This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall
return (via __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE) still sees USER_DS. Since
trying to deal with values other than USER_DS and KERNEL_DS across all
architectures in a safe way is not sensible, this sets KERNEL_DS, but
since that could be extremely dangerous if the protection is not present,
it also raises SIGKILL for current, so that no matter what, the process
will die. A successful test will be visible with a BUG(), like all the
other LKDTM tests.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
void lkdtm_REFCOUNT_ZERO_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
+void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
/* lkdtm_heap.c */
void lkdtm_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION(void);
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
struct lkdtm_list {
struct list_head node;
else
pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
}
+
+void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
+{
+ pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
+ set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
+
+ /* Make sure we do not keep running with a KERNEL_DS! */
+ force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
+}
CRASHTYPE(OVERFLOW),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_ADD),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
+ CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_USER_DS),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK),
CRASHTYPE(UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE),
CRASHTYPE(OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION),