random: avoid initializing twice in credit race

commit fed7ef061686cc813b1f3d8d0edc6c35b4d3537b upstream.

Since all changes of crng_init now go through credit_init_bits(), we can
fix a long standing race in which two concurrent callers of
credit_init_bits() have the new bit count >= some threshold, but are
doing so with crng_init as a lower threshold, checked outside of a lock,
resulting in crng_reseed() or similar being called twice.

In order to fix this, we can use the original cmpxchg value of the bit
count, and only change crng_init when the bit count transitions from
below a threshold to meeting the threshold.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 58eb1b3..32c7863 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 
 static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
 {
-       unsigned int init_bits, orig, add;
+       unsigned int new, orig, add;
        unsigned long flags;
 
        if (crng_ready() || !nbits)
@@ -833,12 +833,12 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
 
        do {
                orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
-               init_bits = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
-       } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, init_bits) != orig);
+               new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+       } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
 
-       if (!crng_ready() && init_bits >= POOL_READY_BITS)
+       if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS)
                crng_reseed();
-       else if (unlikely(crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY && init_bits >= POOL_EARLY_BITS)) {
+       else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
                spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
                if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
                        extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));