ice-$(CONFIG_PCI_IOV) += \
ice_virtchnl_allowlist.o \
ice_virtchnl_fdir.o \
- ice_sriov.o \
+ ice_vf_mbx.o \
ice_vf_vsi_vlan_ops.o \
ice_virtchnl_pf.o
ice-$(CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK) += ice_ptp.o ice_ptp_hw.o
#include "ice_sched.h"
#include "ice_idc_int.h"
#include "ice_virtchnl_pf.h"
-#include "ice_sriov.h"
+#include "ice_vf_mbx.h"
#include "ice_ptp.h"
#include "ice_fdir.h"
#include "ice_xsk.h"
+++ /dev/null
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */
-
-#include "ice_common.h"
-#include "ice_sriov.h"
-
-/**
- * ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf
- * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
- * @vfid: VF ID to send msg
- * @v_opcode: opcodes for VF-PF communication
- * @v_retval: return error code
- * @msg: pointer to the msg buffer
- * @msglen: msg length
- * @cd: pointer to command details
- *
- * Send message to VF driver (0x0802) using mailbox
- * queue and asynchronously sending message via
- * ice_sq_send_cmd() function
- */
-int
-ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval,
- u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd)
-{
- struct ice_aqc_pf_vf_msg *cmd;
- struct ice_aq_desc desc;
-
- ice_fill_dflt_direct_cmd_desc(&desc, ice_mbx_opc_send_msg_to_vf);
-
- cmd = &desc.params.virt;
- cmd->id = cpu_to_le32(vfid);
-
- desc.cookie_high = cpu_to_le32(v_opcode);
- desc.cookie_low = cpu_to_le32(v_retval);
-
- if (msglen)
- desc.flags |= cpu_to_le16(ICE_AQ_FLAG_RD);
-
- return ice_sq_send_cmd(hw, &hw->mailboxq, &desc, msg, msglen, cd);
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl
- * @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed
- * @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted
- *
- * Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl.
- * If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return
- * link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller
- * needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where
- * adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can
- * expect the speed in Mbps.
- */
-u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed)
-{
- u32 speed;
-
- if (adv_link_support)
- switch (link_speed) {
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_1000MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_2500MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_5000MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10000MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_20000MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_25000MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_40000MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_50000MBPS;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100000MBPS;
- break;
- default:
- speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- }
- else
- /* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in
- * the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF
- * drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are
- * resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds
- */
- switch (link_speed) {
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB:
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB:
- speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB:
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB:
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB:
- speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB:
- speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_10GB;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB:
- speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_20GB;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB:
- speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_25GB;
- break;
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB:
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB:
- case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB:
- speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB;
- break;
- default:
- speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- }
-
- return speed;
-}
-
-/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there
- * is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the
- * PF.
- * 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during
- * driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot().
- * The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of
- * messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF.
- *
- * 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an
- * interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before
- * the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This can be
- * done via ice_mbx_reset_snapshot().
- *
- * 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must
- * call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler().
- * Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is
- * filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm.
- *
- * 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a VFId is received which
- * is passed to the state handler. The boolean output is_malvf of the state
- * handler ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the caller
- * whether this VF is malicious or not.
- *
- * 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message
- * to the system administrator. The caller can invoke ice_mbx_report_malvf()
- * to help determine if a malicious VF is to be reported or not. This function
- * requires the caller to maintain a global bitmap to track all malicious VFs
- * and pass that to ice_mbx_report_malvf() along with the VFID which was identified
- * to be malicious by ice_mbx_vf_state_handler().
- *
- * 6. The global bitmap maintained by PF can be cleared completely if PF is in
- * reset or the bit corresponding to a VF can be cleared if that VF is in reset.
- * When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we assume that the new VF
- * brought up is not malicious and hence report it if found malicious.
- *
- * 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information
- * in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled.
- *
- * 8. The memory allocated for variables in ice_mbx_snapshot is de-allocated
- * when driver is unloaded.
- */
-#define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M)
-/* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that
- * the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm
- */
-#define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot
- * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
- * @new_state: new algorithm state
- *
- * Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking
- * for malicious VFs.
- */
-static void
-ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw,
- enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state)
-{
- struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
- u32 num_iterations;
-
- snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf;
-
- /* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask
- * on the incremented iteration count.
- */
- num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations);
-
- /* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal:
- * Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to
- * the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end
- * of the static snapshot.
- * Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a
- * given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need
- * to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not
- * check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal
- * to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item.
- */
- if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head ||
- (snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT &&
- ++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx))
- *new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot
- * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
- * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID
- * @new_state: new algorithm state
- * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious
- *
- * This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages
- * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds
- * the permissible number of messages to send.
- */
-static int
-ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id,
- enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state,
- bool *is_malvf)
-{
- struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
-
- if (vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
- return -EIO;
-
- /* increment the message count in the VF array */
- snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id]++;
-
- if (snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD)
- *is_malvf = true;
-
- /* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */
- ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_reset_snapshot - Reset mailbox snapshot structure
- * @snap: pointer to mailbox snapshot structure in the ice_hw struct
- *
- * Reset the mailbox snapshot structure and clear VF counter array.
- */
-static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap)
-{
- u32 vfcntr_len;
-
- if (!snap || !snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr)
- return;
-
- /* Clear VF counters. */
- vfcntr_len = snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len;
- if (vfcntr_len)
- memset(snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr, 0,
- (vfcntr_len * sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr)));
-
- /* Reset mailbox snapshot for a new capture. */
- memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
- snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm
- * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
- * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data
- * @vf_id: relative virtual function (VF) ID
- * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious
- *
- * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF
- * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state
- * transitions of the algorithm:
- * New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static
- * snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is
- * cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is
- * logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect
- * asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot
- * and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that
- * snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters
- * traverse or detect states.
- * Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate
- * through the snapshot without any action on VF.
- * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse
- * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF.
- */
-int
-ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
- struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id,
- bool *is_malvf)
-{
- struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
- struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
- struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq;
- enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state;
- int status = 0;
-
- if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF
- * is not malicious until detected.
- */
- *is_malvf = false;
-
- /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current
- * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold.
- */
- if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit
- * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox
- * nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the
- * mailbox serviced in current interrupt.
- */
- if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD ||
- mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID;
- snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf;
-
- switch (snap_buf->state) {
- case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT:
- /* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */
- ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap);
-
- /* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and
- * the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the
- * Mailbox for current interrupt.
- */
- snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq;
- snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc;
- snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx;
-
- /* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the
- * head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail
- * value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot.
- */
- snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean +
- mbx_data->num_pending_arq);
- snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1);
- snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail;
-
- /* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem
- * is the difference between the head and tail of the
- * mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark
- * helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs.
- */
- if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >=
- mbx_data->async_watermark_val) {
- new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
- status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf);
- } else {
- new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
- ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
- }
- break;
-
- case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE:
- new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
- ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
- break;
-
- case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT:
- new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
- status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf);
- break;
-
- default:
- new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID;
- status = -EIO;
- }
-
- snap_buf->state = new_state;
-
- return status;
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF
- * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
- * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF
- * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits
- * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF
- * @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported
- *
- * This function will update a bitmap that keeps track of the malicious
- * VFs attached to the PF. A malicious VF must be reported only once if
- * discovered between VF resets or loading so the function checks
- * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been
- * detected in any previous mailbox iterations.
- */
-int
-ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
- u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf)
-{
- if (!all_malvfs || !report_malvf)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- *report_malvf = false;
-
- if (bitmap_len < hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (vf_id >= bitmap_len)
- return -EIO;
-
- /* If the vf_id is found in the bitmap set bit and boolean to true */
- if (!test_and_set_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs))
- *report_malvf = true;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF bitmap and counter for VF ID
- * @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot structure
- * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF
- * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits
- * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF
- *
- * In case of a VF reset, this function can be called to clear
- * the bit corresponding to the VF ID in the bitmap tracking all
- * malicious VFs attached to the PF. The function also clears the
- * VF counter array at the index of the VF ID. This is to ensure
- * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going
- * through the overflow detection algorithm.
- */
-int
-ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
- u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id)
-{
- if (!snap || !all_malvfs)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */
- if (vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
- return -EIO;
-
- /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */
- clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs);
-
- /* Clear the VF counter in the mailbox snapshot structure for that VF ID.
- * This is to ensure that if a VF is unloaded and a new one brought back
- * up with the same VF ID for a snapshot currently in traversal or detect
- * state the counter for that VF ID does not increment on top of existing
- * values in the mailbox overflow detection algorithm.
- */
- snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] = 0;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot structure
- * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
- * @vf_count: number of VFs allocated on a PF
- *
- * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and allocate memory
- * for the VF counter array based on the number of VFs allocated
- * on that PF.
- *
- * Assumption: This function will assume ice_get_caps() has already been
- * called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number
- * of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device.
- */
-int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count)
-{
- struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
-
- /* Ensure that the number of VFs allocated is non-zero and
- * is not greater than the number of supported VFs defined in
- * the functional capabilities of the PF.
- */
- if (!vf_count || vf_count > hw->func_caps.num_allocd_vfs)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), vf_count,
- sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- /* Setting the VF counter length to the number of allocated
- * VFs for given PF's functional capabilities.
- */
- snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = vf_count;
-
- /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the
- * mailbox snapshot state to a new capture.
- */
- memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
- snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot - Free mailbox snapshot structure
- * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
- *
- * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and free the VF counter array.
- */
-void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw)
-{
- struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
-
- /* Free VF counter array and reset VF counter length */
- devm_kfree(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr);
- snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = 0;
-
- /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure */
- memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
-}
+++ /dev/null
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */
-
-#ifndef _ICE_SRIOV_H_
-#define _ICE_SRIOV_H_
-
-#include "ice_type.h"
-#include "ice_controlq.h"
-
-/* Defining the mailbox message threshold as 63 asynchronous
- * pending messages. Normal VF functionality does not require
- * sending more than 63 asynchronous pending message.
- */
-#define ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD 63
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
-int
-ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval,
- u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd);
-
-u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed);
-int
-ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data,
- u16 vf_id, bool *is_mal_vf);
-int
-ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
- u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id);
-int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count);
-void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw);
-int
-ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
- u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf);
-#else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
-static inline int
-ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw __always_unused *hw,
- u16 __always_unused vfid, u32 __always_unused v_opcode,
- u32 __always_unused v_retval, u8 __always_unused *msg,
- u16 __always_unused msglen,
- struct ice_sq_cd __always_unused *cd)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline u32
-ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool __always_unused adv_link_support,
- u16 __always_unused link_speed)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
-#endif /* _ICE_SRIOV_H_ */
--- /dev/null
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include "ice_common.h"
+#include "ice_vf_mbx.h"
+
+/**
+ * ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf
+ * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
+ * @vfid: VF ID to send msg
+ * @v_opcode: opcodes for VF-PF communication
+ * @v_retval: return error code
+ * @msg: pointer to the msg buffer
+ * @msglen: msg length
+ * @cd: pointer to command details
+ *
+ * Send message to VF driver (0x0802) using mailbox
+ * queue and asynchronously sending message via
+ * ice_sq_send_cmd() function
+ */
+int
+ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval,
+ u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd)
+{
+ struct ice_aqc_pf_vf_msg *cmd;
+ struct ice_aq_desc desc;
+
+ ice_fill_dflt_direct_cmd_desc(&desc, ice_mbx_opc_send_msg_to_vf);
+
+ cmd = &desc.params.virt;
+ cmd->id = cpu_to_le32(vfid);
+
+ desc.cookie_high = cpu_to_le32(v_opcode);
+ desc.cookie_low = cpu_to_le32(v_retval);
+
+ if (msglen)
+ desc.flags |= cpu_to_le16(ICE_AQ_FLAG_RD);
+
+ return ice_sq_send_cmd(hw, &hw->mailboxq, &desc, msg, msglen, cd);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl
+ * @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed
+ * @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted
+ *
+ * Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl.
+ * If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return
+ * link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller
+ * needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where
+ * adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can
+ * expect the speed in Mbps.
+ */
+u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed)
+{
+ u32 speed;
+
+ if (adv_link_support)
+ switch (link_speed) {
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_1000MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_2500MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_5000MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10000MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_20000MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_25000MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_40000MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_50000MBPS;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100000MBPS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ /* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in
+ * the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF
+ * drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are
+ * resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds
+ */
+ switch (link_speed) {
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB:
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB:
+ speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB:
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB:
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB:
+ speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB:
+ speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_10GB;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB:
+ speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_20GB;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB:
+ speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_25GB;
+ break;
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB:
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB:
+ case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB:
+ speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB;
+ break;
+ default:
+ speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return speed;
+}
+
+/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there
+ * is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the
+ * PF.
+ * 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during
+ * driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot().
+ * The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of
+ * messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF.
+ *
+ * 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an
+ * interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before
+ * the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This can be
+ * done via ice_mbx_reset_snapshot().
+ *
+ * 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must
+ * call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler().
+ * Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is
+ * filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm.
+ *
+ * 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a VFId is received which
+ * is passed to the state handler. The boolean output is_malvf of the state
+ * handler ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the caller
+ * whether this VF is malicious or not.
+ *
+ * 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message
+ * to the system administrator. The caller can invoke ice_mbx_report_malvf()
+ * to help determine if a malicious VF is to be reported or not. This function
+ * requires the caller to maintain a global bitmap to track all malicious VFs
+ * and pass that to ice_mbx_report_malvf() along with the VFID which was identified
+ * to be malicious by ice_mbx_vf_state_handler().
+ *
+ * 6. The global bitmap maintained by PF can be cleared completely if PF is in
+ * reset or the bit corresponding to a VF can be cleared if that VF is in reset.
+ * When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we assume that the new VF
+ * brought up is not malicious and hence report it if found malicious.
+ *
+ * 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information
+ * in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled.
+ *
+ * 8. The memory allocated for variables in ice_mbx_snapshot is de-allocated
+ * when driver is unloaded.
+ */
+#define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M)
+/* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that
+ * the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm
+ */
+#define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot
+ * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
+ * @new_state: new algorithm state
+ *
+ * Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking
+ * for malicious VFs.
+ */
+static void
+ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw,
+ enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state)
+{
+ struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
+ u32 num_iterations;
+
+ snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf;
+
+ /* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask
+ * on the incremented iteration count.
+ */
+ num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations);
+
+ /* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal:
+ * Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to
+ * the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end
+ * of the static snapshot.
+ * Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a
+ * given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need
+ * to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not
+ * check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal
+ * to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item.
+ */
+ if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head ||
+ (snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT &&
+ ++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx))
+ *new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot
+ * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
+ * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID
+ * @new_state: new algorithm state
+ * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious
+ *
+ * This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages
+ * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds
+ * the permissible number of messages to send.
+ */
+static int
+ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id,
+ enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state,
+ bool *is_malvf)
+{
+ struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
+
+ if (vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /* increment the message count in the VF array */
+ snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id]++;
+
+ if (snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD)
+ *is_malvf = true;
+
+ /* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */
+ ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_reset_snapshot - Reset mailbox snapshot structure
+ * @snap: pointer to mailbox snapshot structure in the ice_hw struct
+ *
+ * Reset the mailbox snapshot structure and clear VF counter array.
+ */
+static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap)
+{
+ u32 vfcntr_len;
+
+ if (!snap || !snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr)
+ return;
+
+ /* Clear VF counters. */
+ vfcntr_len = snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len;
+ if (vfcntr_len)
+ memset(snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr, 0,
+ (vfcntr_len * sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr)));
+
+ /* Reset mailbox snapshot for a new capture. */
+ memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
+ snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm
+ * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
+ * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data
+ * @vf_id: relative virtual function (VF) ID
+ * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious
+ *
+ * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF
+ * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state
+ * transitions of the algorithm:
+ * New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static
+ * snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is
+ * cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is
+ * logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect
+ * asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot
+ * and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that
+ * snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters
+ * traverse or detect states.
+ * Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate
+ * through the snapshot without any action on VF.
+ * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse
+ * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF.
+ */
+int
+ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw,
+ struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id,
+ bool *is_malvf)
+{
+ struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
+ struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf;
+ struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq;
+ enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state;
+ int status = 0;
+
+ if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF
+ * is not malicious until detected.
+ */
+ *is_malvf = false;
+
+ /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current
+ * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold.
+ */
+ if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit
+ * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox
+ * nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the
+ * mailbox serviced in current interrupt.
+ */
+ if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD ||
+ mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID;
+ snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf;
+
+ switch (snap_buf->state) {
+ case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT:
+ /* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */
+ ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap);
+
+ /* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and
+ * the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the
+ * Mailbox for current interrupt.
+ */
+ snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq;
+ snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc;
+ snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx;
+
+ /* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the
+ * head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail
+ * value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot.
+ */
+ snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean +
+ mbx_data->num_pending_arq);
+ snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1);
+ snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail;
+
+ /* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem
+ * is the difference between the head and tail of the
+ * mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark
+ * helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs.
+ */
+ if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >=
+ mbx_data->async_watermark_val) {
+ new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
+ status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf);
+ } else {
+ new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
+ ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE:
+ new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE;
+ ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state);
+ break;
+
+ case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT:
+ new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT;
+ status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID;
+ status = -EIO;
+ }
+
+ snap_buf->state = new_state;
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF
+ * @hw: pointer to the HW struct
+ * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF
+ * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits
+ * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF
+ * @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported
+ *
+ * This function will update a bitmap that keeps track of the malicious
+ * VFs attached to the PF. A malicious VF must be reported only once if
+ * discovered between VF resets or loading so the function checks
+ * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been
+ * detected in any previous mailbox iterations.
+ */
+int
+ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
+ u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf)
+{
+ if (!all_malvfs || !report_malvf)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *report_malvf = false;
+
+ if (bitmap_len < hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (vf_id >= bitmap_len)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /* If the vf_id is found in the bitmap set bit and boolean to true */
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs))
+ *report_malvf = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF bitmap and counter for VF ID
+ * @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot structure
+ * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF
+ * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits
+ * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF
+ *
+ * In case of a VF reset, this function can be called to clear
+ * the bit corresponding to the VF ID in the bitmap tracking all
+ * malicious VFs attached to the PF. The function also clears the
+ * VF counter array at the index of the VF ID. This is to ensure
+ * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going
+ * through the overflow detection algorithm.
+ */
+int
+ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
+ u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id)
+{
+ if (!snap || !all_malvfs)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */
+ if (vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */
+ clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs);
+
+ /* Clear the VF counter in the mailbox snapshot structure for that VF ID.
+ * This is to ensure that if a VF is unloaded and a new one brought back
+ * up with the same VF ID for a snapshot currently in traversal or detect
+ * state the counter for that VF ID does not increment on top of existing
+ * values in the mailbox overflow detection algorithm.
+ */
+ snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot structure
+ * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
+ * @vf_count: number of VFs allocated on a PF
+ *
+ * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and allocate memory
+ * for the VF counter array based on the number of VFs allocated
+ * on that PF.
+ *
+ * Assumption: This function will assume ice_get_caps() has already been
+ * called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number
+ * of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device.
+ */
+int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count)
+{
+ struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
+
+ /* Ensure that the number of VFs allocated is non-zero and
+ * is not greater than the number of supported VFs defined in
+ * the functional capabilities of the PF.
+ */
+ if (!vf_count || vf_count > hw->func_caps.num_allocd_vfs)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), vf_count,
+ sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Setting the VF counter length to the number of allocated
+ * VFs for given PF's functional capabilities.
+ */
+ snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = vf_count;
+
+ /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the
+ * mailbox snapshot state to a new capture.
+ */
+ memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
+ snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot - Free mailbox snapshot structure
+ * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure
+ *
+ * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and free the VF counter array.
+ */
+void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw)
+{
+ struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot;
+
+ /* Free VF counter array and reset VF counter length */
+ devm_kfree(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr);
+ snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = 0;
+
+ /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure */
+ memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf));
+}
--- /dev/null
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */
+
+#ifndef _ICE_VF_MBX_H_
+#define _ICE_VF_MBX_H_
+
+#include "ice_type.h"
+#include "ice_controlq.h"
+
+/* Defining the mailbox message threshold as 63 asynchronous
+ * pending messages. Normal VF functionality does not require
+ * sending more than 63 asynchronous pending message.
+ */
+#define ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD 63
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
+int
+ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval,
+ u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd);
+
+u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed);
+int
+ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data,
+ u16 vf_id, bool *is_mal_vf);
+int
+ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
+ u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id);
+int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count);
+void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw);
+int
+ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs,
+ u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf);
+#else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
+static inline int
+ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw __always_unused *hw,
+ u16 __always_unused vfid, u32 __always_unused v_opcode,
+ u32 __always_unused v_retval, u8 __always_unused *msg,
+ u16 __always_unused msglen,
+ struct ice_sq_cd __always_unused *cd)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline u32
+ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool __always_unused adv_link_support,
+ u16 __always_unused link_speed)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
+#endif /* _ICE_VF_MBX_H_ */
projects / platform / kernel / linux-rpi.git / commitdiff