Please check out the request tracker. Maybe
+ the bug was already reported or has already been fixed.
[If you encounter assembler error messages, try the "no-asm"
configuration option as an immediate fix.]
---------------
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2e
+VERSION=1.0.2g
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
SHLIB_EXT=
PLATFORM=dist
-OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-libunbound no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl-trace no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
+OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-libunbound no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl-trace no-ssl2 no-store no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist
SHLIB_TARGET=
CC= cc
CFLAG= -O
-DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
PEX_LIBS=
EX_LIBS=
EXE_EXT=
GENERAL= Makefile
BASENAME= openssl
NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
- --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
- --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from $(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner 0 --group 0 \
+ --transform 's|^|$(NAME)/|' \
-cvf -
-../$(TARFILE).list:
+$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
- \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
- | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+ \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
+ \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+ | sort > $(TARFILE).list
-tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+tar: $(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE).gz
-tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
- $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+tar-snap: $(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > $(TARFILE)
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE)
dist:
$(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
@$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' $(DISTTARVARS) tar
install: all install_docs install_sw
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
-VERSION=1.0.2e-dev
+VERSION=1.0.2g
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
SHLIB_MAJOR=1
SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
-SHLIB_EXT=
-PLATFORM=gcc
-OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-libunbound no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl-trace no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
-CONFIGURE_ARGS=gcc
-SHLIB_TARGET=
+SHLIB_EXT=.so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
+PLATFORM=linux-x86_64
+OPTIONS=-Wa,--noexecstack no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-libunbound no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl-trace no-ssl2 no-store no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=linux-x86_64 -Wa,--noexecstack
+SHLIB_TARGET=linux-shared
# HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate
# where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage,
# PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
CC= gcc
-CFLAG= -O3
-DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+CFLAG= -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -Wa,--noexecstack -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DBSAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM
+DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
PEX_LIBS=
-EX_LIBS=
+EX_LIBS= -ldl
EXE_EXT=
ARFLAGS=
AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r
PROCESSOR=
# CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
-CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o
-BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
-EC_ASM=
+CPUID_OBJ= x86_64cpuid.o
+BN_ASM= x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o rsaz_exp.o rsaz-x86_64.o rsaz-avx2.o
+EC_ASM= ecp_nistz256.o ecp_nistz256-x86_64.o
DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
-AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
+AES_ENC= aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o aesni-sha256-x86_64.o aesni-mb-x86_64.o
BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
-RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o
+RC4_ENC= rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o
RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
-MD5_ASM_OBJ=
-SHA1_ASM_OBJ=
+MD5_ASM_OBJ= md5-x86_64.o
+SHA1_ASM_OBJ= sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o sha1-mb-x86_64.o sha256-mb-x86_64.o
RMD160_ASM_OBJ=
-WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o
-CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o
-MODES_ASM_OBJ=
+WP_ASM_OBJ= wp-x86_64.o
+CMLL_ENC= cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o
+MODES_ASM_OBJ= ghash-x86_64.o aesni-gcm-x86_64.o
ENGINES_ASM_OBJ=
-PERLASM_SCHEME=
+PERLASM_SCHEME= elf
# KRB5 stuff
KRB5_INCLUDES=
SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
SHARED_LIBS=
-SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
-SHARED_LDFLAGS=
+SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .so
+SHARED_LDFLAGS=-m64
GENERAL= Makefile
BASENAME= openssl
NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
- --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
- --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from $(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner 0 --group 0 \
+ --transform 's|^|$(NAME)/|' \
-cvf -
-../$(TARFILE).list:
+$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
- \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
- | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+ \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
+ \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+ | sort > $(TARFILE).list
-tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+tar: $(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE).gz
-tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
- $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+tar-snap: $(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > $(TARFILE)
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE)
dist:
$(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
@$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' $(DISTTARVARS) tar
install: all install_docs install_sw
GENERAL= Makefile
BASENAME= openssl
NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
-TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
-WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
+TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
-TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
- --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
- --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from $(TARFILE).list \
+ --owner 0 --group 0 \
+ --transform 's|^|$(NAME)/|' \
-cvf -
-../$(TARFILE).list:
+$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
- \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
- | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+ \( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
+ \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
+ | sort > $(TARFILE).list
-tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
+tar: $(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
- $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE).gz
-tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
- $(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
- rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
- ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
+tar-snap: $(TARFILE).list
+ $(TAR_COMMAND) > $(TARFILE)
+ rm -f $(TARFILE).list
+ ls -l $(TARFILE)
dist:
$(PERL) Configure dist
- @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
@$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
- @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
-
-dist_pem_h:
- (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
+ @$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' $(DISTTARVARS) tar
install: all install_docs install_sw
SHLIB_SOVER=${LIBVERSION:+"-$(LIBVERSION)"}; \
ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
- SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base $$deffile -Wl,-s,-Bsymbolic"; \
+ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base $$deffile -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \
$(LINK_SO_O)
#for mingw target if def-file is in use dll-name should match library-name
link_a.cygwin:
SHLIB_SOVER=32; \
extras="$(LIBNAME).def"; \
$(PERL) util/mkdef.pl 32 $$SHLIB > $$extras; \
- base=; [ $(LIBNAME) = "crypto" ] && base=-Wl,--image-base,0x63000000; \
+ base=; [ $(LIBNAME) = "crypto" -a -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] && base=-Wl,--image-base,0x63000000; \
fi; \
dll_name=$$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX; \
$(PERL) util/mkrc.pl $$dll_name | \
extras="$$extras rc.o"; \
ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
- SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-s,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,lib$(LIBNAME).dll.a $$extras"; \
+ SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,lib$(LIBNAME).dll.a $$extras"; \
[ -f apps/$$dll_name ] && rm apps/$$dll_name; \
[ -f test/$$dll_name ] && rm test/$$dll_name; \
$(LINK_SO_A) || exit 1; \
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+ o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers
+ (CVE-2016-0800)
+ o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705)
+ o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak
+ (CVE-2016-0798)
+ o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+ (CVE-2016-0797)
+ o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799)
+ o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702)
+
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+
+ o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)
+ o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197)
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
- OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
take a day for the ticket to show up. (We also scan posts to make sure
- that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
- this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
- https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
- the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to
- openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail
+ to this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database
+ (see https://www.openssl.org/community/index.html#bugs for details) and
+ also forwarded the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail
+ may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the
+ key servers).
Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
else
len = 1024;
len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len);
- if (len <= 0)
+ if (len < 0) {
+ BIO_free(mem);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (len == 0)
break;
if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) {
BIO_free(mem);
return ret;
}
-int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *value)
+int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value)
{
int rv;
char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL;
int *badarg, BIO *err, X509_VERIFY_PARAM **pm);
void policies_print(BIO *out, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in);
-int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *value);
+int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value);
int init_gen_str(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
const char *algname, ENGINE *e, int do_param);
int do_X509_sign(BIO *err, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,
-/* apps/engine.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* apps/engine.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/md4/md4.c
\ No newline at end of file
bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new();
thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
if (ndays != -1)
- nextupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, nmin * 60 + ndays * 3600 * 24);
+ nextupd = X509_time_adj_ex(NULL, ndays, nmin * 60, NULL);
/* Examine each certificate id in the request */
for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) {
# define CLCERTS 0x8
# define CACERTS 0x10
-int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
+static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, PKCS12 *p12, char *pass, int passlen,
int options, char *pempass);
int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
vret = get_cert_chain(ucert, store, &chain2);
X509_STORE_free(store);
- if (!vret) {
+ if (vret == X509_V_OK) {
/* Exclude verified certificate */
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain2); i++)
sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(chain2, i));
X509_free(sk_X509_value(chain2, 0));
sk_X509_free(chain2);
} else {
- if (vret >= 0)
+ if (vret != X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error %s getting chain.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(vret));
else
/* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */
-/* Hope this is OK .... */
-
-int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chn;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chn = NULL;
int i = 0;
- /*
- * FIXME: Should really check the return status of X509_STORE_CTX_init
- * for an error, but how that fits into the return value of this function
- * is less obvious.
- */
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL);
- if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) <= 0) {
- i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx);
- if (i == 0)
- /*
- * avoid returning 0 if X509_verify_cert() did not set an
- * appropriate error value in the context
- */
- i = -1;
- chn = NULL;
- goto err;
- } else
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL)) {
+ *chain = NULL;
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ }
+
+ if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) > 0)
chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&store_ctx);
- err:
+ else if ((i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx)) == 0)
+ i = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
*chain = chn;
-
return i;
}
#define PROG pkeyutl_main
static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
- char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
- char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e);
+ const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
+ char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+ int impl);
static int setup_peer(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform,
- const char *file);
+ const char *file, ENGINE* e);
static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
char *passargin = NULL;
int keysize = -1;
-
+ int engine_impl = 0;
unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL;
- size_t buf_outlen;
+ size_t buf_outlen = 0;
int buf_inlen = 0, siglen = -1;
+ const char *inkey = NULL;
+ const char *peerkey = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL;
int ret = 1, rv = -1;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-inkey")) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
- else {
- ctx = init_ctx(&keysize,
- *(++argv), keyform, key_type,
- passargin, pkey_op, e);
- if (!ctx) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing context\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
- badarg = 1;
- }
- }
+ else
+ inkey = *++argv;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-peerkey")) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
- else if (!setup_peer(bio_err, ctx, peerform, *(++argv)))
- badarg = 1;
+ else
+ peerkey = *++argv;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-passin")) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
badarg = 1;
else
e = setup_engine(bio_err, *(++argv), 0);
+ } else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-engine_impl")) {
+ engine_impl = 1;
}
#endif
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-pubin"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-verifyrecover"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER;
- else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-rev"))
- rev = 1;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-encrypt"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-decrypt"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-derive"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE;
+ else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-rev"))
+ rev = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pkeyopt") == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
- else if (!ctx) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "-pkeyopt command before -inkey\n");
- badarg = 1;
- } else if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, *(++argv)) <= 0) {
- BIO_puts(bio_err, "parameter setting error\n");
- ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ else if ((pkeyopts == NULL &&
+ (pkeyopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pkeyopts, *++argv) == 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
goto end;
}
} else
argv++;
}
- if (!ctx) {
+ if (inkey == NULL ||
+ (peerkey != NULL && pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE)) {
usage();
goto end;
}
+ ctx = init_ctx(&keysize, inkey, keyform, key_type,
+ passargin, pkey_op, e, engine_impl);
+ if (!ctx) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing context\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (peerkey != NULL && !setup_peer(bio_err, ctx, peerform, peerkey, e)) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting up peer key\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (pkeyopts != NULL) {
+ int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(pkeyopts);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ const char *opt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(pkeyopts, i);
+
+ if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, opt) <= 0) {
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "parameter setting error\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
if (sigfile && (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Signature file specified for non verify\n");
}
siglen = bio_to_mem(&sig, keysize * 10, sigbio);
BIO_free(sigbio);
- if (siglen <= 0) {
+ if (siglen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature data\n");
goto end;
}
if (in) {
/* Read the input data */
buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in);
- if (buf_inlen <= 0) {
+ if (buf_inlen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
exit(1);
}
} else {
rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
- if (rv > 0) {
+ if (rv > 0 && buf_outlen != 0) {
buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_outlen);
if (!buf_out)
rv = -1;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free_all(out);
- if (buf_in)
+ if (buf_in != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
- if (buf_out)
+ if (buf_out != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(buf_out);
- if (sig)
+ if (sig != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(sig);
+ if (pkeyopts != NULL)
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts);
return ret;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-hexdump hex dump output\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- "-engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n");
+ "-engine e use engine e, maybe a hardware device, for loading keys.\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-engine_impl also use engine given by -engine for crypto operations\n");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passin arg pass phrase source\n");
}
static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
- char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
- char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e)
+ const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
+ char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
+ int engine_impl)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ ENGINE *impl = NULL;
char *passin = NULL;
int rv = -1;
X509 *x;
if (!pkey)
goto end;
-
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
-
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (engine_impl)
+ impl = e;
+#endif
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, impl);
+
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (!ctx)
}
static int setup_peer(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform,
- const char *file)
+ const char *file, ENGINE* e)
{
EVP_PKEY *peer = NULL;
+ ENGINE* engine = NULL;
int ret;
- if (!ctx) {
- BIO_puts(err, "-peerkey command before -inkey\n");
- return 0;
- }
- peer = load_pubkey(bio_err, file, peerform, 0, NULL, NULL, "Peer Key");
+ if (peerform == FORMAT_ENGINE)
+ engine = e;
+ peer = load_pubkey(bio_err, file, peerform, 0, NULL, engine, "Peer Key");
if (!peer) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading peer key %s\n", file);
#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
#define UTF8_IN "utf8"
-#define DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH 512
-#define MIN_KEY_LENGTH 384
+#define DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH 2048
+#define MIN_KEY_LENGTH 512
#undef PROG
#define PROG req_main
if (outfile) {
if (!(out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "wb"))) {
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Reading Output File\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Writing Output File\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
/* Read the input data */
rsa_inlen = BIO_read(in, rsa_in, keysize * 2);
- if (rsa_inlen <= 0) {
+ if (rsa_inlen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
exit(1);
}
}
- if (rsa_outlen <= 0) {
+ if (rsa_outlen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA operation error\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
" -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",
SSL_HOST_NAME, PORT_STR);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify_host host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
+ " -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -serverpref - Use server's cipher preferences (only SSLv2)\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -cipher - preferred cipher to use, use the 'openssl ciphers'\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" command to see what is available\n");
static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
{
srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg;
+ int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+
if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) {
p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login);
if (p->user == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login);
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ goto err;
}
+
if (SSL_set_srp_server_param
(s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v,
p->user->info) < 0) {
*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ goto err;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n",
p->login, p->user->info);
- /* need to check whether there are memory leaks */
+ ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+err:
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user);
p->user = NULL;
p->login = NULL;
- return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+ return ret;
}
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -accept arg - port to accept on (default is %d)\n", PORT);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
- " -verify_host host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
+ " -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n");
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
&& SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n");
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
- srp_callback_parm.login);
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+ srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
-/* apps/speed.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* apps/speed.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x), 0) == NULL)
goto err;
- /* Lets just make it 12:00am GMT, Jan 1 1970 */
- /* memcpy(x->cert_info->validity->notBefore,"700101120000Z",13); */
- /* 28 days to be certified */
-
- if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x), (long)60 * 60 * 24 * days) ==
- NULL)
+ if (X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(x), days, 0, NULL) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_set_pubkey(x, pkey))
# *-dgux) OUT="dgux" ;;
mips-sony-newsos4) OUT="newsos4-gcc" ;;
*-*-cygwin_pre1.3) OUT="Cygwin-pre1.3" ;;
- *-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin" ;;
+ i[3456]86-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin" ;;
+ *-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-${MACHINE}" ;;
t3e-cray-unicosmk) OUT="cray-t3e" ;;
j90-cray-unicos) OUT="cray-j90" ;;
nsr-tandem-nsk) OUT="tandem-c89" ;;
-/* crypto/aes/aes.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c */
/**
* rijndael-alg-fst.c
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ige.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ige.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_misc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_misc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c */
/**
* rijndael-alg-fst.c
*
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
$1>=10);
-$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
+$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
long plen;
char cst, inf, free_cont = 0;
const unsigned char *p;
- BUF_MEM buf;
+ BUF_MEM buf = { 0, NULL, 0 };
const unsigned char *cont = NULL;
long len;
if (!pval) {
} else {
len = p - cont + plen;
p += plen;
- buf.data = NULL;
}
} else if (cst) {
if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
return 0;
}
- buf.length = 0;
- buf.max = 0;
- buf.data = NULL;
+
+ /* Free any returned 'buf' content */
+ free_cont = 1;
/*
* Should really check the internal tags are correct but some things
* may get this wrong. The relevant specs say that constructed string
* So instead just check for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag.
*/
if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) {
- free_cont = 1;
goto err;
}
len = buf.length;
/* Append a final null to string */
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
buf.data[len] = 0;
cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data;
- free_cont = 1;
} else {
cont = p;
len = plen;
}
/* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */
+ /* asn1_ex_c2i may reuse allocated buffer, and so sets free_cont to 0 */
if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it))
goto err;
# define LLONG long
#endif
-static void fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
- const char *, int, int, int);
-static void fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
- LLONG, int, int, int, int);
-static void fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
- LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
-static void doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
-static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
- size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
- const char *format, va_list args);
+static int fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+ const char *, int, int, int);
+static int fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+ LLONG, int, int, int, int);
+static int fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
+ LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
+static int doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
+static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
+ size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
+ const char *format, va_list args);
/* format read states */
#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
#define char_to_int(p) (p - '0')
#define OSSL_MAX(p,q) ((p >= q) ? p : q)
-static void
+static int
_dopr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen,
if (ch == '%')
state = DP_S_FLAGS;
else
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
+ return 0;
ch = *format++;
break;
case DP_S_FLAGS:
value = va_arg(args, int);
break;
}
- fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
- value, 10, min, max, flags);
+ if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min,
+ max, flags))
+ return 0;
break;
case 'X':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
}
- fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
- ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
- min, max, flags);
+ if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+ ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
+ min, max, flags))
+ return 0;
break;
case 'f':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
- fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
- fvalue, min, max, flags);
+ if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
+ flags))
+ return 0;
break;
case 'E':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'c':
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
- va_arg(args, int));
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+ va_arg(args, int)))
+ return 0;
break;
case 's':
strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
else
max = *maxlen;
}
- fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
- flags, min, max);
+ if (!fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
+ flags, min, max))
+ return 0;
break;
case 'p':
value = (long)va_arg(args, void *);
- fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
- value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM);
+ if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+ value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM))
+ return 0;
break;
case 'n': /* XXX */
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
}
break;
case '%':
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
+ return 0;
break;
case 'w':
/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
*truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
if (*truncated)
currlen = *maxlen - 1;
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0');
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0'))
+ return 0;
*retlen = currlen - 1;
- return;
+ return 1;
}
-static void
+static int
fmtstr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
size_t *maxlen, const char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
{
- int padlen, strln;
+ int padlen;
+ size_t strln;
int cnt = 0;
if (value == 0)
value = "<NULL>";
- for (strln = 0; value[strln]; ++strln) ;
+
+ strln = strlen(value);
+ if (strln > INT_MAX)
+ strln = INT_MAX;
+
padlen = min - strln;
- if (padlen < 0)
+ if (min < 0 || padlen < 0)
padlen = 0;
if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
padlen = -padlen;
while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+ return 0;
--padlen;
++cnt;
}
while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++);
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++))
+ return 0;
++cnt;
}
while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+ return 0;
++padlen;
++cnt;
}
+ return 1;
}
-static void
+static int
fmtint(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
/* spaces */
while (spadlen > 0) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+ return 0;
--spadlen;
}
/* sign */
if (signvalue)
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+ return 0;
/* prefix */
while (*prefix) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix);
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix))
+ return 0;
prefix++;
}
/* zeros */
if (zpadlen > 0) {
while (zpadlen > 0) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+ return 0;
--zpadlen;
}
}
/* digits */
- while (place > 0)
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]);
+ while (place > 0) {
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]))
+ return 0;
+ }
/* left justified spaces */
while (spadlen < 0) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+ return 0;
++spadlen;
}
- return;
+ return 1;
}
static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
return intpart;
}
-static void
+static int
fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
if (signvalue) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+ return 0;
--padlen;
signvalue = 0;
}
while (padlen > 0) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+ return 0;
--padlen;
}
}
while (padlen > 0) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+ return 0;
--padlen;
}
- if (signvalue)
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+ if (signvalue && !doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
+ return 0;
- while (iplace > 0)
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]);
+ while (iplace > 0) {
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]))
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
* char to print out.
*/
if (max > 0 || (flags & DP_F_NUM)) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.');
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.'))
+ return 0;
- while (fplace > 0)
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace]);
+ while (fplace > 0) {
+ if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+ fconvert[--fplace]))
+ return 0;
+ }
}
while (zpadlen > 0) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
+ return 0;
--zpadlen;
}
while (padlen < 0) {
- doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+ if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
+ return 0;
++padlen;
}
+ return 1;
}
-static void
+#define BUFFER_INC 1024
+
+static int
doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, int c)
{
assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
- *maxlen += 1024;
+ if (*maxlen > INT_MAX - BUFFER_INC)
+ return 0;
+
+ *maxlen += BUFFER_INC;
if (*buffer == NULL) {
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
- if (!*buffer) {
- /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
- return;
- }
+ if (*buffer == NULL)
+ return 0;
if (*currlen > 0) {
assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
}
*sbuffer = NULL;
} else {
- *buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
- if (!*buffer) {
- /* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
- return;
- }
+ char *tmpbuf;
+ tmpbuf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
+ if (tmpbuf == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *buffer = tmpbuf;
}
}
(*buffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c;
}
- return;
+ return 1;
}
/***************************************************************************/
dynbuf = NULL;
CRYPTO_push_info("doapr()");
- _dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format, args);
+ if (!_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format,
+ args)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (dynbuf) {
ret = BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen);
OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
size_t retlen;
int truncated;
- _dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args);
+ if(!_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args))
+ return -1;
if (truncated)
/*
# define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
# define BIO_get_conn_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
# define BIO_get_conn_ip(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
-# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0)
+# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,NULL)
# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
-/* BIO_s_accept_socket() */
+/* BIO_s_accept() */
# define BIO_set_accept_port(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,0,(char *)name)
# define BIO_get_accept_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,0)
/* #define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) */
# define BIO_set_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE,mode,NULL)
# define BIO_get_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE,0,NULL)
+/* BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
# define BIO_do_connect(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
# define BIO_do_accept(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
# define BIO_do_handshake(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL)
# define BIO_get_url(b,url) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,2,(char *)(url))
# define BIO_get_no_connect_return(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,5,NULL)
+/* BIO_s_datagram(), BIO_s_fd(), BIO_s_socket(), BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
# define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd)
# define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c)
+/* BIO_s_file() */
# define BIO_set_fp(b,fp,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR,c,(char *)fp)
# define BIO_get_fp(b,fpp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR,0,(char *)fpp)
+/* BIO_s_fd() and BIO_s_file() */
# define BIO_seek(b,ofs) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_SEEK,ofs,NULL)
# define BIO_tell(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_TELL,0,NULL)
long argl, long ret);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
-BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
+BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);
-/* crypto/bio/bss_bio.c -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/bio/bss_bio.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
{
BIO *dbio;
int *ip;
- const char **pptr;
+ const char **pptr = NULL;
long ret = 1;
BIO_CONNECT *data;
case BIO_C_GET_CONNECT:
if (ptr != NULL) {
pptr = (const char **)ptr;
- if (num == 0) {
- *pptr = data->param_hostname;
+ }
- } else if (num == 1) {
- *pptr = data->param_port;
- } else if (num == 2) {
- *pptr = (char *)&(data->ip[0]);
- } else if (num == 3) {
- *((int *)ptr) = data->port;
+ if (b->init) {
+ if (pptr != NULL) {
+ ret = 1;
+ if (num == 0) {
+ *pptr = data->param_hostname;
+ } else if (num == 1) {
+ *pptr = data->param_port;
+ } else if (num == 2) {
+ *pptr = (char *)&(data->ip[0]);
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (num == 3) {
+ ret = data->port;
}
- if ((!b->init) || (ptr == NULL))
+ } else {
+ if (pptr != NULL)
*pptr = "not initialized";
- ret = 1;
+ ret = 0;
}
break;
case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT:
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
num = 0;
- case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
ret = 0;
break;
- case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
ret = 0;
break;
return (&mem_method);
}
-BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len)
+
+BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len)
{
BIO *ret;
BUF_MEM *b;
if (!(ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())))
return NULL;
b = (BUF_MEM *)ret->ptr;
- b->data = buf;
+ /* Cast away const and trust in the MEM_RDONLY flag. */
+ b->data = (void *)buf;
b->length = sz;
b->max = sz;
ret->flags |= BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY;
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
-bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h
-bn_exp.o: rsaz_exp.h
+bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
+bn_exp.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h rsaz_exp.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
$TEMP3 = $Y1;
$TEMP4 = $Y2;
$code.=<<___;
- #we need to fix indexes 32-39 to avoid overflow
+ # we need to fix indices 32-39 to avoid overflow
vmovdqu 32*8(%rsp), $ACC8 # 32*8-192($tp0),
vmovdqu 32*9(%rsp), $ACC1 # 32*9-192($tp0)
vmovdqu 32*10(%rsp), $ACC2 # 32*10-192($tp0)
.type rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2:
+ vzeroupper
+ mov %rsp,%r11
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x88(%rsp),%rax
- vzeroupper
.LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5:
# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
- .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp
- .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #vmovaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #vmovaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 #vmovaps %xmm8,0(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 #vmovaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 #vmovaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 #vmovaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 #vmovaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 #vmovaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 #vmovaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax)
- .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 #vmovaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax)
+ .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 # lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp
+ .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 # vmovaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 # vmovaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 # vmovaps %xmm8,0(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 # vmovaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 # vmovaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 # vmovaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 # vmovaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 # vmovaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 # vmovaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax)
+ .byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 # vmovaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax)
___
$code.=<<___;
- lea .Lgather_table(%rip),%r11
- mov $power,%eax
- and \$3,$power
- shr \$2,%eax # cache line number
- shl \$4,$power # offset within cache line
-
- vmovdqu -32(%r11),%ymm7 # .Lgather_permd
- vpbroadcastb 8(%r11,%rax), %xmm8
- vpbroadcastb 7(%r11,%rax), %xmm9
- vpbroadcastb 6(%r11,%rax), %xmm10
- vpbroadcastb 5(%r11,%rax), %xmm11
- vpbroadcastb 4(%r11,%rax), %xmm12
- vpbroadcastb 3(%r11,%rax), %xmm13
- vpbroadcastb 2(%r11,%rax), %xmm14
- vpbroadcastb 1(%r11,%rax), %xmm15
-
- lea 64($inp,$power),$inp
- mov \$64,%r11 # size optimization
- mov \$9,%eax
- jmp .Loop_gather_1024
+ lea -0x100(%rsp),%rsp
+ and \$-32, %rsp
+ lea .Linc(%rip), %r10
+ lea -128(%rsp),%rax # control u-op density
+
+ vmovd $power, %xmm4
+ vmovdqa (%r10),%ymm0
+ vmovdqa 32(%r10),%ymm1
+ vmovdqa 64(%r10),%ymm5
+ vpbroadcastd %xmm4,%ymm4
+
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1
+ vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*0+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm0
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2
+ vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*1+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm1
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3
+ vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*2+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0
+ vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*3+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1
+ vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*4+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm8
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2
+ vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*5+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm9
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3
+ vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*6+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm8, %ymm10
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm8, %ymm8
+ vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*7+128(%rax)
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm9, %ymm11
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm9, %ymm9
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm10, %ymm12
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm10, %ymm10
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm11, %ymm13
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm11, %ymm11
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm12, %ymm14
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm12, %ymm12
+ vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm13, %ymm15
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm13, %ymm13
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm14, %ymm14
+ vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm15, %ymm15
+
+ vmovdqa -32(%r10),%ymm7 # .Lgather_permd
+ lea 128($inp), $inp
+ mov \$9,$power
-.align 32
.Loop_gather_1024:
- vpand -64($inp), %xmm8,%xmm0
- vpand ($inp), %xmm9,%xmm1
- vpand 64($inp), %xmm10,%xmm2
- vpand ($inp,%r11,2), %xmm11,%xmm3
- vpor %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm1
- vpand 64($inp,%r11,2), %xmm12,%xmm4
- vpor %xmm2,%xmm3,%xmm3
- vpand ($inp,%r11,4), %xmm13,%xmm5
- vpor %xmm1,%xmm3,%xmm3
- vpand 64($inp,%r11,4), %xmm14,%xmm6
- vpor %xmm4,%xmm5,%xmm5
- vpand -128($inp,%r11,8), %xmm15,%xmm2
- lea ($inp,%r11,8),$inp
- vpor %xmm3,%xmm5,%xmm5
- vpor %xmm2,%xmm6,%xmm6
- vpor %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm6
- vpermd %ymm6,%ymm7,%ymm6
- vmovdqu %ymm6,($out)
+ vmovdqa 32*0-128($inp), %ymm0
+ vmovdqa 32*1-128($inp), %ymm1
+ vmovdqa 32*2-128($inp), %ymm2
+ vmovdqa 32*3-128($inp), %ymm3
+ vpand 32*0+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+ vpand 32*1+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1
+ vpand 32*2+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2
+ vpor %ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm4
+ vpand 32*3+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3
+ vmovdqa 32*4-128($inp), %ymm0
+ vmovdqa 32*5-128($inp), %ymm1
+ vpor %ymm2, %ymm3, %ymm5
+ vmovdqa 32*6-128($inp), %ymm2
+ vmovdqa 32*7-128($inp), %ymm3
+ vpand 32*4+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
+ vpand 32*5+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1
+ vpand 32*6+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2
+ vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
+ vpand 32*7+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3
+ vpand 32*8-128($inp), %ymm8, %ymm0
+ vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
+ vpand 32*9-128($inp), %ymm9, %ymm1
+ vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
+ vpand 32*10-128($inp),%ymm10, %ymm2
+ vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
+ vpand 32*11-128($inp),%ymm11, %ymm3
+ vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
+ vpand 32*12-128($inp),%ymm12, %ymm0
+ vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
+ vpand 32*13-128($inp),%ymm13, %ymm1
+ vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
+ vpand 32*14-128($inp),%ymm14, %ymm2
+ vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
+ vpand 32*15-128($inp),%ymm15, %ymm3
+ lea 32*16($inp), $inp
+ vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
+ vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
+ vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
+ vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
+
+ vpor %ymm5, %ymm4, %ymm4
+ vextracti128 \$1, %ymm4, %xmm5 # upper half is cleared
+ vpor %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm5
+ vpermd %ymm5,%ymm7,%ymm5
+ vmovdqu %ymm5,($out)
lea 32($out),$out
- dec %eax
+ dec $power
jnz .Loop_gather_1024
vpxor %ymm0,%ymm0,%ymm0
vzeroupper
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
- movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
- movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
- movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
- movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
- movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
- movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
- movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
- movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
- movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
- lea 0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
+ movaps -0xa8(%r11),%xmm6
+ movaps -0x98(%r11),%xmm7
+ movaps -0x88(%r11),%xmm8
+ movaps -0x78(%r11),%xmm9
+ movaps -0x68(%r11),%xmm10
+ movaps -0x58(%r11),%xmm11
+ movaps -0x48(%r11),%xmm12
+ movaps -0x38(%r11),%xmm13
+ movaps -0x28(%r11),%xmm14
+ movaps -0x18(%r11),%xmm15
.LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5:
___
$code.=<<___;
+ lea (%r11),%rsp
ret
.size rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2
___
.long 0,2,4,6,7,7,7,7
.Lgather_permd:
.long 0,7,1,7,2,7,3,7
-.Lgather_table:
- .byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0xff,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
+.Linc:
+ .long 0,0,0,0, 1,1,1,1
+ .long 2,2,2,2, 3,3,3,3
+ .long 4,4,4,4, 4,4,4,4
.align 64
___
.rva rsaz_se_handler
.rva .Lmul_1024_body,.Lmul_1024_epilogue
.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5:
- .byte 0x01,0x33,0x16,0x00
- .byte 0x36,0xf8,0x09,0x00 #vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
- .byte 0x31,0xe8,0x08,0x00 #vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
- .byte 0x2c,0xd8,0x07,0x00 #vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
- .byte 0x27,0xc8,0x06,0x00 #vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
- .byte 0x22,0xb8,0x05,0x00 #vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
- .byte 0x1d,0xa8,0x04,0x00 #vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
- .byte 0x18,0x98,0x03,0x00 #vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
- .byte 0x13,0x88,0x02,0x00 #vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
- .byte 0x0e,0x78,0x01,0x00 #vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
- .byte 0x09,0x68,0x00,0x00 #vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
- .byte 0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00 #sub rsp,0xa8
+ .byte 0x01,0x36,0x17,0x0b
+ .byte 0x36,0xf8,0x09,0x00 # vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
+ .byte 0x31,0xe8,0x08,0x00 # vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
+ .byte 0x2c,0xd8,0x07,0x00 # vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
+ .byte 0x27,0xc8,0x06,0x00 # vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
+ .byte 0x22,0xb8,0x05,0x00 # vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
+ .byte 0x1d,0xa8,0x04,0x00 # vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
+ .byte 0x18,0x98,0x03,0x00 # vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
+ .byte 0x13,0x88,0x02,0x00 # vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
+ .byte 0x0e,0x78,0x01,0x00 # vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
+ .byte 0x09,0x68,0x00,0x00 # vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
+ .byte 0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00 # sub rsp,0xa8
+ .byte 0x00,0xb3,0x00,0x00 # set_frame r11
___
}
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
push %r14
push %r15
- mov $pwr, $pwr
- subq \$128+24, %rsp
+ subq \$`128+24+($win64?0xb0:0)`, %rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+ movaps %xmm6,0xa0(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm7,0xb0(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm8,0xc0(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm9,0xd0(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm10,0xe0(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm11,0xf0(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm12,0x100(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm13,0x110(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm14,0x120(%rsp)
+ movaps %xmm15,0x130(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
.Lmul_gather4_body:
+ movd $pwr,%xmm8
+ movdqa .Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
+ movdqa .Linc(%rip),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
+
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm8,%xmm8 # broadcast $power
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm7
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power
+#
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+ pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+ movdqa %xmm7,%xmm`$i+3`
+___
+}
+for(;$i<7;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+ pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm7
+
+ movdqa 16*0($bp),%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*1($bp),%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*2($bp),%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*3($bp),%xmm11
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*4($bp),%xmm12
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*5($bp),%xmm13
+ pand %xmm2,%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*6($bp),%xmm14
+ pand %xmm3,%xmm11
+ movdqa 16*7($bp),%xmm15
+ leaq 128($bp), %rbp
+ pand %xmm4,%xmm12
+ pand %xmm5,%xmm13
+ pand %xmm6,%xmm14
+ pand %xmm7,%xmm15
+ por %xmm10,%xmm8
+ por %xmm11,%xmm9
+ por %xmm12,%xmm8
+ por %xmm13,%xmm9
+ por %xmm14,%xmm8
+ por %xmm15,%xmm9
+
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
movl \$0x80100,%r11d
je .Lmulx_gather
___
$code.=<<___;
- movl 64($bp,$pwr,4), %eax
- movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments
- movl ($bp,$pwr,4), %ebx
- movq $mod, %xmm1
- movq $n0, 128(%rsp)
+ movq %xmm8,%rbx
+
+ movq $n0, 128(%rsp) # off-load arguments
+ movq $out, 128+8(%rsp)
+ movq $mod, 128+16(%rsp)
- shlq \$32, %rax
- or %rax, %rbx
movq ($ap), %rax
movq 8($ap), %rcx
- leaq 128($bp,$pwr,4), %rbp
mulq %rbx # 0 iteration
movq %rax, (%rsp)
movq %rcx, %rax
movq %rdx, %r8
mulq %rbx
- movd (%rbp), %xmm4
addq %rax, %r8
movq 16($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r9
adcq \$0, %r9
mulq %rbx
- movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
addq %rax, %r9
movq 24($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r10
adcq \$0, %r10
mulq %rbx
- pslldq \$4, %xmm5
addq %rax, %r10
movq 32($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r11
adcq \$0, %r11
mulq %rbx
- por %xmm5, %xmm4
addq %rax, %r11
movq 40($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r12
adcq \$0, %r13
mulq %rbx
- leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
addq %rax, %r13
movq 56($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r14
adcq \$0, %r14
mulq %rbx
- movq %xmm4, %rbx
addq %rax, %r14
movq ($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r15
.align 32
.Loop_mul_gather:
+ movdqa 16*0(%rbp),%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*1(%rbp),%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*2(%rbp),%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*3(%rbp),%xmm11
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*4(%rbp),%xmm12
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*5(%rbp),%xmm13
+ pand %xmm2,%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*6(%rbp),%xmm14
+ pand %xmm3,%xmm11
+ movdqa 16*7(%rbp),%xmm15
+ leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
+ pand %xmm4,%xmm12
+ pand %xmm5,%xmm13
+ pand %xmm6,%xmm14
+ pand %xmm7,%xmm15
+ por %xmm10,%xmm8
+ por %xmm11,%xmm9
+ por %xmm12,%xmm8
+ por %xmm13,%xmm9
+ por %xmm14,%xmm8
+ por %xmm15,%xmm9
+
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
+ movq %xmm8,%rbx
+
mulq %rbx
addq %rax, %r8
movq 8($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %r8
mulq %rbx
- movd (%rbp), %xmm4
addq %rax, %r9
movq 16($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
adcq \$0, %r9
mulq %rbx
- movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
addq %rax, %r10
movq 24($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
adcq \$0, %r10
mulq %rbx
- pslldq \$4, %xmm5
addq %rax, %r11
movq 32($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
adcq \$0, %r11
mulq %rbx
- por %xmm5, %xmm4
addq %rax, %r12
movq 40($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
adcq \$0, %r14
mulq %rbx
- movq %xmm4, %rbx
addq %rax, %r15
movq ($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
movq %rdx, %r15
adcq \$0, %r15
- leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
leaq 8(%rdi), %rdi
decl %ecx
movq %r14, 48(%rdi)
movq %r15, 56(%rdi)
- movq %xmm0, $out
- movq %xmm1, %rbp
+ movq 128+8(%rsp), $out
+ movq 128+16(%rsp), %rbp
movq (%rsp), %r8
movq 8(%rsp), %r9
.align 32
.Lmulx_gather:
- mov 64($bp,$pwr,4), %eax
- movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments
- lea 128($bp,$pwr,4), %rbp
- mov ($bp,$pwr,4), %edx
- movq $mod, %xmm1
- mov $n0, 128(%rsp)
+ movq %xmm8,%rdx
+
+ mov $n0, 128(%rsp) # off-load arguments
+ mov $out, 128+8(%rsp)
+ mov $mod, 128+16(%rsp)
- shl \$32, %rax
- or %rax, %rdx
mulx ($ap), %rbx, %r8 # 0 iteration
mov %rbx, (%rsp)
xor %edi, %edi # cf=0, of=0
mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9
- movd (%rbp), %xmm4
mulx 16($ap), %rbx, %r10
- movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
adcx %rax, %r8
mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11
- pslldq \$4, %xmm5
adcx %rbx, %r9
mulx 32($ap), %rbx, %r12
- por %xmm5, %xmm4
adcx %rax, %r10
mulx 40($ap), %rax, %r13
adcx %rbx, %r11
mulx 48($ap), %rbx, %r14
- lea 128(%rbp), %rbp
adcx %rax, %r12
mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15
- movq %xmm4, %rdx
adcx %rbx, %r13
adcx %rax, %r14
+ .byte 0x67
mov %r8, %rbx
adcx %rdi, %r15 # %rdi is 0
.align 32
.Loop_mulx_gather:
- mulx ($ap), %rax, %r8
+ movdqa 16*0(%rbp),%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*1(%rbp),%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*2(%rbp),%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*3(%rbp),%xmm11
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*4(%rbp),%xmm12
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*5(%rbp),%xmm13
+ pand %xmm2,%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*6(%rbp),%xmm14
+ pand %xmm3,%xmm11
+ movdqa 16*7(%rbp),%xmm15
+ leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
+ pand %xmm4,%xmm12
+ pand %xmm5,%xmm13
+ pand %xmm6,%xmm14
+ pand %xmm7,%xmm15
+ por %xmm10,%xmm8
+ por %xmm11,%xmm9
+ por %xmm12,%xmm8
+ por %xmm13,%xmm9
+ por %xmm14,%xmm8
+ por %xmm15,%xmm9
+
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
+ movq %xmm8,%rdx
+
+ .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x86,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx ($ap), %rax, %r8
adcx %rax, %rbx
adox %r9, %r8
mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9
- .byte 0x66,0x0f,0x6e,0xa5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # movd (%rbp), %xmm4
adcx %rax, %r8
adox %r10, %r9
mulx 16($ap), %rax, %r10
- movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
- lea 128(%rbp), %rbp
adcx %rax, %r9
adox %r11, %r10
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11
- pslldq \$4, %xmm5
- por %xmm5, %xmm4
adcx %rax, %r10
adox %r12, %r11
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($ap), %rax, %r14
adcx %rax, %r13
+ .byte 0x67
adox %r15, %r14
mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15
- movq %xmm4, %rdx
mov %rbx, 64(%rsp,%rcx,8)
adcx %rax, %r14
adox %rdi, %r15
mov %r14, 64+48(%rsp)
mov %r15, 64+56(%rsp)
- movq %xmm0, $out
- movq %xmm1, %rbp
+ mov 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull arguments
+ mov 128+8(%rsp), $out
+ mov 128+16(%rsp), %rbp
- mov 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0
mov (%rsp), %r8
mov 8(%rsp), %r9
mov 16(%rsp), %r10
call __rsaz_512_subtract
leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+ movaps 0xa0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm6
+ movaps 0xb0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
+ movaps 0xc0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm8
+ movaps 0xd0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm9
+ movaps 0xe0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm10
+ movaps 0xf0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm11
+ movaps 0x100-0xc8(%rax),%xmm12
+ movaps 0x110-0xc8(%rax),%xmm13
+ movaps 0x120-0xc8(%rax),%xmm14
+ movaps 0x130-0xc8(%rax),%xmm15
+ lea 0xb0(%rax),%rax
+___
+$code.=<<___;
movq -48(%rax), %r15
movq -40(%rax), %r14
movq -32(%rax), %r13
mov $pwr, $pwr
subq \$128+24, %rsp
.Lmul_scatter4_body:
- leaq ($tbl,$pwr,4), $tbl
+ leaq ($tbl,$pwr,8), $tbl
movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments
movq $mod, %xmm1
movq $tbl, %xmm2
call __rsaz_512_subtract
- movl %r8d, 64*0($inp) # scatter
- shrq \$32, %r8
- movl %r9d, 64*2($inp)
- shrq \$32, %r9
- movl %r10d, 64*4($inp)
- shrq \$32, %r10
- movl %r11d, 64*6($inp)
- shrq \$32, %r11
- movl %r12d, 64*8($inp)
- shrq \$32, %r12
- movl %r13d, 64*10($inp)
- shrq \$32, %r13
- movl %r14d, 64*12($inp)
- shrq \$32, %r14
- movl %r15d, 64*14($inp)
- shrq \$32, %r15
- movl %r8d, 64*1($inp)
- movl %r9d, 64*3($inp)
- movl %r10d, 64*5($inp)
- movl %r11d, 64*7($inp)
- movl %r12d, 64*9($inp)
- movl %r13d, 64*11($inp)
- movl %r14d, 64*13($inp)
- movl %r15d, 64*15($inp)
+ movq %r8, 128*0($inp) # scatter
+ movq %r9, 128*1($inp)
+ movq %r10, 128*2($inp)
+ movq %r11, 128*3($inp)
+ movq %r12, 128*4($inp)
+ movq %r13, 128*5($inp)
+ movq %r14, 128*6($inp)
+ movq %r15, 128*7($inp)
leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
movq -48(%rax), %r15
.type rsaz_512_scatter4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
rsaz_512_scatter4:
- leaq ($out,$power,4), $out
+ leaq ($out,$power,8), $out
movl \$8, %r9d
jmp .Loop_scatter
.align 16
.Loop_scatter:
movq ($inp), %rax
leaq 8($inp), $inp
- movl %eax, ($out)
- shrq \$32, %rax
- movl %eax, 64($out)
+ movq %rax, ($out)
leaq 128($out), $out
decl %r9d
jnz .Loop_scatter
.type rsaz_512_gather4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
rsaz_512_gather4:
- leaq ($inp,$power,4), $inp
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4:
+ .byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa8,0x00,0x00,0x00 # sub $0xa8,%rsp
+ .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24 # movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x7c,0x24,0x10 # movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x44,0x24,0x20 # movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x4c,0x24,0x30 # movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x54,0x24,0x40 # movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x5c,0x24,0x50 # movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x64,0x24,0x60 # movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x6c,0x24,0x70 # movaps %xmm13,0x70(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xb4,0x24,0x80,0,0,0 # movaps %xmm14,0x80(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xbc,0x24,0x90,0,0,0 # movaps %xmm15,0x90(%rsp)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ movd $power,%xmm8
+ movdqa .Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
+ movdqa .Linc(%rip),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
+
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm8,%xmm8 # broadcast $power
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm7
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power
+#
+for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+ pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+ movdqa %xmm7,%xmm`$i+3`
+___
+}
+for(;$i<7;$i++) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
+ pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm7
movl \$8, %r9d
jmp .Loop_gather
.align 16
.Loop_gather:
- movl ($inp), %eax
- movl 64($inp), %r8d
+ movdqa 16*0($inp),%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*1($inp),%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*2($inp),%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*3($inp),%xmm11
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm8
+ movdqa 16*4($inp),%xmm12
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm9
+ movdqa 16*5($inp),%xmm13
+ pand %xmm2,%xmm10
+ movdqa 16*6($inp),%xmm14
+ pand %xmm3,%xmm11
+ movdqa 16*7($inp),%xmm15
leaq 128($inp), $inp
- shlq \$32, %r8
- or %r8, %rax
- movq %rax, ($out)
+ pand %xmm4,%xmm12
+ pand %xmm5,%xmm13
+ pand %xmm6,%xmm14
+ pand %xmm7,%xmm15
+ por %xmm10,%xmm8
+ por %xmm11,%xmm9
+ por %xmm12,%xmm8
+ por %xmm13,%xmm9
+ por %xmm14,%xmm8
+ por %xmm15,%xmm9
+
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
+ por %xmm9,%xmm8
+ movq %xmm8,($out)
leaq 8($out), $out
decl %r9d
jnz .Loop_gather
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
+ movaps 0x00(%rsp),%xmm6
+ movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
+ movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
+ movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
+ movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
+ movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
+ movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
+ movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
+ movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
+ movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
+ add \$0xa8,%rsp
+___
+$code.=<<___;
ret
+.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4:
.size rsaz_512_gather4,.-rsaz_512_gather4
+
+.align 64
+.Linc:
+ .long 0,0, 1,1
+ .long 2,2, 2,2
___
}
lea 128+24+48(%rax),%rax
+ lea .Lmul_gather4_epilogue(%rip),%rbx
+ cmp %r10,%rbx
+ jne .Lse_not_in_mul_gather4
+
+ lea 0xb0(%rax),%rax
+
+ lea -48-0xa8(%rax),%rsi
+ lea 512($context),%rdi
+ mov \$20,%ecx
+ .long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq
+
+.Lse_not_in_mul_gather4:
mov -8(%rax),%rbx
mov -16(%rax),%rbp
mov -24(%rax),%r12
pop %rdi
pop %rsi
ret
-.size sqr_handler,.-sqr_handler
+.size se_handler,.-se_handler
.section .pdata
.align 4
.rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_by_one
.rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_by_one
+ .rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4
+ .rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4
+ .rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4
+
.section .xdata
.align 8
.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_sqr:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva se_handler
.rva .Lmul_by_one_body,.Lmul_by_one_epilogue # HandlerData[]
+.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4:
+ .byte 0x01,0x46,0x16,0x00
+ .byte 0x46,0xf8,0x09,0x00 # vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
+ .byte 0x3d,0xe8,0x08,0x00 # vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
+ .byte 0x34,0xd8,0x07,0x00 # vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
+ .byte 0x2e,0xc8,0x06,0x00 # vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
+ .byte 0x28,0xb8,0x05,0x00 # vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
+ .byte 0x22,0xa8,0x04,0x00 # vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
+ .byte 0x1c,0x98,0x03,0x00 # vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
+ .byte 0x16,0x88,0x02,0x00 # vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
+ .byte 0x10,0x78,0x01,0x00 # vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
+ .byte 0x0b,0x68,0x00,0x00 # vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
+ .byte 0x07,0x01,0x15,0x00 # sub rsp,0xa8
___
}
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
# 4096. this is done to allow memory disambiguation logic
# do its job.
#
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,4),%r11
+ lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
sub $aptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lsqr8x_sp_alt
sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,4),%rsp # alloca(frame+4*$num)
+ lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
jmp .Lsqr8x_sp_done
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_sp_alt:
- lea 4096-64(,$num,4),%r10 # 4096-frame-4*$num
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,4),%rsp # alloca(frame+4*$num)
+ lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num
+ lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lsqr8x_sp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp
- mov $num,%r10
+ mov $num,%r10
neg $num
- lea 64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 # copy of modulus
mov $n0, 32(%rsp)
mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp
.Lsqr8x_body:
- mov $num,$i
- movq %r11, %xmm2 # save pointer to modulus copy
- shr \$3+2,$i
- mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
- jmp .Lsqr8x_copy_n
-
-.align 32
-.Lsqr8x_copy_n:
- movq 8*0($nptr),%xmm0
- movq 8*1($nptr),%xmm1
- movq 8*2($nptr),%xmm3
- movq 8*3($nptr),%xmm4
- lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr
- movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%r11)
- movdqa %xmm1,16*1(%r11)
- movdqa %xmm3,16*2(%r11)
- movdqa %xmm4,16*3(%r11)
- lea 16*4(%r11),%r11
- dec $i
- jnz .Lsqr8x_copy_n
-
+ movq $nptr, %xmm2 # save pointer to modulus
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr
movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
+ mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
and \$0x80100,%eax
cmp \$0x80100,%eax
jne .Lsqr8x_nox
call bn_sqrx8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module
-
- pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
- lea 48(%rsp),%rax
- lea 64(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx
- shr \$3+2,$num
- mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
- jmp .Lsqr8x_zero
+ # %rax top-most carry
+ # %rbp nptr
+ # %rcx -8*num
+ # %r8 end of tp[2*num]
+ lea (%r8,%rcx),%rbx
+ mov %rcx,$num
+ mov %rcx,%rdx
+ movq %xmm1,$rptr
+ sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0
+ jmp .Lsqr8x_sub
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_nox:
___
$code.=<<___;
call bn_sqr8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module
+ # %rax top-most carry
+ # %rbp nptr
+ # %r8 -8*num
+ # %rdi end of tp[2*num]
+ lea (%rdi,$num),%rbx
+ mov $num,%rcx
+ mov $num,%rdx
+ movq %xmm1,$rptr
+ sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0
+ jmp .Lsqr8x_sub
+.align 32
+.Lsqr8x_sub:
+ mov 8*0(%rbx),%r12
+ mov 8*1(%rbx),%r13
+ mov 8*2(%rbx),%r14
+ mov 8*3(%rbx),%r15
+ lea 8*4(%rbx),%rbx
+ sbb 8*0(%rbp),%r12
+ sbb 8*1(%rbp),%r13
+ sbb 8*2(%rbp),%r14
+ sbb 8*3(%rbp),%r15
+ lea 8*4(%rbp),%rbp
+ mov %r12,8*0($rptr)
+ mov %r13,8*1($rptr)
+ mov %r14,8*2($rptr)
+ mov %r15,8*3($rptr)
+ lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr
+ inc %rcx # preserves %cf
+ jnz .Lsqr8x_sub
+
+ sbb \$0,%rax # top-most carry
+ lea (%rbx,$num),%rbx # rewind
+ lea ($rptr,$num),$rptr # rewind
+
+ movq %rax,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
- lea 48(%rsp),%rax
- lea 64(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx
- shr \$3+2,$num
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
- jmp .Lsqr8x_zero
+ jmp .Lsqr8x_cond_copy
.align 32
-.Lsqr8x_zero:
- movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%rax) # wipe t
- movdqa %xmm0,16*1(%rax)
- movdqa %xmm0,16*2(%rax)
- movdqa %xmm0,16*3(%rax)
- lea 16*4(%rax),%rax
- movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%rdx) # wipe n
- movdqa %xmm0,16*1(%rdx)
- movdqa %xmm0,16*2(%rdx)
- movdqa %xmm0,16*3(%rdx)
- lea 16*4(%rdx),%rdx
- dec $num
- jnz .Lsqr8x_zero
+.Lsqr8x_cond_copy:
+ movdqa 16*0(%rbx),%xmm2
+ movdqa 16*1(%rbx),%xmm3
+ lea 16*2(%rbx),%rbx
+ movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4
+ movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5
+ lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr
+ movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx) # zero tp
+ movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx)
+ movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx,%rdx)
+ movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx,%rdx)
+ pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm3
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm4
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm5
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
+ por %xmm2,%xmm4
+ por %xmm3,%xmm5
+ movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr)
+ movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr)
+ add \$32,$num
+ jnz .Lsqr8x_cond_copy
mov \$1,%rax
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled
sub 0*8($tptr),$zero # pull top-most carry
adc %r15,%r14
- mov -8($nptr),$mi
sbb %r15,%r15 # top-most carry
mov %r14,-1*8($tptr)
cmp 16(%rsp),$bptr
jne .Lmulx4x_outer
- sub %r14,$mi # compare top-most words
- sbb $mi,$mi
- or $mi,%r15
-
- neg $num
- xor %rdx,%rdx
+ lea 64(%rsp),$tptr
+ sub $num,$nptr # rewind $nptr
+ neg %r15
+ mov $num,%rdx
+ shr \$3+2,$num # %cf=0
mov 32(%rsp),$rptr # restore rp
+ jmp .Lmulx4x_sub
+
+.align 32
+.Lmulx4x_sub:
+ mov 8*0($tptr),%r11
+ mov 8*1($tptr),%r12
+ mov 8*2($tptr),%r13
+ mov 8*3($tptr),%r14
+ lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr
+ sbb 8*0($nptr),%r11
+ sbb 8*1($nptr),%r12
+ sbb 8*2($nptr),%r13
+ sbb 8*3($nptr),%r14
+ lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr
+ mov %r11,8*0($rptr)
+ mov %r12,8*1($rptr)
+ mov %r13,8*2($rptr)
+ mov %r14,8*3($rptr)
+ lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr
+ dec $num # preserves %cf
+ jnz .Lmulx4x_sub
+
+ sbb \$0,%r15 # top-most carry
lea 64(%rsp),$tptr
+ sub %rdx,$rptr # rewind
+ movq %r15,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
- mov 0*8($nptr,$num),%r8
- mov 1*8($nptr,$num),%r9
- neg %r8
- jmp .Lmulx4x_sub_entry
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1
+ mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
+ jmp .Lmulx4x_cond_copy
.align 32
-.Lmulx4x_sub:
- mov 0*8($nptr,$num),%r8
- mov 1*8($nptr,$num),%r9
- not %r8
-.Lmulx4x_sub_entry:
- mov 2*8($nptr,$num),%r10
- not %r9
- and %r15,%r8
- mov 3*8($nptr,$num),%r11
- not %r10
- and %r15,%r9
- not %r11
- and %r15,%r10
- and %r15,%r11
-
- neg %rdx # mov %rdx,%cf
- adc 0*8($tptr),%r8
- adc 1*8($tptr),%r9
- movdqa %xmm0,($tptr)
- adc 2*8($tptr),%r10
- adc 3*8($tptr),%r11
- movdqa %xmm0,16($tptr)
- lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr
- sbb %rdx,%rdx # mov %cf,%rdx
+.Lmulx4x_cond_copy:
+ movdqa 16*0($tptr),%xmm2
+ movdqa 16*1($tptr),%xmm3
+ lea 16*2($tptr),$tptr
+ movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4
+ movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5
+ lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr
+ movdqa %xmm0,-16*2($tptr) # zero tp
+ movdqa %xmm0,-16*1($tptr)
+ pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pand %xmm1,%xmm3
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm4
+ pand %xmm0,%xmm5
+ pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
+ por %xmm2,%xmm4
+ por %xmm3,%xmm5
+ movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr)
+ movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr)
+ sub \$32,%rdx
+ jnz .Lmulx4x_cond_copy
- mov %r8,0*8($rptr)
- mov %r9,1*8($rptr)
- mov %r10,2*8($rptr)
- mov %r11,3*8($rptr)
- lea 4*8($rptr),$rptr
+ mov %rdx,($tptr)
- add \$32,$num
- jnz .Lmulx4x_sub
-
- mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
mov -40(%rsi),%r14
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
.Lmul_enter:
mov ${num}d,${num}d
mov %rsp,%rax
- mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%r10d # load 7th argument
+ movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5 # load 7th argument
+ lea .Linc(%rip),%r10
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
-___
-$code.=<<___;
+
lea 2($num),%r11
neg %r11
- lea (%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2))
+ lea -264(%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8)
and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul_body:
- mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp
+ lea 128($bp),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization)
___
$bp="%r12";
$STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size"
$N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size
$code.=<<___;
- mov %r10,%r11
- shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,%r10
- and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
- not %r10
- lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
- and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,%r10 # 5 is "window size"
- lea 96($bp,%r11,8),$bp # pointer within 1st cache line
- movq 0(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
- movq 8(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
- movq 16(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
- movq 24(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm7
-
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
+ movdqa 0(%r10),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
+ movdqa 16(%r10),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
+ lea 24-112(%rsp,$num,8),%r10# place the mask after tp[num+3] (+ICache optimization)
+ and \$-16,%r10
+
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0
+ .byte 0x67
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2
+ movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0
+
+ paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4
+ movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
+
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6
+ movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2
+
+ paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
+
+ paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
+ .byte 0x67
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
+
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3
+ movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
+ pand `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register
+
+ pand `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+ pand `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
+ pand `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm0
+ por %xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4
+ movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5
+ movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+ pand `16*($k+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
+ movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+ pand `16*($k+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
+ por %xmm4,%xmm0
+ pand `16*($k+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
+ por %xmm5,%xmm1
+ pand `16*($k+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm0
+ por %xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ por %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ por %xmm1,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
-
movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0]
mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value
xor $i,$i # i=0
xor $j,$j # j=0
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
-
mov $n0,$m1
mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0]
mov %rax,$lo0
mov ($np),%rax
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
-
imulq $lo0,$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0
mov %rdx,$hi0
- por %xmm2,%xmm0
- lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
-
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$lo0 # discarded
mov 8($ap),%rax
mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1
cmp $num,$j
- jne .L1st
-
- movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[1]
+ jne .L1st # note that upon exit $j==$num, so
+ # they can be used interchangeably
add %rax,$hi1
- mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0]
adc \$0,%rdx
add $hi0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
adc \$0,%rdx
- mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1]
+ mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num-1]
mov %rdx,$hi1
mov $lo0,$hi0
jmp .Louter
.align 16
.Louter:
+ lea 24+128(%rsp,$num,8),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization)
+ and \$-16,%rdx
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16;$k+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0
+ movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+ movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+ movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+ pand `16*($k+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0
+ pand `16*($k+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1
+ por %xmm0,%xmm4
+ pand `16*($k+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2
+ por %xmm1,%xmm5
+ pand `16*($k+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm4
+ por %xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ por %xmm5,%xmm4
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+ por %xmm4,%xmm0
+ lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
+
+ mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0]
+ movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i]
+
xor $j,$j # j=0
mov $n0,$m1
mov (%rsp),$lo0
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
-
mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i]
add %rax,$lo0 # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
mov ($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
-
imulq $lo0,$m1 # tp[0]*n0
mov %rdx,$hi0
- por %xmm2,%xmm0
- lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
-
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$lo0 # discarded
mov 8($ap),%rax
mulq $m1 # np[j]*m1
cmp $num,$j
- jne .Linner
-
- movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[i+1]
-
+ jne .Linner # note that upon exit $j==$num, so
+ # they can be used interchangeably
add %rax,$hi1
- mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0]
adc \$0,%rdx
add $lo0,$hi1 # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
- mov (%rsp,$j,8),$lo0
+ mov (%rsp,$num,8),$lo0
adc \$0,%rdx
- mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1]
+ mov $hi1,-16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num-1]
mov %rdx,$hi1
xor %rdx,%rdx
mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps -88(%rsi),%xmm6
- movaps -72(%rsi),%xmm7
-___
-$code.=<<___;
+
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
mov -40(%rsi),%r14
mov -32(%rsi),%r13
.Lmul4x_enter:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
- and \$0x80100,%r11d
- cmp \$0x80100,%r11d
+ and \$0x80108,%r11d
+ cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1
je .Lmulx4x_enter
___
$code.=<<___;
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
-___
-$code.=<<___;
+
.byte 0x67
- mov ${num}d,%r10d
- shl \$3,${num}d
- shl \$3+2,%r10d # 4*$num
+ shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
+ lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes
neg $num # -$num
##############################################################
- # ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr+4*$num
- # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[2*num]
- # (see bn_exp.c). this is done to allow memory disambiguation
- # logic do its magic. [excessive frame is allocated in order
- # to allow bn_from_mont8x to clear it.]
+ # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+ # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+ # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+ # logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order
+ # to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after
+ # completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+ # calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
- sub $ap,%r11
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ sub $rp,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lmul4xsp_alt
- sub %r11,%rsp # align with $ap
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(128+num*8)
+ sub %r11,%rsp # align with $rp
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
jmp .Lmul4xsp_done
.align 32
.Lmul4xsp_alt:
- lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(128+num*8)
+ lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps -88(%rsi),%xmm6
- movaps -72(%rsi),%xmm7
-___
-$code.=<<___;
+
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
mov -40(%rsi),%r14
mov -32(%rsi),%r13
.type mul4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
mul4x_internal:
- shl \$5,$num
- mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%r10d # load 7th argument
- lea 256(%rdx,$num),%r13
+ shl \$5,$num # $num was in bytes
+ movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5 # load 7th argument, index
+ lea .Linc(%rip),%rax
+ lea 128(%rdx,$num),%r13 # end of powers table (+size optimization)
shr \$5,$num # restore $num
___
$bp="%r12";
$N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size
$tp=$i;
$code.=<<___;
- mov %r10,%r11
- shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,%r10
- and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
- not %r10
- lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
- and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,%r10 # 5 is "window size"
- lea 96(%rdx,%r11,8),$bp # pointer within 1st cache line
- movq 0(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
- movq 8(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
- add \$7,%r11
- movq 16(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
- movq 24(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm7
- and \$7,%r11
-
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
- lea $STRIDE($bp),$tp # borrow $tp
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- .byte 0x67
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($tp),%xmm1
- .byte 0x67
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
- .byte 0x67
- por %xmm2,%xmm0
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($tp),%xmm2
+ movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
+ movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
+ lea 88-112(%rsp,$num),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimization)
+ lea 128(%rdx),$bp # size optimization
+
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
+ .byte 0x67,0x67
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0
.byte 0x67
- pand %xmm4,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2
+ movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0
+
+ paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4
+ movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
+
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6
+ movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2
+
+ paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+
+ paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
.byte 0x67
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($tp),%xmm3
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3
+ movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+ pand `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register
+
+ pand `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+ pand `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+ pand `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm0
+ por %xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4
+ movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5
+ movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+ pand `16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
+ movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+ pand `16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
+ por %xmm4,%xmm0
+ pand `16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
+ por %xmm5,%xmm1
+ pand `16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm0
+ por %xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ por %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ por %xmm1,%xmm0
+ lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0]
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($tp),%xmm0
+
mov %r13,16+8(%rsp) # save end of b[num]
mov $rp, 56+8(%rsp) # save $rp
mov %rax,$A[0]
mov ($np),%rax
- pand %xmm5,%xmm2
- pand %xmm6,%xmm3
- por %xmm2,%xmm1
-
imulq $A[0],$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0
- ##############################################################
- # $tp is chosen so that writing to top-most element of the
- # vector occurs just "above" references to powers table,
- # "above" modulo cache-line size, which effectively precludes
- # possibility of memory disambiguation logic failure when
- # accessing the table.
- #
- lea 64+8(%rsp,%r11,8),$tp
+ lea 64+8(%rsp),$tp
mov %rdx,$A[1]
- pand %xmm7,%xmm0
- por %xmm3,%xmm1
- lea 2*$STRIDE($bp),$bp
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
-
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$A[0] # discarded
mov 8($ap,$num),%rax
mulq $m0
add %rax,$A[1]
- mov 16*1($np),%rax # interleaved with 0, therefore 16*n
+ mov 8*1($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$A[0]
adc \$0,%rdx
add $A[1],$N[1]
lea 4*8($num),$j # j=4
- lea 16*4($np),$np
+ lea 8*4($np),$np
adc \$0,%rdx
mov $N[1],($tp)
mov %rdx,$N[0]
.L1st4x:
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0]
add %rax,$A[0]
- mov -16*2($np),%rax
+ mov -8*2($np),%rax
lea 32($tp),$tp
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$A[1]
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0]
add %rax,$A[1]
- mov -16*1($np),%rax
+ mov -8*1($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$A[0]
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0]
add %rax,$A[0]
- mov 16*0($np),%rax
+ mov 8*0($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$A[1]
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0]
add %rax,$A[1]
- mov 16*1($np),%rax
+ mov 8*1($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$A[0]
mov 16($ap,$j),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
- lea 16*4($np),$np
+ lea 8*4($np),$np
adc \$0,%rdx
mov $N[1],($tp) # tp[j-1]
mov %rdx,$N[0]
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0]
add %rax,$A[0]
- mov -16*2($np),%rax
+ mov -8*2($np),%rax
lea 32($tp),$tp
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$A[1]
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[0]
add %rax,$A[1]
- mov -16*1($np),%rax
+ mov -8*1($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$A[0]
mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1]
mov %rdx,$N[0]
- movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[1]
- lea ($np,$num,2),$np # rewind $np
+ lea ($np,$num),$np # rewind $np
xor $N[1],$N[1]
add $A[0],$N[0]
.align 32
.Louter4x:
+ lea 16+128($tp),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization)
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0
+ movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
+ movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
+ movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
+ pand `16*($i+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0
+ pand `16*($i+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1
+ por %xmm0,%xmm4
+ pand `16*($i+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2
+ por %xmm1,%xmm5
+ pand `16*($i+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm4
+ por %xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ por %xmm5,%xmm4
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+ por %xmm4,%xmm0
+ lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
+ movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i]
+
mov ($tp,$num),$A[0]
mov $n0,$m1
mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i]
mov ($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
-
imulq $A[0],$m1 # tp[0]*n0
- .byte 0x67
mov %rdx,$A[1]
mov $N[1],($tp) # store upmost overflow bit
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
- por %xmm2,%xmm0
lea ($tp,$num),$tp # rewind $tp
- lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$A[0] # "$N[0]", discarded
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i]
add %rax,$A[1]
- mov 16*1($np),%rax # interleaved with 0, therefore 16*n
+ mov 8*1($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add 8($tp),$A[1] # +tp[1]
adc \$0,%rdx
adc \$0,%rdx
add $A[1],$N[1] # np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
lea 4*8($num),$j # j=4
- lea 16*4($np),$np
+ lea 8*4($np),$np
adc \$0,%rdx
mov %rdx,$N[0]
jmp .Linner4x
.Linner4x:
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i]
add %rax,$A[0]
- mov -16*2($np),%rax
+ mov -8*2($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add 16($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
lea 32($tp),$tp
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i]
add %rax,$A[1]
- mov -16*1($np),%rax
+ mov -8*1($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add -8($tp),$A[1]
adc \$0,%rdx
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i]
add %rax,$A[0]
- mov 16*0($np),%rax
+ mov 8*0($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add ($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
adc \$0,%rdx
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i]
add %rax,$A[1]
- mov 16*1($np),%rax
+ mov 8*1($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add 8($tp),$A[1]
adc \$0,%rdx
mov 16($ap,$j),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add $A[1],$N[1]
- lea 16*4($np),$np
+ lea 8*4($np),$np
adc \$0,%rdx
mov $N[0],-8($tp) # tp[j-1]
mov %rdx,$N[0]
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i]
add %rax,$A[0]
- mov -16*2($np),%rax
+ mov -8*2($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add 16($tp),$A[0] # ap[j]*bp[i]+tp[j]
lea 32($tp),$tp
mulq $m0 # ap[j]*bp[i]
add %rax,$A[1]
mov $m1,%rax
- mov -16*1($np),$m1
+ mov -8*1($np),$m1
adc \$0,%rdx
add -8($tp),$A[1]
adc \$0,%rdx
mov $N[0],-24($tp) # tp[j-1]
mov %rdx,$N[0]
- movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[i+1]
mov $N[1],-16($tp) # tp[j-1]
- lea ($np,$num,2),$np # rewind $np
+ lea ($np,$num),$np # rewind $np
xor $N[1],$N[1]
add $A[0],$N[0]
___
if (1) {
$code.=<<___;
+ xor %rax,%rax
sub $N[0],$m1 # compare top-most words
adc $j,$j # $j is zero
or $j,$N[1]
- xor \$1,$N[1]
+ sub $N[1],%rax # %rax=-$N[1]
lea ($tp,$num),%rbx # tptr in .sqr4x_sub
- lea ($np,$N[1],8),%rbp # nptr in .sqr4x_sub
+ mov ($np),%r12
+ lea ($np),%rbp # nptr in .sqr4x_sub
mov %r9,%rcx
- sar \$3+2,%rcx # cf=0
+ sar \$3+2,%rcx
mov 56+8(%rsp),%rdi # rptr in .sqr4x_sub
- jmp .Lsqr4x_sub
+ dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+ xor %r10,%r10
+ mov 8*1(%rbp),%r13
+ mov 8*2(%rbp),%r14
+ mov 8*3(%rbp),%r15
+ jmp .Lsqr4x_sub_entry
___
} else {
my @ri=("%rax",$bp,$m0,$m1);
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
- and \$0x80100,%r11d
- cmp \$0x80100,%r11d
+ and \$0x80108,%r11d
+ cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1
je .Lpowerx5_enter
___
$code.=<<___;
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- mov ${num}d,%r10d
+
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
- shl \$3+2,%r10d # 4*$num
+ lea ($num,$num,2),%r10d # 3*$num
neg $num
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
##############################################################
- # ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr+4*$num
- # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[2*num]
- # (see bn_exp.c). this is done to allow memory disambiguation
- # logic do its magic.
+ # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+ # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+ # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+ # logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+ # calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
- sub $aptr,%r11
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ sub $rptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lpwr_sp_alt
sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
jmp .Lpwr_sp_done
.align 32
.Lpwr_sp_alt:
- lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
mov $n0, 32(%rsp)
mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp
.Lpower5_body:
- movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr
+ movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr, used in sqr8x
movq $nptr,%xmm2 # save $nptr
- movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num
+ movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num, used in sqr8x
movq $bptr,%xmm4
call __bn_sqr8x_internal
+ call __bn_post4x_internal
call __bn_sqr8x_internal
+ call __bn_post4x_internal
call __bn_sqr8x_internal
+ call __bn_post4x_internal
call __bn_sqr8x_internal
+ call __bn_post4x_internal
call __bn_sqr8x_internal
+ call __bn_post4x_internal
movq %xmm2,$nptr
movq %xmm4,$bptr
$code.=<<___;
movq %xmm2,$nptr
-sqr8x_reduction:
+__bn_sqr8x_reduction:
xor %rax,%rax
- lea ($nptr,$num,2),%rcx # end of n[]
+ lea ($nptr,$num),%rcx # end of n[]
lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx # end of t[] buffer
mov %rcx,0+8(%rsp)
lea 48+8(%rsp,$num),$tptr # end of initial t[] window
.byte 0x67
mov $m0,%r8
imulq 32+8(%rsp),$m0 # n0*a[0]
- mov 16*0($nptr),%rax # n[0]
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # n[0]
mov \$8,%ecx
jmp .L8x_reduce
.align 32
.L8x_reduce:
mulq $m0
- mov 16*1($nptr),%rax # n[1]
+ mov 8*1($nptr),%rax # n[1]
neg %r8
mov %rdx,%r8
adc \$0,%r8
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r9
- mov 16*2($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*2($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r9,%r8
mov $m0,48-8+8(%rsp,%rcx,8) # put aside n0*a[i]
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r10
- mov 16*3($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*3($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r10,%r9
mov 32+8(%rsp),$carry # pull n0, borrow $carry
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r11
- mov 16*4($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*4($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
imulq %r8,$carry # modulo-scheduled
add %r11,%r10
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r12
- mov 16*5($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*5($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r12,%r11
mov %rdx,%r12
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r13
- mov 16*6($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*6($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r13,%r12
mov %rdx,%r13
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r14
- mov 16*7($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*7($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r14,%r13
mov %rdx,%r14
mulq $m0
mov $carry,$m0 # n0*a[i]
add %rax,%r15
- mov 16*0($nptr),%rax # n[0]
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # n[0]
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r15,%r14
mov %rdx,%r15
dec %ecx
jnz .L8x_reduce
- lea 16*8($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr
xor %rax,%rax
mov 8+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull end of t[]
cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]?
mov 48+56+8(%rsp),$m0 # pull n0*a[0]
mov \$8,%ecx
- mov 16*0($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%rax
jmp .L8x_tail
.align 32
.L8x_tail:
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r8
- mov 16*1($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*1($nptr),%rax
mov %r8,($tptr) # save result
mov %rdx,%r8
adc \$0,%r8
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r9
- mov 16*2($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*2($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r9,%r8
lea 8($tptr),$tptr # $tptr++
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r10
- mov 16*3($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*3($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r10,%r9
mov %rdx,%r10
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r11
- mov 16*4($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*4($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r11,%r10
mov %rdx,%r11
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r12
- mov 16*5($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*5($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r12,%r11
mov %rdx,%r12
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r13
- mov 16*6($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*6($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r13,%r12
mov %rdx,%r13
mulq $m0
add %rax,%r14
- mov 16*7($nptr),%rax
+ mov 8*7($nptr),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r14,%r13
mov %rdx,%r14
add %rax,%r15
adc \$0,%rdx
add %r15,%r14
- mov 16*0($nptr),%rax # pull n[0]
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%rax # pull n[0]
mov %rdx,%r15
adc \$0,%r15
dec %ecx
jnz .L8x_tail
- lea 16*8($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr
mov 8+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull end of t[]
cmp 0+8(%rsp),$nptr # end of n[]?
jae .L8x_tail_done # break out of loop
adc 8*6($tptr),%r14
adc 8*7($tptr),%r15
adc \$0,%rax # top-most carry
- mov -16($nptr),%rcx # np[num-1]
+ mov -8($nptr),%rcx # np[num-1]
xor $carry,$carry
movq %xmm2,$nptr # restore $nptr
cmp %rdx,$tptr # end of t[]?
jb .L8x_reduction_loop
+ ret
+.size bn_sqr8x_internal,.-bn_sqr8x_internal
___
}\f
##############################################################
{
my ($tptr,$nptr)=("%rbx","%rbp");
$code.=<<___;
- #xor %rsi,%rsi # %rsi was $carry above
- sub %r15,%rcx # compare top-most words
+.type __bn_post4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align 32
+__bn_post4x_internal:
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%r12
lea (%rdi,$num),$tptr # %rdi was $tptr above
- adc %rsi,%rsi
mov $num,%rcx
- or %rsi,%rax
movq %xmm1,$rptr # restore $rptr
- xor \$1,%rax
+ neg %rax
movq %xmm1,$aptr # prepare for back-to-back call
- lea ($nptr,%rax,8),$nptr
- sar \$3+2,%rcx # cf=0
- jmp .Lsqr4x_sub
+ sar \$3+2,%rcx
+ dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+ xor %r10,%r10
+ mov 8*1($nptr),%r13
+ mov 8*2($nptr),%r14
+ mov 8*3($nptr),%r15
+ jmp .Lsqr4x_sub_entry
-.align 32
+.align 16
.Lsqr4x_sub:
- .byte 0x66
- mov 8*0($tptr),%r12
- mov 8*1($tptr),%r13
- sbb 16*0($nptr),%r12
- mov 8*2($tptr),%r14
- sbb 16*1($nptr),%r13
- mov 8*3($tptr),%r15
- lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr
- sbb 16*2($nptr),%r14
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%r12
+ mov 8*1($nptr),%r13
+ mov 8*2($nptr),%r14
+ mov 8*3($nptr),%r15
+.Lsqr4x_sub_entry:
+ lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr
+ not %r12
+ not %r13
+ not %r14
+ not %r15
+ and %rax,%r12
+ and %rax,%r13
+ and %rax,%r14
+ and %rax,%r15
+
+ neg %r10 # mov %r10,%cf
+ adc 8*0($tptr),%r12
+ adc 8*1($tptr),%r13
+ adc 8*2($tptr),%r14
+ adc 8*3($tptr),%r15
mov %r12,8*0($rptr)
- sbb 16*3($nptr),%r15
- lea 16*4($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr
mov %r13,8*1($rptr)
+ sbb %r10,%r10 # mov %cf,%r10
mov %r14,8*2($rptr)
mov %r15,8*3($rptr)
lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr
inc %rcx # pass %cf
jnz .Lsqr4x_sub
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
+
mov $num,%r10 # prepare for back-to-back call
neg $num # restore $num
ret
-.size bn_sqr8x_internal,.-bn_sqr8x_internal
+.size __bn_post4x_internal,.-__bn_post4x_internal
___
+}
{
$code.=<<___;
.globl bn_from_montgomery
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- .byte 0x67
- mov ${num}d,%r10d
+
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
- shl \$3+2,%r10d # 4*$num
+ lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes
neg $num
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
##############################################################
- # ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr+4*$num
- # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[2*num]
- # (see bn_exp.c). this is done to allow memory disambiguation
- # logic do its magic.
+ # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+ # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+ # (see bn_exp.c). The stack is allocated to aligned with
+ # bn_power5's frame, and as bn_from_montgomery happens to be
+ # last operation, we use the opportunity to cleanse it.
#
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
- sub $aptr,%r11
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ sub $rptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lfrom_sp_alt
sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
jmp .Lfrom_sp_done
.align 32
.Lfrom_sp_alt:
- lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%r11d
- and \$0x80100,%r11d
- cmp \$0x80100,%r11d
+ and \$0x80108,%r11d
+ cmp \$0x80108,%r11d # check for AD*X+BMI2+BMI1
jne .Lfrom_mont_nox
lea (%rax,$num),$rptr
- call sqrx8x_reduction
+ call __bn_sqrx8x_reduction
+ call __bn_postx4x_internal
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
lea 48(%rsp),%rax
.Lfrom_mont_nox:
___
$code.=<<___;
- call sqr8x_reduction
+ call __bn_sqr8x_reduction
+ call __bn_post4x_internal
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
lea 48(%rsp),%rax
.align 32
bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
.Lmulx4x_enter:
- .byte 0x67
mov %rsp,%rax
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- .byte 0x67
- mov ${num}d,%r10d
+
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
- shl \$3+2,%r10d # 4*$num
+ lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes
neg $num # -$num
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
##############################################################
- # ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr+4*$num
- # modulo 4096, which covers a[num], ret[num] and n[2*num]
- # (see bn_exp.c). this is done to allow memory disambiguation
- # logic do its magic. [excessive frame is allocated in order
- # to allow bn_from_mont8x to clear it.]
+ # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+ # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+ # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+ # logic do its magic. [Extra [num] is allocated in order
+ # to align with bn_power5's frame, which is cleansed after
+ # completing exponentiation. Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+ # calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
- sub $ap,%r11
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ sub $rp,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lmulx4xsp_alt
sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+$num)
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
jmp .Lmulx4xsp_done
-.align 32
.Lmulx4xsp_alt:
- lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-$num
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+$num)
+ lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps -88(%rsi),%xmm6
- movaps -72(%rsi),%xmm7
-___
-$code.=<<___;
+
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
mov -40(%rsi),%r14
mov -32(%rsi),%r13
.type mulx4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
mulx4x_internal:
- .byte 0x4c,0x89,0x8c,0x24,0x08,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov $num,8(%rsp) # save -$num
- .byte 0x67
+ mov $num,8(%rsp) # save -$num (it was in bytes)
+ mov $num,%r10
neg $num # restore $num
shl \$5,$num
- lea 256($bp,$num),%r13
+ neg %r10 # restore $num
+ lea 128($bp,$num),%r13 # end of powers table (+size optimization)
shr \$5+5,$num
- mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%r10d # load 7th argument
+ movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5 # load 7th argument
sub \$1,$num
+ lea .Linc(%rip),%rax
mov %r13,16+8(%rsp) # end of b[num]
mov $num,24+8(%rsp) # inner counter
mov $rp, 56+8(%rsp) # save $rp
my $STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size"
my $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size
$code.=<<___;
- mov %r10,%r11
- shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,%r10
- and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
- not %r10
- lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
- and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,%r10 # 5 is "window size"
- lea 96($bp,%r11,8),$bptr # pointer within 1st cache line
- movq 0(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
- movq 8(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
- add \$7,%r11
- movq 16(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
- movq 24(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm7
- and \$7,%r11
-
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm0
- lea $STRIDE($bptr),$tptr # borrow $tptr
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm1
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm2
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm3
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($tptr),%xmm1
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
- por %xmm2,%xmm0
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($tptr),%xmm2
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
- .byte 0x67,0x67
- pand %xmm4,%xmm1
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($tptr),%xmm3
+ movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
+ movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
+ lea 88-112(%rsp,%r10),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimizaton)
+ lea 128($bp),$bptr # size optimization
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
+ .byte 0x67
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
+___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
+#
+$code.=<<___;
+ .byte 0x67
+ paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2
+ movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0
+
+ paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4
+ movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
+
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6
+ movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2
+
+ paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized
+ .byte 0x67
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1
+ movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)+112`(%r10)
+
+ paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)+112`(%r10)
+
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3
+ movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)+112`(%r10)
+
+ pand `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0 # while it's still in register
+ pand `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1
+ pand `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i+3)+112`(%r10)
+ pand `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm0
+ por %xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16-4;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm4
+ movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm5
+ movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2
+ pand `16*($i+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
+ movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3
+ pand `16*($i+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
+ por %xmm4,%xmm0
+ pand `16*($i+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
+ por %xmm5,%xmm1
+ pand `16*($i+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm0
+ por %xmm3,%xmm1
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ pxor %xmm1,%xmm0
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
+ por %xmm1,%xmm0
+ lea $STRIDE($bptr),$bptr
movq %xmm0,%rdx # bp[0]
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($tptr),%xmm0
- lea 2*$STRIDE($bptr),$bptr # next &b[i]
- pand %xmm5,%xmm2
- .byte 0x67,0x67
- pand %xmm6,%xmm3
- ##############################################################
- # $tptr is chosen so that writing to top-most element of the
- # vector occurs just "above" references to powers table,
- # "above" modulo cache-line size, which effectively precludes
- # possibility of memory disambiguation logic failure when
- # accessing the table.
- #
- lea 64+8*4+8(%rsp,%r11,8),$tptr
+ lea 64+8*4+8(%rsp),$tptr
mov %rdx,$bi
mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%rax # a[0]*b[0]
xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0
mov $mi,%rdx
- por %xmm2,%xmm1
- pand %xmm7,%xmm0
- por %xmm3,%xmm1
mov $bptr,8+8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i]
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- .byte 0x48,0x8d,0xb6,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr
+ lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr
adcx %rax,%r13
adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0
- mulx 0*16($nptr),%rax,%r10
+ mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10
adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded
adox %r11,%r10
- mulx 1*16($nptr),%rax,%r11
+ mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11
adcx %rax,%r10
adox %r12,%r11
- mulx 2*16($nptr),%rax,%r12
+ mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12
mov 24+8(%rsp),$bptr # counter value
- .byte 0x66
mov %r10,-8*4($tptr)
adcx %rax,%r11
adox %r13,%r12
- mulx 3*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
- .byte 0x67,0x67
+ mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov $bi,%rdx
mov %r11,-8*3($tptr)
adcx %rax,%r12
adox $zero,%r15 # of=0
- .byte 0x48,0x8d,0x89,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00 # lea 4*16($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr
mov %r12,-8*2($tptr)
- #jmp .Lmulx4x_1st
+ jmp .Lmulx4x_1st
.align 32
.Lmulx4x_1st:
lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr
adox %r15,%r10
- mulx 0*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
adcx %rax,%r10
adox %r15,%r11
- mulx 1*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
adcx %rax,%r11
adox %r15,%r12
- mulx 2*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov %r10,-5*8($tptr)
adcx %rax,%r12
mov %r11,-4*8($tptr)
adox %r15,%r13
- mulx 3*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov $bi,%rdx
mov %r12,-3*8($tptr)
adcx %rax,%r13
adox $zero,%r15
- lea 4*16($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr
mov %r13,-2*8($tptr)
dec $bptr # of=0, pass cf
jnz .Lmulx4x_1st
mov 8(%rsp),$num # load -num
- movq %xmm0,%rdx # bp[1]
adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled
lea ($aptr,$num),$aptr # rewind $aptr
add %r15,%r14
.align 32
.Lmulx4x_outer:
+ lea 16-256($tptr),%r10 # where 256-byte mask is (+density control)
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ .byte 0x67,0x67
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`($bptr),%xmm0
+ movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`($bptr),%xmm1
+ movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`($bptr),%xmm2
+ pand `16*($i+0)+256`(%r10),%xmm0
+ movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`($bptr),%xmm3
+ pand `16*($i+1)+256`(%r10),%xmm1
+ por %xmm0,%xmm4
+ pand `16*($i+2)+256`(%r10),%xmm2
+ por %xmm1,%xmm5
+ pand `16*($i+3)+256`(%r10),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm4
+ por %xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ por %xmm5,%xmm4
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+ por %xmm4,%xmm0
+ lea $STRIDE($bptr),$bptr
+ movq %xmm0,%rdx # m0=bp[i]
+
mov $zero,($tptr) # save top-most carry
lea 4*8($tptr,$num),$tptr # rewind $tptr
mulx 0*8($aptr),$mi,%r11 # a[0]*b[i]
mulx 3*8($aptr),%rdx,%r14
adox -2*8($tptr),%r12
adcx %rdx,%r13
- lea ($nptr,$num,2),$nptr # rewind $nptr
+ lea ($nptr,$num),$nptr # rewind $nptr
lea 4*8($aptr),$aptr
adox -1*8($tptr),%r13
adcx $zero,%r14
adox $zero,%r14
- .byte 0x67
mov $mi,%r15
imulq 32+8(%rsp),$mi # "t[0]"*n0
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm0
- .byte 0x67,0x67
mov $mi,%rdx
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm1
- .byte 0x67
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm2
- .byte 0x67
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bptr),%xmm3
- add \$$STRIDE,$bptr # next &b[i]
- .byte 0x67
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
xor $zero,$zero # cf=0, of=0
mov $bptr,8+8(%rsp) # off-load &b[i]
- mulx 0*16($nptr),%rax,%r10
+ mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r10
adcx %rax,%r15 # discarded
adox %r11,%r10
- mulx 1*16($nptr),%rax,%r11
+ mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r11
adcx %rax,%r10
adox %r12,%r11
- mulx 2*16($nptr),%rax,%r12
+ mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r12
adcx %rax,%r11
adox %r13,%r12
- mulx 3*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov $bi,%rdx
- por %xmm2,%xmm0
mov 24+8(%rsp),$bptr # counter value
mov %r10,-8*4($tptr)
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
adcx %rax,%r12
mov %r11,-8*3($tptr)
adox $zero,%r15 # of=0
mov %r12,-8*2($tptr)
- lea 4*16($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr
jmp .Lmulx4x_inner
.align 32
adcx $zero,%r14 # cf=0
adox %r15,%r10
- mulx 0*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 0*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
adcx %rax,%r10
adox %r15,%r11
- mulx 1*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 1*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
adcx %rax,%r11
adox %r15,%r12
- mulx 2*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 2*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov %r10,-5*8($tptr)
adcx %rax,%r12
adox %r15,%r13
mov %r11,-4*8($tptr)
- mulx 3*16($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 3*8($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov $bi,%rdx
- lea 4*16($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 4*8($nptr),$nptr
mov %r12,-3*8($tptr)
adcx %rax,%r13
adox $zero,%r15
jnz .Lmulx4x_inner
mov 0+8(%rsp),$num # load -num
- movq %xmm0,%rdx # bp[i+1]
adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled
sub 0*8($tptr),$bptr # pull top-most carry to %cf
mov 8+8(%rsp),$bptr # re-load &b[i]
cmp %r10,$bptr
jb .Lmulx4x_outer
- mov -16($nptr),%r10
+ mov -8($nptr),%r10
+ mov $zero,%r8
+ mov ($nptr,$num),%r12
+ lea ($nptr,$num),%rbp # rewind $nptr
+ mov $num,%rcx
+ lea ($tptr,$num),%rdi # rewind $tptr
+ xor %eax,%eax
xor %r15,%r15
sub %r14,%r10 # compare top-most words
adc %r15,%r15
- or %r15,$zero
- xor \$1,$zero
- lea ($tptr,$num),%rdi # rewind $tptr
- lea ($nptr,$num,2),$nptr # rewind $nptr
- .byte 0x67,0x67
- sar \$3+2,$num # cf=0
- lea ($nptr,$zero,8),%rbp
+ or %r15,%r8
+ sar \$3+2,%rcx
+ sub %r8,%rax # %rax=-%r8
mov 56+8(%rsp),%rdx # restore rp
- mov $num,%rcx
- jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub # common post-condition
+ dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+ mov 8*1(%rbp),%r13
+ xor %r8,%r8
+ mov 8*2(%rbp),%r14
+ mov 8*3(%rbp),%r15
+ jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry # common post-condition
.size mulx4x_internal,.-mulx4x_internal
___
}\f{
.align 32
bn_powerx5:
.Lpowerx5_enter:
- .byte 0x67
mov %rsp,%rax
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
- movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
-___
-$code.=<<___;
- .byte 0x67
- mov ${num}d,%r10d
+
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
- shl \$3+2,%r10d # 4*$num
+ lea ($num,$num,2),%r10 # 3*$num in bytes
neg $num
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
##############################################################
- # ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $aptr+4*$num
- # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[2*num]
- # (see bn_exp.c). this is done to allow memory disambiguation
- # logic do its magic.
+ # Ensure that stack frame doesn't alias with $rptr+3*$num
+ # modulo 4096, which covers ret[num], am[num] and n[num]
+ # (see bn_exp.c). This is done to allow memory disambiguation
+ # logic do its magic. [Extra 256 bytes is for power mask
+ # calculated from 7th argument, the index.]
#
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
- sub $aptr,%r11
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
+ sub $rptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lpwrx_sp_alt
sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
jmp .Lpwrx_sp_done
.align 32
.Lpwrx_sp_alt:
- lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num
- lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
+ lea 4096-320(,$num,2),%r10
+ lea -320(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num*8+256)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
.Lpowerx5_body:
call __bn_sqrx8x_internal
+ call __bn_postx4x_internal
call __bn_sqrx8x_internal
+ call __bn_postx4x_internal
call __bn_sqrx8x_internal
+ call __bn_postx4x_internal
call __bn_sqrx8x_internal
+ call __bn_postx4x_internal
call __bn_sqrx8x_internal
+ call __bn_postx4x_internal
mov %r10,$num # -num
mov $aptr,$rptr
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps -88(%rsi),%xmm6
- movaps -72(%rsi),%xmm7
-___
-$code.=<<___;
+
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
mov -40(%rsi),%r14
mov -32(%rsi),%r13
$code.=<<___;
movq %xmm2,$nptr
-sqrx8x_reduction:
+__bn_sqrx8x_reduction:
xor %eax,%eax # initial top-most carry bit
mov 32+8(%rsp),%rbx # n0
mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # "%r8", 8*0($tptr)
- lea -128($nptr,$num,2),%rcx # end of n[]
+ lea -8*8($nptr,$num),%rcx # end of n[]
#lea 48+8(%rsp,$num,2),$tptr # end of t[] buffer
mov %rcx, 0+8(%rsp) # save end of n[]
mov $tptr,8+8(%rsp) # save end of t[]
.align 32
.Lsqrx8x_reduce:
mov %r8, %rbx
- mulx 16*0($nptr),%rax,%r8 # n[0]
+ mulx 8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8 # n[0]
adcx %rbx,%rax # discarded
adox %r9,%r8
- mulx 16*1($nptr),%rbx,%r9 # n[1]
+ mulx 8*1($nptr),%rbx,%r9 # n[1]
adcx %rbx,%r8
adox %r10,%r9
- mulx 16*2($nptr),%rbx,%r10
+ mulx 8*2($nptr),%rbx,%r10
adcx %rbx,%r9
adox %r11,%r10
- mulx 16*3($nptr),%rbx,%r11
+ mulx 8*3($nptr),%rbx,%r11
adcx %rbx,%r10
adox %r12,%r11
- .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xe3,0xf6,0xa5,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 16*4($nptr),%rbx,%r12
+ .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xe3,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 8*4($nptr),%rbx,%r12
mov %rdx,%rax
mov %r8,%rdx
adcx %rbx,%r11
mov %rax,%rdx
mov %rax,64+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8) # put aside n0*a[i]
- mulx 16*5($nptr),%rax,%r13
+ mulx 8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13
adcx %rax,%r12
adox %r14,%r13
- mulx 16*6($nptr),%rax,%r14
+ mulx 8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14
adcx %rax,%r13
adox %r15,%r14
- mulx 16*7($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov %rbx,%rdx
adcx %rax,%r14
adox $carry,%r15 # $carry is 0
mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull n0*a[0]
add 8*0($tptr),%r8
- lea 16*8($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr
mov \$-8,%rcx
adcx 8*1($tptr),%r9
adcx 8*2($tptr),%r10
.align 32
.Lsqrx8x_tail:
mov %r8,%rbx
- mulx 16*0($nptr),%rax,%r8
+ mulx 8*0($nptr),%rax,%r8
adcx %rax,%rbx
adox %r9,%r8
- mulx 16*1($nptr),%rax,%r9
+ mulx 8*1($nptr),%rax,%r9
adcx %rax,%r8
adox %r10,%r9
- mulx 16*2($nptr),%rax,%r10
+ mulx 8*2($nptr),%rax,%r10
adcx %rax,%r9
adox %r11,%r10
- mulx 16*3($nptr),%rax,%r11
+ mulx 8*3($nptr),%rax,%r11
adcx %rax,%r10
adox %r12,%r11
- .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 16*4($nptr),%rax,%r12
+ .byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xa5,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 8*4($nptr),%rax,%r12
adcx %rax,%r11
adox %r13,%r12
- mulx 16*5($nptr),%rax,%r13
+ mulx 8*5($nptr),%rax,%r13
adcx %rax,%r12
adox %r14,%r13
- mulx 16*6($nptr),%rax,%r14
+ mulx 8*6($nptr),%rax,%r14
adcx %rax,%r13
adox %r15,%r14
- mulx 16*7($nptr),%rax,%r15
+ mulx 8*7($nptr),%rax,%r15
mov 72+48+8(%rsp,%rcx,8),%rdx # pull n0*a[i]
adcx %rax,%r14
adox $carry,%r15
sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf
mov 48+8(%rsp),%rdx # pull n0*a[0]
- lea 16*8($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 8*8($nptr),$nptr
adc 8*0($tptr),%r8
adc 8*1($tptr),%r9
adc 8*2($tptr),%r10
adc 8*0($tptr),%r8
movq %xmm3,%rcx
adc 8*1($tptr),%r9
- mov 16*7($nptr),$carry
+ mov 8*7($nptr),$carry
movq %xmm2,$nptr # restore $nptr
adc 8*2($tptr),%r10
adc 8*3($tptr),%r11
lea 8*8($tptr,%rcx),$tptr # start of current t[] window
cmp 8+8(%rsp),%r8 # end of t[]?
jb .Lsqrx8x_reduction_loop
+ ret
+.size bn_sqrx8x_internal,.-bn_sqrx8x_internal
___
}\f
##############################################################
#
{
my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
-my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
-my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
$code.=<<___;
- xor %ebx,%ebx
- sub %r15,%rsi # compare top-most words
- adc %rbx,%rbx
+.align 32
+__bn_postx4x_internal:
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%r12
mov %rcx,%r10 # -$num
- or %rbx,%rax
mov %rcx,%r9 # -$num
- xor \$1,%rax
- sar \$3+2,%rcx # cf=0
+ neg %rax
+ sar \$3+2,%rcx
#lea 48+8(%rsp,%r9),$tptr
- lea ($nptr,%rax,8),$nptr
movq %xmm1,$rptr # restore $rptr
movq %xmm1,$aptr # prepare for back-to-back call
- jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub
+ dec %r12 # so that after 'not' we get -n[0]
+ mov 8*1($nptr),%r13
+ xor %r8,%r8
+ mov 8*2($nptr),%r14
+ mov 8*3($nptr),%r15
+ jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry
-.align 32
+.align 16
.Lsqrx4x_sub:
- .byte 0x66
- mov 8*0($tptr),%r12
- mov 8*1($tptr),%r13
- sbb 16*0($nptr),%r12
- mov 8*2($tptr),%r14
- sbb 16*1($nptr),%r13
- mov 8*3($tptr),%r15
- lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr
- sbb 16*2($nptr),%r14
+ mov 8*0($nptr),%r12
+ mov 8*1($nptr),%r13
+ mov 8*2($nptr),%r14
+ mov 8*3($nptr),%r15
+.Lsqrx4x_sub_entry:
+ andn %rax,%r12,%r12
+ lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr
+ andn %rax,%r13,%r13
+ andn %rax,%r14,%r14
+ andn %rax,%r15,%r15
+
+ neg %r8 # mov %r8,%cf
+ adc 8*0($tptr),%r12
+ adc 8*1($tptr),%r13
+ adc 8*2($tptr),%r14
+ adc 8*3($tptr),%r15
mov %r12,8*0($rptr)
- sbb 16*3($nptr),%r15
- lea 16*4($nptr),$nptr
+ lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr
mov %r13,8*1($rptr)
+ sbb %r8,%r8 # mov %cf,%r8
mov %r14,8*2($rptr)
mov %r15,8*3($rptr)
lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr
inc %rcx
jnz .Lsqrx4x_sub
-___
-}
-$code.=<<___;
+
neg %r9 # restore $num
ret
-.size bn_sqrx8x_internal,.-bn_sqrx8x_internal
+.size __bn_postx4x_internal,.-__bn_postx4x_internal
___
+}
}}}
{
my ($inp,$num,$tbl,$idx)=$win64?("%rcx","%edx","%r8", "%r9d") : # Win64 order
.globl bn_gather5
.type bn_gather5,\@abi-omnipotent
-.align 16
+.align 32
bn_gather5:
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
-.LSEH_begin_bn_gather5:
+.LSEH_begin_bn_gather5: # Win64 thing, but harmless in other cases
# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
- .byte 0x48,0x83,0xec,0x28 #sub \$0x28,%rsp
- .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24 #movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
- .byte 0x0f,0x29,0x7c,0x24,0x10 #movdqa %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+ .byte 0x4c,0x8d,0x14,0x24 #lea (%rsp),%r10
+ .byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0x08,0x01,0x00,0x00 #sub $0x108,%rsp
+ lea .Linc(%rip),%rax
+ and \$-16,%rsp # shouldn't be formally required
+
+ movd $idx,%xmm5
+ movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
+ movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
+ lea 128($tbl),%r11 # size optimization
+ lea 128(%rsp),%rax # size optimization
+
+ pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast $idx
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
+ movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
___
+########################################################################
+# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to $idx and save result to stack
+#
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
- mov $idx,%r11d
- shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,$idx
- and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
- not $idx
- lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
- and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,$idx # 5 is "window size"
- lea 128($tbl,%r11,8),$tbl # pointer within 1st cache line
- movq 0(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
- movq 8(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
- movq 16(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
- movq 24(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm7
+ paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0
+___
+$code.=<<___ if ($i);
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax)
+___
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
+
+ paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2
+ movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)-128`(%rax)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0
+
+ paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4
+ movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)-128`(%rax)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
+
+ paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
+ pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6
+ movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)-128`(%rax)
+ movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax)
jmp .Lgather
-.align 16
-.Lgather:
- movq `0*$STRIDE/4-128`($tbl),%xmm0
- movq `1*$STRIDE/4-128`($tbl),%xmm1
- pand %xmm4,%xmm0
- movq `2*$STRIDE/4-128`($tbl),%xmm2
- pand %xmm5,%xmm1
- movq `3*$STRIDE/4-128`($tbl),%xmm3
- pand %xmm6,%xmm2
- por %xmm1,%xmm0
- pand %xmm7,%xmm3
- .byte 0x67,0x67
- por %xmm2,%xmm0
- lea $STRIDE($tbl),$tbl
- por %xmm3,%xmm0
+.align 32
+.Lgather:
+ pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
+ pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
+___
+for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
+$code.=<<___;
+ movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`(%r11),%xmm0
+ movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`(%r11),%xmm1
+ movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`(%r11),%xmm2
+ pand `16*($i+0)-128`(%rax),%xmm0
+ movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`(%r11),%xmm3
+ pand `16*($i+1)-128`(%rax),%xmm1
+ por %xmm0,%xmm4
+ pand `16*($i+2)-128`(%rax),%xmm2
+ por %xmm1,%xmm5
+ pand `16*($i+3)-128`(%rax),%xmm3
+ por %xmm2,%xmm4
+ por %xmm3,%xmm5
+___
+}
+$code.=<<___;
+ por %xmm5,%xmm4
+ lea $STRIDE(%r11),%r11
+ pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
+ por %xmm4,%xmm0
movq %xmm0,($out) # m0=bp[0]
lea 8($out),$out
sub \$1,$num
jnz .Lgather
-___
-$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
- movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
- movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
- lea 0x28(%rsp),%rsp
-___
-$code.=<<___;
+
+ lea (%r10),%rsp
ret
.LSEH_end_bn_gather5:
.size bn_gather5,.-bn_gather5
}
$code.=<<___;
.align 64
-.Lmagic_masks:
- .long 0,0, 0,0, 0,0, -1,-1
- .long 0,0, 0,0, 0,0, 0,0
+.Linc:
+ .long 0,0, 1,1
+ .long 2,2, 2,2
.asciz "Montgomery Multiplication with scatter/gather for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
___
lea .Lmul_epilogue(%rip),%r10
cmp %r10,%rbx
- jb .Lbody_40
+ ja .Lbody_40
mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num
mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer
+
jmp .Lbody_proceed
.Lbody_40:
mov 40(%rax),%rax # pull saved stack pointer
.Lbody_proceed:
-
- movaps -88(%rax),%xmm0
- movaps -72(%rax),%xmm1
-
mov -8(%rax),%rbx
mov -16(%rax),%rbp
mov -24(%rax),%r12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15
- movups %xmm0,512($context) # restore context->Xmm6
- movups %xmm1,528($context) # restore context->Xmm7
.Lcommon_seh_tail:
mov 8(%rax),%rdi
$code.=<<___;
.align 8
.LSEH_info_bn_gather5:
- .byte 0x01,0x0d,0x05,0x00
- .byte 0x0d,0x78,0x01,0x00 #movaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
- .byte 0x08,0x68,0x00,0x00 #movaps (rsp),xmm6
- .byte 0x04,0x42,0x00,0x00 #sub rsp,0x28
+ .byte 0x01,0x0b,0x03,0x0a
+ .byte 0x0b,0x01,0x21,0x00 # sub rsp,0x108
+ .byte 0x04,0xa3,0x00,0x00 # lea r10,(rsp)
.align 8
___
}
#ifndef HEADER_BN_H
# define HEADER_BN_H
+# include <limits.h>
# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
# include <stdio.h> /* FILE */
/* library internal functions */
-# define bn_expand(a,bits) ((((((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)) <= (a)->dmax)?\
- (a):bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2))
+# define bn_expand(a,bits) \
+ ( \
+ bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1) ? \
+ NULL \
+ : \
+ (((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) ? \
+ (a) \
+ : \
+ bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) \
+ )
+
# define bn_wexpand(a,words) (((words) <= (a)->dmax)?(a):bn_expand2((a),(words)))
BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
*/
#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"
#include "bn_lcl.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(r);
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(r);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(r);
+ }
return ret;
}
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(rr);
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(rr);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(rr);
+ }
return ret;
}
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
- int width)
+ int window)
{
- size_t i, j;
+ int i, j;
+ int width = 1 << window;
+ BN_ULONG *table = (BN_ULONG *)buf;
if (top > b->top)
top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
* zeroed */
- for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
- buf[j] = ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i];
+ for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top; i++, j += width) {
+ table[j] = b->d[i];
}
return 1;
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
- int width)
+ int window)
{
- size_t i, j;
+ int i, j;
+ int width = 1 << window;
+ volatile BN_ULONG *table = (volatile BN_ULONG *)buf;
if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
return 0;
- for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
- ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i] = buf[j];
+ if (window <= 3) {
+ for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
+ BN_ULONG acc = 0;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < width; j++) {
+ acc |= table[j] &
+ ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
+ }
+
+ b->d[i] = acc;
+ }
+ } else {
+ int xstride = 1 << (window - 2);
+ BN_ULONG y0, y1, y2, y3;
+
+ i = idx >> (window - 2); /* equivalent of idx / xstride */
+ idx &= xstride - 1; /* equivalent of idx % xstride */
+
+ y0 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,0)&1);
+ y1 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,1)&1);
+ y2 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,2)&1);
+ y3 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,3)&1);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
+ BN_ULONG acc = 0;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < xstride; j++) {
+ acc |= ( (table[j + 0 * xstride] & y0) |
+ (table[j + 1 * xstride] & y1) |
+ (table[j + 2 * xstride] & y2) |
+ (table[j + 3 * xstride] & y3) )
+ & ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
+ }
+
+ b->d[i] = acc;
+ }
}
b->top = top;
* precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to
* protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed
* out by Colin Percival,
- * http://www.daemong-consideredperthreading-considered-harmful/)
+ * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
*/
int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(rr);
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(rr);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(rr);
+ }
return ret;
}
if (window >= 5) {
window = 5; /* ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even
* for RSA4096 */
- if ((top & 7) == 0)
- powerbufLen += 2 * top * sizeof(m->d[0]);
+ /* reserve space for mont->N.d[] copy */
+ powerbufLen += top * sizeof(mont->N.d[0]);
}
#endif
(void)0;
const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
- BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0, *np2;
+ BN_ULONG *n0 = mont->n0, *np;
/*
* BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = 0;
- if (top & 7)
- np2 = np;
- else
- for (np2 = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++)
- np2[2 * i] = np[i];
+ /*
+ * copy mont->N.d[] to improve cache locality
+ */
+ for (np = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++)
+ np[i] = mont->N.d[i];
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1);
# if 0
for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# else
}
for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) {
int j;
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
}
}
for (; i < 16; i += 2) {
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i);
}
for (; i < 32; i += 2) {
- bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
+ bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# endif
while (bits >= 0) {
wvalue = bn_get_bits5(p->d, bits - 4);
bits -= 5;
- bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, wvalue);
+ bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue);
}
}
- ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np2, n0, top);
+ ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np, n0, top);
tmp.top = top;
bn_correct_top(&tmp);
if (ret) {
} else
#endif
{
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, window))
goto err;
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, window))
goto err;
/*
if (window > 1) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
- (&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2,
+ window))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
- (&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i,
+ window))
goto err;
}
}
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
- (&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
+ window))
goto err;
/*
/*
* Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
*/
- if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
- (&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
+ if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
+ window))
goto err;
/* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
- } else
+ } else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
+ }
return ret;
}
if (a == 0) {
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-
- if (bits == 0) {
- ret = BN_one(r);
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ /* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+ if (BN_is_one(m)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ BN_zero(r);
+ } else {
+ ret = BN_one(r);
+ }
return ret;
}
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include "bn_lcl.h"
a++;
}
- for (i = 0; isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) ;
+ for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
+ continue;
+
+ if (i > INT_MAX/4)
+ goto err;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
BN_zero(ret);
}
- /* i is the number of hex digests; */
+ /* i is the number of hex digits */
if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
goto err;
a++;
}
- for (i = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) ;
+ for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
+ continue;
+
+ if (i > INT_MAX/4)
+ goto err;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
BN_zero(ret);
}
- /* i is the number of digests, a bit of an over expand; */
+ /* i is the number of digits, a bit of an over expand */
if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_init(&(recp->N));
BN_init(&(recp->Nr));
recp->num_bits = 0;
+ recp->shift = 0;
recp->flags = 0;
}
"string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
/*
+ * Test that r == 0 in test_exp_mod_zero(). Returns one on success,
+ * returns zero and prints debug output otherwise.
+ */
+static int a_is_zero_mod_one(const char *method, const BIGNUM *r,
+ const BIGNUM *a) {
+ if (!BN_is_zero(r)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s failed:\n", method);
+ fprintf(stderr, "a ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "a = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nr = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success.
*/
static int test_exp_mod_zero()
{
BIGNUM a, p, m;
BIGNUM r;
+ BN_ULONG one_word = 1;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- int ret = 1;
+ int ret = 1, failed = 0;
BN_init(&m);
BN_one(&m);
BN_zero(&p);
BN_init(&r);
- BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (BN_is_zero(&r))
- ret = 0;
- else {
- printf("1**0 mod 1 = ");
- BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
- printf(", should be 0\n");
+ if (!BN_rand(&a, 1024, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_recp", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_simple", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx, NULL)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime", &r, &a))
+ failed = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * A different codepath exists for single word multiplication
+ * in non-constant-time only.
+ */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_word(&r, one_word, &p, &m, ctx, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_is_zero(&r)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_word failed:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "1 ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "r = ");
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, &r);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ return 0;
}
+ ret = failed;
+
+ err:
BN_free(&r);
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&p);
BN_free(&m);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
/*
* Algorithm Specification
- * http://info.isl.llia/specicrypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html
+ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html
*/
/*
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ctr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ctr.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_locl.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_locl.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_misc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_misc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
EVPerr(EVP_F_CMAC_INIT, EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS);
return 0;
}
+
+ /* Switch to FIPS cipher implementation if possible */
+ if (cipher != NULL) {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *fcipher;
+ fcipher = FIPS_get_cipherbynid(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher));
+ if (fcipher != NULL)
+ cipher = fcipher;
+ }
/*
* Other algorithm blocking will be done in FIPS_cmac_init, via
* FIPS_cipherinit().
return stderr;
}
-int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void *in_a, const volatile void *in_b, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
- const unsigned char *a = in_a;
- const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+ const volatile unsigned char *a = in_a;
+ const volatile unsigned char *b = in_b;
unsigned char x = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
* into a defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other
* than to be non-zero.
*/
-int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void *a, const volatile void *b, size_t len);
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/*
-/* crypto/des/des_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/des/des_old.c */
/*-
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING
-/* crypto/des/des_old.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/des/des_old.h */
/*-
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING
-/* crypto/des/des_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/des/des_old.c */
/*
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING The
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE 0x02
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID 0x04
/*
* primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
- BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
- q = BN_new();
- if (q == NULL)
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
- BN_set_word(q, 1);
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
- BN_copy(q, dh->p);
- BN_sub_word(q, 1);
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
+ if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+ if (dh->q != NULL) {
+ /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ }
+
ok = 1;
err:
- if (q != NULL)
- BN_free(q);
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
return (ok);
}
0xC2, 0x6C, 0x5D, 0x7C
};
+static const unsigned char dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y[] = {
+ 0x45, 0x32, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x07, 0xE5, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xD6, 0x02, 0x82, 0xB3,
+ 0x32, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x41, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xAD,
+ 0xC6, 0x26, 0x85, 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x8C, 0x12, 0x4C, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x20,
+ 0xC4, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xA4, 0x25, 0xB7, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xCC, 0x67,
+ 0xBA, 0xEA, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0x24, 0x72, 0x60, 0xDA, 0x88,
+ 0x18, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x35, 0x8B, 0x83,
+ 0x4A, 0x6E, 0xFA, 0x48, 0x73, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x87, 0xFF, 0x6B, 0x66, 0x1F,
+ 0xA8, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x01, 0xE5, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x52, 0xD0, 0xE9, 0xD8,
+ 0x72, 0xF9, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA5, 0x25, 0x95, 0x74, 0xE2,
+ 0x7A, 0x61, 0x4E, 0xA7, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xE2, 0xD2, 0x9D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x70,
+ 0x34, 0x44, 0x32, 0xC7, 0xB2, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xFE, 0x17, 0x2B, 0xD6, 0x1F,
+ 0x8B, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x9A, 0x33, 0x66,
+ 0x62, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x18, 0x3E, 0xA2, 0x5F, 0x00, 0x07, 0xD8, 0x9B, 0x22,
+ 0xE4, 0xEC, 0x84, 0xD5, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x31, 0x23, 0xD8, 0x44,
+ 0x22, 0x2A, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x44, 0xCC, 0xC6, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xBE, 0x50, 0x9D,
+ 0x4A, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x72, 0x4D, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xED,
+ 0x33, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0x7F, 0x16, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xEB, 0xD2, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x01,
+ 0x73, 0x84, 0x62, 0xB9, 0x29, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x32, 0x9E, 0x7A, 0x6A,
+ 0xCF, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x62, 0x77, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x62, 0x72,
+ 0x5A, 0x69, 0xA6, 0x5B, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x95, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0xC2,
+ 0xDF, 0x72, 0x6D, 0xB1, 0x1E, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0x89,
+ 0x93, 0x74, 0x89, 0x59
+};
+
typedef struct {
DH *(*get_param) (void);
const unsigned char *xA;
static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
{
int i;
+ DH *dhA = NULL;
+ DH *dhB = NULL;
+ unsigned char *Z1 = NULL;
+ unsigned char *Z2 = NULL;
+ const rfc5114_td *td = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *bady = NULL;
+
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(rfctd) / sizeof(rfc5114_td)); i++) {
- DH *dhA, *dhB;
- unsigned char *Z1 = NULL, *Z2 = NULL;
- const rfc5114_td *td = rfctd + i;
+ td = rfctd + i;
/* Set up DH structures setting key components */
dhA = td->get_param();
dhB = td->get_param();
DH_free(dhB);
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+ dhA = NULL;
+ dhB = NULL;
+ Z1 = NULL;
+ Z2 = NULL;
+ }
+ /* Now i == OSSL_NELEM(rfctd) */
+ /* RFC5114 uses unsafe primes, so now test an invalid y value */
+ dhA = DH_get_2048_224();
+ if (dhA == NULL)
+ goto bad_err;
+ Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA));
+ if (Z1 == NULL)
+ goto bad_err;
+
+ bady = BN_bin2bn(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y,
+ sizeof(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y), NULL);
+ if (bady == NULL)
+ goto bad_err;
+
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dhA))
+ goto bad_err;
+
+ if (DH_compute_key(Z1, bady, dhA) != -1) {
+ /*
+ * DH_compute_key should fail with -1. If we get here we unexpectedly
+ * allowed an invalid y value
+ */
+ goto err;
}
+ /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ printf("RFC5114 parameter test %d OK\n", i + 1);
+
+ BN_free(bady);
+ DH_free(dhA);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+
return 1;
bad_err:
+ BN_free(bady);
+ DH_free(dhA);
+ DH_free(dhB);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+
fprintf(stderr, "Initalisation error RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return 0;
err:
+ BN_free(bady);
+ DH_free(dhA);
+ DH_free(dhB);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z1);
+ OPENSSL_free(Z2);
+
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
return 0;
}
STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
DSA *dsa = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
}
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (ndsa)
- sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
- else
- ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
- return 1;
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
decerr:
- DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
dsaerr:
+ DSA_free(dsa);
+ done:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (privkey)
+ if (ndsa)
+ sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
+ else
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
- sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
- DSA_free(dsa);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
- ret = DSA_SIG_new();
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
/*
* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
* unlikely.
}
goto redo;
}
+ ret = DSA_SIG_new();
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
ret->r = r;
ret->s = s;
err:
- if (!ret) {
+ if (ret == NULL) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
-/* dso.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso.h */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
-/* dso_dl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_dl.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
-/* dso_dlfcn.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_dlfcn.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
-/* dso_lib.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_lib.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
ret->meth = meth;
ret->references = 1;
if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
+ sk_void_free(ret->meth_data);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
-/* dso_vms.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_vms.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
-/* dso_win32.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* dso_win32.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
push %r15
sub \$32*5+8, %rsp
+.Lpoint_double_shortcut$x:
movdqu 0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr.x
mov $a_ptr, $b_ptr # backup copy
movdqu 0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1
mov 0x40+8*1($b_ptr), $acc6
mov 0x40+8*2($b_ptr), $acc7
mov 0x40+8*3($b_ptr), $acc0
+ movq $b_ptr, %xmm1
lea 0x40-$bias($b_ptr), $a_ptr
lea $Z1sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z1^2
test $acc0, $acc0
jnz .Ladd_proceed$x # (in1infty || in2infty)?
test $acc1, $acc1
- jz .Ladd_proceed$x # is_equal(S1,S2)?
+ jz .Ladd_double$x # is_equal(S1,S2)?
movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr
pxor %xmm0, %xmm0
jmp .Ladd_done$x
.align 32
+.Ladd_double$x:
+ movq %xmm1, $a_ptr # restore $a_ptr
+ movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr
+ add \$`32*(18-5)`, %rsp # difference in frame sizes
+ jmp .Lpoint_double_shortcut$x
+
+.align 32
.Ladd_proceed$x:
`&load_for_sqr("$R(%rsp)", "$src0")`
lea $Rsqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # R^2
goto err;
if (!BN_one(&point->Z))
goto err;
+ point->Z_is_one = 1;
ret = 1;
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (ty == NULL)
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
*/
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][0], &group->generator->X)) ||
(!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][1], &group->generator->Y)) ||
}
make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_felems);
+ done:
if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre, nistp224_pre_comp_dup,
nistp224_pre_comp_free,
nistp224_pre_comp_clear_free))
*/
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
if ((!BN_to_felem(x_tmp, &group->generator->X)) ||
(!BN_to_felem(y_tmp, &group->generator->Y)) ||
}
make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_smallfelems);
+ done:
if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre, nistp256_pre_comp_dup,
nistp256_pre_comp_free,
nistp256_pre_comp_clear_free))
*/
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
- ret = 1;
- goto err;
+ goto done;
}
if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][0], &group->generator->X)) ||
(!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][1], &group->generator->Y)) ||
}
make_points_affine(15, &(pre->g_pre_comp[1]), tmp_felems);
+ done:
if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre, nistp521_pre_comp_dup,
nistp521_pre_comp_free,
nistp521_pre_comp_clear_free))
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
__declspec(align(4096))
#elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
-# pragma align 4096(ecp_nistz256_precomputed)
+# pragma align 64(ecp_nistz256_precomputed)
#endif
static const BN_ULONG ecp_nistz256_precomputed[37][64 *
sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) /
int degree;
/*
* Qx, Qy and D are taken from
- * http://csrcdocut.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
* Otherwise, values are standard curve parameters from FIPS 180-3
*/
const char *p, *a, *b, *Qx, *Qy, *Gx, *Gy, *order, *d;
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
ABORT;
+ /*
+ * We have not performed precomputation so have_precompute mult should be
+ * false
+ */
+ if (EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP))
+ ABORT;
+
/* now repeat all tests with precomputation */
if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(NISTP, ctx))
ABORT;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP))
+ ABORT;
/* fixed point multiplication */
EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx);
-/* crypto/engine/eng_all.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/engine/eng_all.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
* If we lost the race to set the context, c is non-NULL and *ctx is the
* context of the thread that won.
*/
- if (c)
+ if (c) {
+ sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(c->dirs);
OPENSSL_free(c);
+ }
return 1;
}
-/* crypto/evp/e_camellia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/evp/e_camellia.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
DES_key_schedule ks;
} ks;
union {
- void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t, const void *, void *);
+ void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t,
+ const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *);
} stream;
} EVP_DES_KEY;
# if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
-/* ---------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that
+/* ----------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that
* assembler support was in general requested... */
# include "sparc_arch.h"
void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks);
void des_t4_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
- DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
+ const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
void des_t4_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
- DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
+ const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
# endif
static int des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
{
EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
- if (dat->stream.cbc) {
+ if (dat->stream.cbc != NULL) {
(*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv);
return 1;
}
DES_key_schedule ks[3];
} ks;
union {
- void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t, const void *, void *);
+ void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t,
+ const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *);
} stream;
} DES_EDE_KEY;
# define ks1 ks.ks[0]
void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks);
void des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
- DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
+ const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]);
void des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
- DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
+ const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]);
# endif
static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
}
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (dat->stream.cbc) {
- (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, &dat->ks, ctx->iv);
+ (*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv);
return 1;
}
int rv = -1;
if (inl < 24)
return -1;
- if (!out)
+ if (out == NULL)
return inl - 16;
memcpy(ctx->iv, wrap_iv, 8);
/* Decrypt first block which will end up as icv */
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- if (!out)
+ if (out == NULL)
return inl + 16;
/* Copy input to output buffer + 8 so we have space for IV */
memmove(out + 8, in, inl);
-/* crypto/evp/e_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/evp/e_old.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2004.
-/* crypto/evp/e_seed.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/evp/e_seed.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/mem_clr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/mem_clr.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2002.
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
- $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+ $avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22);
}
if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
- movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm7
+ movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
- $avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
+ $avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22);
}
if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
/* increment counter (128-bit int) by 1 */
static void ctr128_inc(unsigned char *counter)
{
- u32 n = 16;
- u8 c;
+ u32 n = 16, c = 1;
do {
--n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
+ c += counter[n];
+ counter[n] = (u8)c;
+ c >>= 8;
} while (n);
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
static void ctr128_inc_aligned(unsigned char *counter)
{
- size_t *data, c, n;
+ size_t *data, c, d, n;
const union {
long one;
char little;
1
};
- if (is_endian.little) {
+ if (is_endian.little || ((size_t)counter % sizeof(size_t)) != 0) {
ctr128_inc(counter);
return;
}
data = (size_t *)counter;
+ c = 1;
n = 16 / sizeof(size_t);
do {
--n;
- c = data[n];
- ++c;
- data[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
+ d = data[n] += c;
+ /* did addition carry? */
+ c = ((d - c) ^ d) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1);
} while (n);
}
#endif
}
# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
- if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) !=
- 0)
+ if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ecount_buf)
+ % sizeof(size_t) != 0)
break;
# endif
while (len >= 16) {
(*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key);
ctr128_inc_aligned(ivec);
- for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t))
+ for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(out + n) =
*(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ecount_buf + n);
len -= 16;
/* increment upper 96 bits of 128-bit counter by 1 */
static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
{
- u32 n = 12;
- u8 c;
+ u32 n = 12, c = 1;
do {
--n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
+ c += counter[n];
+ counter[n] = (u8)c;
+ c >>= 8;
} while (n);
}
-/* crypto/o_dir.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_dir.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2004.
-/* crypto/o_dir.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_dir.h */
/*
* Copied from Richard Levitte's (richard@levitte.org) LP library. All
* symbol names have been changed, with permission from the author.
-/* crypto/o_dir.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_dir.h */
/*
* Copied from Richard Levitte's (richard@levitte.org) LP library. All
* symbol names have been changed, with permission from the author.
-/* crypto/o_str.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_str.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
-/* crypto/o_str.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_str.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
-/* crypto/o_time.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_time.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
-/* crypto/o_time.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/o_time.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+#endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE)
# define NO_SSL_TRACE
# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2)
+# define NO_SSL2
+# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
# define NO_STORE
# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
# define NO_UNIT_TEST
# endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS)
+# define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# endif
#endif
/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000205fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000207fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2e-fips 3 Dec 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2g-fips 1 Mar 2016"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
if ($gas) {
# Solaris /usr/ccs/bin/as can't handle multiplications
# in $self->{value}
- $self->{value} =~ s/(?<![\w\$\.])(0x?[0-9a-f]+)/oct($1)/egi;
- $self->{value} =~ s/([0-9]+\s*[\*\/\%]\s*[0-9]+)/eval($1)/eg;
+ my $value = $self->{value};
+ $value =~ s/(?<![\w\$\.])(0x?[0-9a-f]+)/oct($1)/egi;
+ if ($value =~ s/([0-9]+\s*[\*\/\%]\s*[0-9]+)/eval($1)/eg) {
+ $self->{value} = $value;
+ }
sprintf "\$%s",$self->{value};
} else {
$self->{value} =~ s/(0b[0-1]+)/oct($1)/eig;
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
return 0;
}
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * NB: this test commented out because some versions of Netscape
+ * illegally include zero length content when signing data. Also
+ * Microsoft Authenticode includes a SpcIndirectDataContent data
+ * structure which describes the content to be protected by the
+ * signature, rather than directly embedding that content. So
+ * Authenticode implementations are also expected to use
+ * PKCS7_verify() with explicit external data, on non-detached
+ * PKCS#7 signatures.
+ *
+ * In OpenSSL 1.1 a new flag PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT has been
+ * introduced to disable this sanity check. For the 1.0.2 branch
+ * this change is not acceptable, so the check remains completely
+ * commented out (as it has been for a long time).
+ */
/* Check for data and content: two sets of data */
if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && indata) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT);
return 0;
}
+#endif
sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
-/* crypto/rand/rand_vms.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/rand/rand_vms.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
-/* crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/seed/seed_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
if (err)
printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
# endif
- EXIT(err);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+ EXIT(err);
return (0);
}
DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache)
typedef struct SRP_user_pwd_st {
+ /* Owned by us. */
char *id;
BIGNUM *s;
BIGNUM *v;
+ /* Not owned by us. */
const BIGNUM *g;
const BIGNUM *N;
+ /* Owned by us. */
char *info;
} SRP_user_pwd;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd)
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd);
+
typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st {
STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd) *users_pwd;
STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache;
SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key);
int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb);
int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file);
+
+/* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. */
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
+/* NOTE: unlike in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user, caller owns the returned pointer.*/
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
+
char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g);
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
return olddst;
}
-static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
}
+static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
+{
+ SRP_user_pwd *ret;
+
+ if (src == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N);
+ if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info)
+ || !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) {
+ SRP_user_pwd_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
{
SRP_VBASE *vb = (SRP_VBASE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_VBASE));
}
-SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
{
int i;
SRP_user_pwd *user;
- unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
+
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
return user;
}
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
+ * In other words, caller must not free the result.
+ */
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+ return find_user(vb, username);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
+ * In other words, caller must free the result once done.
+ */
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
+{
+ SRP_user_pwd *user;
+ unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
+
+ if (vb == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL)
+ return srp_user_pwd_dup(user);
+
if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
(vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
return NULL;
void sk_sort(_STACK *st)
{
- if (st && !st->sorted) {
+ if (st && !st->sorted && st->comp != NULL) {
int (*comp_func) (const void *, const void *);
/*
-/* crypto/store/store.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/store.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
-/* crypto/store/str_lib.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_lib.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
-/* crypto/store/str_locl.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_locl.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
-/* crypto/store/str_mem.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_mem.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
-/* crypto/store/str_meth.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/store/str_meth.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2003.
/* chain is an out argument. */
*chain = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted))
+ return 0;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN);
i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
-/* crypto/ui/ui.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
-/* crypto/ui/ui_compat.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_compat.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
-/* crypto/ui/ui.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
-/* crypto/ui/ui_lib.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_lib.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
-/* crypto/ui/ui.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui.h */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2001.
-/* crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) and others for the
* OpenSSL project 2001.
-/* crypto/ui/ui_util.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/ui/ui_util.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
int num, j, retry;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+ int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ int err;
+
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
return -1;
if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
&& (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/*
* If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
* again later.
if (xtmp != NULL) {
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
bad_chain = 1;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
} else {
/*
* We have a match: replace certificate with store
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
if (ok == 0)
break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ok = 0;
- goto end;
+ ok = -1;
+ goto err;
}
num++;
}
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
- i = check_trust(ctx);
+ if ((trust = check_trust(ctx)) == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+ /* Callback already issued */
+ ok = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* If explicitly rejected error */
- if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
- goto end;
/*
* If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
* chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
* chain checking
*/
retry = 0;
- if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
+ if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
&& !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
while (j-- > 1) {
xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
if (ok < 0)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/* Check if we found an alternate chain */
if (ok > 0) {
/*
* self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
* and set bad_chain == 1
*/
- if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
+ if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
bad_chain = 1;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
}
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/* Check name constraints */
ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
ok = check_id(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
- i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
- ctx->param->flags);
- if (i != X509_V_OK) {
- ctx->error = i;
+ err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->flags);
+ if (err != X509_V_OK) {
+ ctx->error = err;
ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
}
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
else
ok = internal_verify(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
#endif
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
if (!ok)
- goto end;
+ goto err;
if (0) {
- end:
+ err:
+ /* Ensure we return an error */
+ if (ok > 0)
+ ok = 0;
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
}
if (sktmp != NULL)
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
ctx->tree = NULL;
ctx->parent = NULL;
+ /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
+ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-
if (!ctx->param) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
/*
* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
*/
-
if (store)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
if (store) {
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, else must be idempotent */
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
} else
ctx->cleanup = 0;
if (ret == 0) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
if (store && store->check_issued)
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+ if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ &ctx->ex_data))
+ return 1;
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+
+ err:
/*
- * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
- * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
- * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
+ * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
+ * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
*/
- /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
- if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
- &(ctx->ex_data))) {
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ return 0;
}
/*
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (ctx->cleanup)
+ /*
+ * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
+ * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
+ * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
+ * pointers below after they're freed!
+ */
+ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
+ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ ctx->cleanup = NULL;
+ }
if (ctx->param != NULL) {
if (ctx->parent == NULL)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
X509_LOOKUP_ctrl((x),X509_L_ADD_DIR,(name),(long)(type),NULL)
# define X509_V_OK 0
-/* illegal error (for uninitialized values, to avoid X509_V_OK): 1 */
+# define X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED 1
# define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT 2
# define X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL 3
* Refuse names with embedded NUL bytes, except perhaps as final byte.
* XXX: Do we need to push an error onto the error stack?
*/
- if (namelen == 0)
+ if (namelen == 0 || name == NULL)
namelen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
else if (name && memchr(name, '\0', namelen > 1 ? namelen - 1 : namelen))
return 0;
- if (name && name[namelen - 1] == '\0')
+ if (namelen > 0 && name[namelen - 1] == '\0')
--namelen;
if (mode == SET_HOST && id->hosts) {
-/* v3_pci.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* v3_pci.c */
/*
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
-/* v3_pcia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* v3_pcia.c */
/*
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
* (richard@levitte.org)
state = LABEL_START;
++dots;
} else if (p[i] == '-') {
- if ((state & LABEL_HYPHEN) != 0)
+ /* no domain/subdomain starts with '-' */
+ if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0)
return NULL;
state |= LABEL_HYPHEN;
} else
static const char *const names[] = {
"a", "b", ".", "*", "@",
".a", "a.", ".b", "b.", ".*", "*.", "*@", "@*", "a@", "@a", "b@", "..",
+ "-example.com", "example-.com",
"@@", "**", "*.com", "*com", "*.*.com", "*com", "com*", "*example.com",
"*@example.com", "test@*.example.com", "example.com", "www.example.com",
"test.www.example.com", "*.example.com", "*.www.example.com",
"test.*.example.com", "www.*.com",
".www.example.com", "*www.example.com",
"example.net", "xn--rger-koa.example.com",
+ "*.xn--rger-koa.example.com", "www.xn--rger-koa.example.com",
+ "*.good--example.com", "www.good--example.com",
+ "*.xn--bar.com", "xn--foo.xn--bar.com",
"a.example.com", "b.example.com",
"postmaster@example.com", "Postmaster@example.com",
"postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM",
"set CN: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set CN: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
"set CN: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+ "set CN: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+ "set CN: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]",
+ "set CN: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]",
"set CN: host-no-wildcards: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set CN: host-no-wildcards: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set emailAddress: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
"set dnsName: host: [*.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
"set dnsName: host: [*www.example.com] matches [www.example.com]",
"set dnsName: host: [test.www.example.com] matches [.www.example.com]",
+ "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--rger-koa.example.com] matches [www.xn--rger-koa.example.com]",
+ "set dnsName: host: [*.xn--bar.com] matches [xn--foo.xn--bar.com]",
+ "set dnsName: host: [*.good--example.com] matches [www.good--example.com]",
"set rfc822Name: email: [postmaster@example.com] does not match [Postmaster@example.com]",
"set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@example.com]",
"set rfc822Name: email: [Postmaster@example.com] does not match [postmaster@EXAMPLE.COM]",
-/* -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "bsd" -*- */
+/* */
/*-
* easy-tls.c -- generic TLS proxy.
* $Id: easy-tls.c,v 1.4 2002/03/05 09:07:16 bodo Exp $
-/* -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "bsd" -*- */
+/* */
/*-
* easy-tls.h -- generic TLS proxy.
* $Id: easy-tls.h,v 1.1 2001/09/17 19:06:59 bodo Exp $
/*
* This function name is attributed to the term donated by David Schwartz
* on openssl-dev, message-ID:
- * <NCBBLIEPOCbmasEKBEAKEEDGLIAA.davids@webmaster.com>. :-)
+ * <NCBBLIEPOCNJOAEKBEAKEEDGLIAA.davids@webmaster.com>. :-)
*/
if (!state_machine_churn(&item->sm))
/*
Like B<-v>, but include cipher suite codes in output (hex format).
-=item B<-ssl3>
+=item B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>
-only include SSL v3 ciphers.
+This lists ciphers compatible with any of SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2.
=item B<-ssl2>
-only include SSL v2 ciphers.
-
-=item B<-tls1>
-
-only include TLS v1 ciphers.
+Only include SSLv2 ciphers.
=item B<-h>, B<-?>
-print a brief usage message.
+Print a brief usage message.
=item B<cipherlist>
-a cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included
+A cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included
then the default cipher list will be used. The format is described below.
=back
=item B<DEFAULT>
-the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and
-is normally B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>. This must be the firstcipher string
-specified.
+The default cipher list.
+This is determined at compile time and is normally
+B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>.
+When used, this must be the first cipherstring specified.
=item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT>
=item B<LOW>
-"low" encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit encryption algorithms
-but excluding export cipher suites.
+Low strength encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit
+encryption algorithms but excluding export cipher suites.
+As of OpenSSL 1.0.2g, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<EXP>, B<EXPORT>
-export encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms.
+Export strength encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms.
+As of OpenSSL 1.0.2g, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<EXPORT40>
-40 bit export encryption algorithms
+40-bit export encryption algorithms
+As of OpenSSL 1.0.2g, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<EXPORT56>
-56 bit export encryption algorithms. In OpenSSL 0.9.8c and later the set of
+56-bit export encryption algorithms. In OpenSSL 0.9.8c and later the set of
56 bit export ciphers is empty unless OpenSSL has been explicitly configured
with support for experimental ciphers.
+As of OpenSSL 1.0.2g, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<eNULL>, B<NULL>
-the "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no
-encryption at all and are a security risk they are disabled unless explicitly
-included.
+The "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no
+encryption at all and are a security risk they are not enabled via either the
+B<DEFAULT> or B<ALL> cipher strings.
+Be careful when building cipherlists out of lower-level primitives such as
+B<kRSA> or B<aECDSA> as these do overlap with the B<eNULL> ciphers.
+When in doubt, include B<!eNULL> in your cipherlist.
=item B<aNULL>
-the cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous
+The cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous
DH algorithms and anonymous ECDH algorithms. These cipher suites are vulnerable
to a "man in the middle" attack and so their use is normally discouraged.
+These are excluded from the B<DEFAULT> ciphers, but included in the B<ALL>
+ciphers.
+Be careful when building cipherlists out of lower-level primitives such as
+B<kDHE> or B<AES> as these do overlap with the B<aNULL> ciphers.
+When in doubt, include B<!aNULL> in your cipherlist.
=item B<kRSA>, B<RSA>
=head2 Deprecated SSL v2.0 cipher suites.
SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 RC4-MD5
- SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
- SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 RC2-MD5
- SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC2-MD5
+ SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 Not implemented.
+ SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 RC2-CBC-MD5
+ SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 Not implemented.
SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 IDEA-CBC-MD5
- SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC-MD5
+ SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 Not implemented.
SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC3-MD5
=head1 NOTES
which specifies the digest in use for sign, verify and verifyrecover operations.
The value B<alg> should represent a digest name as used in the
EVP_get_digestbyname() function for example B<sha1>.
+This value is used only for sanity-checking the lengths of data passed in to
+the B<pkeyutl> and for creating the structures that make up the signature
+(e.g. B<DigestInfo> in RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+In case of RSA, ECDSA and DSA signatures, this utility
+will not perform hashing on input data but rather use the data directly as
+input of signature algorithm. Depending on key type, signature type and mode
+of padding, the maximum acceptable lengths of input data differ. In general,
+with RSA the signed data can't be longer than the key modulus, in case of ECDSA
+and DSA the data shouldn't be longer than field size, otherwise it will be
+silently truncated to field size.
+
+In other words, if the value of digest is B<sha1> the input should be 20 bytes
+long binary encoding of SHA-1 hash function output.
=head1 RSA ALGORITHM
=item B<default_bits>
-This specifies the default key size in bits. If not specified then
-512 is used. It is used if the B<-new> option is used. It can be
-overridden by using the B<-newkey> option.
+Specifies the default key size in bits.
+
+This option is used in conjunction with the B<-new> option to generate
+a new key. It can be overridden by specifying an explicit key size in
+the B<-newkey> option. The smallest accepted key size is 512 bits. If
+no key size is specified then 2048 bits is used.
=item B<default_keyfile>
given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
1a2b3c4d.
-=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
+=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
-these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
-the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
-servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.
-
-Unfortunately there are still ancient and broken servers in use which
-cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only
-work if TLS is turned off.
+These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols.
+By default the initial handshake uses a I<version-flexible> method which will
+negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol version.
=item B<-fallback_scsv>
given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
1a2b3c4d.
-=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
+=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
-these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
-the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
-servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.
+These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols.
+By default the initial handshake uses a I<version-flexible> method which will
+negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol version.
=item B<-bugs>
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-The B<s_client> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a
+The B<s_time> command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a
remote host using SSL/TLS. It can request a page from the server and includes
the time to transfer the payload data in its timing measurements. It measures
the number of connections within a given timeframe, the amount of data
=head1 NOTES
-B<s_client> can be used to measure the performance of an SSL connection.
+B<s_time> can be used to measure the performance of an SSL connection.
To connect to an SSL HTTP server and get the default page the command
openssl s_time -connect servername:443 -www / -CApath yourdir -CAfile yourfile.pem -cipher commoncipher [-ssl3]
long BIO_set_conn_int_port(BIO *b, char *port);
char *BIO_get_conn_hostname(BIO *b);
char *BIO_get_conn_port(BIO *b);
- char *BIO_get_conn_ip(BIO *b, dummy);
- long BIO_get_conn_int_port(BIO *b, int port);
+ char *BIO_get_conn_ip(BIO *b);
+ long BIO_get_conn_int_port(BIO *b);
long BIO_set_nbio(BIO *b, long n);
BIO_set_mem_buf(BIO *b,BUF_MEM *bm,int c)
BIO_get_mem_ptr(BIO *b,BUF_MEM **pp)
- BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
+ BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
a macro.
BIO_new_mem_buf() creates a memory BIO using B<len> bytes of data at B<buf>,
-if B<len> is -1 then the B<buf> is assumed to be null terminated and its
+if B<len> is -1 then the B<buf> is assumed to be nul terminated and its
length is determined by B<strlen>. The BIO is set to a read only state and
as a result cannot be written to. This is useful when some data needs to be
made available from a static area of memory in the form of a BIO. The
=item B<-named_curve>
-This sets the temporary curve used for ephemeral ECDH modes. Only used by
+This sets the temporary curve used for ephemeral ECDH modes. Only used by
servers
The B<value> argument is a curve name or the special value B<auto> which
=item B<-cipher>
Sets the cipher suite list to B<value>. Note: syntax checking of B<value> is
-currently not performed unless a B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> structure is
+currently not performed unless a B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> structure is
associated with B<cctx>.
=item B<-cert>
=item B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
-Disables protocol support for SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2
-by setting the corresponding options B<SSL_OP_NO_SSL2>, B<SSL_OP_NO_SSL3>,
-B<SSL_OP_NO_TLS1>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLS1_1> and B<SSL_OP_NO_TLS1_2> respectively.
+Disables protocol support for SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2
+by setting the corresponding options B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2>, B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3>,
+B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1> and B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2> respectively.
=item B<-bugs>
=item B<CipherString>
Sets the cipher suite list to B<value>. Note: syntax checking of B<value> is
-currently not performed unless an B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> structure is
+currently not performed unless an B<SSL> or B<SSL_CTX> structure is
associated with B<cctx>.
=item B<Certificate>
=item B<ECDHParameters>
-This sets the temporary curve used for ephemeral ECDH modes. Only used by
+This sets the temporary curve used for ephemeral ECDH modes. Only used by
servers
The B<value> argument is a curve name or the special value B<Automatic> which
The B<value> argument is a comma separated list of supported protocols to
enable or disable. If an protocol is preceded by B<-> that version is disabled.
-All versions are enabled by default, though applications may choose to
-explicitly disable some. Currently supported protocol values are B<SSLv2>,
-B<SSLv3>, B<TLSv1>, B<TLSv1.1> and B<TLSv1.2>. The special value B<ALL> refers
-to all supported versions.
+Currently supported protocol values are B<SSLv2>, B<SSLv3>, B<TLSv1>,
+B<TLSv1.1> and B<TLSv1.2>.
+All protocol versions other than B<SSLv2> are enabled by default.
+To avoid inadvertent enabling of B<SSLv2>, when SSLv2 is disabled, it is not
+possible to enable it via the B<Protocol> command.
=item B<Options>
The order of operations is significant. This can be used to set either defaults
or values which cannot be overridden. For example if an application calls:
- SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv2");
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3");
SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue);
-it will disable SSLv2 support by default but the user can override it. If
+it will disable SSLv3 support by default but the user can override it. If
however the call sequence is:
SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue);
- SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv2");
+ SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3");
-SSLv2 is B<always> disabled and attempt to override this by the user are
+then SSLv3 is B<always> disabled and attempt to override this by the user are
ignored.
By checking the return code of SSL_CTX_cmd() it is possible to query if a
and an error is indicated. If 0 is returned some other error occurred and
this can be reported back to the user.
-The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() can be used by applications to
+The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() can be used by applications to
check for the existence of a command or to perform additional syntax
checking or translation of the command value. For example if the return
value is B<SSL_CONF_TYPE_FILE> an application could translate a relative
=head1 NAME
-SSL_CTX_new - create a new SSL_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL enabled functions
+SSL_CTX_new,
+SSLv23_method, SSLv23_server_method, SSLv23_client_method,
+TLSv1_2_method, TLSv1_2_server_method, TLSv1_2_client_method,
+TLSv1_1_method, TLSv1_1_server_method, TLSv1_1_client_method,
+TLSv1_method, TLSv1_server_method, TLSv1_client_method,
+SSLv3_method, SSLv3_server_method, SSLv3_client_method,
+SSLv2_method, SSLv2_server_method, SSLv2_client_method,
+DTLS_method, DTLS_server_method, DTLS_client_method,
+DTLSv1_2_method, DTLSv1_2_server_method, DTLSv1_2_client_method,
+DTLSv1_method, DTLSv1_server_method, DTLSv1_client_method -
+create a new SSL_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL enabled functions
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void);
+ #endif
+
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLS_client_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_2_client_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void);
+ const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
=over 4
-=item SSLv2_method(void), SSLv2_server_method(void), SSLv2_client_method(void)
+=item SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv23_client_method()
+
+These are the general-purpose I<version-flexible> SSL/TLS methods.
+The actual protocol version used will be negotiated to the highest version
+mutually supported by the client and the server.
+The supported protocols are SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
+Most applications should use these method, and avoid the version specific
+methods described below.
+
+The list of protocols available can be further limited using the
+B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2>, B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1>,
+B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1> and B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2> options of the
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> or L<SSL_set_options(3)> functions.
+Clients should avoid creating "holes" in the set of protocols they support,
+when disabling a protocol, make sure that you also disable either all previous
+or all subsequent protocol versions.
+In clients, when a protocol version is disabled without disabling I<all>
+previous protocol versions, the effect is to also disable all subsequent
+protocol versions.
+
+The SSLv2 and SSLv3 protocols are deprecated and should generally not be used.
+Applications should typically use L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> in combination with
+the B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3> flag to disable negotiation of SSLv3 via the above
+I<version-flexible> SSL/TLS methods.
+The B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2> option is set by default, and would need to be cleared
+via L<SSL_CTX_clear_options(3)> in order to enable negotiation of SSLv2.
+
+=item TLSv1_2_method(), TLSv1_2_server_method(), TLSv1_2_client_method()
-A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand
-the SSLv2 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages
-and will also indicate that it only understand SSLv2. A server will only
-understand SSLv2 client hello messages.
+A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
+TLSv1.2 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1.2 client hello messages and
+will also indicate that it only understand TLSv1.2. A server will only
+understand TLSv1.2 client hello messages.
-=item SSLv3_method(void), SSLv3_server_method(void), SSLv3_client_method(void)
+=item TLSv1_1_method(), TLSv1_1_server_method(), TLSv1_1_client_method()
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
-SSLv3 protocol. A client will send out SSLv3 client hello messages
-and will indicate that it only understands SSLv3. A server will only understand
-SSLv3 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will
-not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for
-compatibility reasons, see SSLv23_*_method().
+TLSv1.1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1.1 client hello messages and
+will also indicate that it only understand TLSv1.1. A server will only
+understand TLSv1.1 client hello messages.
-=item TLSv1_method(void), TLSv1_server_method(void), TLSv1_client_method(void)
+=item TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), TLSv1_client_method()
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
-TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages
-and will indicate that it only understands TLSv1. A server will only understand
-TLSv1 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will
-not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for
-compatibility reasons, see SSLv23_*_method(). It will also not understand
-SSLv3 client hello messages.
-
-=item SSLv23_method(void), SSLv23_server_method(void), SSLv23_client_method(void)
-
-A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods may understand the SSLv2,
-SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols.
-
-If the cipher list does not contain any SSLv2 ciphersuites (the default
-cipher list does not) or extensions are required (for example server name)
-a client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages including extensions and
-will indicate that it also understands TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 and permits a
-fallback to SSLv3. A server will support SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2
-protocols. This is the best choice when compatibility is a concern.
-
-If any SSLv2 ciphersuites are included in the cipher list and no extensions
-are required then SSLv2 compatible client hellos will be used by clients and
-SSLv2 will be accepted by servers. This is B<not> recommended due to the
-insecurity of SSLv2 and the limited nature of the SSLv2 client hello
-prohibiting the use of extensions.
+TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages and will
+indicate that it only understands TLSv1. A server will only understand TLSv1
+client hello messages.
-=back
+=item SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), SSLv3_client_method()
+
+A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
+SSLv3 protocol. A client will send out SSLv3 client hello messages and will
+indicate that it only understands SSLv3. A server will only understand SSLv3
+client hello messages. The SSLv3 protocol is deprecated and should not be
+used.
+
+=item SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv2_client_method()
+
+A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
+SSLv2 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages and will
+also indicate that it only understand SSLv2. A server will only understand
+SSLv2 client hello messages. The SSLv2 protocol offers little to no security
+and should not be used.
+As of OpenSSL 1.0.2g, EXPORT ciphers and 56-bit DES are no longer available
+with SSLv2.
-The list of protocols available can later be limited using the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2,
-SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 and SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
-options of the SSL_CTX_set_options() or SSL_set_options() functions.
-Using these options it is possible to choose e.g. SSLv23_server_method() and
-be able to negotiate with all possible clients, but to only allow newer
-protocols like TLSv1, TLSv1.1 or TLS v1.2.
+=item DTLS_method(), DTLS_server_method(), DTLS_client_method()
-Applications which never want to support SSLv2 (even is the cipher string
-is configured to use SSLv2 ciphersuites) can set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+These are the version-flexible DTLS methods.
+
+=item DTLSv1_2_method(), DTLSv1_2_server_method(), DTLSv1_2_client_method()
+
+These are the version-specific methods for DTLSv1.2.
+
+=item DTLSv1_method(), DTLSv1_server_method(), DTLSv1_client_method()
+
+These are the version-specific methods for DTLSv1.
+
+=back
-SSL_CTX_new() initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting,
-the callbacks, the keys and certificates and the options to its default
-values.
+SSL_CTX_new() initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting, the
+callbacks, the keys and certificates and the options to its default values.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
=item NULL
-The creation of a new SSL_CTX object failed. Check the error stack to
-find out the reason.
+The creation of a new SSL_CTX object failed. Check the error stack to find out
+the reason.
=item Pointer to an SSL_CTX object
=head1 SEE ALSO
+L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_clear_options(3)>, L<SSL_set_options(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_free(3)|SSL_CTX_free(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>,
L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
int SSL_CTX_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
int SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
- int SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set0_chain_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
+ int SSL_set1_chain_cert_store(SSL *ctx, X509_STORE *st);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
Do not use the SSLv2 protocol.
+As of OpenSSL 1.0.2g the B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2> option is set by default.
=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
Do not use the SSLv3 protocol.
+It is recommended that applications should set this option.
=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
Do not use the TLSv1 protocol.
+=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+
+Do not use the TLSv1.1 protocol.
+
+=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+
+Do not use the TLSv1.2 protocol.
+
=item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session
--- /dev/null
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb, SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg,
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_type, SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp - OCSP Certificate Status Request functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/tls1.h>
+
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*callback)(SSL *, void *));
+ long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+
+ long SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(SSL *s, int type);
+
+ long SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char **resp);
+ long SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char *resp, int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+A client application may request that a server send back an OCSP status response
+(also known as OCSP stapling). To do so the client should call the
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() function prior to the start of the handshake.
+Currently the only supported type is B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp>. This value
+should be passed in the B<type> argument. The client should additionally provide
+a callback function to decide what to do with the returned OCSP response by
+calling SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(). The callback function should determine
+whether the returned OCSP response is acceptable or not. The callback will be
+passed as an argument the value previously set via a call to
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(). Note that the callback will not be called in
+the event of a handshake where session resumption occurs (because there are no
+Certificates exchanged in such a handshake).
+
+The response returned by the server can be obtained via a call to
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). The value B<*resp> will be updated to point
+to the OCSP response data and the return value will be the length of that data.
+Typically a callback would obtain an OCSP_RESPONSE object from this data via a
+call to the d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE() function. If the server has not provided any
+response data then B<*resp> will be NULL and the return value from
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() will be -1.
+
+A server application must also call the SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb() function
+if it wants to be able to provide clients with OCSP Certificate Status
+responses. Typically the server callback would obtain the server certificate
+that is being sent back to the client via a call to SSL_get_certificate();
+obtain the OCSP response to be sent back; and then set that response data by
+calling SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). A pointer to the response data should
+be provided in the B<resp> argument, and the length of that data should be in
+the B<len> argument.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+The callback when used on the client side should return a negative value on
+error; 0 if the response is not acceptable (in which case the handshake will
+fail) or a positive value if it is acceptable.
+
+The callback when used on the server side should return with either
+SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK (meaning that the OCSP response that has been set should be
+returned), SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK (meaning that an OCSP response should not be
+returned) or SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL (meaning that a fatal error has
+occurred).
+
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(), SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(),
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() and SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() return 0 on
+error or 1 on success.
+
+SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() returns the length of the OCSP response data
+or -1 if there is no OCSP response data.
+
+=cut
only used for signing.
In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
-The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
-if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
-It will immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
-In this case,
-it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
-being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
-negotiation is being saved.
-
-If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
-necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
-secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
-attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
-computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
-application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
-The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
+(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate
+a new DH key during the negotiation.
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
-are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
-B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
-parameters in the callback.
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() or alternatively, use
+the callback but ignore B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply
+supply at least 2048-bit parameters in the callback.
=head1 EXAMPLES
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
/* Error. */
}
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
...
=head1 RETURN VALUES
=over 4
-=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_client_method>(void);
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv23_method>(void);
-Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client.
+Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for
+clients, servers or both.
+See L<SSL_CTX_new(3)> for details.
-=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_server_method>(void);
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv23_client_method>(void);
-Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server.
+Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for
+clients.
-=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_method>(void);
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv23_client_method>(void);
-Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server.
+Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for
+servers.
-=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_client_method>(void);
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_method>(void);
-Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client.
+Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
+or both.
-=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_server_method>(void);
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_client_method>(void);
-Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server.
+Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
-=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_method>(void);
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_method>(void);
-Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server.
+Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
+or both.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
+or both.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_client_method>(void);
-Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client.
+Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_server_method>(void);
-Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server.
+Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
-=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_method>(void);
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
+or both.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_server_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
+or both.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_client_method>(void);
+
+Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
+
+=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_server_method>(void);
-Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server.
+Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
=back
# define CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER 0x00010000
# endif
+# ifndef ALG_SID_SHA_256
+# define ALG_SID_SHA_256 12
+# endif
+# ifndef ALG_SID_SHA_384
+# define ALG_SID_SHA_384 13
+# endif
+# ifndef ALG_SID_SHA_512
+# define ALG_SID_SHA_512 14
+# endif
+
+# ifndef CALG_SHA_256
+# define CALG_SHA_256 (ALG_CLASS_HASH | ALG_TYPE_ANY | ALG_SID_SHA_256)
+# endif
+# ifndef CALG_SHA_384
+# define CALG_SHA_384 (ALG_CLASS_HASH | ALG_TYPE_ANY | ALG_SID_SHA_384)
+# endif
+# ifndef CALG_SHA_512
+# define CALG_SHA_512 (ALG_CLASS_HASH | ALG_TYPE_ANY | ALG_SID_SHA_512)
+# endif
+
# include <openssl/engine.h>
# include <openssl/pem.h>
# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
}
/* Convert the signature type to a CryptoAPI algorithm ID */
switch (dtype) {
+ case NID_sha256:
+ alg = CALG_SHA_256;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_sha384:
+ alg = CALG_SHA_384;
+ break;
+
+ case NID_sha512:
+ alg = CALG_SHA_512;
+ break;
+
case NID_sha1:
alg = CALG_SHA1;
break;
-/* crypto/engine/e_chil.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/engine/e_chil.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org), Geoff Thorpe
* (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) and Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for
for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {
&function_begin_B("_\$lazy${i}");
&lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable")));
- &push ("eax");
&push ($i);
+ &push ("eax");
&call (&label("OPENSSL_Uplink"));
- &add ("esp",8);
&pop ("eax");
+ &add ("esp",4);
&jmp_ptr(&DWP(4*$i,"eax"));
&function_end_B("_\$lazy${i}");
}
Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
Name: openssl
-Version: 1.0.2e
+Version: 1.0.2g
Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c
+TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c sslv2conftest.c
APPS=
LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_clnt.c ssl_locl.h
+s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_clnt.c
+s2_clnt.o: ssl_locl.h
s2_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
s2_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
s2_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
-s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_lib.c ssl_locl.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_lib.c
+s2_lib.o: ssl_locl.h
s2_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
s2_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
s2_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_pkt.c
s2_pkt.o: ssl_locl.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
-s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
/* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
while (s->init_num > 0) {
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
+ /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
+
+ if (frag_off > 0) {
+ /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
+
+ if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /*
+ * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
+ * contained the message header plus one other byte.
+ * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
+ * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
+ * wrong.
+ */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
+ * message header for this fragment.
+ */
+ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We must have been called again after a retry so use the
+ * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
+ * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
+ * that should already have been done before the retry.
+ */
+ frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ }
+ }
+
used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
*/
ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
- if (ret <= 0)
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
return ret;
+ }
used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- if (s->init_off != 0) {
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- /*
- * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should
- * be safe
- */
- if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
- len = curr_mtu;
- else
- len = s->init_num;
- }
-
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- if (len > INT_MAX)
- len = INT_MAX;
-
if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
}
s->init_off += ret;
s->init_num -= ret;
- frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ frag_off += ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
+ * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
+ * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
+ * updated again later.
+ */
+ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
}
}
return (0);
-/* ssl/kssl.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/kssl.c */
/*
* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
-/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/kssl.h */
/*
* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000. project 2000.
-/* ssl/kssl.h -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/kssl.h */
/*
* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000. project 2000.
128,
},
+# if 0
/* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
{
1,
40,
128,
},
+# endif
/* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
{
128,
},
+# if 0
/* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
{
1,
40,
128,
},
+# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
/* IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
},
# endif
+# if 0
/* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
{
1,
56,
56,
},
+# endif
/* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
{
}
cp = ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(p);
- if (cp == NULL) {
+ if (cp == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(s->session->ciphers, cp) < 0) {
ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return (-1);
s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length = i;
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->tmp.session_id_length = i;
+ if ((i < 0) || (i > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
n2s(p, i);
s->s2->challenge_length = i;
if ((i < SSL2_MIN_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) ||
prio = cs;
allow = cl;
}
+
+ /* Generate list of SSLv2 ciphers shared between client and server */
for (z = 0; z < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++) {
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z)) < 0) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, z);
+ if ((cp->algorithm_ssl & SSL_SSLV2) == 0 ||
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, cp) < 0) {
(void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio, z);
z--;
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = prio;
}
+
+ /* Make sure we have at least one cipher in common */
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(s->session->ciphers) == 0) {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ return -1;
+ }
/*
* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of ciphers that are on
* both the client and server. This list is ordered by the order the
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
+ -1, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- if (n < 4) {
- /* need at least status type + length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2l3(p, resplen);
- if (resplen + 4 != n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ /*
+ * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+ * tlsext_status_expected is set
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (n < 4) {
+ /* need at least status type + length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2l3(p, resplen);
+ if (resplen + 4 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
}
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
DH_free(dh_srvr);
}
- if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
+ if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024)
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
},
/* Cipher 03 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
40,
128,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 04 */
{
},
/* Cipher 06 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
40,
128,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 07 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
#endif
/* Cipher 08 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 09 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 0A */
{
/* The DH ciphers */
/* Cipher 0B */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
0,
SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 0C */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 0D */
{
},
/* Cipher 0E */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
0,
SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 0F */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 10 */
{
/* The Ephemeral DH ciphers */
/* Cipher 11 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 12 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 13 */
{
},
/* Cipher 14 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 15 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 16 */
{
},
/* Cipher 17 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
40,
128,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 18 */
{
},
/* Cipher 19 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
128,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 1A */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+#endif
/* Cipher 1B */
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
/* Cipher 1E */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 1F */
{
},
/* Cipher 22 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
56,
56,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 23 */
{
},
/* Cipher 26 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
56,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 27 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
40,
128,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 28 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
40,
128,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 29 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
40,
56,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 2A */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
40,
128,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 2B */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
40,
128,
},
+# endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* New AES ciphersuites */
# endif
/* Cipher 62 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 63 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
56,
56,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 64 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
56,
128,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 65 */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
56,
128,
},
+# endif
/* Cipher 66 */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- DH_free(dh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- }
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+ size_t len;
+
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
s->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
ret = 1;
if (parg == NULL)
break;
- if (strlen((char *)parg) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
+ len = strlen((char *)parg);
+ if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME);
return 0;
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return 0;
}
- if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(new);
- return 0;
- }
- }
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
cert->dh_tmp = new;
-/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
goto f_err;
}
+ if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
}
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
# define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L
-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */
# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L
/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
# define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0
# define SSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
# define SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
- SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,clistlen,(int *)slist)
+ SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS,slistlen,(int *)slist)
# define SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(ctx, s) \
SSL_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST,0,(char *)s)
# define SSL_CTX_set1_client_sigalgs(ctx, slist, slistlen) \
# define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275
# define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277
# define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219
+# define SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT 407
# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360
# define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220
# define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1),
SSL_FLAG_TBL_INV("TLSv1.2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)
};
+ int ret;
+ int sslv2off;
+
if (!(cctx->flags & SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE))
return -2;
cctx->tbl = ssl_protocol_list;
cctx->ntbl = sizeof(ssl_protocol_list) / sizeof(ssl_flag_tbl);
- return CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
+
+ sslv2off = *cctx->poptions & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ ret = CONF_parse_list(value, ',', 1, ssl_set_option_list, cctx);
+ /* Never turn on SSLv2 through configuration */
+ *cctx->poptions |= sslv2off;
+ return ret;
}
static int cmd_Options(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *value)
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED),
"session id context uninitialized"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHORT_READ), "short read"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT), "shutdown while in init"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR),
"signature algorithms error"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE),
return -1;
}
- if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
- return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
- else
- return (1);
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+ /*
+ * Disable SSLv2 by default, callers that want to enable SSLv2 will have to
+ * explicitly clear this option via either of SSL_CTX_clear_options() or
+ * SSL_clear_options().
+ */
+ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+
return (ret);
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
int r;
#endif
- if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- goto err;
-
if (session_id + len > limit) {
fatal = 1;
goto err;
--- /dev/null
+/* Written by Matt Caswell for the OpenSSL Project */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+
+#define TOTAL_NUM_TESTS 2
+#define TEST_SSL_CTX 0
+
+#define SSLV2ON 1
+#define SSLV2OFF 0
+
+SSL_CONF_CTX *confctx;
+SSL_CTX *ctx;
+SSL *ssl;
+
+static int checksslv2(int test, int sslv2)
+{
+ int options;
+ if (test == TEST_SSL_CTX) {
+ options = SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx);
+ } else {
+ options = SSL_get_options(ssl);
+ }
+ return ((options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) == 0) ^ (sslv2 == SSLV2OFF);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ BIO *err;
+ int testresult = 0;
+ int currtest;
+
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+
+ confctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+ ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ if (confctx == NULL || ctx == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(confctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_FILE
+ | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT
+ | SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER);
+
+ /*
+ * For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see whether SSLv2 is enabled
+ * as expected after various SSL_CONF_cmd("Protocol", ...) calls.
+ */
+ for (currtest = 0; currtest < TOTAL_NUM_TESTS; currtest++) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test number %d\n", currtest);
+ if (currtest == TEST_SSL_CTX)
+ SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(confctx, ctx);
+ else
+ SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl(confctx, ssl);
+
+ /* SSLv2 should be off by default */
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2OFF)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: Off by default test FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(confctx, "Protocol", "ALL") != 2
+ || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(confctx)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: SSL_CONF command FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Should still be off even after ALL Protocols on */
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2OFF)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: Off after config #1 FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(confctx, "Protocol", "SSLv2") != 2
+ || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(confctx)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: SSL_CONF command FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Should still be off even if explicitly asked for */
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2OFF)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: Off after config #2 FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(confctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv2") != 2
+ || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(confctx)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: SSL_CONF command FAIL\n");;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2OFF)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: Off after config #3 FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (currtest == TEST_SSL_CTX)
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ else
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2ON)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: On after clear FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(confctx, "Protocol", "ALL") != 2
+ || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(confctx)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: SSL_CONF command FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Option has been cleared and config says have SSLv2 so should be on */
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2ON)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: On after config #1 FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(confctx, "Protocol", "SSLv2") != 2
+ || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(confctx)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: SSL_CONF command FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Option has been cleared and config says have SSLv2 so should be on */
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2ON)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: On after config #2 FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(confctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv2") != 2
+ || !SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(confctx)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: SSL_CONF command FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Option has been cleared but config says no SSLv2 so should be off */
+ if (!checksslv2(currtest, SSLV2OFF)) {
+ BIO_printf(err, "SSLv2 CONF Test: Off after config #4 FAIL\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ testresult = 1;
+
+ end:
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ SSL_CONF_CTX_free(confctx);
+
+ if (!testresult) {
+ printf("SSLv2 CONF test: FAILED (Test %d)\n", currtest);
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ } else {
+ printf("SSLv2 CONF test: PASSED\n");
+ }
+
+ ERR_free_strings();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+ BIO_free(err);
+
+ return testresult ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
+}
so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
/*
* must be same as col (see
- * draft-resc-00.txts-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
+ * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1)
*/
sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
}
}
# endif
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
/*
* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
* callback
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
- && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int r;
/*
- * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
- * response.
+ * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
+ * knows there is no response
*/
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- }
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (r == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
{
- int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+ int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
return;
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
*psign_nid = sign_nid;
}
if (psignhash_nid) {
- if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
- OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
- else
+ if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
+ || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
+ sign_nid) <= 0)
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
}
}
CONSTTIMETEST= constant_time_test
VERIFYEXTRATEST= verify_extra_test
CLIENTHELLOTEST= clienthellotest
+SSLV2CONFTEST = sslv2conftest
TESTS= alltests
$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SRPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(V3NAMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HEARTBEATTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(CONSTTIMETEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(VERIFYEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ $(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLV2CONFTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
# $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
$(BFTEST).o $(SSLTEST).o $(DSATEST).o $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
$(HEARTBEATTEST).o $(CONSTTIMETEST).o $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).o \
- $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
+ $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o $(SSLV2CONFTEST).o
SRC= $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
$(MD2TEST).c $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
$(BFTEST).c $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
$(EVPTEST).c $(EVPEXTRATEST).c $(IGETEST).c $(JPAKETEST).c $(SRPTEST).c $(ASN1TEST).c \
$(V3NAMETEST).c $(HEARTBEATTEST).c $(CONSTTIMETEST).c $(VERIFYEXTRATEST).c \
- $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).c
+ $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).c $(SSLV2CONFTEST).c
EXHEADER=
HEADER= testutil.h $(EXHEADER)
test_gen test_req test_pkcs7 test_verify test_dh test_dsa \
test_ss test_ca test_engine test_evp test_evp_extra test_ssl test_tsa test_ige \
test_jpake test_srp test_cms test_ocsp test_v3name test_heartbeat \
- test_constant_time test_verify_extra test_clienthello
+ test_constant_time test_verify_extra test_clienthello test_sslv2conftest
test_evp: $(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) evptests.txt
../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(EVPTEST) evptests.txt
@echo $(START) $@
../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)
+test_sslv2conftest: $(SSLV2CONFTEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo $(START) $@
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(SSLV2CONFTEST)
+
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
$(CLIENTHELLOTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(CLIENTHELLOTEST).o
@target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+$(SSLV2CONFTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SSLV2CONFTEST).o
+ @target=$(SSLV2CONFTEST) $(BUILD_CMD)
+
#$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c
# $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c
ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
ssltest.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h ssltest.c
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+sslv2conftest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+sslv2conftest.o: sslv2conftest.c
v3nametest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
v3nametest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/bf/bftest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/bn/bntest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/cast/casttest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../ssl/clienthellotest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/constant_time_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/des/destest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/dh/dhtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/dsa/dsatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/ecdh/ecdhtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/ec/ectest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/engine/enginetest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/evp/evp_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/bn/exptest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../ssl/heartbeat_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/hmac/hmactest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/idea/ideatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
-/* test/igetest.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* test/igetest.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/md4/md4test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/md5/md5test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/rand/randtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/rc4/rc4test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/dummytest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/ripemd/rmdtest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/rsa/rsa_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/sha/sha1test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/sha/sha256t.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/sha/sha512t.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/sha/shatest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/srp/srptest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../ssl/ssltest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/x509/verify_extra_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
+++ /dev/null
-openssl-1.0.2e/../crypto/whrlpool/wp_test.c
\ No newline at end of file
cp Makefile Makefile.save
# fake the presence of Kerberos
touch $TOP/krb5.h
-if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep -q "clang" ||
- echo $MAKEDEPEND | grep -q "gcc"; then
+if ${MAKEDEPEND} --version 2>&1 | grep "clang" > /dev/null ||
+ echo $MAKEDEPEND | grep "gcc" > /dev/null; then
args=""
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
if [ "$1" != "--" ]; then args="$args $1"; fi
X509_REQ_digest 2362 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP
X509_CRL_digest 2391 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP
ASN1_STRING_clear_free 2392 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user 2393 EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
+SRP_user_pwd_free 2394 EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7 2397 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_ALGOR_cmp 2398 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length 2399 EXIST::FUNCTION:
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS" if $no_weak_ssl;
$cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
$cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
# The OpenSSL directory
SRC_D=$src_dir
-LINK=$link
+LINK_CMD=$link
LFLAGS=$lflags
RSC=$rsc
"no-jpake" => \$no_jpake,
"no-ec2m" => \$no_ec2m,
"no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => 0,
+ "no-weak-ssl-ciphers" => \$no_weak_ssl,
"no-err" => \$no_err,
"no-sock" => \$no_sock,
"no-krb5" => \$no_krb5,
{
local($ex)=($target =~ /O_SSL/)?' $(L_CRYPTO)':'';
$ex.=' ws2_32.lib gdi32.lib';
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target /def:ms/${Name}.def @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex\n<<\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target /def:ms/${Name}.def @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex\n<<\n";
}
$ret.="\n";
return($ret);
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $files \$(APP_EX_OBJ), $target,, $libs\n\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $files \$(APP_EX_OBJ), $target,, $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}
1;
{
local($ex)=($target =~ /O_SSL/)?' $(L_CRYPTO)':'';
$ex.=' -lsocket';
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) \$(${Name}OBJ) $ex os2/${Name}.def\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) \$(${Name}OBJ) $ex os2/${Name}.def\n";
$ret.="\temximp -o $out_def/$name.a os2/${Name}.def\n";
$ret.="\temximp -o $out_def/$name.lib os2/${Name}.def\n\n";
}
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(CFLAG) \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(CFLAG) \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}
if ($fips && $target =~ /O_CRYPTO/)
{
$ret.="$target: $objs \$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)";
- $ret.="\n\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
+ $ret.="\n\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK_CMD)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
$ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)\n";
else
{
$ret.="$target: $objs";
- $ret.="\n\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target $name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex \$(EX_LIBS)\n<<\n";
+ $ret.="\n\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target $name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex \$(EX_LIBS)\n<<\n";
}
$ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;2\n\n";
}
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs";
if ($standalone == 1)
{
- $ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj\n";
- $ret.=" \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
- $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild);
+ $ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj" if $shlib;
+ $ret.="\n";
+ $ret.=" \$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
+ if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild) {
+ $ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) ";
+ $ret.= "\$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if $shlib;
+ }
$ret.="$files $libs\n<<\n";
}
elsif ($standalone == 2)
{
$ret.="\n";
- $ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
+ $ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK_CMD)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
$ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\n";
else
{
$ret.="\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
$ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n";
}
$ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;1\n\n";
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}
if ($gnuc)
{
$ret.="\t\$(MKLIB) $lib_flags \$(TMP_D)${o}\$(E_EXE).a \$(filter-out \$(TMP_D)${o}\$(E_EXE)${obj},$files)\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2\n";
$ret.="\t\@$mv \$(E_EXE)2.nlm \$(TEST_D)\n";
}
else
{
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2 $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target2\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2 $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target2\n";
}
}
if ($gnuc)
{
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file\n";
$ret.="\t\@$mv \$(\@F) \$(TEST_D)\n";
}
else
{
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target\n";
}
$ret.="\n";
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
- $ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
+ $ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}