Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs

This patch adds initial support for verifying the confirmation value
that the remote side has sent.

Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index c284be0..b03d9c4 100644 (file)
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ struct l2cap_conn {
 
        __u8            disc_reason;
 
+       __u8            preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
+       __u8            prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
+       __u8            prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random */
+       __u8            pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
+
        struct list_head chan_l;
        rwlock_t        chan_lock;
 };

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 57fc7d0..fa22f4a 100644 (file)
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
        BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+       conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+       memcpy(&conn->preq[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
        skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
        rp->io_capability = 0x00;
@@ -196,17 +198,25 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
        rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
        rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
 
+       conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+       memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
+
        smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
 }
 
 static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+       struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
        struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
 
        BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
        memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
 
+       conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+       memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
+       skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
        smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 }
 
@@ -266,6 +276,9 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
        cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
        cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
 
+       conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+       memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
        smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 }
 
@@ -303,6 +316,10 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
                cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
                cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
                cp.auth_req = authreq;
+
+               conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+               memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
                smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
        } else {
                struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;