apparmor: move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}

AppArmor split out task oriented controls to their own logical file
a while ago. Ptrace mediation is better grouped with task than
ipc, so move it.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index d583824..d066ccc 100644 (file)
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
 #include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
 
 /*
  * The apparmor filesystem interface used for policy load and introspection

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index 9cafd80..a1ac6ff 100644 (file)
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -13,24 +13,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
-struct aa_profile;
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE                MAY_WRITE
-#define AA_PTRACE_READ         MAY_READ
-#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED       AA_MAY_APPEND
-#define AA_MAY_BE_READ         AA_MAY_CREATE
-#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT      2
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
-                            AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
-#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
-
-#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
-       "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
-       "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
-
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-                 u32 request);
 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
 
 #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index f13d123..13437d6 100644 (file)
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -77,4 +77,22 @@ static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
        ctx->token = 0;
 }
 
+#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE                MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_PTRACE_READ         MAY_READ
+#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED       AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_MAY_BE_READ         AA_MAY_CREATE
+#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT      2
+
+#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
+                            AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
+#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+
+#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
+       "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
+       "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
+
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+                 u32 request);
+
+
 #endif /* __AA_TASK_H */

diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index fe36d11..3dbbc59 100644 (file)
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/ptrace.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
@@ -18,115 +17,6 @@
 #include "include/ipc.h"
 #include "include/sig_names.h"
 
-/**
- * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
- * @mask: permission mask to convert
- *
- * Returns: pointer to static string
- */
-static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
-{
-       switch (mask) {
-       case MAY_READ:
-               return "read";
-       case MAY_WRITE:
-               return "trace";
-       case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
-               return "readby";
-       case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
-               return "tracedby";
-       }
-       return "";
-}
-
-/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
-static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-{
-       struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-
-       if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
-               audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
-                                audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
-
-               if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
-                       audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
-                                        audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
-               }
-       }
-       audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
-       aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
-                       FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
-}
-
-/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
-/* TODO: conditionals */
-static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-                            struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
-                            struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-       struct aa_perms perms = { };
-
-       aad(sa)->peer = peer;
-       aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
-                              &perms);
-       aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
-       return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
-                              struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
-                              struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-       if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
-           !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-               return 0;
-
-       return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
-                              struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
-                              struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
-       if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
-               return 0;
-
-       if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-               return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
-
-       /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
-       if (&tracer->label == tracee)
-               return 0;
-
-       aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
-       aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
-       aad(sa)->request = 0;
-       aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
-                                   CAP_OPT_NONE);
-
-       return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
- * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
- * @tracee: task label to be traced
- * @request: permission request
- *
- * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
- */
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
-                 u32 request)
-{
-       struct aa_profile *profile;
-       u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
-       DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
-
-       return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
-                       profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
-                       profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
-}
-
 
 static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
 {

diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index d17130e..503dc08 100644 (file)
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -12,7 +12,12 @@
  * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
  */
 
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/task.h"
 
 /**
@@ -177,3 +182,112 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
 
        return 0;
 }
+
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+       switch (mask) {
+       case MAY_READ:
+               return "read";
+       case MAY_WRITE:
+               return "trace";
+       case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+               return "readby";
+       case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+               return "tracedby";
+       }
+       return "";
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+       struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+       if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+                                audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+
+               if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+                       audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+                                        audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+               }
+       }
+       audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+       aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+                       FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+                            struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+                            struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+       struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+       aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+       aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+                              &perms);
+       aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+       return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+                              struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+                              struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+       if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+           !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+               return 0;
+
+       return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+                              struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+                              struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+       if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+               return 0;
+
+       if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+               return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+       /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+       if (&tracer->label == tracee)
+               return 0;
+
+       aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
+       aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
+       aad(sa)->request = 0;
+       aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+                                   CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+       return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+                 u32 request)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
+       DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
+
+       return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+                       profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+                       profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+}