security: Add AID_NET_RAW and AID_NET_ADMIN capability check in cap_capable().

Signed-off-by: Chia-chi Yeh <chiachi@android.com>

diff --git a/include/linux/android_aid.h b/include/linux/android_aid.h
index d22723a..7f16a14 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/android_aid.h
+++ b/include/linux/android_aid.h
@@ -21,5 +21,6 @@
 #define AID_NET_BT       3002
 #define AID_INET         3003
 #define AID_NET_RAW      3004
+#define AID_NET_ADMIN    3005
 
 #endif

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a93b3b7..1322b6a 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
+#include <linux/android_aid.h>
+#endif
+
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
  * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
@@ -83,6 +87,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
 int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
                struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
 {
+       if (cap == CAP_NET_RAW && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_RAW))
+               return 0;
+       if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_ADMIN))
+               return 0;
+
        for (;;) {
                /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
                if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)