Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap

Smack onlycap allows limiting of CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to
processes running with the configured label. But having single privileged
label is not enough in some real use cases. On a complex system like Tizen,
there maybe few programs that need to configure Smack policy in run-time
and running them all with a single label is not always practical.
This patch extends onlycap feature for multiple labels. They are configured
in the same smackfs "onlycap" interface, separated by spaces.

Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>

diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
index abc82f8..de5e1ae 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
@@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ netlabel
        label. The format accepted on write is:
                "%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
 onlycap
-       This contains the label processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+       This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
        and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
        these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
-       label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
-       file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+       label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated
+       by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
 ptrace
        This is used to define the current ptrace policy
        0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules.

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index b8c1a86..244e035 100644 (file)
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -138,6 +138,11 @@ struct smk_port_label {
        struct smack_known      *smk_out;       /* outgoing label */
 };
 
+struct smack_onlycap {
+       struct list_head        list;
+       struct smack_known      *smk_label;
+};
+
 /*
  * Mount options
  */
@@ -249,6 +254,7 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
 struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
 void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
 struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+int smack_privileged(int cap);
 
 /*
  * Shared data.
@@ -257,7 +263,6 @@ extern int smack_enabled;
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
-extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
@@ -276,6 +281,9 @@ extern struct mutex smack_known_lock;
 extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
 extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
 
+extern struct mutex     smack_onlycap_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
+
 #define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
 extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
 
@@ -332,21 +340,6 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
- * by the onlycap rule.
- */
-static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
-{
-       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
-       if (!capable(cap))
-               return 0;
-       if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp)
-               return 1;
-       return 0;
-}
-
-/*
  * logging functions
  */
 #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 408e20b..00f6b38 100644 (file)
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -617,3 +617,44 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
        rcu_read_unlock();
        return &smack_known_invalid;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Unless a process is running with one of these labels
+ * even having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
+ * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no labels are
+ * designated (the empty list case) capabilities apply to
+ * everyone.
+ */
+LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not.
+ */
+int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+       struct smack_onlycap *sop;
+
+       if (!capable(cap))
+               return 0;
+
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       if (list_empty(&smack_onlycap_list)) {
+               rcu_read_unlock();
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       list_for_each_entry_rcu(sop, &smack_onlycap_list, list) {
+               if (sop->smk_label == skp) {
+                       rcu_read_unlock();
+                       return 1;
+               }
+       }
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+
+       return 0;
+}

diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index e40dc48..f1c22a8 100644 (file)
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -87,16 +87,6 @@ int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
  */
 int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
 
-/*
- * Unless a process is running with this label even
- * having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
- * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no label is
- * designated (the NULL case) capabilities apply to
- * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label
- * will be used if any label is used.
- */
-struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 /*
  * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
@@ -1636,34 +1626,79 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
        .llseek         = default_llseek,
 };
 
-/**
- * smk_read_onlycap - read() for smackfs/onlycap
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to put the result
- * @cn: maximum to send along
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+/*
+ * Seq_file operations for /smack/onlycap
  */
-static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
-                               size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+static void *onlycap_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 {
-       char *smack = "";
-       ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
-       int asize;
+       return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
 
-       if (*ppos != 0)
-               return 0;
+static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+       return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
 
-       if (smack_onlycap != NULL)
-               smack = smack_onlycap->smk_known;
+static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+       struct list_head *list = v;
+       struct smack_onlycap *sop =
+               list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_onlycap, list);
 
-       asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+       seq_puts(s, sop->smk_label->smk_known);
+       seq_putc(s, ' ');
 
-       if (cn >= asize)
-               rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+       return 0;
+}
 
-       return rc;
+static const struct seq_operations onlycap_seq_ops = {
+       .start = onlycap_seq_start,
+       .next  = onlycap_seq_next,
+       .show  = onlycap_seq_show,
+       .stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int smk_open_onlycap(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+       return seq_open(file, &onlycap_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_list_swap_rcu - swap public list with a private one in RCU-safe way
+ * The caller must hold appropriate mutex to prevent concurrent modifications
+ * to the public list.
+ * Private list is assumed to be not accessible to other threads yet.
+ *
+ * @public: public list
+ * @private: private list
+ */
+static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public,
+                             struct list_head *private)
+{
+       struct list_head *first, *last;
+
+       if (list_empty(public)) {
+               list_splice_init_rcu(private, public, synchronize_rcu);
+       } else {
+               /* Remember public list before replacing it */
+               first = public->next;
+               last = public->prev;
+
+               /* Publish private list in place of public in RCU-safe way */
+               private->prev->next = public;
+               private->next->prev = public;
+               rcu_assign_pointer(public->next, private->next);
+               public->prev = private->prev;
+
+               synchronize_rcu();
+
+               /* When all readers are done with the old public list,
+                * attach it in place of private */
+               private->next = first;
+               private->prev = last;
+               first->prev = private;
+               last->next = private;
+       }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1679,28 +1714,47 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
                                 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
        char *data;
-       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
+       char *data_parse;
+       char *tok;
+       struct smack_known *skp;
+       struct smack_onlycap *sop;
+       struct smack_onlycap *sop2;
+       LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
        int rc = count;
 
        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                return -EPERM;
 
-       /*
-        * This can be done using smk_access() but is done
-        * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
-        * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
-        */
-       if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
-               return -EPERM;
-
        data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (data == NULL)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
        if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
-               rc = -EFAULT;
-               goto freeout;
+               kfree(data);
+               return -EFAULT;
+       }
+
+       data_parse = data;
+       while ((tok = strsep(&data_parse, " ")) != NULL) {
+               if (!*tok)
+                       continue;
+
+               skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0);
+               if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+                       rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+                       break;
+               }
+
+               sop = kzalloc(sizeof(*sop), GFP_KERNEL);
+               if (sop == NULL) {
+                       rc = -ENOMEM;
+                       break;
+               }
+
+               sop->smk_label = skp;
+               list_add_rcu(&sop->list, &list_tmp);
        }
+       kfree(data);
 
        /*
         * Clear the smack_onlycap on invalid label errors. This means
@@ -1710,26 +1764,29 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         * so "-usecapabilities" will also work.
         *
         * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
+        * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt.
         */
-       skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
-       if (PTR_ERR(skp) == -EINVAL)
-               skp = NULL;
-       else if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
-               rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
-               goto freeout;
+       if (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))
+               rc = count;
+
+       if (rc >= 0) {
+               mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+               smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp);
+               mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
        }
 
-       smack_onlycap = skp;
+       list_for_each_entry_safe(sop, sop2, &list_tmp, list)
+               kfree(sop);
 
-freeout:
-       kfree(data);
        return rc;
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
-       .read           = smk_read_onlycap,
+       .open           = smk_open_onlycap,
+       .read           = seq_read,
        .write          = smk_write_onlycap,
-       .llseek         = default_llseek,
+       .llseek         = seq_lseek,
+       .release        = seq_release,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP