The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
owned by uid=0.
- ima_audit= [IMA]
- Format: { "0" | "1" }
- 0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
- 1 -- enable informational integrity auditing messages.
-
ima_hash= [IMA]
Format: { "sha1" | "md5" }
default: "sha1"
int_pln_enable [x86] Enable power limit notification interrupt
+ integrity_audit=[IMA]
+ Format: { "0" | "1" }
+ 0 -- basic integrity auditing messages. (Default)
+ 1 -- additional integrity auditing messages.
+
intel_iommu= [DMAR] Intel IOMMU driver (DMAR) option
on
Enable intel iommu driver.
F: arch/ia64/
IBM Power in-Nest Crypto Acceleration
-M: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
L: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: drivers/crypto/nx/
INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
M: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+M: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
S: Supported
F: security/integrity/ima/
F: drivers/media/usb/tm6000/
TPM DEVICE DRIVER
-M: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M: Leonidas Da Silva Barbosa <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+M: Ashley Lai <ashley@ashleylai.com>
M: Rajiv Andrade <mail@srajiv.net>
W: http://tpmdd.sourceforge.net
M: Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net>
* Once all references to platform device are down to 0,
* release all allocated structures.
*/
-static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
+void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct tpm_output_header out;
} tpm_cmd_header;
-#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
struct tpm_pcrread_out {
u8 pcr_result[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;
const struct tpm_vendor_specific *);
extern int tpm_open(struct inode *, struct file *);
extern int tpm_release(struct inode *, struct file *);
+extern void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev);
extern void tpm_dev_vendor_release(struct tpm_chip *);
extern ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
loff_t *);
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/i2c.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include "tpm.h"
};
static struct tpm_inf_dev tpm_dev;
-static struct i2c_driver tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
/*
* iic_tpm_read() - read from TPM register
return -ENODEV;
}
- client->driver = &tpm_tis_i2c_driver;
tpm_dev.client = client;
rc = tpm_tis_i2c_init(&client->dev);
if (rc != 0) {
- client->driver = NULL;
tpm_dev.client = NULL;
rc = -ENODEV;
}
rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
- if (IS_ERR(pdev=platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0)))
- return PTR_ERR(pdev);
- if((rc=tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0)) != 0) {
- platform_device_unregister(pdev);
- platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
+ pdev = platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(pdev)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(pdev);
+ goto err_dev;
}
+ rc = tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_init;
+ return 0;
+err_init:
+ platform_device_unregister(pdev);
+err_dev:
+ platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
return rc;
}
* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
*
* @inode_getsecctx:
- * Returns a string containing all relevant security context information
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ * context for the given @inode.
*
* @inode we wish to get the security context of.
* @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_H__
#define __LINUX_TPM_H__
+#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
+
/*
* Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
*/
inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev, VM_NORESERVE);
if (inode) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+ error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
+ if (error) {
+ iput(inode);
+ return error;
+ }
+#endif
error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir,
&dentry->d_name,
shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
return error;
}
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
- error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
- if (error) {
- iput(inode);
- return error;
- }
-#else
+
error = 0;
-#endif
dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
"HINT",
"STATUS",
"ERROR",
- "KILLED"
+ "KILLED",
"AUTO"
};
}
/**
+ * aa_get_task_profile - Get another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: counted reference to @task's profile
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *p;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ p = aa_get_profile(__aa_task_profile(task));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+/**
* aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles
* @profile: new profile (NOT NULL)
*
*/
int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
{
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
struct cred *new;
BUG_ON(!profile);
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
- cxt = new->security;
- if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) {
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+ if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns))
/* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
* clear out context state
*/
- aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
- aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
- cxt->previous = NULL;
- cxt->onexec = NULL;
- cxt->token = 0;
- }
+ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+
/* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it
* is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby is the reference keeping
* @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before dropping
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
- cxt = new->security;
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
aa_get_profile(profile);
aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
cxt->onexec = profile;
return -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(!profile);
- cxt = new->security;
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
if (!cxt->previous) {
/* transfer refcount */
cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
- cxt = new->security;
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
if (cxt->token != token) {
abort_creds(new);
return -EACCES;
aa_get_profile(cxt->profile);
aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
}
- /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+ /* ref has been transfered so avoid putting ref in clear_task_cxt */
cxt->previous = NULL;
- cxt->token = 0;
- aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
- cxt->onexec = NULL;
+ /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
commit_creds(new);
return 0;
struct aa_profile *to_profile)
{
struct task_struct *tracer;
- const struct cred *cred = NULL;
struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
int error = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
- if (tracer) {
+ if (tracer)
/* released below */
- cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
- tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred);
- }
+ tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
/* not ptraced */
if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (cred)
- put_cred(cred);
+ aa_put_profile(tracerp);
return error;
}
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
- cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+ cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
BUG_ON(!cxt);
profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile));
} else {
error = -ENOENT;
info = "profile not found";
+ /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
+ perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
}
}
} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
cxt->profile = new_profile;
/* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
- aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
- aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
- cxt->previous = NULL;
- cxt->onexec = NULL;
- cxt->token = 0;
+ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
audit:
error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
- struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+ struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
/* released below */
cred = get_current_cred();
- cxt = cred->security;
+ cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
previous_profile = cxt->previous;
bool permtest)
{
const struct cred *cred;
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
struct file_perms perms = {};
}
cred = get_current_cred();
- cxt = cred->security;
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
/*
#ifndef __APPARMOR_H
#define __APPARMOR_H
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include "match.h"
/* fn's in lib */
char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
void aa_info_message(const char *str);
-void *kvmalloc(size_t size);
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags);
void kvfree(void *buffer);
+static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+ return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size)
+{
+ return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO);
+}
/**
* aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
#include "policy.h"
+#define cred_cxt(X) (X)->security
+#define current_cxt() cred_cxt(current_cred())
+
/* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
* @perms: the permission the file was opened with
*
int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile);
int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task);
-/**
- * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
- * @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL)
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
-{
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security;
-
- BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
- if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
/**
* aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles
*/
static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred)
{
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
}
/**
+ * __aa_task_profile - retrieve another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: @task's profile without incrementing its ref count
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task));
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
+ * @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return !unconfined(__aa_task_profile(task));
+}
+
+/**
* __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile
*
* Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL)
*/
static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
{
- const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+ const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
struct aa_profile *profile;
BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
return profile;
}
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_cxt_trans - clear transition tracking info from the cxt
+ * @cxt: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+{
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->previous = NULL;
+ cxt->onexec = NULL;
+ cxt->token = 0;
+}
+
#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
}
-#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40))
-
-/* from namei.c */
-#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x))
-
/**
* aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
* @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
*/
static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
{
- int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags);
- u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode);
+ int flags = file->f_flags;
+ u32 perms = 0;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+ perms |= MAY_READ;
if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;
* This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
#define __AA_MATCH_H
#include <linux/kref.h>
-#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#define DFA_NOMATCH 0
#define DFA_START 1
-#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff
-#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff
/**
* The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
* file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
* info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
* used in the header is 0x1B5E783D instead of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
- * the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used
- * slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package).
+ * new tables have been defined and others YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF
+ * (default) tables are used slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser
+ * package).
+ *
+ *
+ * The data in the packed dfa is stored in network byte order, and the tables
+ * are arranged for flexibility. We convert the table data to host native
+ * byte order.
+ *
+ * The dfa begins with a table set header, and is followed by the actual
+ * tables.
*/
#define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D
-#define YYTH_DEF_RECURSE 0x1 /* DEF Table is recursive */
struct table_set_header {
u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */
#define YYTD_DATA32 4
#define YYTD_DATA64 8
-/* Each ACCEPT2 table gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
+/* ACCEPT & ACCEPT2 tables gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
* first flags
*/
#define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f)
extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
#define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
-#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) \
- ((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || \
- ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN))
+#define PROFILE_MODE(_profile, _mode) \
+ ((aa_g_profile_mode == (_mode)) || \
+ ((_profile)->mode == (_mode)))
-#define KILL_MODE(_profile) \
- ((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || \
- ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL))
+#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+
+#define KILL_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_KILL)
#define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT)
* @acct: accounting for the namespace
* @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
* @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace.
+ * @uniq_null: uniq value used for null learning profiles
*
* An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine
* which profile to attach to a task. Profiles can not be shared between
struct aa_ns_acct acct;
struct aa_profile *unconfined;
struct list_head sub_ns;
+ atomic_t uniq_null;
};
/* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
* @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
* @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
* @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
- * @sid: the unique security id number of this profile
* @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
* @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
* @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
int xmatch_len;
- u32 sid;
enum audit_mode audit;
enum profile_mode mode;
u32 flags;
int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test);
int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test);
-int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
#include <linux/types.h>
-struct aa_profile;
+/* sid value that will not be allocated */
+#define AA_SID_INVALID 0
+#define AA_SID_ALLOC AA_SID_INVALID
u32 aa_alloc_sid(void);
void aa_free_sid(u32 sid);
* - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
*/
- struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
- /* cred released below */
- const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+ struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
int error = 0;
- tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
- /* lcred released below */
- const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee);
- struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred);
+ struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
- put_cred(lcred);
+ aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
}
- put_cred(cred);
+ aa_put_profile(tracer_p);
return error;
}
*ns_name = skip_spaces(&name[1]);
if (split) {
/* overwrite ':' with \0 */
- *split = 0;
- name = skip_spaces(split + 1);
+ *split++ = 0;
+ if (strncmp(split, "//", 2) == 0)
+ split += 2;
+ name = skip_spaces(split);
} else
/* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
name = NULL;
}
/**
- * kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
- * @size: size of allocation
+ * __aa_kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
+ * @size: how many bytes of memory are required
+ * @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc).
*
* Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed
*
* It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than
* what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc.
*/
-void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
void *buffer = NULL;
/* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */
if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE))
- buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ buffer = kmalloc(size, flags | GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!buffer) {
/* see kvfree for why size must be at least work_struct size
* when allocated via vmalloc
*/
if (size < sizeof(struct work_struct))
size = sizeof(struct work_struct);
- buffer = vmalloc(size);
+ if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+ buffer = vzalloc(size);
+ else
+ buffer = vmalloc(size);
}
return buffer;
}
/**
- * do_vfree - workqueue routine for freeing vmalloced memory
- * @work: data to be freed
- *
- * The work_struct is overlaid to the data being freed, as at the point
- * the work is scheduled the data is no longer valid, be its freeing
- * needs to be delayed until safe.
- */
-static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- vfree(work);
-}
-
-/**
* kvfree - free an allocation do by kvmalloc
* @buffer: buffer to free (MAYBE_NULL)
*
*/
void kvfree(void *buffer)
{
- if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) {
- /* Data is no longer valid so just use the allocated space
- * as the work_struct
- */
- struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *) buffer;
- INIT_WORK(work, do_vfree);
- schedule_work(work);
- } else
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer))
+ vfree(buffer);
+ else
kfree(buffer);
}
*/
static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
- cred->security = NULL;
+ aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
+ cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
}
/*
if (!cxt)
return -ENOMEM;
- cred->security = cxt;
+ cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
return 0;
}
if (!cxt)
return -ENOMEM;
- aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
- new->security = cxt;
+ aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
+ cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
return 0;
}
*/
static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
- struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
+ const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
+ struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
}
static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
- struct dentry *dentry;
int mask = 0;
if (!file || !file->f_security)
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
- dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
}
char **value)
{
int error = -ENOENT;
- struct aa_profile *profile;
/* released below */
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
- struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
- profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
- } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
- error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
- } else {
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
- sa.aad = &aad;
- aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
- aad.info = name;
- aad.error = -EINVAL;
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
- __aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
- &sa, NULL);
- }
+ } else
+ goto fail;
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
- error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
- !AA_DO_TEST);
- } else {
+ if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
+ error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
+ !AA_DO_TEST);
+ else
+ goto fail;
+ } else
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
return -EINVAL;
- }
+
if (!error)
error = size;
return error;
+
+fail:
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
+ aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+ aad.info = name;
+ aad.error = -EINVAL;
+ aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
return -ENOMEM;
cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
- cred->security = cxt;
+ cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
return 0;
}
error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
if (error) {
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+ aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
+ cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
- goto set_init_cxt_out;
+ goto register_security_out;
}
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
return error;
-set_init_cxt_out:
- aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security);
-
register_security_out:
aa_free_root_ns();
* This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/match.h"
+#define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff)
+
/**
* unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check)
* @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
*
* Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure
*
- * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kmalloc)
+ * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree)
*/
static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
{
if (bsize < tsize)
goto out;
- table = kvmalloc(tsize);
+ table = kvzalloc(tsize);
if (table) {
*table = th;
if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
goto out;
- /* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
- if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
+ if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
"bounds error\n");
goto out;
u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
/* default is direct to next state */
for (; len; len--) {
- pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
} else {
/* default is direct to next state */
for (; len; len--) {
- pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
/* default is direct to next state */
while (*str) {
- pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
} else {
/* default is direct to next state */
while (*str) {
- pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
/* default is direct to next state */
- pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c];
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c];
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
state = def[state];
} else {
/* default is direct to next state */
- pos = base[state] + (u8) c;
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c;
if (check[pos] == state)
state = next[pos];
else
if (info && error) {
if (error == -ENOENT)
*info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
- else if (error == -ESTALE)
+ else if (error == -EACCES)
*info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
*info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
#include "include/resource.h"
-#include "include/sid.h"
/* root profile namespace */
if (!ns->unconfined)
goto fail_unconfined;
- ns->unconfined->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_UNCONFINED | PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
PFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
*/
ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
+ atomic_set(&ns->uniq_null, 0);
+
return ns;
fail_unconfined:
/* released when @new is freed */
new->parent = aa_get_profile(old->parent);
new->ns = aa_get_namespace(old->ns);
- new->sid = old->sid;
__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, new);
/* inherit children */
list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &old->base.profiles, base.list) {
}
/**
- * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
- * @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
-{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
-
- /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
- profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!profile)
- return NULL;
-
- if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
- kzfree(profile);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /* refcount released by caller */
- return profile;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
- * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
- * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
- *
- * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of
- * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-sid.
- *
- * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
- * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
- * not in use.
- *
- * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
-{
- struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
- char *name;
- u32 sid = aa_alloc_sid();
-
- /* freed below */
- name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!name)
- goto fail;
- sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, sid);
-
- profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
- kfree(name);
- if (!profile)
- goto fail;
-
- profile->sid = sid;
- profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
- profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
- if (hat)
- profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
-
- /* released on free_profile */
- profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
- profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
-
- write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
- __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
- write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
-
- /* refcount released by caller */
- return profile;
-
-fail:
- aa_free_sid(sid);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
* free_profile - free a profile
* @profile: the profile to free (MAYBE NULL)
*
aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
- aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
free_profile(p);
}
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
+ * @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
+ profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
+ kzfree(profile);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* refcount released by caller */
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
+ * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
+ * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
+ *
+ * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of
+ * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-<uniq>.
+ *
+ * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
+ * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
+ * not in use.
+ *
+ * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ char *name;
+ int uniq = atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null);
+
+ /* freed below */
+ name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!name)
+ goto fail;
+ sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, uniq);
+
+ profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
+ kfree(name);
+ if (!profile)
+ goto fail;
+
+ profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+ profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
+ if (hat)
+ profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
+
+ /* released on free_profile */
+ profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
+ profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
+
+ write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
+ __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
+ write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
+
+ /* refcount released by caller */
+ return profile;
+
+fail:
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */
/**
profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *) policy);
__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, profile);
/* released on free_profile */
- profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
}
if (!error) {
if (rename_profile)
__replace_profile(rename_profile, new_profile);
- if (old_profile) {
- /* when there are both rename and old profiles
- * inherit old profiles sid
- */
- if (rename_profile)
- aa_free_sid(new_profile->sid);
+ if (old_profile)
__replace_profile(old_profile, new_profile);
- }
if (!(old_profile || rename_profile))
__add_new_profile(ns, policy, new_profile);
}
if (fqname[0] == ':') {
char *ns_name;
name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
- if (ns_name) {
- /* released below */
- ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
- if (!ns) {
- info = "namespace does not exist";
- error = -ENOENT;
- goto fail;
- }
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
+ if (!ns) {
+ info = "namespace does not exist";
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto fail;
}
} else
/* released below */
#include "include/match.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
-#include "include/sid.h"
/*
* The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
return res;
}
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff
+
/**
* verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa
* @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL)
name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test);
}
-
-int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname)
-{
- /* TODO: add ipc permission querying */
- return -ENOTSUPP;
-}
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/resource.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
+ struct aa_profile *task_profile;
int error = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ task_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task)));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
/* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
- * processes. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
- * that the task is setting the resource of the current process
+ * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
+ * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
+ * the same profile.
*/
- if ((task != current->group_leader) ||
+ if (profile != task_profile ||
(profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
error = -EACCES;
+ aa_put_profile(task_profile);
+
return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error);
}
This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
usually only added from initramfs.
+config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+ bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
+ depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
+ default y
+ help
+ In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
+ option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
+ controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
+ 0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
+ 1 - additional integrity auditing messages
+
+ Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
+ be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
+ command line.
+
config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
#
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
int evm_initialized;
+static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
+ "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
char *evm_hash = "sha1";
int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
- return -EPERM;
+ goto out;
}
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+out:
+ if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+ -EPERM, 0);
return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
return -EPERM;
}
that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
-config IMA_AUDIT
- bool "Enables auditing support"
- depends on IMA
- depends on AUDIT
- default y
- help
- This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
- allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
- at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity
- auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
- the kernel command line.
-
config IMA_LSM_RULES
bool
depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
};
extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-/* declarations */
-void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
- const char *cause, int result, int info);
-#else
-static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *fname,
- const char *op, const char *cause,
- int result, int info)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
/* Internal IMA function definitions */
int ima_init(void);
void ima_cleanup(void);
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+ const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname,
+ const char *op, const char *cause,
+ int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
/* set during initialization */
extern int iint_initialized;
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include "ima.h"
+#include "integrity.h"
-static int ima_audit;
+static int integrity_audit_info;
/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
-static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
+static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long audit;
if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
- ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
+ integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
-__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
+__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
+ if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
return;
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
#define SMK_LONGLABEL 256
/*
+ * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * and so that they can be shared.
+ *
+ * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
+ * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
+ * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
+ * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
+ * never deleted.
+ *
+ * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
+ * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
+ * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
+ * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
+ * these components have been repaired.
+ *
+ * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too.
+ *
+ * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
+ * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
+ * time.
+ */
+struct smack_known {
+ struct list_head list;
+ char *smk_known;
+ u32 smk_secid;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr smk_netlabel; /* on wire labels */
+ struct list_head smk_rules; /* access rules */
+ struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for rules */
+};
+
+/*
* Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
* Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
* bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
};
struct socket_smack {
- char *smk_out; /* outbound label */
- char *smk_in; /* inbound label */
- char *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */
+ char *smk_in; /* inbound label */
+ char *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
};
/*
* Inode smack data
*/
struct inode_smack {
- char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
- char *smk_task; /* label of the task */
- char *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */
- struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
- int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
+ char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
+ struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label of the task */
+ struct smack_known *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */
+ struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
+ int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
};
struct task_smack {
- char *smk_task; /* label for access control */
- char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
+ struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label for access control */
+ struct smack_known *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */
struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */
};
*/
struct smack_rule {
struct list_head list;
- char *smk_subject;
+ struct smack_known *smk_subject;
char *smk_object;
int smk_access;
};
};
/*
- * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
- * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
- * and so that they can be shared.
- *
- * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
- * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
- * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
- * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
- * never deleted.
- *
- * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
- * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
- * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
- * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
- * these components have been repaired.
- *
- * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too.
- *
- * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
- * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
- * time.
+ * An entry in the table identifying ports.
*/
-struct smack_known {
- struct list_head list;
- char *smk_known;
- u32 smk_secid;
- struct netlbl_lsm_secattr smk_netlabel; /* on wire labels */
- struct list_head smk_rules; /* access rules */
- struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for rules */
+struct smk_port_label {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct sock *smk_sock; /* socket initialized on */
+ unsigned short smk_port; /* the port number */
+ char *smk_in; /* incoming label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
};
/*
#define SMK_FSFLOOR "smackfsfloor="
#define SMK_FSHAT "smackfshat="
#define SMK_FSROOT "smackfsroot="
+#define SMK_FSTRANS "smackfstransmute="
#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION "-CIPSO"
* These functions are in smack_access.c
*/
int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
-int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
-char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
char *smk_import(const char *, int);
*/
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
-extern char *smack_net_ambient;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
extern char *smack_onlycap;
extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
}
/*
- * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob.
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob.
*/
-static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
{
return tsp->smk_task;
}
/*
- * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob.
+ * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
*/
-static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
{
return tsp->smk_forked;
}
/*
* Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
*/
-static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
{
return smk_of_task(current_security());
}
*/
static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
if (!capable(cap))
return 0;
- if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
+ if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp->smk_known)
return 1;
return 0;
}
list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
if (srp->smk_object == object_label &&
- srp->smk_subject == subject_label) {
+ srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) {
may = srp->smk_access;
break;
}
/**
* smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
- * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @subject_known: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
* @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
* @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
* @a : a pointer to the audit data
*
* Smack labels are shared on smack_list
*/
-int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
- struct smk_audit_info *a)
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
+ int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
- struct smack_known *skp;
int may = MAY_NOT;
int rc = 0;
*
* A star subject can't access any object.
*/
- if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known) {
+ if (subject_known == &smack_known_star) {
rc = -EACCES;
goto out_audit;
}
* An internet subject can access any object.
*/
if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
- subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+ subject_known == &smack_known_web)
goto out_audit;
/*
* A star object can be accessed by any subject.
* An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
* with the same label.
*/
- if (subject_label == object_label)
+ if (subject_known->smk_known == object_label)
goto out_audit;
/*
* A hat subject can read any object.
if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known)
goto out_audit;
- if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known)
+ if (subject_known == &smack_known_hat)
goto out_audit;
}
/*
* good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
* indicates there is no entry for this pair.
*/
- skp = smk_find_entry(subject_label);
rcu_read_lock();
- may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &skp->smk_rules);
+ may = smk_access_entry(subject_known->smk_known, object_label,
+ &subject_known->smk_rules);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
out_audit:
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
if (a)
- smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a);
+ smack_log(subject_known->smk_known, object_label, request,
+ rc, a);
#endif
return rc;
}
int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
- char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
int may;
int rc;
/*
* Check the global rule list
*/
- rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
if (rc == 0) {
/*
* If there is an entry in the task's rule list
* it can further restrict access.
*/
- may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
+ may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
+ &tsp->smk_rules);
if (may < 0)
goto out_audit;
if ((mode & may) == mode)
out_audit:
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
if (a)
- smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
+ smack_log(skp->smk_known, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
#endif
return rc;
}
sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
sap->attr.mls.lvl = level;
sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!sap->attr.mls.cat)
+ return -ENOMEM;
sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++)
* smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
* @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
*
- * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one,
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label entry if there is one,
* otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
*/
-char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
rcu_read_unlock();
- return skp->smk_known;
+ return skp;
}
}
* of a secid that is not on the list.
*/
rcu_read_unlock();
- return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+ return &smack_known_invalid;
}
/**
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
+#define SMK_CONNECTING 0
+#define SMK_RECEIVING 1
+#define SMK_SENDING 2
+
+LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+
/**
* smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
* @ip: a pointer to the inode
* Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
* or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
*/
-static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
+static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
+ struct dentry *dp)
{
int rc;
char *buffer;
- char *result = NULL;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
return NULL;
rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
if (rc > 0)
- result = smk_import(buffer, rc);
+ skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
kfree(buffer);
- return result;
+ return skp;
}
/**
*
* Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
*/
-static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
+ struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct task_smack *tsp;
{
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- char *tsp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
+ skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
- rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
{
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- char *tsp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
+ skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
- rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
{
int rc = 0;
- char *sp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
- if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
+ if (skp != &smack_known_floor)
rc = -EACCES;
return rc;
sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
- sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
-
+ /*
+ * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc.
+ */
sb->s_security = sbsp;
return 0;
dp = smackopts;
else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
dp = smackopts;
+ else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
+ dp = smackopts;
else
dp = otheropts;
char *op;
char *commap;
char *nsp;
+ int transmute = 0;
- if (sp->smk_initialized != 0)
+ if (sp->smk_initialized)
return 0;
sp->smk_initialized = 1;
nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
if (nsp != NULL)
sp->smk_root = nsp;
+ } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
+ op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
+ nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+ if (nsp != NULL) {
+ sp->smk_root = nsp;
+ transmute = 1;
+ }
}
}
* Initialize the root inode.
*/
isp = inode->i_security;
- if (isp == NULL)
+ if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
- else
+ isp = inode->i_security;
+ } else
isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
+ if (transmute)
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
return 0;
}
*/
static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp->smk_known);
if (inode->i_security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
void **value, size_t *len)
{
- struct smack_known *skp;
struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
- char *csp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
int may;
}
if (value) {
- skp = smk_find_entry(csp);
rcu_read_lock();
- may = smk_access_entry(csp, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
+ may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- char *nsp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
- nsp = smk_import(value, size);
- if (nsp != NULL)
- isp->smk_inode = nsp;
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
else
isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
- nsp = smk_import(value, size);
- if (nsp != NULL)
- isp->smk_task = nsp;
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ isp->smk_task = skp;
else
- isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+ isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
- nsp = smk_import(value, size);
- if (nsp != NULL)
- isp->smk_mmap = nsp;
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ isp->smk_mmap = skp;
else
- isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
- } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
- isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+ isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
+ }
return;
}
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
isp = ssp->smk_in;
else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
- isp = ssp->smk_out;
+ isp = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ file->f_security = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
unsigned long flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *mkp;
struct smack_rule *srp;
struct task_smack *tsp;
- char *sp;
- char *msmack;
char *osmack;
struct inode_smack *isp;
int may;
isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
return 0;
- msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
+ mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
tsp = current_security();
- sp = smk_of_current();
- skp = smk_find_entry(sp);
+ skp = smk_of_current();
rc = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
/*
* Matching labels always allows access.
*/
- if (msmack == osmack)
+ if (mkp->smk_known == osmack)
continue;
/*
* If there is a matching local rule take
* that into account as well.
*/
- may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
+ may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known, osmack,
&tsp->smk_rules);
if (may == -ENOENT)
may = srp->smk_access;
* If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
* can't have as much access as current.
*/
- skp = smk_find_entry(msmack);
- mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &skp->smk_rules);
+ mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack,
+ &mkp->smk_rules);
if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
rc = -EACCES;
break;
* If there is a local entry it modifies the
* potential access, too.
*/
- tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
+ tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack,
+ &tsp->smk_rules);
if (tmay != -ENOENT)
mmay &= tmay;
*/
static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ file->f_security = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
struct file *file;
int rc;
- char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
/*
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
- rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+ skp = smk_find_entry(file->f_security);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
- smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+ smack_log(file->f_security, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
- char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- if (smack == NULL)
+ if (skp == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
+ new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
return 0;
}
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
- tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
- tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+ tsp->smk_forked = smk_find_entry(isp->smk_inode);
+ tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
return 0;
}
const char *caller)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
+ return smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, access, &ad);
}
/**
*/
static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+
+ *secid = skp->smk_secid;
}
/**
int sig, u32 secid)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
* can write the receiver.
*/
if (secid == 0)
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
- &ad);
+ return smk_curacc(tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
/*
* If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
- smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ return smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
- isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+
+ isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
}
/*
*/
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
- char *csp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
struct socket_smack *ssp;
ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
if (ssp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- ssp->smk_in = csp;
- ssp->smk_out = csp;
+ ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_out = skp;
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
sk->sk_security = ssp;
labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
else {
- skp = smk_find_entry(ssp->smk_out);
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
}
*/
static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
int rc;
int sk_lbl;
char *hostsp;
ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
#endif
sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
- rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ rc = smk_access(skp, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
} else {
sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
rc = 0;
}
/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct smk_port_label *spp;
+ unsigned short port = 0;
+
+ if (address == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This operation is changing the Smack information
+ * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
+ * as well.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+ if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
+ continue;
+ spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+ spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
+ * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+ /*
+ * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
+ */
+ if (port == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Look for an existing port list entry.
+ * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+ if (spp->smk_port != port)
+ continue;
+ spp->smk_port = port;
+ spp->smk_sock = sk;
+ spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+ spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A new port entry is required.
+ */
+ spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (spp == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ spp->smk_port = port;
+ spp->smk_sock = sk;
+ spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+ spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+
+ list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int act)
+{
+ __be16 *bep;
+ __be32 *be32p;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+ struct smk_port_label *spp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ unsigned short port = 0;
+ char *object;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
+ skp = smack_net_ambient;
+ object = ssp->smk_in;
+ } else {
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ object = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the IP address and port from the address.
+ */
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+ bep = (__be16 *)(&addr6->sin6_addr);
+ be32p = (__be32 *)(&addr6->sin6_addr);
+
+ /*
+ * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
+ */
+ if (be32p[0] || be32p[1] || be32p[2] || bep[6] || ntohs(bep[7]) != 1)
+ goto auditout;
+
+ /*
+ * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
+ */
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
+ skp = &smack_known_web;
+ goto auditout;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+ if (spp->smk_port != port)
+ continue;
+ object = spp->smk_in;
+ if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
+ ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out->smk_known;
+ break;
+ }
+
+auditout:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->dport = port;
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+ ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+ else
+ ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+ return smk_access(skp, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
* smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
* @inode: the object
* @name: attribute name
static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- char *sp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct socket *sock;
if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
return -EACCES;
- sp = smk_import(value, size);
- if (sp == NULL)
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+ if (skp == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
- nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+ nsp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
return 0;
}
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
- ssp->smk_in = sp;
+ ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
- ssp->smk_out = sp;
- if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
+ ssp->smk_out = skp;
+ if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING
} else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+ smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
+
return 0;
}
}
/**
+ * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @address: the port address
+ * @addrlen: size of the address
+ *
+ * Records the label bound to a port.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+ smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
* smack_socket_connect - connect access check
* @sock: the socket
* @sap: the other end
static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
int addrlen)
{
- if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (sock->sk == NULL)
return 0;
- if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
- return -EINVAL;
- return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_CONNECTING);
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
/**
*/
static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- msg->security = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ msg->security = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- isp->security = smk_of_current();
+ isp->security = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- isp->security = smk_of_current();
+ isp->security = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
- kisp->security = smk_of_current();
+ kisp->security = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
struct super_block *sbp;
struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
struct inode_smack *isp;
- char *csp = smk_of_current();
- char *fetched;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
char *final;
char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
int transflag = 0;
* Programs that change smack have to treat the
* pty with respect.
*/
- final = csp;
+ final = ckp->smk_known;
break;
case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
/*
* Get the dentry for xattr.
*/
dp = dget(opt_dentry);
- fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
- if (fetched != NULL)
- final = fetched;
+ skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ final = skp->smk_known;
/*
* Transmuting directory
}
if (final == NULL)
- isp->smk_inode = csp;
+ isp->smk_inode = ckp->smk_known;
else
isp->smk_inode = final;
*/
static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
char *cp;
int slen;
if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
+ cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
if (cp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
{
struct task_smack *tsp;
struct cred *new;
- char *newsmack;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
/*
* Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
- if (newsmack == NULL)
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+ if (skp == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
*/
- if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+ if (skp == &smack_known_web)
return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
return -ENOMEM;
tsp = new->security;
- tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
+ tsp->smk_task = skp;
commit_creds(new);
return size;
static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
#endif
- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ rc = smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ }
/*
* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
*/
if (rc == 0) {
- nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
- ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
+ nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out->smk_known;
}
return rc;
{
struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- int rc = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
struct lsm_network_audit net;
smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
#endif
- if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
- return rc;
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
* @msg: the message
* @size: the size of the message
*
- * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
- * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
- * label host.
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
+ * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
+ * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
*/
static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+ struct sockaddr *sap = (struct sockaddr *) msg->msg_name;
+ int rc = 0;
/*
* Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
*/
- if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
+ if (sip == NULL)
return 0;
- return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
+ switch (sip->sin_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
/**
* @sap: netlabel secattr
* @ssp: socket security information
*
- * Returns a pointer to a Smack label found on the label list.
+ * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
*/
-static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
- struct socket_smack *ssp)
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+ struct socket_smack *ssp)
{
- struct smack_known *kp;
- char *sp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
int found = 0;
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
* ambient value.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry(kp, &smack_known_list, list) {
- if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != kp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
+ list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+ if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
continue;
if (memcmp(sap->attr.mls.cat,
- kp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
SMK_CIPSOLEN) != 0)
continue;
found = 1;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (found)
- return kp->smk_known;
+ return skp;
if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
- return smack_known_web.smk_known;
- return smack_known_star.smk_known;
+ return &smack_known_web;
+ return &smack_known_star;
}
if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
/*
* Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
*/
- sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
/*
* This has got to be a bug because it is
* impossible to specify a fallback without
* it has a secid, and the only way to get a
* secid is from a fallback.
*/
- BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
- return sp;
+ BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
+ return skp;
}
/*
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
return smack_net_ambient;
}
+static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr *sap)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
+ u8 nexthdr;
+ int offset;
+ int proto = -EINVAL;
+ struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
+ struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+ __be16 frag_off;
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+ struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+ sip->sin6_port = 0;
+
+ offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+ ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+ if (ip6 == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
+
+ nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+ offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+ offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ proto = nexthdr;
+ switch (proto) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+ if (th != NULL)
+ sip->sin6_port = th->source;
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ if (uh != NULL)
+ sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP:
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
+ break;
+ }
+ return proto;
+}
+
/**
* smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
* @sk: socket
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
- char *csp;
- int rc;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct sockaddr sadd;
+ int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
struct lsm_network_audit net;
#endif
- if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Translate what netlabel gave us.
- */
- netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ switch (sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ /*
+ * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+ */
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
- rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
- if (rc == 0)
- csp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
- else
- csp = smack_net_ambient;
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+ else
+ skp = smack_net_ambient;
- netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
- smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
- ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
- ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
- ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+ ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
#endif
- /*
- * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
- * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
- * This is the simplist possible security model
- * for networking.
- */
- rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
- if (rc != 0)
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+ /*
+ * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+ * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+ * This is the simplist possible security model
+ * for networking.
+ */
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ rc = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
+ if (rc == IPPROTO_UDP || rc == IPPROTO_TCP)
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
+ else
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
return rc;
}
{
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
- char *sp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
int family = PF_UNSPEC;
u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
int rc;
if (family == PF_UNIX) {
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
- s = smack_to_secid(ssp->smk_out);
+ s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
} else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
- sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
- s = smack_to_secid(sp);
+ skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+ s = skp->smk_secid;
}
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
}
static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
if (sk == NULL ||
(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
return;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
- ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
+ ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+ ssp->smk_out = skp;
/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
}
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
struct iphdr *hdr;
- char *sp;
char *hsp;
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net;
#endif
- /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
- if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
- family = PF_INET;
+ if (family == PF_INET6) {
+ /*
+ * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
+ * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
+ * processing on IPv6.
+ */
+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0)
- sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+ skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
else
- sp = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
+ skp = &smack_known_huh;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
* Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
* here. Read access is not required.
*/
- rc = smk_access(sp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
* Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
* smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
*/
- req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(sp);
+ req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
/*
* We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
hsp = smack_host_label(&addr);
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (hsp == NULL) {
- skp = smk_find_entry(sp);
+ if (hsp == NULL)
rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
- } else
+ else
netlbl_req_delattr(req);
return rc;
const struct request_sock *req)
{
struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
- if (req->peer_secid != 0)
- ssp->smk_packet = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
- else
+ if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
+ skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
+ ssp->smk_packet = skp->smk_known;
+ } else
ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
}
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+
+ key->security = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
{
struct key *keyp;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (keyp == NULL)
/*
* This should not occur
*/
- if (tsp == NULL)
+ if (tkp == NULL)
return -EACCES;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
#endif
- return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
- MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+ return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
- char *smack;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
char *rule = vrule;
if (!rule) {
if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
return 0;
- smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
/*
* No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
* label.
*/
if (op == Audit_equal)
- return (rule == smack);
+ return (rule == skp->smk_known);
if (op == Audit_not_equal)
- return (rule != smack);
+ return (rule != skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
*/
static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
if (secdata)
- *secdata = sp;
- *seclen = strlen(sp);
+ *secdata = skp->smk_known;
+ *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
return 0;
}
.unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
.socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
+ .socket_bind = smack_socket_bind,
.socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
.socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
.socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
return 0;
- tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
- smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
* If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
* It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
*/
-char *smack_net_ambient;
+struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
/*
* This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
struct smack_parsed_rule {
- char *smk_subject;
+ struct smack_known *smk_subject;
char *smk_object;
int smk_access1;
int smk_access2;
*/
static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current());
+ nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
}
/*
struct smack_known *skp;
if (import) {
- rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
+ rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
return -1;
kfree(cp);
if (skp == NULL)
return -1;
- rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
+ rule->smk_subject = skp;
cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
if (cp == NULL)
struct list_head *rule_list,
struct mutex *rule_lock, int format)
{
- struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_parsed_rule *rule;
char *data;
int datalen;
goto out_free_rule;
}
-
if (rule_list == NULL) {
load = 1;
- skp = smk_find_entry(rule->smk_subject);
- rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
- rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
+ rule_list = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules;
+ rule_lock = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules_lock;
}
rc = smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock, load);
* because you should expect to be able to write
* anything you read back.
*/
- if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
+ if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max ||
+ strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
return;
if (srp->smk_access == 0)
return;
- seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
+ seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject->smk_known, srp->smk_object);
seq_putc(s, ' ');
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
}
if (smack_net_ambient == NULL)
- smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+ smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor;
- rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient->smk_known, PF_INET,
NULL, NULL, &nai);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
else
- rule += strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
*/
mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
- asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient) + 1;
+ asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient->smk_known) + 1;
if (cn >= asize)
rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos,
- smack_net_ambient, asize);
+ smack_net_ambient->smk_known,
+ asize);
else
rc = -EINVAL;
static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
char *oldambient;
- char *smack = NULL;
char *data;
int rc = count;
goto out;
}
- smack = smk_import(data, count);
- if (smack == NULL) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ if (skp == NULL) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
- oldambient = smack_net_ambient;
- smack_net_ambient = smack;
+ oldambient = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
+ smack_net_ambient = skp;
smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient);
mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *data;
- char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
int rc = count;
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
* explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
* would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
*/
- if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
+ if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp->smk_known)
return -EPERM;
data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (res)
return -EINVAL;
- res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, rule.smk_access1,
- NULL);
+ res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
+ rule.smk_access1, NULL);
data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0';
data[1] = '\0';
projects / platform / adaptation / renesas_rcar / renesas_kernel.git / commitdiff