ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
authorThiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Thu, 15 Mar 2018 20:33:42 +0000 (17:33 -0300)
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Sun, 25 Mar 2018 11:26:30 +0000 (07:26 -0400)
Replace nested ifs in the EVM xattr verification logic with a switch
statement, making the code easier to understand.

Also, add comments to the if statements in the out section and constify the
cause variable.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c

index 0c5f94b..8bd7a07 100644 (file)
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
                             int xattr_len, int opened)
 {
        static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
-       char *cause = "unknown";
+       const char *cause = "unknown";
        struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
        enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -241,16 +241,22 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
        }
 
        status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
-       if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) &&
-           (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) &&
-           (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
-               if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
-                   || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
-                       cause = "missing-HMAC";
-               else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
-                       cause = "invalid-HMAC";
+       switch (status) {
+       case INTEGRITY_PASS:
+       case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE:
+       case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN:
+               break;
+       case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS:        /* No EVM protected xattrs. */
+       case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL:         /* No security.evm xattr. */
+               cause = "missing-HMAC";
+               goto out;
+       case INTEGRITY_FAIL:            /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
+               cause = "invalid-HMAC";
                goto out;
+       default:
+               WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status);
        }
+
        switch (xattr_value->type) {
        case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
                /* first byte contains algorithm id */
@@ -316,17 +322,20 @@ out:
                integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
                                    op, cause, rc, 0);
        } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+               /* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */
                if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
                    (!xattr_value ||
                     xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
                        if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
                                status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
-               } else if ((inode->i_size == 0) &&
-                          (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
-                          (xattr_value &&
-                           xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
+               }
+
+               /* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */
+               if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE &&
+                   xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) {
                        status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
                }
+
                integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
                                    op, cause, rc, 0);
        } else {