KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings

commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.

It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 722914798f3749c126c16620eb97411541dd8b9e..6a544726903e6b79fa7854e3b0ef1675ed25410e 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN       8       /* set if key is built in to the kernel */
 #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL        9       /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
 #define KEY_FLAG_KEEP          10      /* set if key should not be removed */
+#define KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING   11      /* set if key is a user or user session keyring */
 
        /* the key type and key description string
         * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -235,6 +236,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
 #define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA         0x0002  /* not in quota */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN             0x0004  /* Key is built into kernel */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION   0x0008  /* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING          0x0010  /* allocating a user or user session keyring */
 
 extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);

diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index a705a7d92ad7a95ca513ae2d3da8a18879196a2a..fb0c65049c1944d04771dbb6c39734328207e773 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
 extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx);
 
-extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check);
+extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring);
 
 extern int install_user_keyrings(void);
 extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *);

diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 2f4ce35ae2aafd6cd318651f5ef48a1a0f50e686..135e1eb7e4688af394e672f6c8ee251172b2e402 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
                key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
        if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
                key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
+       if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
+               key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
 
 #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
        key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;

diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 73bf35e9e378264eda2ef3dd56bd6f53b412acc9..a86d0ae1773c8f9177c599b9cb214f86258b40aa 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -985,15 +985,15 @@ found:
 /*
  * Find a keyring with the specified name.
  *
- * All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they
- * grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is
- * skipped).  Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been
- * revoked are skipped.
+ * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a
+ * user in the current user namespace are considered.  If @uid_keyring is %true,
+ * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session
+ * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller.
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being
  * incremented on success.  -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found.
  */
-struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
+struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
 {
        struct key *keyring;
        int bucket;
@@ -1021,10 +1021,15 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
                        if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0)
                                continue;
 
-                       if (!skip_perm_check &&
-                           key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
-                                          KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
-                               continue;
+                       if (uid_keyring) {
+                               if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
+                                             &keyring->flags))
+                                       continue;
+                       } else {
+                               if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
+                                                  KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
+                                       continue;
+                       }
 
                        /* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
                         * key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead'

diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 45536c677b05a04aec23a2ba6912ba5a01422390..ce45c78cf0a23a4c8c8c4cab8b6f6f45b4d3e929 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
                if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
                        uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
                                                    cred, user_keyring_perm,
-                                                   KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+                                                   KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+                                                       KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
                                                    NULL, NULL);
                        if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
                                ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
@@ -93,7 +94,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
                        session_keyring =
                                keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
                                              cred, user_keyring_perm,
-                                             KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+                                             KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING |
+                                                 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
                                              NULL, NULL);
                        if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
                                ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);